patrik 7-2321

Respectfully, I think this is the wrong methodology. When two authors disagree, the right reaction isn't to decide ahead of time that one of them is right and the other is wrong just because of who they are. Instead, I think we ought to study each author carefully until we have a solid grasp of what each respectively is saying, then compare the two positions to determine which has better evidence and arguments in its favor.

In Objectivism, a "proof" of an idea is reduction. One thereby goes backwards "down" through the steps necessary to reach the abstract idea, which can be a proposition or a concept, through the necessarily prior ideas, until one reaches the most basic kinds of observations on which the idea depends.
The prime example of this would be the Objectivist proof of the principle of egoism. It is normally proved by reducing the concept "value" down to its necessary prerequisites, which are entities acting to achieve goals in face of the fundamental alternative of life or death.
However, according to Objectivism as I understand it, this kind of reduction-based proof is not enough for a person to be justified in claiming certain knowledge that an idea is true. It is for instance said in How We Know that "full validation" of an idea, as it is called, requires at first reduction but then also non-contradictory integration into one's total knowledge (I think OPAR says this too, for instance at the bottom of page 138 and in other places where proof is discussed, but perhaps not as explicitly).
So, one aquires certain knowledge of an idea after a "full validation" has been performed, which necessarily involves reduction and integration with the rest of one's knowledge.
But where does induction fit into this picture?
Peikoff's course Objectivism Through Induction (OTI) makes a really big deal out of the idea that real understanding and validation of an idea is based on induction. He repeatedly uses the term "inductive proof" (which btw. seems to run contrary to the definition of proof given in OPAR as essentially "reduction". What would "inductive reduction" be?). "Inductive proof" or derivation is the only way to fully validate an idea he basically says - this presupposing a reduction to begin with.
What I end up with is that "full validation" of an idea requires reduction and integration, the integration being based on induction - when I combine the works of OPAR, HWK, and OTI (and more). However why isn't this explicitly stated in either OPAR or HWK, that induction has this crucial role in the integration-part of "full validation" of an idea, if indeed this is the case? Why does this role of induction only show up kind of obscurely in OTI if it is so crucially important as it is claimed in that course?
"Mere" integration of an idea "into the sum of one's knowledge" to me implies a sort of inward-looking, assuming that the content of one's mind is the test of an idea rather than the content of reality, and for that reason the focus on "induction" as in the OTI course appeals to me, because there one is taught to integrate data from direct observation. It sounds more objective to me.
But I'm confused. What is "full validation"? What essential steps do you have to go through to reach certain knowledge of a given proposition?

It seems like you're pointing to an apparent conflict between the following claims:
Full validation only requires reduction and integration. Full validation requires induction. Induction is distinct from both reduction and integration. The solution will require rejecting or modifying one of these three claims somehow (probably the third).

OTI was created long ago with the laudable goal of combating a tendency toward rationalism.  However, there was not an actual theory of induction within Objectivism during Rand's lifespan (and arguably there still isn't since Objectivism as Rand knew it became a closed system upon her death).  So it is a question whether what Peikoff and Rand were doing in OTI is actually induction in the technical philosophical sense.
Binwanger is unreliable due to his radical dualism.  In any contradiction between Binwanger and Rand or a Peikoff/Rand presentation dump Binswanger.
Peikoff and Harriman authored "The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics" which is little more than the claim that the process of concept formation is induction.  That doesn't satisfy many people looking for a theory of induction who are not already Objectivists and many who are.
Peikoff's lecture course "Art of Thinking" lecture 6 covers "aspects of certainty excised from OPAR for space".  The four aspects covered are thinking about the future, thinking in terms of statistics, does present context of knowledge limit certainty, and does certainty imply error is impossible.   I wonder how much your line questioning here is motivated by an underlying confusion about certainty, and if that should be your next question.

Whatever it is, it's certainly not a proof that knowledge is impossible, nor is it intended to be. This is how analytic philosophy is done. One proposes the necessary and sufficient conditions for a certain thing, and then others try to find counterexamples. These counterexamples are then used to discover new conditions (or to jettison wrong ones) and the concept becomes further and further refined.
The JTB analysis is especially interesting and it led to the development of the causal theory of knowledge which I think is on the right track. However, some philosopher (I forget who) claimed to have proven that it is always possible to come up with Gettier cases regardless of the conditions for justification. This has led some other philosophers to propose that knowledge is not a "state" of consciousness at all, but something else entirely.
EDIT: Here's a video:
 

The only perspective that matters is that of S.  All S can do is be methodical and conscientious about his reasoning and general alertness.  It takes an external perspective, frequently the omniscient or "God's Eye" view, to judge that S does not really have knowledge.  This is why communication with others is so helpful for being objective, it allows S to better check his premises and expand his awareness of relevant factors.
The same critique can be applied to the doctrine of Justified True Belief. Who is it exactly that is standing in judgement as a final authority on what is True or not?  There is an implied omniscient perspective, but no individual has access to that perspective so JTB is not a workable theory.
In short, one can be justified and still be in error.  If knowledge must be guaranteed to be true before it can count as knowledge then there is no such thing as knowledge and epistemology is a dead end rather than an ongoing problem to be solved.

Once in a lifetime opportunities are very rare. That's why I clicked on this thread, I was intrigued about what it could be. Were you selected for the next space mission? Are you 35 and just failed your Olympics qualifier? What could it be?

From the sound of it, your opportunity isn't "once in a lifetime". If you work hard and are a good enough salesman to have deserved that job, you're going to get another offer eventually.

I find that often people treat opportunities the same way they treat love: as a mystical, unearned concept. They're not: opportunities aren't gifts, they are the result of your actions just as much as full out success. Getting an opportunity is the sign that you're at least half way to success. Blowing that opportunity is a sign that you are exactly half way to success. It's not a sign that you suck. If you sucked, you wouldn't have gotten the opportunity.

So you should look at the glass as half full: you are good enough to have earned yourself this opportunity. You are not quite good enough to fully benefit from it, but this is not a setback. Just because you blew this, it doesn't mean that you're worse off than where you were before. You're just as good as you were before you got this opportunity, which means you should expect more of them to come along as you continue to work hard.

Great lecture--and one that I had not heard before.

Interesting that both Peikoff and Kelly essentially tell you to "not bother" with this label, generally, as it is not very practical (Peikoff) and ripe for abuse (Kelly).

I have the answer to my original query, which is that generally we should not get caught up with labels and names as they redirect the conversation needlessly away from the subject at hand--and I can properly call myself "an Objectivist" and not worry that somebody is going to check my identifying documents or demand a secret handshake. I agree with the fundamental principles of Objectivism and I'm trying to apply these principles, and that's enough.

Thanks, everybody.

Thanks to Facebook posts on the Ayn Rand and Atlas Shrugged pages (my suggestion ), @AynRandBot is now firmly in 2nd place. I think the only way to beat JK Rowling would be to get the leaders of the various Objectivist clubs to send out messages to their members.

I think this discussion took a rationalistic turn. It did for me at least. So I want to bring this discussion back to the beginning with a more inductive approach.

I have solved it.
Man must produce, because in the context of comparing to animals attaining values, the unique action taken by men is production. That is therfore the cause of attinment of human values.
My question at first was "But how do you deal with a person who steals? How does he fit into this?", and later it also became "How do you deal with a beggar, or a moocher? He who tries to get things without either producing OR stealing?". I didn't realize first that the coontrast with animals actually solves these problems.
The theif/looter is properly dealt with by dismissal; by realizing that whatever he does is causally irrelevant - because he acts like an animal! Thus whatever he can get by his own accord, 'long range' if we assume a principled manner of living, is what an animal gets. One can therfore see that he attains his values by some means other than himself or his own actions, by the mercy of womever person he steals from. i.e. he is not engaging in a method of survival.
A "moocher" is likewise irrelevant, but his actions are irrelevant not merly because he's unproductive, but because he's also ineffective. A beggar doesn't even give the appearance of successful living.

Thus the principle I talked about in the beginning is certainly not arbitrary. The reason why production is "long-range" I have understood is also based on the contrast, and is primarily because we are talking about principled behaviour. Nevermind that typical thieves get into trouble, they don't even on principle enact the cause which would get them values. So why would one assume they could achieve values over the course of years or decades? If they seem to do it, it's not because of their own actions, but because of something else; someone elses production and mercy at their behaviour.

So that's it. I'd like to hear your comments.

That last post made me lose hope in this guy but I'd already written this, so let this be my last statement.


No, not nessecarily. They are activities which can be pursued either productively or for leisure.


I agree he does not need to earn money. But he needs to produce in the sense of applying reason to the problem of survival, which has a broader meaning.


So AS has sold ~3,660,000 copies. If we assume only a couple of thousand accepted the philosophy after reading AS, what will that prove? That Objectivism is false because if it were true then it would spread quickly? You might aswell use that same argument and say that since christianity spread quickly it must be true, and since X spread slowly it must be false.

It's obviously the case that you are unsure whether Objectivism is correct or not, and are trying to use this "track record" or "conversion rate" or whatever to decide whether it is worth your time or not, because then it will be "more likely true" or not. But that is the wrong method. Look at it and read about it and try to decide for yourself, ask specific questions on this forum and try to make up your mind that way instead. It's a totally useless way of going about philosophy, because you can't avoid the task of thinking yourself.

Shenanigans.

Go to your college guidance center and speak to a counselor there. If your college is anything like the one I've been to, if you explain your situation they will be able to give you some paper work to fill out to take a semester or so off from school because of your depression. This official time off from school for mental health reasons at least in the United States has made it possible for one to put on hold the requirement to pay back the loans because it makes clear you are not quitting school, you do intend to finish, and that you are off from school due to necessity, not just for fun. Furthermore, how long have you been taking the anti-depressants? They typically take around a month to reach full effectiveness, so don't be surprised if after a week you haven't noticed much yet. Additionally, you may need to get a higher dosage of your medication, try another type of medication in addition to your current medication, or change medications as it is in fact quite common for people's first prescription for anti-depressants to not end up being what works best for them. Also, are you seeing a psychologist regularly in addition to the psychiatrist who prescribed you the medication? Anti-depressants are not generally a solution all on their own so much as something which may enable a psychologist to help a patient who had physical complications which were standing in the way of being able to make progress on healing up psychologically.

I am apparently gonna be pissing off by taking humor seriously, but the truth must be told:

It seems like he does not think, rather memorizes some slogans as a substitute to actual reasoning, while speaking.
They probably don't even have a good source \ indication on the nature of a rational argument, since I never respond automatically, I don't think of Ayn Rand either while discussing. I think and phrase my sentences in my head before slowly putting the argument.
As well, observe that the therapist simply reacts with "Aha . . . I see . . . you are an Objectivist" (mentioned as if it were some illness) without proving what's wrong with it.
And he is the one to be considered the "common sense" in the issue. In a recent context, it reminds me a fanatic mystic who confessed that he 'just knows' that god exists.

Where exactly can a young guy get Objectivism during his freshman year? LOL, they would wish he could have so they can regard themselves underground, but just go to Google and search for Objectivism; past month. You won't find a whole lot of percentage of positive ones.
Ojectivism is the exact opposite of existentialism, being founded on the principle 'Existence Exists.' As well, it holds that everything is itself.

An Objectivist does not have to define sky---it demonstrates some fundamental misunderstanding of the epistemology of definitions.
A definition is required so long as a concept is an abstraction from abstraction, which means: it requires complex conceptualization and is not an obvious sensory given.
In such a case, a definition is required so one can know what he's talking about. But according to Objectivism, conceptualization and perception are an axiomatically valid means of knowledge.

"Private corporations cannot be trusted with the means of production."
Let alone the fact I suppose he means the vice versa, because this sounds pretty Marxist---
this altruism is not even the sort of abstract circumstances of O`ism. Plus "means of production" is a floating abstraction and an invalid terminology since it assumes that the property (=values) just exists and the rest is a matter of who luckily picks it up.

"Libertarian, why?"

Omitting the fact that the (partial) similarity between O`ism qua philosophy and Libertarianism qua "philosophy" is exclusively technical, concrete; the libertarian party is not liberal (as a derivative of 'liberty,' the genetic roots of the concepts) even in accordance with libertarian standards.

"I'm afraid he has a severe case of logical contradiction."
A is A?

"Is he an idiot?---For the moment, yes."
Rationality as man's basic virtue?

"[A]nd I'm going to hire him. Son, I'm gonna pay you minimum wage for papers . . ."
Objectivism does find money a value, but not an ultimate value.
Personally, I cannot stand people who give up their greatest values and especially moral principles in order to get beloved by anyone and thus "earn" some bucks.
Personally, I would never agree to receive tax-paid money (unless I have already paid taxes throughout my previous life), no matter how great it is.
So, the contradiction does not exist.


Yet, I must admit that the Samus T-shirt made me laugh A LOT

“A few silicon valley entrepreneurs admired Ayn Rand’s philosophy, and they like made computers, and banks like used computers, yeah?, and the banks messed up while they were using computers, yeah?, so therefore the financial crisis was caused by silicon valley disciples of Ayn Rand, oh and also by Alan Greenspan who was like best friends with Rand, and was in control of the Federal Reserve, so he presumably tried to implement Randian concepts while in power, yeah?, and that like allowed the financial sector to coast towards disaster, irrevocable catastrophic disaster that is worse than anything else in history and any possible alternative, yeah?, it even happened ten years prior in south-east Asia, who suffered terrible consequences for Westernizing their economy, yeah? and presumably haven't recovered since and are still much worse off than ever before, in fact China helped mastermind the current financial crisis as revenge on the US, yeah? and even right now as we type our thoughts are being commodified by the silicon valley Randian oligarchs, yeah?”

It's a matter of making another turn of the screw.

If you value reason above all else then you are bound to accept the uncertainty of reality. Objectivism seems to demand certainty.

No rational person can assert that one individual was omniscient and Ayn Rand would have been the first to confirm this.

There might be other topics in this forum where the possible dogmatism of Objectivism is discussed.

I just want to remind you that by personal and alien experience I've found that deeply valuing and loving Ayn Rand's works is not mutually exclusive with being your own un-tagged self.
There are many non Objectivists who either love or see truth in Ayn Rand while professing similar but nor exactly similar views with no hostility whatsoever.
Celia Green is my favorite example. Jerome Tuccille my least favorite example (but worth a gaze)

It is 2011. Where is the book?

In certain parts of the essay The Objectivist Ethics I do not understand what is meant, or how Ayn could possibly have known her claims to be true.

These parts are (more to come):

1.

How does she know this?

2.

(My emphasis)
Why does it mean all those things?


3.

(My emphasis)
Why does it mean that, and how does she know?


4. This one is very much like the first but slightly different:

Why? And how does she know you cannot start somewhere else?


5.

What is meant by "value" here? Is it "value" as she just defined it, or in the positive sense of moral value as "that which should be pursued"?
Why is value not a primary and what does that mean?
How does she know the concept value presupposes an answer to that specific question?
Why does she phrase "the question" in terms of a personality ("whom")? (when really she is trying to trace the roots of the more general concept "value" which is not only applicable to humans?)


6.

Why? How does she know?


7. About the robot...

(My emphasis) Why not? It can move and act, can it then not enact some specific cause in order to make something specific happen, i.e act towards a goal?


(My apologies if the quotations are not 100% correct. The ones to which these questions are directed know which passages I am referring to.)

whereupon she launches into a long answer





from The Objectivist Newsletter: Vol. 2 No. 5 May, 1963 or The Voice of Reason
Books: Aristotle by John Herman Randall, Jr.
Reviewed by Ayn Rand


Omitted lots of appearances in the Letters where the name of Hume comes up but without elaboration, presumably because both the writer (Rand) and the addressee knew what was meant and why he was relevant. Peikoff mentions him a lot throughout OPAR and Ominous Parallels, and he appears in "The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy" essay.

WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT MY THEORIES

Main Theory #1: A MODEL OF THE UNIVERSE WITH 5 DIMENSIONS (IF THE FOURTH DIMENSION IS TIME)

I believe that a black hole or singularity is an access portal to the 5 th dimension. It could be held open and stable because the 5th dimension forces the neutrons away from the center making a perfect circular ring that can attach our 3 dimensional plane to the 5 th dimension. Which would allow the energy from matter in our 3 dimensional universe access to the fifth dimension. The energy could then spread out in the 5th dimension where it could stick to or be absorbed in a sense by the outer shell of any Three dimensional universe or bubble. You will never see the 5th plane because it is not in our three dimensions. I believe the 5th dimension is what houses our universe and maybe an infinite number of universes. This could allow for the expansion and contraction of all the universes or bubbles in the 5th dimension and could also allow for enough energy to build up in the 5 th dimension to create a new 3 dimensional bubble for matter to form and expand (example: The Big Bang). It could also explain why, when we look past 15 billion light years we are not seeing any formations of galaxies or solar systems. It just may be that we are seeing the beginning of creation. Where the energy is just starting to form into matter on the outer edge of our bubble. As we travel closer to the singularity in our galaxy we will experience severe time distortion. It may be possible that we will actually travel back to the beginning of creation.

Theory#2: A FOLDED AND OSCILLATING THREE DIMENSIONAL UNIVERSE MODEL

I believe the universe may exist in the shape of a bubble because our universe might be a folded oscillating dimension . Now imagine the singularity to be shaped like a ring which allows energy to pass from the "end of creation side" through the center of the ring to the "creation side". I believe The two planes oscillate due to the difference of matter on one side of the plane and only energy on the other. This is how a bubble could form because our three dimensional plane (our observable universe) exists on the "end of creation side" of all singularities in our bubble and the "creation side" of our universe (The non-observable side) would fold back onto the 3 dimensional side (creating a two sided three dimensional plane for the energy to oscillate from the inner regions to the outer most regions of our universe) This weak side of the plane holds the shape of the visible universe together to help form a bubble . The "creation side" and the "end of creation" side converge at the same point but on opposite sides of the ring within the singularity and the two planes are held together by its intense gravitational force. So as our planet gets closer to the singularity we would eventually cease to exist, because all matter would be transformed to its simplest state of energy. only energy created by the singularities can travel on the "creation side" of the plane. The energy would then begin to re-form into solid matter as it enters the outer edge of our bubble or plane and starts its journey back to the "end of creation" side of all singularities. This would be a never ending cycle of the universe.
My e-mail address is [email protected]

Why is it enough to observe only one causal process to conceptualize it, when to conceptualize a normal concept takes two or more units? I was expecting him to say you need two or more causal processes. Why this difference? Because there is no concept formation going on, merely the application of already formed concepts.

What is a causal connection? How would you define it? A causal connection refers to the action of one entity upon another.

Are ALL generalizations (All S is P) statements of causal connection? (pg. 21) Even the ones that generalize about a specific thing´s color for, example “All swans are white”? Yes. Some statements of a causal connection will be particular ("Johnny kicked the ball") not universal. Therefore it is not true that all statements of causal connection are generalizations. The manner in which all generalizations are causal takes some explaining.

“All swans are white” asserts a universal entity-attribute relation between being a swan and being white. The essence of the problem is that causality is about action but the entity-attribute relation is not an action. The resolution of the problem is that feathers are white for a reason, the reason being the identity of the parts of the swan (the acting entities in this case) that grow feathers. The entity-attribute relation is sometimes brought about by the actions of parts of an entity. "All swans are white" has the form of a generalization, but it fails to be an inductive conclusion because the argument made for it is invalid; enumeration has no causality in it explaining what makes feathers any particular color, consequently no necessity has been established that forces the conclusion that all swans must be white.

"All lightning is electricity" is a genus-species relationship. How is this causal? There is the implied inference that whatever makes up lightning is the same kind of stuff that makes up electricity. "That stuff" is the common identity acting in the two cases. "That stuff" is not a completely arbitrary hypothetical, it refers to what is caught in a charged Leyden jar.

To deny a conclusion that follows necessarily from deduction is to deny a generalization, he says. (pg. 31) Does that mean you are denying a premise, or a new “product” of the deduction? You have paraphrased inaccurately here. He does not write this on pg. 31 or anywhere else. I won't guess at which word you got wrong or your "real" question. Try again.

To deny a conclusion that follows necessarily from induction is to deny all your knowledge. (pg. 31) How can the conclusion follow necessarily? (There should have been a concrete example of this) How can you deny all your knowledge by denying the conclusion? This appears on page 35. Franklin-flies-a-kite (pg. 33-34) was a concrete example. Given that perception is valid, concepts are valid, and all knowledge is interrelated, (each of these premises is a book in itself) then either the inductive conclusion is true or it is false. The conclusion is false if and only if the premises are wrong. But the premises are not wrong therefore the conclusion is necessarily true.

Is the generalization ”All swans are white” properly or improperly made in the example? (pg. 8) Is it disproven or not when a black swan appears? It is improperly made, which means not that it is true or false but that it is a non sequitor. It is contradicted and demonstrated to be false when the black swan appears.

At page 18 the book seems to say sometimes you need certain generalizations to reach or be able to form certain concepts, is that true? Yes. Examples (shadows, blocking) were given.

“New instances are conceptualized i.e., placed under the appropriate concept, as and when they are encountered” This seems to say that to conceptualize (to induce) is to place new instances under an appropriate concept, which is just like Ayn Rand´s description of deduction in ITOE (pg. 28): “The process of subsuming new instances under a known concept is, in essence, a process of deduction.” Why do I think I´m looking at a contradiction here? (Which I hope I´m not) This is from pg. 26. You have forgotten that induction is about propositions (sentences) and concept formation is about concepts (words). A causal connection requires two or more entities, and an inductive generalization requires two or more concepts related in a sentence.

Are all first-level generalizations really built from first-level concepts? Do they have to be? Why? (pg. 19) Yes. Yes. By definition that is what makes them first level.

Did he miss underlining (or italicalizing) two actions on the bottom of page 23, or did he have some kind of point in only doing it to the other two? Call it a typo. All four gerunds should have been emphasized the same way.

Why can´t induction be reduced to the formalism of symbols, and what does that mean? (pg. 35)Symbolic logic is a notation system used for deductive logic. Induction is not based on atoms of knowledge, symbolic logic only deals with atomic propositions, therefore they are incompatible. (If you are not familiar with the usage, 'atomic' here means 'out of context.') It means symbolic logic cannot prove everything, or even most things. Since symbolic logic cannot validate the premises it starts with, it cannot complete the proofs of anything.

Those interested in Whewell, and especially the debate he got into with John Stuart Mill over the nature of induction, may find interesting Reforming Philosophy: A Victorian Debate on Science and Society by Laura J. Snyder, the author of the SEP article. I wrote a review of it for The Objective Standard.

For your discussion about the relevance of an epistemologist's metaphysical views, see especially the discussion on page 131 regarding Mill's idealism. He considered himself a follower of Berkeley -- "To be is to be perceived" -- and defined matter as "a Permanent Possibility of Sensation."

There is now a book that examines the history of the debate over the substance, depth, and breadth of Whewell's Kantianism, Whewell's Critics by John Wettersten. I can't recommend the book generally, but it's a place to turn if you want to study this long-running debate about how Kantian Whewell was and whether it matters.

Also, do not overlook that what makes Whewell so interesting in the history of induction is that he was the most mature in a line of thinkers developing Francis Bacon's theory of induction. Do not overlook Bacon's own Novum Organum and other works in the Baconian tradition, especially those by Thomas Reid and John Herschel.

It's best to see Whewell as he saw himself, as a Baconian struggling with (what we'd call) axiomatic concepts and how it is that perceptions and not sensations are the foundations of human cognition and how it is that new concepts get formed. You'll understand Whewell better that way than if you read him as a Kantian and then try figuring out whether his deviations from Kant were fruitful or not.