Dante

sNerd's gonna have to change his welcome statement

There are very few out there who deny the self-evident, and many of those people simply misunderstand what is being put forth as self-evident by Objectivists. Furthermore, I see no indication of anything like that in the OP; just someone who thinks Rand said a bunch of stuff she didn't actually say (contempt for the poor and weak, moral indifference to the suffering of others, and her demanding to be treated as a demi-god) and misunderstanding what 'closed system' means. Calmly and rationally arguing with such people is not always a waste of time; how else will misconceptions about Rand ever get cleared up? I do agree, though, that Youtube comments are not the place for it.

In the fall I'll be attending the wedding of two of my good friends from college. They are both Christians and quite religious, and it will definitely be a Christian ceremony. I'm very excited about it, because it'll be a celebration of a beautiful thing: the two of them joining their lives together. I'll be happy to sit through all the religious stuff, because the celebration isn't about me; it's about them, and they want their religious beliefs included in the ceremonies, which is quite understandable. As far as the group prayer stuff you brought up, I never lower my head when I'm attending something and there's a mass prayer, because I don't want to be pretending to be participating in something that I'm not, and I'd think that those actually praying wouldn't want me to either. My friends all know and are comfortable with my lack of religious belief, and with the other people there I just won't care.

It's unclear from your post, but if with your siblings you're talking about people who aren't religious but submitted to a religious wedding for the sake of their families, that is something that should make you uncomfortable, more than uncomfortable actually. The wedding is about the two people getting married, and no one else, and it's pretty messed up to have one of the most important events of one's life infused with beliefs one doesn't share for the sake of family members.

Welcome to the forum. Rand actually wrote her most extensive and explicitly philosophical stuff on the subject of epistemology, in the form of Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. I would highly recommend a very careful reading of that to gain an understanding of how Rand thought we gain knowledge and conceptualize it properly.

There is also a more accessible reference that you can view free online that does a good and faithful overview of the Objectivist viewpoint on the nature and features of knowledge. It doesn't go in-depth into Rand's concept-formation methodology (subjects like measurement omission, for example), but it lays out the proposed nature of knowledge and the support for that nature. It's called The Logical Structure of Objectivism. The relevant chapters are the Introduction and Chapter 1. The discussion of knowledge begins on page 7 of the Introduction and continues through the entire first chapter, entitled 'Knowledge.'

You know, until I came on the O'ist lists a few years ago I only had a vague idea that there were other Objectivists 'out there', and didn't think too much about it. For almost 30 years I met a few people here who had heard of Rand - but not another Objectivist. Only on the forums did I first come across this weird notion of a "cult".
What did that make me all that time? A cult of one?
How many people comprise a cult?
I suppose any and every group of individuals with a common purpose and understanding could be called one.
I'd suggest, when the accusation is made, to laugh it off.

In reading Dante's post and your response, I have to wonder... do you think that there's nothing about music which a person could learn with regard to the typical effects of one musical choice or another?

All I read Dante as saying (though maybe there's more) is that certain music will generally produce certain effects in the listener; a musician who strives to express himself to others -- to reproduce in them the sensations or what-have-you which he feels and seeks to share -- must take that into consideration, in order to attain his goals. He must consider the audience.

Though it's been a while since I've read The Fountainhead, I seem to recall Roark designing a temple such that man would feel grand inside of it. Well, to accomplish such a thing, Roark couldn't simply throw anything up as it came to him -- he would have to give lengthy consideration to what would produce the effects he was after in those who would enter the temple. When Greek architects wanted their columns to appear straight from a distance, they had to make mathematical calculations in order to produce the desired visual effects. And aren't there parallels to this sort of thing in music? Aren't there considerations given to thematic variations and resolutions, etc., depending on what musicians think those will "communicate"? Aren't there different emotions associated (for instance) with major or minor chords, or fast or slow tempos? (Or the timbre of various instruments?)

I don't know. I'm flailing in that I don't really know much about music or architecture (as I'm sure is obvious). But while I don't believe that architecture or music can convey stories in the manner that a film or novel can, I have to believe that there are still lessons in craft that an aspiring artist in either genre could learn. And where artistic expression is concerned, that craft would have to take into consideration the audience; the recognition that certain architectural or musical choices produce certain predictable effects in a typical observer/listener.

Metaphysically, if you choose any particular man and examine him, there is no characteristic that has some essence hidden away in it. He just is the way he is. Rationality is a better essential trait when forming a definition of man because it underlies and explains more characteristics of man than opposable thumbs. Thus, epistemologically, it is better suited to the task of defining man. However, metaphysically, for any particular man he has his rationality and his opposable thumbs and his hair and his eyes and they are all equally aspects of that man.

So I just finished "Humor in The Fountainhead," from Essays on Ayn Rand's The Fountainhead, and its caused me to think some more about humor, a subject I hadn't given too much serious thought to. My purpose here is just to share some thoughts and hopefully hear others' thoughts on the subject.

In the essay, Rand is quoted as making the following two statements:





Upon first reading these, I found myself disagreeing strongly with both of them. My opinion is and has been that the ability to laugh at oneself demonstrates health and good-naturedness. In thinking about it, and reading through the essay and a few more of Rand's statements on humor, I find that these views are actually very easily reconcilable with my own. Consider this statement by Rand:



In the essay, Robert Mayhew distinguishes between benevolent and malicious humor. Benevolent humor is basically humor aimed at objects which deserve scorn and ridicule, while malicious humor is aimed at objects which deserve respect and reverence. Thus, benevolent humor belittles the metaphysical importance of bad things, while malevolent humor belittles the importance of good things. Now, humor which is aimed at one's own achievements, or more generally one's own positive values, is obviously malicious humor. Laughing at oneself in the sense of laughing at these things is indeed bad. However, in thinking about it, that is not at all what I picture when I think of 'the ability to laugh at oneself.'

Consider someone who slips and falls, or misspeaks in some absurd way, or makes an obvious error in a presentation. In all of these situations, I am inclined to think of the person who can 'laugh it off' as good-natured. I would contrast this with the image of the person who, when something like this happens, blusters and attempts to 'save face.' Obviously, this second person is primarily concerned with others' impressions of him rather than the actual error or accident. Such second-handedness is clearly not an appropriate attitude.

But what is the first individual doing? First of all, he is acknowledging the reality of the accident or mistake. Furthermore, he is (in Rand's characterization) belittling its importance by laughing at it. Self-deprecating humor, in this case, is not aimed at ones values, but rather at one's mistakes. This form of humor is indicative of genuine self-esteem; the person in question is acknowledging the reality of his own thoughts and actions (an essential first step for genuine self-esteem) and is able to casually dismiss errors with a laugh. There is no attempt to pretend for the sake of others' opinions that the error was not made; rather, it is acknowledged and then moved on from.

In my experience, the majority of instances of self-deprecating humor fall into this latter category of laughing off a mistake. Thus, while it is true that actually cutting oneself down with humor also undoubtedly occurs, the everyday understanding of 'laughing at oneself,' (at least what I think is the prevalent understanding of it) is a healthy practice, one which should be celebrated.

Capital in a production function does not refer to financial capital such as equity and bonds but rather physical capital such as land, plants, machinery, etc. A production function models how physical capital is combined with labor to produce physical output. Physical capital itself is notoriously hard for economists to quantify and calculate. It is difficult to valuate the capital in use by a company, quantify depreciation of capital, etc. There are forms of capital that are sometimes relevant but are nonphysical, such as reputational capital. It's one of the most difficult issues in empirical economics. If you're further interested, here is a link with probably more than you ever wanted to know on the subject: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/16/43734711.pdf

It's in Atlas Shrugged,
Dagny loved her morning coffee and naturally smoked (lots of age specific context. i.e. in The Fountainhead a particularly annoying hostess is described as "she doesn't like women who smoke")
Also beer is gulped down by Howard Roark after a hard day's work with his newly found found; other references to casually violating laws of prohibition are found in the beginning of the novel.  
Dagny and Hank enjoy the mild buzz of the wine (several references) during their one romantic dinner, as well as the evening drink she offers Hank Rearden while living together.
However Dagny's brother is found a wreck in his bedroom surrounded by empty bottles of, I believe, Whiskey.
So, never forgetting the context in which it was written (post Prohibition pre Dyonisius decade), AS shows (as a very marginal theme) the two facets of Recreational Drugs, in this case alcohol. It can either be used to enhance life enjoyment or (ab)used to evade life altogether (sometimes by the crushing force of external circumstances such as was the end of Leo Kovalenski)
Productive-enhancement drugs such as caffeine, nicotine, amphetamines, are also referenced both in her novels as well as in her life. The story says that she quit two of those drugs as soon as she was presented with the evidence of their destructive power, even so, it was a value judgement not a dogmatic conditioning or appeal to authority.
Finally, medical drugs (!) like pain killers I believe she wrote about the right to euthanasia as being necessary for the right to life (she wrote that not being allowed to die if one wants to is just as immoral as being forced to die if one wants to live), obviously this extends to quality and length of life being determined by oneself and not society.

The thing to keep in mind here is that for Objectivism, an ethical system is supposed to be helpful to the individual, a guide to living one's life to the fullest and best extent possible. There is no universal ethical minimum of science knowledge needed for this; requirements are context-dependent. The requirements for an understanding of biology and human anatomy are obviously much higher for a doctor than for a layman; it would be irresponsible for a doctor to practice without a solid and in-depth understanding of such subjects. However, even for a layman, would it be beneficial to one's life to attain a basic understanding of, say, how disease transmission works? Absolutely.

The bottom line would be, if you have reason to believe that you will benefit significantly from attaining some level of knowledge in a particular scientific area, even given the time and effort it takes to attain, then you should go for it. However, there's no reason to think that everyone should attain a solid understanding of (for example) the scientific theories of evolution or global climate change, or else they're immoral. It depends on the relationship between that knowledge and one's individual life. Plenty of people have little to no reason to spend the time it takes to learn any particular scientific theory.

Heh, now that I look, basically what DonAthos said

The thing to keep in mind here is that for Objectivism, an ethical system is supposed to be helpful to the individual, a guide to living one's life to the fullest and best extent possible. There is no universal ethical minimum of science knowledge needed for this; requirements are context-dependent. The requirements for an understanding of biology and human anatomy are obviously much higher for a doctor than for a layman; it would be irresponsible for a doctor to practice without a solid and in-depth understanding of such subjects. However, even for a layman, would it be beneficial to one's life to attain a basic understanding of, say, how disease transmission works? Absolutely.

The bottom line would be, if you have reason to believe that you will benefit significantly from attaining some level of knowledge in a particular scientific area, even given the time and effort it takes to attain, then you should go for it. However, there's no reason to think that everyone should attain a solid understanding of (for example) the scientific theories of evolution or global climate change, or else they're immoral. It depends on the relationship between that knowledge and one's individual life. Plenty of people have little to no reason to spend the time it takes to learn any particular scientific theory.

Heh, now that I look, basically what DonAthos said

The "house" that is mainly built upon the foundation of philosophy -- and Objectivism in specific -- is a life-well-lived. To that end, we can expect that most people will have a need for certain basic understandings of sciences, like nutrition and health, household chemistry, and the physics of making their car brake on time. Some people, primarily those who choose to follow a career path which depends on a more intensive study of one or more branches of science, will need to know more.

But it is not required for an Objectivist, as such, to be a master of all branches of science. An Objectivist could be, for instance, a plumber, and doubtless that would make many demands on certain areas of his scientific knowledge. But there are also several areas of science that he will not necessarily need, and the time he would otherwise have spent gaining that knowledge might be better spent in a variety of ways that will more directly impact his individual affairs.

The problems with allowing the government to unilaterally determine interest rates and the money supply go far beyond chronic inflation. The roots of the problem are the general issues associated with central planning of any variety. The interest rate is, at root, a price, the price of intertemporal trading. Allowing the government to dictate this price suffers from the same problems as all price-fixing: the severe lack of information on the part of the central planners, market distortions, inefficiencies, etc. Advocating a commodity standard and a free market in money is simply a result of the more general stance of supporting utilization of the market mechanism to organize economic activity, rather than central planners.

We certainly are governed strictly by the laws of cause and effect, and there are no loopholes in causality. However, accepting this view does not immediately lead to the acceptance of determinism, as is often supposed. The non sequitur is often accepted because many people have an incorrect conception of causality. For many people, determinism is part of the definition of causality; this viewpoint might be termed 'billiard-ball' causality, where all instances of causality are assumed to be instances of objects interacting deterministically like billiard balls. However, Objectivism supports a more general conceptualization of causality, which does not smuggle in determinism. Causality, properly conceptualized, is simply the statement that, "A thing acts in accordance with its nature." This formulation leaves open the question of whether or not that nature is deterministic or (as in the case of human consciousness) some ability of self-determination is part of that nature.

Now, I would not dispute the fact that the particles which make up the human brain and form the physical basis for human consciousness act deterministically, but it does not follow from this that the system as a whole acts that way (see fallacy of composition). In fact, to claim that determinism is true is to engage in a contradiction. The existence of knowledge itself presupposes that volition exists; knowledge depends on our ability to volitionally weigh evidence and separate truth from falsehoods. To claim something as true which undercuts the basis for truth is clearly contradictory. For some further threads on determinism, see 1 2 3 4.

The rest of your point, however, is well taken (replacing 'acting deterministically' with 'acting causally'). If we pretend that our free will can do more than it actually can, then we will be helpless to face many personal issues. Our minds have a certain, definite nature, and our will is limited in scope. We need to understand this nature and these limits in order to act effectively (this is just another example of "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed"). The example of kicking an addiction is a good one, where understanding how the human mind works will contribute greatly to one's success. Psychological issues in general depend on a good understanding of the nature of human consciousness. This thread on procrastination and how to beat it using an understanding of human consciousness also comes to mind.

For almost all Americans, 9/11 is a day of sadness, remembrance, and unity. It isn't one of horror, outrage, and fury. Evidently, proper behavior demands that everyone should weep, reflect, and sing Kumbaya.

Following this logic, maybe September 11th should also be a day of tolerance, acceptance, and forgiveness of the jihadis. Perhaps everybody should honor and celebrate the lives -- and lament the untimely deaths -- of the nineteen airplane hijackers.

In reality, of course, 9/11 should be a day of rage. It should be a day of learning about, seeking vengeance against, and triumphing over, the enemy jihadis.

And everyone who calls these jihadi monsters by the ambiguous term "terrorists" is morally sanctioning their past evils -- and actively promoting their future ones. This last, as everybody knows, includes simultaneous suitcase nuclear devices for New York City and Washington DC.

Anyone who is so PC and MC as to call these miserable, mutant, Muslim monkeys "extremists" or "terrorists" is an enabler and a major problem. Such dishonest and cowardly euphemisms are the source of much of the Muslim activists' strength and destructive power.

Such false, misleading, and counterproductive terms morally sanction the jihadi enemy by refusing to accurately identify him. And by denying reality, a new reality is created: that of the morally-uncondemned monster. Now Mohammed is free to go forth and commit new atrocities. By declining to call these guys jihadis, Americans are permitting and encouraging Muslims to do what they do best: slaughter the innocent.

Ultimately, September 11th should be a day of rage against all of religion and the Judeo-Christian ethic. Contrary to what practically everyone today thinks and says, these two are not forces for good. 9/11 was their handiwork!

People who love "god" ultimately hate man -- and they destroy him. People who practice religious-type self-sacrifice ultimately sacrifice their fellow man too -- and in droves.

Religion and "god" are 100% false and 100% evil -- and everybody knows it. But the worst religion by far is that of Islam. That's what 9/11 should be about: remembering the spectacularly loathsome evil of the genocidal Muslims -- and then fervently swearing a holy oath that in future the good guys of this earth will successfully avoid it, neutralize it, and defeat it.

Sooner rather than later, the jihad-based philosophy of Islam needs to be brutally crushed. And every jihadi on earth needs to be summarily annihilated.

The point of contention here is what Ayn Rand was referring to when she used the term 'tabula rasa.' Thus, it doesn't help at all to show how other people use the term. Rand made her claim concerning tabula rasa very clear: people are not born with any conceptual knowledge. To saddle her with some other claim just because other people use the same term to refer to different things is equivocation.



The point here is that if we have been successful in identifying true moral principles, then they apply whenever their context obtains. They are absolute within that context, like scientific principles. If you find yourself defying one, you know that you're harming your own life in the long run. 'Adapting yourself to Objectivism' in this case means taking those moral principles seriously and attempting to use them to better your own life, rather than pretending they aren't true when you don't feel like following them. Of course, applying these principles to concretes often involves a lot of individual context, so it is also true that concrete applications of principles are highly individualized.



I disagree. Biological altruism, to the extent it is true, is a fact about human nature. It cannot be wished away by any philosophy, including Objectivism, and no philosophy should seek to. It must be taken as given when constructing a moral system. Philosophical altruism, on the other hand, is a man-made position on the fundamental nature of morality, one that should be rejected in the strongest terms. Objectivism is a fact-based philosophy, and biological altruism is a fact. There is no conflict there. Philosophical altruism, on the other hand, is in direct conflict with Objectivist moral philosophy. Any 'reinforcement' that occurs between different usages of the term altruism is only due to confusion about the issues and unclear thinking.

The point of contention here is what Ayn Rand was referring to when she used the term 'tabula rasa.' Thus, it doesn't help at all to show how other people use the term. Rand made her claim concerning tabula rasa very clear: people are not born with any conceptual knowledge. To saddle her with some other claim just because other people use the same term to refer to different things is equivocation.



The point here is that if we have been successful in identifying true moral principles, then they apply whenever their context obtains. They are absolute within that context, like scientific principles. If you find yourself defying one, you know that you're harming your own life in the long run. 'Adapting yourself to Objectivism' in this case means taking those moral principles seriously and attempting to use them to better your own life, rather than pretending they aren't true when you don't feel like following them. Of course, applying these principles to concretes often involves a lot of individual context, so it is also true that concrete applications of principles are highly individualized.



I disagree. Biological altruism, to the extent it is true, is a fact about human nature. It cannot be wished away by any philosophy, including Objectivism, and no philosophy should seek to. It must be taken as given when constructing a moral system. Philosophical altruism, on the other hand, is a man-made position on the fundamental nature of morality, one that should be rejected in the strongest terms. Objectivism is a fact-based philosophy, and biological altruism is a fact. There is no conflict there. Philosophical altruism, on the other hand, is in direct conflict with Objectivist moral philosophy. Any 'reinforcement' that occurs between different usages of the term altruism is only due to confusion about the issues and unclear thinking.

What Brian said. You completely misunderstand Rand's conception of tabula rasa as well as her view of the scope of our control over our emotions. In addition, you also completely misunderstand the content of 'altruism' that Rand opposed. Altruism in the biological literature refers to a sense of empathy or concern for the well-being of others of our species. This is a completely different usage of the word than philosophical altruism, which originated with Comte and consists of self-denial of values. It is this second sense of altruism that was virulently opposed by Rand. And as for conclusion C, if you have grave concerns about society collapsing, just build an underground bunker somewhere out in the woods like everyone else who worries about that.

And it is the liberal, who claims that freedom is the correct state of man. However I am argiung that slavery is a part of that concept and thus must also be a correct state of man. One cannot speak of freedom without indavertently referring to slavery. Half of the argument promoting freedom is an argument denouncing slavery. Liberalism is an anti/pro philisophy. It is just as equally concerned with slavery as it is with freedom, therefore slavery is half of the philosophy. Withouth the false dichotomy, the liberal would not have a philosophy at all, therefore their whole state of being an liberal depends on the very existence of that which they denounce. Liberalism is the act of distinguishing between, therefore they are inadvertently emphazing both, though they claim to be against one. "AGAINST" is a tricky concept to use as a foundation because come to rely on that which they are against. Slavery is irnonically a part of them, more than it is a par of any other philosophy. Funny how that doesn't make sense at all.

You misunderstand. I was not making an argument against self-interest, I am not against self-interest. It is the objectivist who claims to be against selfless acts. I am arguing agaisnt the false dichotomy that objectivists promote. It is the objectivist, who claims that rational self interest is the correct state of man. However I am argiung that rational selflessness is a part of that concept and thus must also be a correct state of man. One cannot speak of selfish without indavertently referring to selflessness. Half of the argument promoting rational selfishness is an argument denouncing selflessness. Objecivism is an anti/pro philisophy. It is just as equally concerned with selflessness as it is with selfishness, therefore selflessness is half of your philosophy. Withouth your false dichotomy, you would not have a philosophy at all, therefore your whole state of being an objectivist depends on the very existence of that which you denounce. Objectivism is the act of distinguishing between, therefore you are inadvertently emphazing both, though you claim to be against one. "AGAINST" is a tricky concept to use as a foundation because come to rely on that which you are against. Selflessness is irnonically a part of you, more than it is a par of any other philosophy. Funny how that works.

Do you understand how that works?

I promote the idea that selflishness and selflessness are spectral...and exist in degree. I was trying to pose an example of how one interdependent micro-concept dies with out it's other. If the world suddenly stopped being selfless all together, we would no longer know of the concept of either selfishness or selflessnes. Objectivism is the act of distinguishing between. The only way for use to understand the both concepts is to accepts that it is a singularity. An act of selflessness can be a selfish act, niether side of the coin crushes the other into oblivion. Showing "heads," only reminds us there is a "tails."

"Real Life" is another concept you use. This idea of "Real." Do you claim that my story is somehow not possibe? Do you claim that this can only happen in fiction? Do you think that similar things cannot happen? Do you claim that people do not die alone in the woods more often than groups do? This summer 15 people died in just Yosemite, but explaining this to you is not really my goal. The fact is that people's way of life in Alaska is far different than yours. I can tell you about things I experienced in Italy, Germany, France, Japan, Norway, Greece, Spain that wouldn't even imagined in your "reality." From the way you speak, I am willing to bet I have seem more of reality thant you have. People's way of life in Africa is far different from yours as well. Is it irrational to think that? There are people getting lined up and shot against walls, as we speak in some third world countries. More people are starving around the world right now, then their are American Citizens. To them, your way of life is a dream. If it happens in real life, it is real life. The fact that you would judge the rest of the world from your little microchism only tells me that you havent experienced the world at all. I have. There is no way you could travel like I have and still believe as you do. Sorry....its a hard truth.

I guess not all of us would wish to possibly alienate a newcomer with terse response to "go look it up" than give a simple answer.

If you don't want to participate then don't.

I think I’d better make it clear that I was trying to frame the issue, not provide a summary of either side’s stated position. Peikoff wouldn’t accept the characterization of studying Objectivism being like going to a museum, nor does Kelley claim that Objectivism equals Philosophy. In the talk I do recall him saying something like “I think everything that’s true is (or should be) part of Objectivism”, but he also goes to some length in “isolating the essence”, this in the context of describing what an Objectivist “movement” should be like.

In practice, both have produced work that “goes beyond” Rand, in the sense of being on subjects she didn’t address. So what’s the real difference? I think l’affaire McCaskey is a great illustration, and that really had little to do with the open/closed question. I say the lesson there was: when Peikoff makes a new contribution, the book it’s in is not to be criticized, not even behind closed doors.

Because causal factors always operate through existents. Literal nonexistence, nothingness, has no causal efficacy. Take a Christian who holds that the universe as we know it today was created by a conscious God. God is the existent to which he appeals in order to explain the universe. Where did God come from? Well, he is eternal, uncaused. Or take a quantum mechanics researcher who posits that the universe as we know it popped out of a quantum fluctuation. In that case, the existent to which he is appealing is the quantum-mechanical nature and features of the 'wider universe', out of which popped this present universe. Where did that QM structure come from? Well, that's just the way it is. Maybe we can also explain that structure, but however we explain it, it will be through the causal processes of yet another existent. In any case, whatever it is that you appeal to to explain the creation of this universe, that thing is also part of existence as such.



The relevant question re: supernatural is, are you proposing that the eternal existent has a definite nature, with definite capabilities, which works through definite causal processes to interact with and change (or in this case create) the world outside itself? If you are, then your deity is simply another existent with a definite nature. If not, if you're proposing literal magic, this deity can do things without any sort of causal process, then you're talking nonsense; hence, 'meaningless.'

Yikes. Maybe because sex is the physical expression of romantic love, which is someone's response to his or her own highest values in the person of another, to paraphrase Ayn Rand (see here). And only people have the capacity to choose their own moral values, and thus be an object of romantic love and thus proper sexual desire. There is an essential difference between homosexuality and those other things you list, which is: other individuals are capable of rational thought, making moral choices, and building moral character, even if they are the same sex as I am. Plastic yard flamingos are not.

This type of feeble 'slippery slope' argumentation might crop up often in religious fundamentalist circles, where sex is derided as base and animal... but one would hope that it wouldn't in Objectivist circles, where the nature of sex is properly understood and appreciated as a deeply spiritual response to another individual.