Dante

Not true. As long as you reject false gods and embrace his noodliness, the Flying Spaghetti Monster will overlook the rest of your puny, misguided personal ambitions to be in charge of your own destiny.

This is not at all what Rand was saying. Let's pull that quote of hers up again:



Now notice what she says. The country has no national rights, which means that the dictator is not a legitimate form of government and has no right to rule. However, the individual people living under the government still have their own individual rights. Thus, it would be wildly immoral to come in and just start slaughtering everyone. What would be morally acceptable is coming in, deposing the dictatorship, and establishing a government which respects the rights of its citizens. Nowhere in there is there room for what the Spanish did, and the Spanish did not even attempt to establish something that Objectivism would view as legitimate.

Now, your other concern, about whether or not this avenue is the best way to bring change to a country, is very well taken. Oftentimes, deposing a dictator does not do anything for the freedom of the country's inhabitants. If the country's culture does not have the right philosophical currents, it is nearly an impossible task to instill a rights-respecting government. I agree with this statement of yours:



What is important to notice about Rand's stance here is this: freeing the citizens of a foreign country is not the primary reason for invading it. We need a government in order to protect our own rights. That is the sole purpose of government; to protect the rights of its citizens. To that end, the only time it is required of our government to invade another country is when that strategy serves to protect our rights as citizens. It's not primarily about the oppressed peoples, but about the threat their leaders pose to us. Thus, Rand's stance is not an edict to go out and spread freedom and individual rights wherever they are lacking, through invading other countries. That would be an altruistic endeavor. Rather, she is simply highlighting the fact that we are not wronging the dictators of a country if we do decide to invade it. They do not have the right to be dictators in the first place.

I would say that yes, at zero or insignificant cost, you are morally obligated to help a stranger, and I believe that this position is consistent with my understanding of Objectivism.

All people have the potential to be rational value producers, and indeed almost all people are, to some extent. Very few in society produce nothing of objective value, and while almost all have mixed premises, almost all rely on reason to some extent (remember the characterization of the morality of death as impotent, and dependent on the morality of life; altruism can never be practiced consistently without resulting in imminent death).

Now, with a stranger, all of this value is potential, rather than actual; you don't actually know the person. However, value is value. To avoid gaining a value with very little or no cost attached is just like any other failure on your part to adhere to your code of values; it is a moral failing.

As others have said, zero cost situations are not realistic, and in reality you must weigh the potential value you place in strangers against the costs imposed. Different people have different mindsets about how likely strangers are to be worthwhile people (Some are optimistic, others cynical), and there is room for rational disagreement over such a matter (to a certain degree; either naivete or misanthropy is irrational). Additionally, different people assess costs differently (although in general, anyone with well-developed feelings of self-worth and self-respect will take impositions on their own life seriously). Thus, in any realistic situation, evaluation of alternatives must be made.

However, in such a fictitious situation, where one of the alternatives is costless by design, a failure to help a stranger indicates either a failure to live up to one's value system or a misanthropic view of humanity, either one of which is irrational and therefore immoral.

To summarize, you completely disagree with the entirety of the Objectivist ethics, for which you would substitute hedonism.

Productivity at its core is about taking personal responsibility for achieving the values you desire, and this should be interpreted much more widely than simply the values that a career provides. It's about being an active creator of values, not only in the professional realm, but also in the areas of personal relationships, romantic love, and leisure time and hobbies. It's about being a value-achiever, and this might mean forcing yourself to go out and meet new people (when focusing on the values of personal relationships), or working on your communication in a relationship, or even forcing yourself to set aside work and enjoy the value of some downtime. In this last case, taking responsibility for achieving the values of peace and relaxation might require doing nothing (even when this is difficult for you), or purposefully finding a mindless way to pass the time. If those are the values you feel a particular need to focus on, productiveness means that it's up to you to figure out how to attain them.

His root mistake is thinking that clinging to government benefits is a selfish course of action, or that refusing to vote oneself more benefits is "selfless." His vision of the selfish man is clearly someone who accumulates money at all costs, from all sources, rather than someone who refuses to use the government to transfer money from others to himself. The people that he called "selfish," i.e. citizens who would drive the country off the fiscal cliff in order to get their government check, are indeed condemnable; they're condemnable for not being properly selfish. His point was right, but his language was wrong, and that's not an uncommon mistake at all in America's confused ethical landscape. When he says we all need to "share in the sacrifice," what he was talking about was that we all need to stop begging the government for a check, and allow politicians to cut spending. He's right; we should do that, but it won't be a sacrifice.

ADDED ON EDIT: There's a fundamental difference between a politician asking citizens to "sacrifice" by giving up their government benefits, and a politician asking citizens to sacrifice by paying more of their own income to the government. Only in the second case is the person giving up something that actually belongs to them.

Yup.

That was easy.

However, those who treat sexual preference as a moral issue should be opposed, and homophobic is often an apt description of such people. To treat morally neutral characteristics like gender preferences as immoral distorts morality and incorrectly impugnes the moral character of groups of people.

Heya Superman123, another gay Oist here. Same to the OP, hello! Welcome to the forum.

In response to your recent point, Superman: In a free market system all minorities would be in the same boat. However, there's an important part of Ayn Rand's view of -how- a free market system becomes adopted. Ayn Rand believed that in order for the government to change fundamentally to become more capitalist the general attitude of individuals' personal views on morality and politics would have to change. If a dictator ran in and suddenly abolished taxes, regulations, social programs, and left the perfect framework for a capitalist government with individual rights, it would immediately topple. You can't force people to believe in a philosophical system, and such a system is a necessary part of how a government style arises.

The general trend is that individualism is more compatible with atheism and (classical) liberalism than it is with religion and theocracy. Those fundamentalist religious types who are such 'ardent' supporters of individual rights are simply compartmentalizing their metaphysical and moral beliefs away from their political beliefs. When it comes right down to it Jesus was a dirty hippie who hated family and wanted people to pay their taxes and support the poor, hungry, and bereaved. The association with religion and capitalism has been a recent development in America, and in my opinion it is not a strong bond. There is a ticking timebomb in America's culture war, which ends with the marriage of fundamentalist religion and mystical altruism. Already the two parties are nearly identical ideologically on every important issue, and argue mostly on the most practical way to implement altruism.

So the idea here is that if and when a free market system arises in America it will be to a whole new moral zeitgeist (which the ARI is trying to start) that will necessarily have to include individual rights for all human beings. So you're right, nothing will stop a single shopkeeper from putting up a sign what says "Keep out the gays." And similarly, nothing will stop the majority of people from simply not patronizing such businesses. Any business which unfairly and irrationally denies itself customers is doomed to failure in a capitalist economic system, besides being irrational and immoral to discriminate based on such criteria, it is also not good business sense.

That is a fundamental part of Objectivism: That all real principles must also be practical. There is no dichotomy between theory and practice, because if your principles do not work in practice, they were not good principles in the first place.

Also another thing I am surprised no one has brought up here: Ayn Rand had a very close friend who was gay, her husband's brother. She remained friends with him her entire life. No, she was not a homophobe, and no her recorded comments about gays do not constitute a necessary part of this philosophy. Peikoff is recorded in his podcasts saying that Objectivism does not count homosexuality as immoral and that he personally believes the theory Louie put forth earlier that it may be the sum of a number of choices. This view of his is not a result or tenet of Objectivism.

Objectivism has been the most amazing force for positive change in my life. I know many Objectivist gays and many Objectivists with gay friends. So stick around, Queer Capitalist, and Superman123. We would be happy to have you, and don't let any small minds get you down.

<3

So it seems to me like there are two different principles being illustrated in the story concerning fame and fortune. The first is that the main character is so fixated on those things that he wants, "Victory. Fame. Money. Respect. Achievement..." that he hardly even gives a thought to what he needs to do to win the duel and get those things, and this results in his death. The second is that, even if he were to win and get all those things, ultimately his life still wouldn't mean anything; he'd just be a 'titanium crate.' So on the one hand, we have the fact that you won't succeed by just dreaming about and wishing for fame and fortune, and on the other hand we have that even if you get it, it's not worth anything if that's all there is to your life.

Now, the first aspect is illustrated well through the events of the story. We see the narrator fixated on fame and fortune, and giving nary a thought to what is actually needed to win a Laser Pick Duel, and as a result when the moment comes he is frozen and then killed. I really like this aspect of the story.

However, the second aspect that you attempt to weave into the story, basically cannot be shown through the plot as it stands (because he never actually achieves fame and fortune, and we don't see anyone else who does, really), so you basically have to tell the reader, via a realization by the narrator just before he dies: "The money, the fame, it would provide me with nothing. I’d only end up how I was before, lacking skills, friends, and a productive future. I’d have some pleasurable values, but for what end? I’d have my material values, then what?" Personally, I'd just focus on the aspect of fame-seeking that is illustrated in the story, and drop what amounts to telling the reader, "If you pursue fame and fortune and actually get it, you'll still end up empty." It is a short story after all, and I think including both of these aspects is attempting to do too much. The plot structure which is perfect for illustrating failure doesn't work very well for attempting to show the results of success.

So, I'm going to reply to the OP here, although probably some of what I will say has been said already in another way. Also let me say that I share your regard for the philosophy underlying Rowling's HP series. So here goes.



First of all, I think you have to see the same sentiment in Rand's writings. Her ideal characters are willing to live life only on their own terms, not on anyone else's. They are clearly not aiming at 'mere survival,' but something more. So let's explore this a little. She certainly states that her morality is based on the alternative of life and death, and yet her morality does not seem to result in people who are willing to prolong their life at all costs. Whence the disconnect?

When she says that the fundamental alternative is life or death, she is attempting to give some guidance as to what is a value or not. It's fine to say that love is what is worth living for, but that leaves the deeper question: what is worthy of love? Even love can be directed at the wrong people or things. There are any number of people who would swear that they love people who treat them badly; abuse them, cheat on them, etc. Voldemort himself harbors a love for power (which Rand herself illustrates as wrong through the character of Gail Wynand). We need standards for love just like any other emotion; this is what Rand means when she says that emotions are not tools of cognititon.

You write as though it's a crime for Objectivists to say that emotions are what's worth living for, but Objectivism does not denigrate emotion. Emotion is critically important, and those that disregard it do so at their own peril. And yet, we need standards to tell us what it is proper to feel positive emotions for, and we know from experience that emotion itself does not provide these standards. So what is the ultimate standard that tells us, no matter how good it might feel, that things that detract from our overall well-being are not good? What tells us that (to use an extreme example), no matter how good heroin feels, it's not ultimately a value?

It's our long-term well-being; as Rand would say, our own life, lived over the long term. Survival isn't precisely the right word, because once we invest in a certain value that is concordant with our long-term well-being (like a person, or an ideal), we might very well sacrifice our own life for that value. Rand gives numerous examples, such as John Galt, who is willing to die to save Dagny, or a rational soldier who might be willing to die for the sake of preserving freedom in his nation. The Harry Potter series gives us more: defeating an enemy who seeks to subjugate all before him. In all such instances, what is common among the things worth dying for? It is the fact that these are the things that promote human life, or the kinds of people or relationships that promote our own individual lives. Those things that promote human life (as over the alternative of death) are the things ultimately worth fighting (and dying) for. In that light, let's look at some of your HP quotes (quotes that I wholeheartedly agree with):



Rand seeks to provide the philosophy for living a truly human life. Her ultimate goal is to provide the philosophy for achieving happiness and success on this earth. All of her characters accept the fact that they will eventually die; and yet, their achievements in their own lives are of paramount importance to them. She goes one step further in asking, what is the root of human achievement? Her answer: it makes life better for us all, it prolongs our life on this earth, it furthers the goal of human health and well-being. And what is the root of the concepts of health and well-being? It is the fundamental alternative of life or death. That's what she means when she says that all we do should be ultimately to promote our own lives.

So, I'm going to reply to the OP here, although probably some of what I will say has been said already in another way. Also let me say that I share your regard for the philosophy underlying Rowling's HP series. So here goes.



First of all, I think you have to see the same sentiment in Rand's writings. Her ideal characters are willing to live life only on their own terms, not on anyone else's. They are clearly not aiming at 'mere survival,' but something more. So let's explore this a little. She certainly states that her morality is based on the alternative of life and death, and yet her morality does not seem to result in people who are willing to prolong their life at all costs. Whence the disconnect?

When she says that the fundamental alternative is life or death, she is attempting to give some guidance as to what is a value or not. It's fine to say that love is what is worth living for, but that leaves the deeper question: what is worthy of love? Even love can be directed at the wrong people or things. There are any number of people who would swear that they love people who treat them badly; abuse them, cheat on them, etc. Voldemort himself harbors a love for power (which Rand herself illustrates as wrong through the character of Gail Wynand). We need standards for love just like any other emotion; this is what Rand means when she says that emotions are not tools of cognititon.

You write as though it's a crime for Objectivists to say that emotions are what's worth living for, but Objectivism does not denigrate emotion. Emotion is critically important, and those that disregard it do so at their own peril. And yet, we need standards to tell us what it is proper to feel positive emotions for, and we know from experience that emotion itself does not provide these standards. So what is the ultimate standard that tells us, no matter how good it might feel, that things that detract from our overall well-being are not good? What tells us that (to use an extreme example), no matter how good heroin feels, it's not ultimately a value?

It's our long-term well-being; as Rand would say, our own life, lived over the long term. Survival isn't precisely the right word, because once we invest in a certain value that is concordant with our long-term well-being (like a person, or an ideal), we might very well sacrifice our own life for that value. Rand gives numerous examples, such as John Galt, who is willing to die to save Dagny, or a rational soldier who might be willing to die for the sake of preserving freedom in his nation. The Harry Potter series gives us more: defeating an enemy who seeks to subjugate all before him. In all such instances, what is common among the things worth dying for? It is the fact that these are the things that promote human life, or the kinds of people or relationships that promote our own individual lives. Those things that promote human life (as over the alternative of death) are the things ultimately worth fighting (and dying) for. In that light, let's look at some of your HP quotes (quotes that I wholeheartedly agree with):



Rand seeks to provide the philosophy for living a truly human life. Her ultimate goal is to provide the philosophy for achieving happiness and success on this earth. All of her characters accept the fact that they will eventually die; and yet, their achievements in their own lives are of paramount importance to them. She goes one step further in asking, what is the root of human achievement? Her answer: it makes life better for us all, it prolongs our life on this earth, it furthers the goal of human health and well-being. And what is the root of the concepts of health and well-being? It is the fundamental alternative of life or death. That's what she means when she says that all we do should be ultimately to promote our own lives.

Grames, I think you might be on to something. I'd tend to draw a distinction between people who have a sexually loose period in their youth, but eventually settle down, and people who are determined never to settle down or to find one person that they can invest deeply in, romantically and sexually. I think the real hindrance to one's life and happiness is not a few years of fooling around in one's youth, but rather a failure to ever grow out of this phase and find someone to build a life with. Obviously you should still be discriminating and careful even in this 'youthful' period, but expecting one's first sexual partner to be a lifelong love can have its own negative consequences. This looser attitude towards sex doesn't really become a problem until it becomes permanent.

Not precisely. The Objectivist case does indeed rest upon the fact that each individual must think, decide, and act for himself in order to achieve the best life possible. This comes from the self-oriented nature of life; no one else can do your living for you. However, this does not mean that objectively true moral principles are impossible to form, or that these principles do not apply to people who do not recognize them. Deciding on the right or wrong action in a particular case is indeed an individual decision, but there is an objectively right and an objectively wrong way to do so. The Objectivist case for limited government does not rest on the notion that no one ever knows what is best for anyone else; in fact, Objectivist moral principles tell us precisely what the best way to live is, for everyone. We need limited government because the only way for a person to truly follow moral principle and flourish is to understand it himself and apply it individually to his own life, a task no one else can do for him.

intellectualammo seems to be saying here that the concepts of "right" and "wrong" have no meaning outside of a human-made social system which assigns these concepts to particular actions. The Objectivist view is precisely the opposite; that even alone on a desert island, given that one wants to survive, there is a right and a wrong way to act. Right and wrong are not fully human creations; they arise out of the choice to live, and therefore arise through human involvement, but after that point we can't simply decide that something right or wrong by societal decree. The facts of survival and flourishing make it so. Laissez-faire capitalism doesn't make the initiation of force wrong; it is wrong because it is contrary to the nature and requirements of human life. LFC simply codifies moral principle in an objective legal system.

intellectualammo, your doctrine of "might makes right" confuses the descriptive and the normative. More precisely, it does away with the normative by saying that whatever happens is right because, by definition, the person trying to make it happen had the might to make it so. That would be fine as a descriptive statement, replacing "that was right" with simply "that happened," but putting it forth as normative in addition to descriptive simply codifies a vacuous moral system.

Not precisely. The Objectivist case does indeed rest upon the fact that each individual must think, decide, and act for himself in order to achieve the best life possible. This comes from the self-oriented nature of life; no one else can do your living for you. However, this does not mean that objectively true moral principles are impossible to form, or that these principles do not apply to people who do not recognize them. Deciding on the right or wrong action in a particular case is indeed an individual decision, but there is an objectively right and an objectively wrong way to do so. The Objectivist case for limited government does not rest on the notion that no one ever knows what is best for anyone else; in fact, Objectivist moral principles tell us precisely what the best way to live is, for everyone. We need limited government because the only way for a person to truly follow moral principle and flourish is to understand it himself and apply it individually to his own life, a task no one else can do for him.

intellectualammo seems to be saying here that the concepts of "right" and "wrong" have no meaning outside of a human-made social system which assigns these concepts to particular actions. The Objectivist view is precisely the opposite; that even alone on a desert island, given that one wants to survive, there is a right and a wrong way to act. Right and wrong are not fully human creations; they arise out of the choice to live, and therefore arise through human involvement, but after that point we can't simply decide that something right or wrong by societal decree. The facts of survival and flourishing make it so. Laissez-faire capitalism doesn't make the initiation of force wrong; it is wrong because it is contrary to the nature and requirements of human life. LFC simply codifies moral principle in an objective legal system.

intellectualammo, your doctrine of "might makes right" confuses the descriptive and the normative. More precisely, it does away with the normative by saying that whatever happens is right because, by definition, the person trying to make it happen had the might to make it so. That would be fine as a descriptive statement, replacing "that was right" with simply "that happened," but putting it forth as normative in addition to descriptive simply codifies a vacuous moral system.

The argument simply points out a contradiction in the design argument. If complexity implies design, and the designer is a complex sentient being, then he needs a designer himself, and so on. You don't need to go to the data when an argument is self-contradictory. That's how logic works.

"Good guys finish last." That one bugs me.

It has happened a few times where I've felt motivated to bring up the issue of "civility" in threads in which I've participated here. Enough so that I think it warrants its own, separate discussion.

Let me set the table a bit for what I want to talk about.

When I look through threads I'm occasionally taken aback by the kind of "discussions" that some here participate in. They are hostile and filled with invective and scorn. Do I mean to implicate everyone? By no means. Nor am I making any claim about a certain percentage who participate in that manner, whether "some," "many" or "most" or anything like that. All that I'm saying is that it happens often enough that I'm no longer surprised to see it. If this hostility isn't quite "characteristic," it's certainly a noticeable feature of the community. A predictable feature.

And if this were most places on the Internet, I guess I'd let it go and spare everyone a pointless lecture on my own ruffled sense of propriety. I fully expect the comments on a YouTube vid to be heinous, for instance, and don't think I could get through to the myriad snarky 14 year olds there via such an appeal. But given the nature of this community -- people who care about ideas and take them seriously; people similarly committed to reason and standards of integrity and honesty -- I expect something different. Something better.

It's enough to make me wonder whether some people believe (perhaps implicitly) that there is some tie between being "honest" and intelligent, and being cruel or cutting. That's certainly nothing new to me, if so; I've lived long enough to recognize that sometimes the intelligent feel that their ability gives them license to be scornful, especially to those they consider (often incorrectly) to be their inferiors. Or maybe some take meaning from reports of Ayn Rand's testy demeanor and anger? Maybe they think that there's something inherently virtuous in being mean?

But here is why I believe that "civility" is important, and especially given the context of the kinds of discussions that I presume we wish to pursue.

Discussions don't generally take place between machines, but men. As a man, I strive to be logical, to be reasonable, and to use my mind as best I can to arrive at truth, to make good choices, and to live my life well. Discussions are both enjoyable and profitable for me in that they serve those ends. When I "philosophize" in a social setting (here meaning: discuss, debate, argue), I like the give-and-take and am thankful for those who challenge me. Why "thankful"? Because their challenges can often provoke me to new insights, both into their positions and into my own. And what is more, as a man I am prone to error and to mistake. This is not an argument for any subtle kind of skepticism, but a recognition that the process of arriving at truth is neither automatic, nor necessarily "easy." Through the process of argument, sometimes I am led to recognizing that I have been/am wrong, and to correction. This is, in fact, precisely what happened to me when I read Rand; I was persuaded that I had been wrong on a number of topics, and was overjoyed at the discovery.

However. As a man, I am also an emotional creature. Not to disparage emotion, which I think plays important roles in my life, but I know from experience that when I am in the throes of a strong emotion, my ability to reason clearly is sometimes impacted. When I fight with my family, with my wife, I sometimes say things that I recognize I do not mean or otherwise believe, upon later reflection. What's worse, I have a short temper -- a flaw that has long been with me, and which I continually seek to correct through being aware of my own emotional state, and tempering my passionate drive for immediate response against those who arouse my anger. There have been times even here, and despite my apparent righteousness on this subject, when I have lost my temper. And I have regretted it every time.

What we seek to do through conversation, and the rewards that are possible through these discussions, is wholly threatened when we allow ourselves to get angry, to lash out. Am I speaking just of my own personal experiences? Perhaps, but I do not believe so. Incivility -- "being a jerk" -- is a provocation to another person's anger; an invitation to "lose it." And that is no boon for rational discussion of any kind. To the contrary, it does nothing but put men "on their guard," and make it less likely that they will give all arguments the cool and reflective analysis that reasoned thought and discussion so often demands.

So. What I'm asking is that we try to maintain a certain level of politeness in our discussions. That we hold others -- and most importantly ourselves -- to the highest possible standard. This is not a call for false kindness or that we should all "like" one another or anything of the sort. Feel free to hate me, hate each other, I don't really care about that. Nor would I ask that we refrain from stark and frank discussion of ideas: it is not uncivil in this context to say that a certain position is unequivocally wrong, or to clearly demonstrate why. But if we want to discuss any topic of import, we ought to treat that topic with the respect it deserves. (If it is an unimportant topic, why discuss it at all?) And because we are men engaged in this discussion, and not machines, we should strive to be equally respectful of and polite to one another in order to facilitate the kinds of discussion necessary to make the entire endeavor fruitful.

If instead we just want the emotional satisfaction of railing against perceived "enemies," and allowing our bile to flow unimpeded, there are a million other forums on the Internet seemingly tailored for just that very thing. I would rather we make this place unlike all of those others, and as a valuable by-product demonstrate to the world what it looks like when men and women of intelligence, reason, and goodwill come together to discuss those matters upon which they might (howsoever temporarily) disagree.

I'm gonna reply to this, because after reading Peikoff's comments carefully and also reading this thread, I think this argument is clearly the same one Peikoff's putting forth.

So the argument here is that she actually is consenting by being in the room regardless of what she says, up to the point where she tries to leave the room. The analogy is that posting on this site communicates one's consent to be posting on this site, even if one says in the post "I don't consent to posting here." This is a flawed analogy because here, the individual is simultaneously taking the action and also stating that they don't consent to it. Their statement is the relevant action. In this posting analogy, we have just one action, making the post, and it's sending contradictory messages about consent. In the Kobe example, on the other hand, we have two separate actions. The first is going up to the room, and the second is verbally stating 'stop.' The first gives consent, and the second is intended by the woman to withdraw that consent.

Therefore, a more relevant analogy would be making a post, and then later messaging the site owner or an admin asking to have it taken down. In that situation, it seems obvious to me that the later message does adequately communicate that the post is staying up without the poster's consent. (Of course, that doesn't obligate the post being taken down, because the site owner doesn't need continued consent to keep posts up, as stated in the forum rules. Here, consent is not required to keep the post up, because it's on the site owner's property and not the poster's. Unless someone wants to argue that the sex situation is analogous and continued consent by the woman isn't required, the analogy breaks down here).

The salient point is that the later message does withdraw consent. It's a separate action, taken after the first consenting action, clearly intended to communicate that the situation has changed and consent no longer exists. If you continue at that point, you're continuing without the consent of the person. In certain circumstances, that's permissible. The posting example is one; holding someone to a bet that they made, lost, and then tried to back out of would be another. In the sex example, I hope we can agree it's not.

Percepts are epistemologically first because they are what our conscious mind actually deals with. Sensations are integrated into percepts unconsciously, automatically, before they reach our conscious mind. In terms of physics, sensations come first, interacting with our senses, and then are integrated into percepts automatically by our brains. When we look out, we don't see or hear individual sensations, we see them already integrated into percepts. This is important to understand because the fact that percept formation is automatic means that it cannot err. It occurs according to deterministic processes. Our conscious mind can misinterpret percepts, but there cannot be a contradiction within the physical process itself that produces percepts.

David Kelley's book "The Evidence of the Senses" goes into great detail concerning perception and sensations. Grames, one of our frequent forum users, has posted his notes on the relevant section here: http://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?showtopic=17927&view=findpost&p=237133. It's quite involved stuff.

Percepts are epistemologically first because they are what our conscious mind actually deals with. Sensations are integrated into percepts unconsciously, automatically, before they reach our conscious mind. In terms of physics, sensations come first, interacting with our senses, and then are integrated into percepts automatically by our brains. When we look out, we don't see or hear individual sensations, we see them already integrated into percepts. This is important to understand because the fact that percept formation is automatic means that it cannot err. It occurs according to deterministic processes. Our conscious mind can misinterpret percepts, but there cannot be a contradiction within the physical process itself that produces percepts.

David Kelley's book "The Evidence of the Senses" goes into great detail concerning perception and sensations. Grames, one of our frequent forum users, has posted his notes on the relevant section here: http://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?showtopic=17927&view=findpost&p=237133. It's quite involved stuff.

So I just finished "Humor in The Fountainhead," from Essays on Ayn Rand's The Fountainhead, and its caused me to think some more about humor, a subject I hadn't given too much serious thought to. My purpose here is just to share some thoughts and hopefully hear others' thoughts on the subject.

In the essay, Rand is quoted as making the following two statements:





Upon first reading these, I found myself disagreeing strongly with both of them. My opinion is and has been that the ability to laugh at oneself demonstrates health and good-naturedness. In thinking about it, and reading through the essay and a few more of Rand's statements on humor, I find that these views are actually very easily reconcilable with my own. Consider this statement by Rand:



In the essay, Robert Mayhew distinguishes between benevolent and malicious humor. Benevolent humor is basically humor aimed at objects which deserve scorn and ridicule, while malicious humor is aimed at objects which deserve respect and reverence. Thus, benevolent humor belittles the metaphysical importance of bad things, while malevolent humor belittles the importance of good things. Now, humor which is aimed at one's own achievements, or more generally one's own positive values, is obviously malicious humor. Laughing at oneself in the sense of laughing at these things is indeed bad. However, in thinking about it, that is not at all what I picture when I think of 'the ability to laugh at oneself.'

Consider someone who slips and falls, or misspeaks in some absurd way, or makes an obvious error in a presentation. In all of these situations, I am inclined to think of the person who can 'laugh it off' as good-natured. I would contrast this with the image of the person who, when something like this happens, blusters and attempts to 'save face.' Obviously, this second person is primarily concerned with others' impressions of him rather than the actual error or accident. Such second-handedness is clearly not an appropriate attitude.

But what is the first individual doing? First of all, he is acknowledging the reality of the accident or mistake. Furthermore, he is (in Rand's characterization) belittling its importance by laughing at it. Self-deprecating humor, in this case, is not aimed at ones values, but rather at one's mistakes. This form of humor is indicative of genuine self-esteem; the person in question is acknowledging the reality of his own thoughts and actions (an essential first step for genuine self-esteem) and is able to casually dismiss errors with a laugh. There is no attempt to pretend for the sake of others' opinions that the error was not made; rather, it is acknowledged and then moved on from.

In my experience, the majority of instances of self-deprecating humor fall into this latter category of laughing off a mistake. Thus, while it is true that actually cutting oneself down with humor also undoubtedly occurs, the everyday understanding of 'laughing at oneself,' (at least what I think is the prevalent understanding of it) is a healthy practice, one which should be celebrated.

That is precisely what you will find in the Objectivist literature as the most prominent defense of a creator's property right in his or her creation. Our characteristic method of survival is through production. We take what is found in nature, improve it, and then use our creations and alterations to improve our lives, to flourish. The system of justice which provides the widest scope for this flourishing by one's own labor is precisely the system which protects a creator's right to use, transfer, and dispose of his work. This is the core argument at the center of Rand's defense of property rights as a vital component of individual rights, to be protected by a proper government, and the support for the argument arises directly out of her characterization of the way humans survive and flourish.

However, those who treat sexual preference as a moral issue should be opposed, and homophobic is often an apt description of such people. To treat morally neutral characteristics like gender preferences as immoral distorts morality and incorrectly impugnes the moral character of groups of people.

However, those who treat sexual preference as a moral issue should be opposed, and homophobic is often an apt description of such people. To treat morally neutral characteristics like gender preferences as immoral distorts morality and incorrectly impugnes the moral character of groups of people.