Vik

' Sometimes, the behavior of something is sufficient for you to recognize what kind of thing it is. For example, the trajectory of a particle in an electric field of known value is sufficient to determine the particle's charge and mass. If those match certain numbers associated with electrons, they are classified as electrons. Would you say that "characteristics" refers to attributes insofar as they are used to classify existents, while "properties" refers to attributes in the context of identity and causality?

I know of the following exceptions to freedom of assembly: infringing upon the free movement of goods or people causing personal injury physically endangering others damaging property national security interfering with proceedings In order to determine whether there are any others that can be put into place without infringing on the right of assembly, it will be necessary to identify the similarities among these exceptions.

``Now, all but two state attorneys general have signed a "friend of the court" brief, to be filed tomorrow, that argues the First Amendment should not apply to some "intrusive and harassing" forms of expression.`` This seems to package speech/assembly against the government with speech/assembly against private citizens. That would be a scary precedent.

"What is knowledge? And what is study, what is observation? It's the discovery of properties in the nature of certain objects, existents, entities. All knowledge consists of learning more and more about the nature - the properties and characteristics - of given objects." ~Ayn Rand, ITOE, pg. 298

1. The error is called "integration by non-essentials". 2. Some forms of empirical evidence are better than others. The individual in question is correct that anecdotal evidence is perceptual-concrete evidence BUT does not grasp that statistically rigorous evidence is better. 3. I suggest education, such as the meaning and use of sample size, margin of error, and the like.

Predetermination means that every action is causally determined by the past environment. This view cannot be reconciled with the Objectivist concept of causality, which is identity-based.

There are problems with his epistemology too: 1) his reliance on the concept of invariance 2) his notion of "objective facts" 3) his view on truth, especially his discussion of "contingency" and "the Least Arbitrary Theory" I will address only the first two as the third is merely a variation of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy. For those who don't know, the analytic-synthetic dichotomy was addressed by Leonard Peikoff in the Introduction to Objectivst Epistemology. But onto Nozick's epistemology... (1) his reliance on the concept of invariance "A property or relationship is objective when it is invariant under appropriate transformations" ~Robert Nozick, Invariance, pg. 79 The language makes me think of "invariance under Lorentz transformations". Nozick even brings up the Lorentz transformations. However, Nozick's invariance has nothing do with trying to formulate a law that applies across certain measurable dimensions. Furthermore, it is very difficult to identify all the factors that an equation will "survive". Who is to say that we haven't overlooked something? Consider the history of the gas laws. Effectively, he ends up demanding omniscience. But let's suppose he's merely drawing a very loose analogy and didn't tell us. Fine. I'll just move onto his characteristization of "objective facts" . (2) his notion of "objective facts" "An objective fact is accessible from different angles, there is or can be intersubjective agreement about it, and it holds independently of our beliefs, desires, and observations. It is because an objective fact is invariant under specified transformation that it has these three traits." ~pg. 90 Let's look at the first characteristic: "An objective fact is accessible from different angles. Access to it can be repeated by the same sense (sight, touch, etc) at different times; it can be repeated by different senses of the same observer" ~pg. 75 Repeatability is nice--if samples are available. Some sciences deal with things that CANNOT be repeated. Consider chemical tests that destroy original samples. As for "different senses", what on earth justifies the idea that facts MUST be accessible by multiple senses?? Do I have to HEAR color as well as see it? Surely not. But then what does he mean? Maybe he believes that data from multiple senses makes the belief more objective. But let's look at the second one: "Intersubjective agreement can be taken as evidence for objectiveness. Different people agree because there is an objective fact that they have access to, and they agree n the results of that access. But there can be intersubjective agreement without an objective fact--everyone else in Salem thinks she is a witch--and there can be objective facts without intersubjective agreement." ~pg. 90-91 "We need to find an objectiveness property such that we can see (at least sketchily) HOW that property produces (or tends to produce) intersubjective agreement" ~pg. 91 If he were just saying that invariance explains agreement, I would be fine with it. But he speaks of "evidence for objectiveness" and invokes the practice of hypothesizing causation. His third characteristic of "objective facts": "it holds independently of our beliefs, desires, and observations. His third characteristic sounds like the Objectivist recognition of the supremacy of reality. But then elsewhere in the book he says: "An objective view of things is valuable, but it is not always what is needed or what will serve us best" So much for Nozick's alleged respect for reality!

Predestination is the result of failing to apply the Law of Identity to action. Predestination makes the following argument: 1. Certain things interacted with X. 2. After that, X does action A. Therefore, the factors caused action A. First, this is an instance of the post hoc fallacy. Second, it ignores the thing performing the action.

"Universe" has a very specific meaning in the sciences. I strongly suggest you avoid it. As an alternative, I propose "totality". "Nature" has to do with the sum of everything as a system of interconnected parts. "Existence and identity are not attributes of existents, they are the existents . . . . The units of the concepts “existence” and “identity” are every entity, attribute, action, event or phenomenon (including consciousness) that exists, has ever existed or will ever exist." ~Ayn Rand, ITOE 74

You mean how we use certain words to narrow the scope of a phrase so that we can classify the sentence, given a set of alternatives: A specific thing exists. There exist members of a class. A specific unit has an attribute. Members of a class have an attribute. A specific thing is a member of a wider category. A class is a subcategory of a wider category.

In the context of "entity-action-object", the word "object" was used to distinguish things appearing in a predicate from things appearing in a subject, as the subject is what unifies predicates. If you're talking about physical existents, the concept of "object" is a species of the concept "entity"

Are you referring to things like: * examples of the concept * reduction of a concept to its referents in reality * chain (or tree) of abstractions down to the perceptual level * list of measurements that have been omitted

The concept of "action" is compatible with the concept of "entity" in the sense that actions are performed by entities. Propositions assert or deny that juxtapositions of "compatible" concepts have correspondence. Their truth depends on both that correspondence AND whether the concepts were defined in terms of essentials What do you think?

We know that a subject specifies an existent or set of units under consideration. We also know that a predicate has to be compatible with the nature of the units specified in the subject. Consider: "Cats meow" asserts that a certain type of action is part of the nature of certain units capable of action. "Cats make arguments" is a false proposition because it specifies an action that is not within the nature of the units specified by the subject. "Cats with sufficiently large wings fly" is arbitrary because it's unwarranted. But it qualifies as a proposition because the genus of flying is action and animals are certainly capable of action. "Whiskers flood vigorously" satisfies the rules of grammar but the genii of the concepts are incompatible. As for language seeming more satisfactory, I think the satisfaction we get stems from the fact that language enables us to think more clearly and more quickly. Specification of units means clarity of subject and speed of accessing conceptual content. It is very difficult to capture the features of a thing when the thing itself hasn't been clearly differentiated.

The idea of "likeness" The idea of "field lines". The idea of light as EM propagation. Would you say an "idea" is what you have before you form a proper concept or proposition? As for the genus of propositions: I'm not taking propositions to be linguistic forms. After all, concept aren't merely symbols associated with arbitrary collections. I meant something else by "declaration" but I can't think of a suitable example. I'll drop "statement" and get at the genus of propositions indirectly. Concepts integrate units. Every concept implies a set of units. Some of those units are different from the others. They are distinguished by certain measurements that were omitted during the process of concept-formation. A particular cat can be viewed as a unit in the set of cats. A particular sofa can be viewed as a unit in the set of sofas. A particular action of scratching can be viewed as a unit as well. These units can be "mentally juxtaposed" in several ways. However, the nature of the existents and actions conceptualized determine the validity of such juxtapositions. Actions are done by entities. It isn't in the nature of sofas to run up to a cat and scratch it. That sort of thing. Also, we aren't talking about scratching as such. We're talking about a specific scratching happening relative to the present. We are specifying the time of the scratching. "The cat scratched the sofa" asserts that the conceived event actually took place. It alleges that a particular entity performed a certain type of action on another, different kind of entity. We conceived of an entity-action-object relationship, and we asserted that it actually took place. "The sofa was scratched by the cat" focuses on the cause of a state of the sofa. We conceived of an object-acted-on-by-entity relationship, and we asserted that it actually took place. So a proposition involves asserting or denying that a relationship among certain units holds for their respective identities. (Again, I don't have a word to designate the genus of propositions, but I know very well that it isn't a linguistic form)

I can see the need for distinguishing most of those, but I'm not sure about "idea". What's the relevance here? Moving onto the others. A "proposition" is a statement that asserts or denies a predication of a subject. A "statement" is any meaningful declaration--including opinions not intended to be either true or false. A "sentence" is any series of words that can be interpreted by a language-capable brain to express something. They can be declarations, questions, commands, exclamations for conveying emotions, etc. "True", "warranted" (vs "arbitrary"), "possible", and "provable" apply to propositions, but they aren't applicable to just any statement. "Warranted" and "possible" designate assessments about the evidence for a conclusion. There is no such thing as a warranted but impossible proposition. Nor is there such a thing as a provable but unwarranted proposition. Suppose a light, wooden board hangs off the edge of a table. If an object of sufficient weight goes across the board a sufficient distance, the board will flip. Suppose a mouse is scurrying across the board. We don't know the weight of the mouse. It's possible that the board will flip, but it's arbitrary to say that it will. The lack of evidence means "arbitrary". But such an event is within the nature of what we know of boards and masses. It is possible. "Provable" designates a judgment about the conditions for drawing a conclusion, given the nature of that conclusion and the channels of information available. If we know the mass of the mouse and the length of the board, including the overhang, we can calculate whether the board WILL flip. THAT proposition is provable. The following morning, we find the board on the floor. The mouse is nowhere to be found. It is possible that the mouse flipped the board. It is warranted that the mouse flipped the board. But unless we have evidence that the mouse reached a location that WOULD flip the board, it is not provable that the mouse flipped the board. So warranted propositions aren't necessarily provable.

I haven't seen that concept of "hypothesis" used anywhere else. I'd like to hear more about it. I've always heard "hypothesis" used more generally, along the lines of "testable proposition held with uncertainty" This is distinct from "postulate", which is a "proposition taken as a starting point, as if it were true, for the sake of demonstrating other propositions" Sometimes, the same proposition serves both functions. For example, the invariance of the speed of light is a hypothesis insofar as it makes predictions. But it's a postulate in the sense of being a foundational proposition in the theory of Special Relativity.

"length" is an attribute, but we don't say "lengthed" or "lengthable". "weight" is an attribute, so is "weighted", but not "weightable" Hm... what's different about the concepts I mentioned... Is it because they have to do with relationships between consciousness and existence while "length" and "weight" designate relationships that do not depend on consciousness?

What do you mean by "operationalized"? By "proposition", I mean a statement that alleges or denies the existence of a conceived state of affairs. "...the function of a proposition is similar to that of an equation: it applies conceptual abstractions to a specific problem" ITOE pg75

They're part of a longer list and a more complicated method for spot-checking my conclusions and evaluating the conclusions of others. But my method isn't rigorous. I think that improving my understanding of them will help me in that at regard. The Objectivist literature has a lot on concepts but very little on propositions. I am even aware of certain "conceptual fallacies" that Rand points out in the works of others, as appears in The Marginalia. I should post something about that too actually.

I'm claiming that the following concepts (among other attributes) are applicable to propositions: 1) truth 2) warrant 3) possibility 4) certainty 5) provability For reference: "Truth" appears in Galt's speech; ITOE pg63, 65, 136, 150; PWNI pg14 "Arbitrary" appears in ITOE pg110 "Possible" appears in LP's lectures and LP's analytic-synthetic essay "Certainty" appears in LP's lectures and PWNI pg14 "Proof" and "prove" appear in Galt's speech; "prove" appears in ITOE pg73 3 questions: Q1: Are these concepts in fact applicable to propositions? Q2: If so, are there any others that Objectivists have commented on? Q3: Is there a better way to think about propositions?

Would you say that "true" designates a recognized correspondence to reality? Would you say that "truth" designates an identification of fact?

Perception justifies propositions. Facts simply are. Truth is the product of an assessment about the factuality of a proposition.

Are we talking about Rand's concepts, different concepts, or are you fishing for our understanding of the concepts? Here is Rand's concept of "truth": "Truth is the product of the recognition (i.e., identification) of the facts of reality. Man identifies and integrates the facts of reality by means of concepts. He retains concepts in his mind by means of definitions. He organizes concepts into propositions—and the truth or falsehood of his propositions rests, not only on their relation to the facts he asserts, but also on the truth or falsehood of the definitions of the concepts he uses to assert them, which rests on the truth or falsehood of his designations of essential characteristics." (Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, p.63) And here is Rand's concept of "fact": "A fact is merely a way of saying "This is something which exists in reality" -- as distinguished from imagination or misconception or error. So you could say "That the American Revolution took place is a fact", or "That George Washington existed is a fact". In the first case you refer to an enormously complex series of events over a period of years. In the second case you refer to just one individual. Both are facts." Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, pg 242 "...when we say something is a fact, we distinguish primarily from error, lie or any aberration of consciousness. And it serves another function: it delimits the concept "existence" or "reality". Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, pg 243 When I plug those into your post, I conclude the following: 1) The clause "of which one is certain" is redundant. If a proposition is true, it's factual. 2) Truth-hood must indeed be assessed, but I wouldn't call it "validation". "Valid" means that a mental product was formed in such a way that it is related to the facts of reality. Truth-hood, however, has to do with correspondence.

Also, the ability to specify quantities that were never measured. Cows jumping over moons come to mind.