ZSorenson

Possible Spoilers Below Bioshock Wikia Page "Dr. Sofia Lamb is the primary antagonist of BioShock 2. She has taken over Andrew Ryan's position as the leader of Rapture, albeit with completely different view. Lamb was an old political rival of Ryan, and is in many ways his opposite. She is an Altruist, and believes we all have a duty to the world, and she has allowed those beliefs to corrupt her. And in the name of the greater good, she's begun to see people as numbers. To make the world one family. And that is why she comes into contact with the player, a lone agent, an extremely powerful individual, fighting with her collective. She is a part of Rapture's history, and through reasons discovered in BioShock 2, you find out why she wasn't present during the events of BioShock. Her Altruist vision has been altered by her lieutenant, Father Wales, into something called the Rapture Family. It's been made simpler so that the Splicers could understand it. She uses Rapture Family to recruit more Splicers, saying that they owe each other some sense of unity and brotherhood. In BioShock 2, you get to find out her relationship with Andrew Ryan through possible audio diaries, his dialogue still playing throughout the city and her plans for Rapture." If you haven't played BioShock, it's a vidoegame about an 'Objectivist' utopia built on the bottom of the ocean. The art style is awesome, and the plot intriguing, but the sad truth is that premise of the game is that the utopia collapses for of a variety of reasons. When you arrive there, the citizens are all basically zombies, and the city in ruins. Some see this as artistic 'criticism' of Objectivism. It's refreshing to see hints like this one above which indicate a more acceptable moral theme for the sequel. The zombies of the game, called 'splicers' are genetically modified people and there is a sense that their condition not only severely affects their sanity, but also causes their free will to be subject to those with the technology to control them. In BioShock 2, you are an individual who was involved in early experiments, so you've maintained your free will. And the enemy seems to be motivated by Altruism - when in the first game, for awhile, your main enemy was 'Andrew Ryan' motivated in theory by 'Objectivism'. Your character in the first game was subject to a key phrase that would force him to obey orders. A slave fighting an 'Objectivist'. So it's exciting to see the roles reversed. And of course, the real enemy in the first game ended up being a petty criminal thug who manipulated everyone into the destruction of the city. I'm excited about this new game. Hopefully this new enemy's past will show that it was altruism that destroyed the city in the first place. Anyone else with BioShock experience? I think this game will redeem the series because it will show how a bloody dystopia populated by literal zombies fits well with a vision of altruism, and how moral individualism is the only thing that can oppose it.

What there could never be are things that operate without reason. An unknowable truth. An omniscient God. An infinite life. A soul that operates in ways that cannot be understood. However, technically there could be a superbeing that controls things. There could be a 'soul' that takes material form as 'phantom particles' that can be detected, but only barely. Of course, there is no solid evidence for any of this. So we shouldn't believe it. But there could be things we're not aware of (though they usually derive from the impossible concepts of the first line when it comes to SF)

Good point, he probably knew the shuttle could be a dangerous suicide mission, and his interest was with Destiny. But I was referring to Col. Young's sentiments. Specifically, I wanted to know if there was any rational justification for considering a sacrifice like that to be a virtue. Without knowing Dr. Rush's perspective. But, perhaps the character alone is worth watching the show for. It has redeemed itself! Do you think Dr. Rush caused the attack from episode one to occur in the first place?

My response in another thread, after considering this issue, was that reason is objective, so it can be used to perceive an objective reality through senses that may provide subjective data. You can see pink elephants, or not, but there are more senses than sight, there is data over a period of time, there are the witnesses of other people and their senses. If you integrate all the available data using reason, you can come to a conclusion about objective reality. That isn't a guarantee that your outcome is perfect, but it is objective - reason and logic can't vary from person to person. That's my personal conclusion, as a 'fan' and student of Objectivism, not an official one. However, I hope it helps you win a debate against your cousin.

Exactly! Requiring ALL knowledge about a thing presupposes the existence of a totality. Again, it's imposing concepts on reality, rather than deriving concepts from reality. An inductive error at the heart of your thinking.

Did you read what followed: reason is not subjective. If reason is applied to the evidence of the senses, the resulting picture is objective. The key is reason. In fact, by reason you can conclude that the senses are usually objective. If you develop some disorder, and colors and sizes of things in your vision begin to vary, you might say that you vision is no longer objective - but you can still use reason, your memory, other senses, to get a picture of objective reality from your flawed vision. I know someone who has this problem when they eat cheese. They realize that the table that looks like they can walk under is in fact too short when they hit their shins on it. Reason is the common standard. There is a good cause for the 5 senses being objective - evolution favored creatures who senses were objective, for obvious reasons. Yes, even if objective, senses can't describe all reality (infrared, ultraviolet for example), but generally what they describe they do so objectively. And we know this because reason allows us to conclude so. In the case of a 'sixth' sense - reason dictates that this does not describe reality. Yes, you 'feel' things sometimes, but reason can be used to conclude that these feelings are not revelations, but products of the subconscious (generally, that's just an example). Reason. Reason. Reason.

CJM, why is it that subjective knowledge can't lead to objective knowledge - to comment on it? You should read my post that is nested in early at the beginning of this thread. The issue that makes so many problems of philosophy unsolvable, and causes so many problems with mysticism is that of the unknown. There is ALWAYS going to be an unknown, any other way requires some reality that doesn't function based on reason. Reason and causality are necessary for anything that exists and matters. I think people accept 'faith' as legitimate because they want to believe that certain things have a meaning when they objectively don't. For example, people want to believe that at the edge of the universe there's some God, rather than say some leviathan monster that will eat our planet tomorrow. That's ridiculous to say, but that's sort of the point when it comes to mysticism and faith. If something affects you, then it is real, its effects can be measured. If something is measured to be consistent, and a logical process describing causal effects is discovered, then you can reason that it exists. Do you know for sure? No! Consider Hume: will the sun rise tomorrow? We don't know, conclusively, for sure. But, we have every REASON to think it will. That is, from our base of knowledge, it would be utterly preposterous to assume the sun will not rise. This is the source of his error - a desire for mystical omniscience. Subjectively, we desire explanations for things that take our highly advanced abstract concepts - constructed out of reality - and impose them on reality. This is the Platonic idea that meaning trickles down from above, from a mystical realm, rather than being constructed - via reason - from observations of objective reality. The difference is that in one realm, reason is unreliable, in the other, it is everything. The axioms of Objectivism have to do with our base of knowledge. One conclusion drawn from them is that if something is unknowable, it is irrelevant. Knowable means: you can use reason to describe it. The great insight of all this is that if there is anything, anywhere that affects you at all, then reason can be used to describe it. This is opposed to the idea that there are mystical forces that cannot be described by reason by their nature, and yet they affect us. You have to use reason to even comprehend that, and it is false. I agree that the senses are subjective. But Objectivism is still correct. Consider the 'mormon' position. Mormons believe that their knowledge of God is not subjectively obtained. They believe that God 'tells' them he is true through a spirit. This spirit is thought of as a 'sixth sense' - that affects how you 'feel'. That might seem obviously subjective, and it is, but mormons don't think so. They believe that one can conclude that a consistent feeling of a certain type is rational evidence for an effect. They are right. Their error is that such a feeling is evidence only that they had a feeling, saying nothing of its source. More often than not, the subconscious expectation for something is what causes the feeling - I believe. Mormons also believe in faith, but if you argue with one as an Objectivist, they will describe faith exclusively according to the terms I just described. This is relevant to your questions because I think you are right that senses are subjective. The beautiful secret is that reason is not subjective. This means you can take the evidence of the senses, and use reason to integrate what you've observed, and draw conclusions about whatever it is that is affecting you. The resultant picture, though subject to inductive error, is objective reality, because you have no reason to think that it is not. Also, I think we agree about determinism and free will. This, "You are consciously aware that you could have made a choice, so you really could have," is false. You are only aware that there were multiple choices possible. Interestingly, you are also aware of the reasons why you made your choice over the others - and the reasons for this choice - which presumably were not subject to mystical volition. Again, the issue with determinism causes the most problems with ethics. "If I have no volition, I'm not responsible for my choices." is the conclusion. But this is the real sentence, "If I have no mystical identity that chooses based on a mechanism that can't be described by reason, then the mystical force of ethics in the universe - also not describable by reason - should not hold me responsible for my choices" which is false. I think your problem is assuming that there is some 'soul' separate from the decision making process, that it 'deserves' to be coddled for the mistakes of its mind it couldn't control. But I contend that your mind is your soul, and so you should be held responsible for its results - regardless of 'how' the decision making process works. The non-mystical arbiter of this decision is: reality. I agree with everyone who has said that it's not good to worry about the question of free will - that it exists effectively - if not according to some mystical standard. In reality, where logic rules, your choices defining your volition vs. your volition defining your choices is equivalent. Only under a subjective standard would one be different than the other. But, I think I've repeated myself more than enough - I hope my argument is now perfectly clear.

Well, that's why I have 'mixed feelings'. Of course, I'm still promoting the idea, so I have to defend it. And, naturally, I'd happily accept a convincing argument that refutes determinism. What specifically is contradictory about determinism and reason? Just because your thought process can be experienced and perceived doesn't mean you have control over it. That's the issue, really. Reason means use of logic, and logic is absolute, firm, irrefutable. The real choice is whether to use reason or not - to think or not to think. And so, what is the source of the mechanism that makes that choice? Who are 'you'? Are you a mystical soul, who by faculty of reason, judges facts and then is free to choose whatever you want? What is the standard for choosing? If it is reason, perfectly, then there will always be an optimal choice given your situation and knowledge base - reality determines the choice. If it is anything else, what could it be? If it is some aftermath of evolution, a combination of instinct and psychology, then it is assuredly not free will. Otherwise, by what mechanism of 'self' do you choose to use reason or non-reason? A mystical Form of self that makes this choice by some mechanism that's 'above reason'? I don't think that's true. I think the mechanism of self is a combination of instinct and reason, and the proper thing to do is use reason. The issue makes me uncomfortable, because a mind confronted with the idea that will is deterministic might become impotent. Though that would be a result of a logical error, I believe. I remember someone telling me once that if people's choices are determined, then they can't be punished for bad choices. However, I think that the issue is that they absolutely can be held ethically accountable for their choices, because reality determined those choices, and there is only reality - no other realm that coddles the rationally deprived and forgives them and values them anyway. That's IF there is determinism - if there is, the concept of volition still applies. It applies in the sense that it exists in reality as the reverse of its abstraction. Rather than your volition causing choices, the reality is that your choices define your volition. In that sense, I don't bother worrying too much about 'determinism'. My purpose is to refute the logic that determinism means ethics are impossible - because it was listed as a 'problem' with Objectivism. That's my explanation. As I have repeated, the whole issue still makes me a little uncomfortable. It makes me uncomfortable in the sense that people tell me I'm supporting an obvious contradiction. So I'd like to hear an explanation of how 'free will' is logical possible - in reality, a place ruled by reason - if someone can offer it. Then I'll be able to see how much I might need to reevaluate my perspective. UPDATE: I want to add a more direct reply to your comment. According to my theory, belief and volition are the product of pure logical reason, and some hodgepodge of instinct, and learned subconscious routines. They are the 'product' of 'forces'. I'm not a psychologist, but this is the best I can do because I don't understand by what mechanism volition can exist if it is not somehow deterministic. Reason is not the equivalent of volition. Volition is choosing between reason and instinct. Reason is logic, using facts to determine the best choices. 'Believing in determinism' is an aggregate of psychological forces causing someone to feel confident in a set of logical outcomes. In this case, it is logic and reason - even if flawed - that dominate those forces. Whereas, discomfort with the idea that there isn't some mystical source of volition, causing someone to not believe in determinism relies on the same process, but reason and logic are not dominating. Please don't take offense to that, I'm just trying to be as clear as possible over the point of disagreement for me.

My point of view on free will is mixed (well, my feelings about my point of view are mixed). I know that if I am ever confronted with a choice, I assume that I make it for one of two reasons: 1) I weigh the choice against my values in a rational process and pick what is demonstrably optimal or 2) A sub-conscious decision making algorithm impels me to choose based on a weighing of psychological and evolved standards. In both cases, and in a mix (which is the most likely common process), the process is algorithmic - even if hopelessly complex. So, it seems that every choice is deterministic? I've heard about Roger Penrose who tries to explain why physics says will is not. But his point of view seems to rely heavily on Plato, and it is the mystics that usually offer a 'source' of 'non-deterministic' free will. That's why I am inclined to think choices are deterministic. However, the truth of the matter is that even if choices are deterministic, they are still possessed, or owned, by those who make them. Thus, a person can feel properly accountable for his or her choices, because they define him/her. The 'why' when it comes to choice is the product alone of Reason. A creature that can experience pain and pleasure does not know why it does without the faculty of reason. If you would prefer a world without why, with only pleasure and pain I suggest oblivion instead, it has no pain. It is the context, and the why, that gives pleasure its significance. It is the why that gives meaning, and provides motive. An animal without a why is subject to instinct alone, and its experience is meaningless - pleasure is only a token of what to do, but can't be appreciated. The faculty that allows appreciation - the one that makes you think (or feel, but 'feel' in the spiritual sense, not in the physical sense) "I want that" or "That's good" - is the same that allows you to process information rationally. I think the issue of free will is more the issue of what 'part' of your decision making process has precedent: reason, or instinct. The more 'reason' is working, the more 'appreciation of life' can function. If your mind - your deterministic mind let's say - fails to grasp that it must start preferring reason and slowly build that faculty over instinct - then you will enjoy existence less. It's not that you are being 'punished', it is a product of reality. In that sense, reality dictates that you 'own' your decision making process. Because there is only reality, this means for all intents and purposes that you have (possess) free will. Free will -> You=your choices, and so your choices=You. It's an equality, the order doesn't matter, the implications are the same - in reality.

Exactly, so, how do you know there's a 'whole picture'. Intutively? Is it a Platonic Form, that you just know is there, but haven't observed? Objective reality is that which is real, period. Anything that isn't is irrelevant, because it has no effect on us. This means that whatever tools of cognition/perception/sensation/intuition may be available to us, that anything we can observe to be consistent, measurable, definable, identifiable, is part of objective reality. If something isn't consistent, identifiable, etc., then it is not part of objective reality. Assume for instance that the universe was your personal dream. Your mind can control it. This means that there is an objective reality: your mind. However, proper observation, and use of induction over the centuries has proved conclusively that objective reality happens to be something outside of man's consciousness, that acts according to given physical laws, which have no relationship to man's whims or desires. In fact, a day's observation in a toga could tell you that. The desire to define "the whole picture" is an inductive error. You're basically saying that you want to impose you concept of 'wholeness' on objective reality, when you can easily demonstrate that the concept of 'wholeness' is an abstraction derived from observable reality. Could we someday develop science to the point where we can describe every effect that is observed to affect everything observable? Yeah, but that isn't a guarantee that some new effect won't pop up at sometime. The principle is: the unknown is unknown. It seems like mysticism is caused by a desire to have the comfort of knowing the unknown. But ironically, once known, the unknown is no longer the unknown, and so there still remains some other great unknown. Desiring to paint over it a veneer of abstract mystical explanations is only an inductive error, but it is the cause of so much mischief. That's the essence of your 'problems with Objectivism', by my estimation.

Right, that is itself an entire issue worth discussion. I left it out intentionally, but it's important. He did pick 2 out of 17 - a pilot and a medic - as givens before the lottery. I think the idea of the lottery was to prevent hysteria (i.e. a fight where no one would have made it to the shuttle) by using a system that was demonstrably neutral. I would do that if I was with subjective-minded people on that ship. 'Fate' and 'Chance' are considered fair because it leaves the decision up to the 'perfect, ultimate authority'. Whereas a colonel might show preference. That theory is obviously wrong, chaotic chance from which one has no reason to expect a meaningful outcome is not more fair than even a potentially biased authority figure. His judgment, even if flawed, is infinitely closer to rewarding virtue for virtue than fate. But that segues to your question. The name of the ship is 'Destiny', and it seems to 'know' what its doing. This is the common theme so far, that the ship is on some course, and solves problems on its own just at the moment when the humans realize that they are unable to themselves. There has already been a mystical vision which may possibly have been caused by dehydration, but coincidentally led to a life-saving discovery. So let's call it Stargate: Voyager-star Galactica. I've now decided that I really need to think about whether I should keep watching it. On the other hand, Flash Forward is something I'll keep watching. It has interesting, if flawed, spiritual implications. Knowing you future - can it give you motive power? Well, we can't, but we can anticipate it. So, whatever we have every reason to expect, we should, motive power doesn't depend on God's grace.

I consider boats to be in the same spiritual category as railroad engines, airplanes, and rockets. There's the balance of forces, and the motive power, and the moving from place to place, for whatever conceivable purpose. And I think you did a good job. Congratulations, thanks for posting.

I think you have to separate the concept of rights from ideas regarding their implementation. The concept of rights is a moral issue, and therefore the product of philosophy. Morality tells man what he should do. I'm reading Ominous Parallels by Leonard Peikoff, and I've realized something important about the role of philosophy in guiding morality. The utter evil and systemic brutality of Nazism was the product of a moral depravity made possible only by a completely absurd and unreasoned philosophy - if I understood properly. What's interesting is that a common feature of the philosophies that contributed to Nazism is the idea that the mind is impotent. I've wondered about this because at first it seems wrong. If people believe that the mind is impotent - which seems impossible and absurd in the first place - how could they even wake up in the morning, or eat? Not to mention the fact that Nazis built missiles, rockets, jet planes and so forth. But what I missed was that the concept that the mind is impotent doesn't apply to the use of the mind in all situations. The mind can be used to get through each day, build rockets, and everything else, but remain impotent as long as the choice of what to do - moral values - is the product of mysticism. Ultimately, these values would destroy a society, but presumably it could function for awhile. The issue - when it comes to man - is volition. Man must choose to survive, and make choices based on the premise that his life is in fact a moral value. My observation is that philosophy has the strongest effect on - and is the only source - of moral values and the choice of right and wrong. It answers the question, specifically, "What to do?" Now consider the concept of the social contract. Forget the stupidity associated with general will, let's define a social contract as an arrangement between individuals regarding a common understanding on the proper use of force among them. Force, because anything not involving force requires no general common understanding. If you 'sign on' to such a contract (say you are on a desert island with just a few other people), there are two moral issues involved. Primarily, you accept the rightful use of force against you if you breech the contract. Secondarily, you give your sanction to the use of force against other people in your name as a signatory. Without rights, as the absolute justification for and standard of the social contract, you as an individual have not moral basis for joining it. Obviously, we are born into a country today, and by advocating for, and voting for correct political ideas you retain moral integrity. But as far as rights are concerned: absolute rights, discovered through philosophy, must be the basis for a proper social contract. It can't properly exist without them. So, the nitty-gritty of how to organize and implement a social contract is irrelevant initially. Checks and balances are as meaningful as Nazi industrial achievements unless they exist to protect rights that are pre-existing and objectively accepted. That said, I think that rights do usually require a practical framework in order to be protected. That is, they exist without a social contract, and they can be protected without one under ideal circumstances, but a social contract might be a rational way of protecting them under many circumstances. That said, a child can have 'rights' but that doesn't mean they will be protected. In the same sense, a person can be completely moral, work and think to their fullest capacity, and still fail to survive. This may be tragic, but nowhere is there a moral failure. Somebody who violates a child's rights - or yours for that matter - can rightfully be punished for doing so. But that is a moral statement, objectively derived, and speaks in no way about how that punishment will occur. Importantly, the moral issue is completely settled from the beginning. While exactly what to do requires more thought, what to do generally - the ought as is - has been decided. My personal vision of an ideal government involves parents retaining a certain 'stewardship' over minors that details how some of the child's rights are retained 'through' the parent. While the government has no explicit obligation to protect the child's rights, and therefore maintains no authority to expropriate funds from citizens by force in order run orphanages or pay foster parents, it can authorize a 'transfer' of stewardship where a concerned party can bring 'bad parents' to court and take their kids from them. The issue with children is custody, because obviously they can't function as an adult and require someone else's efforts to survive for at least some portion of their childhood. Rights are all about man acting in support of his own life, which a baby would obviously fail at. So this stewardship idea is my best effort And about the idea of a person retaining rights 'through' somebody else, consider these examples: a child chooses to leave home, say they are 8, and can survive selling newspapers on the street. In this case, the ideal thing for the government to do would be to tell the parents that they have no right force the child back home. In another situation, the child wants to stay at home, but the parents are clearly intimidating the child and there is clear evidence of abuse. This time, the child's 'choice' is not acknowledged. This might be an error - adults are expected to know what's good for themselves, whether they demonstrably do or don't - but something about especially small children lacking the remotest opportunity to obtain enough knowledge to know better changes my opinion regarding them. Sure, you could just say the line is too fine to ever draw - that 18 is just convention - and 10, or 8 or even a 'scientific' standard is too subjective. In that case, you just ask a child what they want, and whatever best guess you have as to their answer, you allow them to reap the consequences of that choice even if you know they don't even have the capacity to do so rationally, and the only reason for this is that they are a child. I guess, in the end, you don't draw a line. You include in the architecture of the law basic regard towards rights. All people have defined rights, and whether they be adults, the mentally ill, or children, those rights apply and are manifested clearly in the legal framework. That is, just because a person isn't properly aware of their rights doesn't mean they do not have them. So a child, or mentally ill person, can be deemed unable to properly make rational judgments, but they still have rights. So an abused child who says they want to stay in the abusive home can be taken out of one in protection of its rights. The standard for competence is broad. Emotionally damaged battered wives, or emotionally confused adolescents cannot be judged incompetent (or polygamous mormons). The state cannot remove them from a situation 'for their own good'. But mentally ill citizens, or small children who are clearly incapable of basic rational judgment can be removed 'for their own good'. In that sense, children have their rights 'through' their stewards - those who see to the survival of those utterly incompetent to do so themselves. And of course, being a steward is voluntary, so no taxes for orphans. More broadly, my vision for a social contract is one where the use of force is authorized through the contract only. So even retaliatory force is subject to the dictates of the contract and its constitution. This is willful, you turn over your right to the use of force properly to the judgment of the constitutional government in exchange for a civilized consensus about the use of force. The government, therefore, cannot initiate force, only proscribe allowable use of force in retaliation (or immediate self-defense). It, therefore, cannot tax. But it can commission. It can authorize people - who through their own wealth, or donations (possibly according to a systematic process detailed by the legislature) - to use force in the preservation of rights. It's like the desert island situation expanded. By the way, these conclusions are all mine, and I don't claim that they are endorsed by anyone else. UPDATE: I started this post an hour or two ago, and took a break, and then finished it. Since then, there have been many new comments. If my post is at all redundant, this is the reason. UPDATE #2: I have read the new posts, and give full credit to TLD and others who expressed what I have expressed, first. They have expressed everything I wanted to express, though I'd like to know if rangingpanda is satisfied by my thoughts concerning protecting the rights of children.

I've just watched the newest episode of the new Stargate series, Stargate: Universe. The show is about a group of people from our day and age getting stranded on a broken-down spaceship far across the Universe. In this episode, the ship is on an unalterable course towards a Sun and is expected to be destroyed. There is a shuttle, that can accommodate a small portion of the total population of the ship, that might be able to land on some planet. The solution, from the commanding officer, to the question of who would be allowed to escape on the shuttle, is a lottery. Whether this is rational or not, the point is that after the episode ended - and everybody miraculously survived - the commander ended up offering some words of commendation to the token pessimistic character of the show. This character refused to accept undeserved accolades, and so the officer gave him one last - I suppose the 'best' - accolade. He pointed out that the pessimistic character was the only one who voluntarily removed his name from the lottery. The conclusion of the show involved the officer deciding that, in fact, the pessimistic altruist must have known everyone would miraculously survive, so he didn't really make a sacrifice. Ignoring the details of the plot, and whatever implications that might have on characters' motives, what do you have to say about this instance of the altruist ethic in popular culture? Specifically, is there any way the idea of, "You took your name out of the fair lottery so others could live because of your sacrifice," is morally good or admirable in ANY way outside of notions of strict altruism? And, finally, do you think the average person (of reasonable intelligence) who might watch that would be able to produce any articulate reason why such a sacrifice is admirable other than, "Well, that's how it is" with regards to morality? Let's say they have 60 seconds to think about it. For a little personal context, I should announce that the ideas of Objectivism are relatively new to me, as far as I understand them I completely accept them, and consequently I am nearly always completely floored when I see instances of altruism like this in the popular culture. Previously, I never would have questioned or even noticed them. Now, I don't understand how these examples of 'morality' are not, in fact, morally depraved. I have a sense of intellectual whiplash and I would appreciate any comments or benevolent solidarity from those with experience who might be familiar with this phenomenon. Hence, I have posted in the 'culture' section because I suppose the implication is that American culture is often fundamentally depraved.