[A is A?]

This is the difference between the concept "cat" and the concretes that it subsumes, i.e., the specific cat that you can point at in front of you. A concept is not a concrete it is a mental abstraction that subsumes all of it's concretes that either have existed, currently exist, or will exist in the future.

I'm aware of this. But how can one form a concept that applies to the unperceived if one can only gain knowledge by perception?

Don't pretend you don't understand the concept of cat vs a specific cat either. If you didn't you wouldn't be able to tell the difference between the picture of a cat in the window on Halloween, your own cat, and a mountain lion.

I understand it very clearly.

The only pretending going on here is me pretending to actually take the Objectivist Epistemological doctrine seriously in order to show that if one does, one would not be able to accurately form a concept or to know that the concept is universally applicable because one would be using perception as one's sole means of knowledge.

[A is A?]

The denial of universality is the denial that it is valid to speak of types or classes or kinds, or X's and A's. Everything is unutterably unique and no conclusions can ever be transferred from one thing to another. At root it is the denial that there is such a thing as similarity. But there is similarity. Perception and memory of perceptions gives us similarity directly. Similarity exists, it is valid. Once we are able to name similarity and identify the phenomenon at the conceptual level it is possible to incorporate it into our methods of thought for higher conceptual abstractions where the similarity (if present) is not given directly by perception.

But, by perception alone, all I can know is that those things that I've perceived have similarity to each other. How can I know that anything not perceived will be similar in any way to that which has been perceived?

[A is A?]

From the Ayn Rand Lexicon.

Bold mine.

and

Is this the answer you need or is your question different that what it seems?

Different, but related. I am questioning (challenging) the idea that the axioms (particularly, the Law of Identity) can be validated by direct perception. They may be shown to be evident in each instance of direct perception-- but the idea that they are universally valid cannot be since this requires knowledge of that which is not directly perceived.

The question as follows: IF knowledge comes ONLY from perception, then how can we know ANYTHING (like the applicability of the axioms) concerning that which has not been perceived? In other words, how can we know that contradictions do not exist by perception *alone*?

I say we can't know this by perception alone, but that we can indeed know it- meaning that perception is not the only ground for knowledge.

[A is A?]

Why is it by perception alone? Perception alone, gives you nothing except what you see. By perception alone, you can know nothing.

Because I am attempting to take the doctrine that "all knowledge comes from perception alone" seriously.

So which is it? "All knowledge comes from perception alone" OR "By perception alone, you can know nothing"??

What role does the mind or consciousness play in conjunction with perception? How do you reduce "universally"? By "universally" aren't you implying that knowledge of X applies to every X you have observed, every X is that is, was and will be? Is "universality" an invalid concept? While I cannot isolate precisely why, this line of reasoning reminds me of the analytic/synthetic dichotomy. Your assessment is one that is essentially comes across as empiricist in nature.

Remember- this is a "Reductio" argument. I am taking the Objectivist Doctrine of Epistemology to it's logical conclusion- which does indeed bring you to Empiricism (Locke), followed closely be Skepticism (Hume), and then utter irrationality (Kant).

I am trying to show that this is where Objectivism will lead to if this one small epistemological doctrine is not adjusted properly.

[A is A?]

The same way you know that the knowledge you know to be true about cats, applies to every cat that is, has ever been, and will ever be, even though you have only formed the knowledge from the specific cats you have percieved.

But by perception alone, I don't know that. The only way I CAN know that is by assuming that A=A and therefore that Cat=Cat, universally. But by perception alone, I simply perceive the cat that is right in front of me being perceived.

[A is A?]

Because existence is identity. And how do we know this? Because it is perceptually self-evident and undeniable (i.e. axiomatic.)

Perceptually self-evident? do you mean to say that you have PERCEIVED somewhere that existence is identity? If so, where I can go to perceive this?

OR, did you reason that is such by virtue of the undeniability of it (the axiomatic nature of it)?

If the latter, is it's undeniability/axiomatic nature perceived? If so, where can I perceive it? If not, then you know something (namely that axioms are undeniable) that is not perceived.

[A is A?]

DreamWeaver, you seem to have missed the point of the thread and my question.

I am aware of the Objectivist Theory of Concepts.

IF all knowledge ultimately comes from perception (including the LI),

and if I have not perceived all that can be perceived,

then how can I know that the LI holds universally rather than just among that which I have perceived?

[Objectivism vs. Nominalism?]

For clarification, when I said "essences" I was not just referring to "that which is essential to a thing", but I was referring to any and all "attributes" so that when I was saying that "essences" are metaphysical, I meant that "attributes" are metaphysical.

And if we agree that attributes are metaphysical, then we are "all Realists now". lol.

However, if Oism holds that attributes are epistemological and not metaphysical, then that would be Nominalism.

Additionally, I think I would argue that an essential attribute is not just essential in an epistemological way, but that it is also essential in a metaphyscial way such that if absent or altered, the metaphyic would also be absent or altered respectively.

[A is A?]

No, I'm not gonna do your homework for you and spoon feed you ITOE, wtf? There's no fancy tricks involved, it's really just common sense. In order for reason to work, it requires a framework upon which the investigation can proceed. Simply open your eyes and ears and believe what is in front of you. There is no reason whatsoever to question the validity of the external world or the validity of the law of identity. These are self-evident and do not require justification beyond themselves. The framework necessary for rational investigation cannot itself be rationally investigated the same way. It is impossible to infer their validity from anything beyond themselves, and if you tried to, then reason, logic, and all of philosophy is nonsense (see David Hume for details.)

If I could sit down and ask Rand questions about ITOE, I would. However, I can't, so I'm here.

Again, I am NOT questioning the validity of the law of identity. I am questioning YOUR ground for believing in it's validity. There's a difference.

My ground for its validity is logical necessity- the fact that it cannot not be true, that it cannot be consistently doubted or argued against.

Your (Oism in general) ground is that it is evident in perception.

My problem with the Oist position is that IF it were true, then we could only know that the law of identity holds for that which has been perceived and we would have no way of knowing that it applies to that which has not been perceived.

We can know about things beyond the directly perceivable because of the validity of the senses, Rand's theory of concepts, and the validity of induction.

And what is it in any of those three that gives you information about the unperceived? I know Rand's theory of concepts claims that a concept can be applied to any and all concretes which fit into it, but this begs the question. HOW does one know from what they have perceived that x (the law of identity for instance) can be applied to that which has not been perceived?

Reason is substantive and justified through experience, just as the laws of logic are discovered through experience (as in Aristotle.) If you are confused, try reading OPAR chapters 1 through 4. Take your own advice about not ignoring other people's work.

Yes, knowledge is DISCOVERED through experience- but it is not always validated by experience. If it were, all knowledge would be subjective- based solely in an individual's experience. Think about how you DISCOVERED that 2+2=4 vs. why you know that 2+2=4 is valid. Your discovery of it probably involved gradually adding random things together (mixed with instruction from a teacher or something) while the reason you know that it is true, universally, is because you understand that it must be so. If you based the validity of it in your early childhood experience, then you would be treating it as a subjective belief rather than an objective mathematical fact.

As far as the difference between nominalism and objectivism, nominalism says that there is no mind-indepent relation between concept and particulars, whereas objectivism (which despite what Rand says is a kind of conceptualism as far as I can tell) says that there is a real relation between the particulars (the axes of measurement of their characteristics), but not (as in conceptual realism) a separate existing essence or universal either in particulars themselves or in heaven. It's a psychological abstractionist account of the meaning of universals, and it includes concepts of consciousness, such as "knowledge" and all the normative epistemic root concepts, such as "fact," "belief," "truth," "justification," etc. all of which are gained inductively via abstraction and measurement omission in reality via actual experience and interacting with the external world.

I'd rather pick that up in the thread on Objectivism vs Nominalism, if you don't mind.

If you wanna take down this kind of foundationalism, you have to take down the validity of the senses, Rand's theory of concepts, and the validity of induction without undercutting yourself and collapsing into solipsism and skepticism. Which means you have to use mysticism (e.g. Plato.)

It is not that I want to "take down" any of the above. Rather, I am arguing that they take themselves down (in due time) without acknowledging the vital role of logical necessity in addition to the others. Without accepting the epistemological validity logical necessity, one cannot consistently hold to the law of identity or to reason in general. Those who attempt to hold to the latter apart from the former, have no grounding to the latter and therefore only believe in it by virtue of some sort of pragmatic necessity or blind faith or subjective personal experience- none of which is a safe grounding for logic & reason.

[Objectivism vs. Nominalism?]

Essences are epistemological because they are judgments made by a subject for a purpose. As there is no place for considering the subject and the subject's purposes in metaphysics an essence cannot be metaphysical.

At the first level the essence will be chosen from among the existential attributes of the entities referred to by the concept, but at higher levels an essential can be an abstraction itself and not a pointer to an existent such as an attribute. If some essences are not existential, then essences are not metaphysical.

Your comment "Essences cannot be solely Epistemological because they would not accurately coorespond to reality" completely ignores Randian theory of concepts at the first level, in which the essence is selected from among percepts held in common between the entities integrated together into the concept. Whatever is selected may or may not serve well as an essence but it will always and automatically correspond to reality because it is given by reality via perception.

But what I am saying is that the attributes to which our concepts refer are metaphysical. Yes, we discover them via perception, isolate them via abstraction, and identify them via concepts, but they are metaphysical (real) the entire time. Our epistemological classification may develop and change over time- but it does so based on the metaphysical reality we encounter. Our epistemological classification of "cat" may start out as "furry animal" and progress into "furry four legged animal with a tail" and then into whatever it is today-- but the whole time, everything that is true about cats being cats has always been true, metaphysically and every difference between cats and dogs has been true, metaphysically.

[A is A?]

Why yes, it's called direct realism and the objectivist theory of concepts. I know, weird right? I hear there's this book on Amazon.com even... Maybe you should get two copies, one for you and one for your buddy Alvin Plantinga.

I've heard of Plantiga but I am not familiar with any of his work or ideas. I've also read ITOE (I'm assuming that is what you are referring to) and don't recall coming across "direct realism". In fact, I started another thread asking about the difference between Objectivism & Nominalism (the opposite of realism) because they seem to be saying the same things.

Please explain, though, how one can know "A is A" about the unperceived based in that which has been perceived. I know that the "objectivist theory of concepts" says you can, but I want to get into the details and figure out how and why- because I suspect that objectivists are simply cheating their own system.

[A is A?]

Okay, I see what you're saying.. something like, "It is only an assumption that contradictions cannot exist. Just because they never have, doesn't mean they never will."

Actually, I am saying that something like that is the best one can do using the Objectivist reasoning (the belief that logic is grounded in perception)- IF they are consistent. I, of course, disagree because I realize that logic must have a grounding which allows it to be certainly true at all times and in all situations.

I suppose you cannot know for sure, just as you can't know that the sun will not come up tomorrow. But because of all the reasons I listed "perception, common sense, reason, my own observations, and others' observations," you can be pretty certain the sun will in fact come up tomorrow. If I'm not mistaken, the only way the law of identity has been previously proven is by using examples.. things that are different in any way cannot be the same. Apple 1 might look identical and weigh the same as apple 2, but it may have more seeds, or more water inside of it than Apple 1.

I would say that contradictions don't exist can also be proven by using examples. It's impossible for the sun to rise and fall tomorrow at exactly 8:00. Of course it's physically impossible, but based on "perception, common sense, reason, my own observations, and others' observations," it would be silly to suggest that this is possible. Whether the sun will ever rise and fall at exactly 8:00 is the question that I think you are getting at. ie: "How can we know that contradictions cannot ever exist?" My only answer would be that there's no objective reason, as you said, to think otherwise.

Under this reasoning, the most one could say with certainty is "contradictions most likely do not exist". But, as I stated in my OP, that is very different from saying "contradictions do not and cannot exist"-- which is a necessary assumption to knowing anything. If contradictions are even possible, then one cannot know that anything is "A" and not "non-A" at the same time and same relationship. Every bit of human knowledge assumes that "A is A" is universally valid. If "A is A" is not universally valid, then human knowledge (conceptual knowledge) is impossible.

[A is A?]

With the exception of 2046 and possibly mdegges, no other responders to this thread seem to have fully read or understood my original post and the whole point of the thread- particularly the following paragraph:

"I do not question the validity of logic. However, the ground upon which one validates an idea is crucially important and it seems that Objectivists tend to ground the validity of logic in very intellectual dangerous territory-- such that if one takes Objectivist Epistemology seriously (or, at least, that which is professed by many parts of Oist Epistemology), one cannot also consistently take the laws of logic seriously. So, I want to test that out and reveal what is and is not the proper epistemological grounding for the validity of logic."

Now, if that is difficult to understand, ask clarifying questions. But if you don't understand my position and the intent of my post, don't come out guns-slinging at ridiculous straw men that have nothing to do with anything that I've said.

The inability/refusal to follow an objective line of reasoning among people on a philosophy forum is very frustrating.

[A is A?]

I wonder if you have a specific example in mind. For instance, "how can you say that frogs don't grow on trees if you haven't personally seen every tree in existence?" In this case, I would agree that perception, common sense, reason, my own observations, and others' observations dictate my beliefs. I wouldn't call it faith, because faith is believing in something that cannot be proven, and I certainly don't believe that frogs grow on trees (there is no reason to).

Actually, "A is A" is the main example I'm concerned about. Everything else will flow from that. BTW, I agree that one ought not to believe in something that they have no objective reason for.

A is A can be proven using similiar means, where A is anything with a personal identity. "Each entity exists as something specific, its identity is particular, and it cannot exist as something else. An entity can have more than one characteristic, but any characteristic it has is a part of its identity. A car can be both blue and red, but not at the same time or not in the same respect. Whatever portion is blue cannot be red at the same time, in the same way. Half the car can be red, and the other half blue. But the whole car can't be both red and blue. These two traits, blue and red, each have single, particular identities. The concept of identity is important because it makes explicit that reality has a definite nature. Since reality has an identity, it is knowable. Since it exists in a particular way, it has no contradictions."

What do you mean by "similar means"? I agree with everything in the quote about the law of Identity and it's application to things. But I want to know how an Objectivist justifies their belief that "A is A" universally; that contradictions do not and cannot exist. Is this belief rooted solely in perception? And if so, why ought it not be restrained to that which has been perceived?

[A is A?]

Haha. No. Not a stealth argument for God. Rather, the flaw in Oist Epistemology which I discovered while discussing the issue of God- which flaw, incidentally, I think allows Oists to superficially dignify their atheism. But that's besides the point. I really am concerned about hammering out the Epistemological issue because left un-corrected, it would undermine many great things in Objectivism.

You say that "knowledge of things not perceivable is grounded in thing that are perceivable". How is this justified? I understand that you could have somewhat of a probabilistic justification (i.e. "i've never observed any contradictions and therefore there probably are not any contradictions") but that is VERY different from saying "contradictions do not and can not exist".

AND, how do you know that "knowledge of things not perceivable is grounded in things that are perceivable"? Is that bit of knowledge perceived somewhere?

[A is A?]

Save the sarcasm. If you are unsure as to the nature of my question, ask for clarification.

I'm aware that Identity is an axiom. I am also aware that the other laws are corollaries. But, what do you mean by "perceptually self-evident"? Does it mean that one only knows it is true in what one has perceived (that would seem to be the plain conclusion)? And if so, how does one know that it is true for that which one has not perceived?

Please directly answer my actual, particular questions or provide a quote which directly answers my actual, particular, questions- rather than randomly recommending material which vaguely dances around the general issue.

[A is A?]

What is the Epistemological ground for believing the universal validity of the basic laws of logic (Identity, Non-Contradiction, Excluded Middle). How does one properly validate that "A is A", universally? Can one know that it is true universally or is it only possible to know it about that which one has perceived? If it is only possible to know it concerning that which has been perceived, then how can one know that "contradictions do not exist"?

I do not question the validity of logic. However, the ground upon which one validates an idea is crucially important and it seems that Objectivists tend to ground the validity of logic in very intellectual dangerous territory-- such that if one takes Objectivist Epistemology seriously (or, at least, that which is professed by many parts of Oist Epistemology), one cannot also consistently take the laws of logic seriously. So, I want to test that out and reveal what is and is not the proper epistemological grounding for the validity of logic.

Many (if not all) Objectivists hold that the validity of logic is grounded in perception (along with all other knowledge). However, if this is the case, one can only know it's validity concerning that which one has perceived. If one can know that it is valid concerning that which has not been perceived, where did this knowledge come from and upon what is it grounded? Is it simply believed as a pragmatic necessity? Is it assumed by whim or by faith? OR is there some other form of validating knowledge aside from perception? I obviously would argue that there is.

I want to ask everyone who participates in this conversation to attempt to accurately understand what is (and is NOT) being said in order to avoid straw men, and that everyone attempt to be CONSISTENT with their professed views.

I predict that most (if not all) objections will be the result of failing to do one of the above.

[Objectivism vs. Nominalism?]

I'm sorry that I haven't had a chance to fully check out the referenced material, but I'd like to throw my own personal working theory out in order to get some responses.

Essences cannot be solely Epistemological because they would not accurately coorespond to reality and therefore would be non-sense (Nominalism). Therefore essenses are Metaphysical in some sense.

The exact metaphyscial status of essences need not be known (i.e. Plato's theory of "forms in heaven" or Aristotle's theory of it being in the concretes, etc...)- regardless of in what sense they are metaphysical, they must be metaphysical in some sense.

**By the way, I think this is where people get so riled up about this issue-- thinking that if realism is true, then some particular brand of realism must be true (whether Plato's or Aristotle's or whoever else). Perhaps no one has yet accurately identified the correct "brand" of realism-- this doesn't mean that it isn't true. It is possible to conclude that metaphysical essences are real in some sense without yet knowing in what sense.

Definitions and concepts are attempts (accurate to some degree or other) at identifying the essence of a thing. The metaphysical essence of a thing does not change, but our knowledge and understanding of it does change. This is why definitions can change; not because the essence has changed metaphyscially, but because epistemologically, we have discovered previously unknown information about that thing (information which has been true all along but which we were previously unaware of).

Example:

Man as a "rational animal" is the best description of the essence of Man given our current knowledge. If a "rational spider" were discovered, our definition (description of the essence of Man) would have to change- but the essence of Man didn't change metaphysically.

Metaphysically, everything has an essence. Epistemologically, we don't always know exactly what it is and our understanding of it is gradual.

I don't see how you can hold to any other position without logically leading into some irrational ideas.

Thoughts?

[Refutation of existence of an all powerful being.]

Deep Thought of the Day: Actions are always of (or by) entities acting.

Yup.

And when an entity acts, it either chooses to or it doesn't.

[Refutation of existence of an all powerful being.]

You're considering only beings with volitional consciousness. There are entities capable of self-generated action that do not possess faculties of volition. Like all known living things other than human beings.

When you say "self-generated" here, though, you mean something different from volitional self-generated action. "Self-generated action" which is non-volitional is just a label given to reactionary action which is a reaction to something internal rather than external-- but it's being internal does not negate the fact that it is a REaction.

Unless I'm vastly misunderstanding something, your point only applies to volitional agents, and does not apply to instinct or to involuntary actions (such as scab formation).

Instincts are a combination of REactions to genetics and stimuli. Scab formation (and all other involuntary actions) are REactions to internal (and sometimes external) phenomena.

As I said above, there is no magical third category for non-volitional action which is not a reaction to prior action.

[Refutation of existence of an all powerful being.]

This is the extra step that you continue to make, that I am questioning; that 'choosing to act' and 'acting entirely of its own accord' are always and everywhere one and the same thing, two different ways to reference the exact same group of phenomena. I see no support for the proposition that volition is the only quality of an object that enables it to initiate action, or that "volition" and "the ability to initiate action" are two different ways of saying the same thing. Your argument fundamentally relies on your assumption that you can simply hash together self-directed with volitional as you do, when I am saying that you are importing additional things when you do that; self-directed becomes consciously self-directed when you move to volition.

That's because they do go together. A thing either acts accidentally or on purpose, unintentionally or intentionally, chosen or unchosen, willfully or coerced, volitional or reactionary. There is no possible third magical category for a thing that acts non-accidentally but not on purpose, not unintentionally but not intentionally, not chosen but not unchosen, not willfully but not coerced, not volitional but not reactionary. These are A or Non-A scenarios.

[Refutation of existence of an all powerful being.]

Now why would an entity without the possibility of going out of existence have a "necessity" to "enhance existence"? (enhance along what standard? What is at the negative end of such a standard, if not death?)

It wouldn't have the necessity to enhance it's existence. It would simply have the necessity to act should it desire to enhance existence. And why do you need a negative end to a standard? I'll submit one, but I don't understand the need.

The "negative end" would simply be living a bland, lowest common denominator life as opposed to thriving and enjoying everything possible.

I'd like to point out, though, that I have already demonstrated that the doctrine of "the positive being contingent upon the possibility of the negative" to be contradictory and destructive to all of Objectivist ethics. You're only problem now is that it messes up (slightly) your conception of what the term "life" means.

Certainly life encompasses the concept of non-death, but it is and must be MORE than that.

[Refutation of existence of an all powerful being.]

The point of Rand's drawing attention to the alternative of life and death is not to make the metaphysical case that death makes life possible, but the epistemological point that of the genus entity we can note that the differentia between the animate and the inanimate is this necessity to act to continue in existence.

If you want to reject that distinction then propose a better basis to separate the living and the non-living.

The ability and necessity to act in order to enhance existence.

OR, simply "the ability to act" would suffice.

[Refutation of existence of an all powerful being.]

Think through the alternative: there is no difference between being alive and being dead, the animate and the inanimate can and do both act in the pursuit of values.

Why would my position mean that there is no difference between life and death? Or that the inanimate would act in pursuit of values??

[Refutation of existence of an all powerful being.]

The negative is the absence of the positive,

I completely agree. But the positive is NOT the absence of the negative.

and it IS true that a thing cannot be said to exist in any meaningful way unless there is some conceivable alternative.

Allow me to reword this in order to show the devastating error:

"A thing can only be said to exist in a meaningful way if there is conceivable alternative."

"A is Non-A"

A, only if Non-A.

Life, only if Death.

Pleasure, only if Pain.

How is it nihilistic to say that values presupppose an alternative to life, which is non-life or death?

This assumes that the essence of life is non-death; that the sum total of the meaning of life is avoiding death. It is true that one must avoid death in order to live (and so non-death is a prerequisite) but if there is ANYthing more to life than avoiding death (and all of Objectivist ethics says there is!), then life is possible and meaningful without the possibility of death.

If there is no alternative to being alive then it would actually be true that it doesn't matter what you do. Why is this problematic?

So, you would say that the ONLY reason what I do matters is to avoid death? Do you not have a category for ENHANCING life? for THRIVING? For reaching for the absolute best?

This is very very dis-heartening to me. I sincerely hope that this doctrine is not widespread among Objectivists.