RReLV_FRiSH

In discussing Objectivism's view of axioms, it is helpful (essential, actually) to remember Objectivism's overall view of how *all* concepts are formed, including axiomatic concepts. In ITOE Chapter 1, Ayn Rand writes: "Although, chronologically, man's consciousness develops in three stages: the stage of sensations, the percpetual, the conceptual -- epistemologically, the base of all of man's knowledge is the *perceptual* stage. ... Discriminated awareness begins on the level of percepts." On the role of sensations, Ayn Rand explains [ibid.]: "Percepts, not sensations, are the given, the self-evident. The knowledge of sensations as components of percepts is not direct, it is acquired by man much later: it is a scientific, *conceptual* discovery." Concepts, according to Objectivism, are integrations of percepts -- specifically, percepts of *existents*, with the existents regarded as *units* of a type or kind. The type or kind is an *integration* (essentialization) of the units. [iTOE, Chap. 1] So, if this applies to axiomatic concepts as well as non-axiomatic ones, what is the purpose or function of classifying certain concepts as axiomatic? The term "axiomatic" in Objectivism pertains to the process of *validating* concepts, i.e., of establishing a concept's relation to reality. Axiomatic concepts differ from other concepts in that axiomatic concepts are *perceptual self-evidencies*. [OPAR, p. 8] No "proof" of an axiomatic concept is needed or possible beyond pointing to abundant examples of it (ostensive definition), preferably along with representative "near misses" (instances that closely resemble the concept in question but don't quite qualify), and showing that the concept is axiomatic, i.e., that it identifies "a primary fact of reality which cannot be analyzed, i.e., reduced to other facts or broken into component parts. It is implicit in all facts and all knowledge." [iTOE Chap. 6] OPAR emphasizes the validation issue very succinctly [p. 11]: "The foregoing is not a proof that the axioms of existence, consciousness, and identity are true. It is a proof that they are *axioms*, that they are at the base of knowledge and thus inescapable. This proof itself, however, relies on the axioms. Even in showing that no opponent can escape them, Ayn Rand too has to make use of them. All argument presupposes those axioms, including the argument that all argument presupposes them." In what sense, then, are axiomatic concepts "starting points" for knowledge? Are they to be taken as the exhaustive "givens" for all sorts of deductive chains purporting to derive all other concepts and propositions from the axioms by deductive logic? Clearly not, according to Objectivism. Knowledge -- propositions and concepts -- is derived from observation of reality (ultimately percepts) and integration of those observations into abstractions. In essence, we look at reality and report what we see. It's only when we have sufficient knowledge to begin *proving* various propositions that we discover that all our proofs depend on certain fundamental concepts that we necessarily must accept as axiomatic, inescapably and ostensively verifiably so. The idea of simply looking at reality and reporting what one sees may seem fraught with pitfalls. Prof. John Ridpath once commented to a live audience at a talk on a college campus [i'm quoting approximately from memory]: "As children you probably had total confidence in your sensory-perceptual apparatus; it took a sophisticated 20th Century argument to talk you out of it." Objectivism, however, navigates all the pitfalls astoundingly skillfully. See especially ITOE and OPAR. -------------------- In defense of Reality and Reason, Life and Value, Freedom and Rights, Spirit and Happiness, through epistemology and individualism -- RReLV_FRiSH.

Does the concept of consciousness apply to animals? Objectivists and most other observers undoubtedly would say: "Of course it does. One would have to engage in massive evasion to claim otherwise." Yet I did see a TV program on PBS once that regarded the question of whether or not animals are conscious as a seriously debatable issue. (I think that program was implicitly limiting the concept of consciousness to mean only *human* consciousness, i.e., *conceptual* consciousness.) Assuming that we accept that animals are conscious, then we should ask how we know it. I.e., what objectively observable evidence is our conceptual application based on? Once we understand that kind of evidence, then we ought to be able to see that it *would* be a contradiction to assert that Person Whoever is not conscious if, in fact, he *is* consciousness. Being conscious (or not) is an objectively observable issue. Note that we also routinely use the concept of "sleep," and we apply it to animals as well as humans. What is our evidence for *that* concept, particularly in regard to others, where the evidence is non-introspective? Is there an unstated and unvalidated assumption being promulgated by some (perhaps unwittingly) that being conscious or not is knowable only by introspection? A further note: in addition to asking how we know animals are conscious, we should also ask how we know that plants are not. That is precisely something that primitive pantheistic mystics do *not* know, as they ascribe all kinds of "god-like" qualities to trees, bushes, flowers, etc. --------------- In defense of Reality and Reason, Life and Value, Freedom and Rights, Spirit and Happiness, through epistemology and individualism -- RReLV_FRiSH

Re: Life, Value and Choice This topic ("Beg the Question") and two other closely related topics ("Indestructible Robot" and "Cooties") have been dormant for more than three weeks, but the central issue -- life as the standard of value -- is crucial to the entire Objectivist ethics and politics. It has occurred to me, therefore, that it might be worthwhile to summarize the key issues and answers, as I see them. There are three major issues, in particular, that warrant thorough "chewing": (a) What is the nature of Ayn Rand's argument validating "man's life *qua* man" as the only objective standard of value for man? ( How does her argument establish anything beyond mere physical survival as an objective standard of value? (c ) What is the relation between an individual's *choice* to pursue life or not, and the objective validity of the standard? Here are what I understand to be the key points in answer to these questions: 1. All living things exist within a life-death spectrum. To maintain and advance their positions in that spectrum, they must act in specific ways according to their nature. Inaction leads, by default, toward death, eventually reaching it irreversibly if the inaction persists long enough. The "spectrum" is essentially an identification of one's efficacy for living, one's *capacity* to act in the future, as well as the present result of having exercised that capacity (or not) in the past. 2. There is no objective basis for forming a concept of "value" except in terms of pursuing life, i.e., a living entity seeking to maintain and advance its position in the life-death spectrum. Ayn Rand's validation is essentially an "argument from concept formation." 3. This is the only objective basis for "value" because "value" (in any serious theory of values) presupposes a valuer and a reason for valuing, i.e., "to *whom* and for *what* ... an entity capable of acting to achieve a goal in the face of an alternative." [VOS Chap. 1] The pursuit of life is the most fundamental "for what" that is possible, and it is an end in itself. By the rules of epistemologically proper concept formation (the principles identifying how man's cognitive faculty must operate to gain knowledge of reality) -- principles such as measurement omission, the rule of fundamentality, "Rand's Razor," and the rule against committing the fallacy of the stolen concept -- the pursuit of life is the only valid basis for "value." Conceptually, "pursuit of life" subsumes both maintaining one's present position in the life-death spectrum and advancing one's position, if possible -- i.e, *strengthening* one's life as well as maintaining it. 4. For man, *any* pursuit of life, on whatever scale or level, requires, at minimum, thinking and productive work, over the span of a lifetime. This must be guided by a comprehensive life-furthering *code* of values because man has no automatic knowledge of the actions required by his nature for living. 5. The *standard* of the pro-life code encompasses man's full potential and is independent of any particular individual's choice to follow that code fully or not. It is not because an individual chooses to pursue his life (or not) that the standard is what it is. Conceptually, the standard needs to encompass those who do choose to pursue life to the fullest degree possible to them, as well as those who choose to pursue life to some lesser degree. All human life-seekers need the same basic standard, the same basic code of values; some will simply be unable or unmotivated to follow the code's highest prescriptions unless and until they work at it and advance their positions in the life-death spectrum. 6. Anyone who chooses to renounce life entirely, taking no life-sustaining action at all, is irrelevant to the existence of the others and *their* need for a code of values. There will be no conflict in principle with a death seeker, since a death seeker has no *need* to act at all; only life-seeking can be a basis for the concept of "need." (An "indestructible robot," if one existed, would have no objective basis for any "needs," either.) If a death seeker attacks others, they can rightfully grant him his stated wish to die, if that becomes necessary to end the threat or to retaliate justly for harm already done to others. 7. There is no necessary conflict between life *seekers*, either, if they adhere to the cardinal values of reason, purpose and self-esteem. Human existence need not be a "lifeboat" writ large, in which some can benefit only at the expense of others (although mysticism and altruism inexorably reduce man to just such a state). Man can *create* new wealth where none existed before, and trading with others can be *mutually* beneficial and cooperative, spectacularly so, if the trading partners adhere to a rational code of values. There are numerous excerpts in the literature of Objectivism that I can cite, principally from VOS, GS and OPAR, to support these points. I can discuss these references further in future postings if there is interest. _______________ In defense of Reason and Reality, Life and Value, Freedom and Rights, Spirit and Happiness, through epistemology and individualism -- RReLV_FRiSH.