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What does 'valid' mean?

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I hold 'true' to be a subset of 'valid,' that truth represents validity as applied to conceptual-level statements. A valid statement is a true one, but not all that is valid is an example of 'truth.' Reasoning is valid because it leads to the truth when properly done. Sense data are all valid, but they're not examples of truth because they're not conceptual-level.
I have my standard aversion to the term "sense data", which the rationalists uses to refer to some bizarre thing, like the pictures in the head which the mind perceives. On the other hand, there are "sensations", which give rise to percepts when the mind operates on them and turns them into "data", so can I assume you mean that sensations are valid but not truths?

The problem with your connection to conceptual-level statements that I think it would mean that assertions about concretes can't be true, so "It's John" can't be true or false, because "John" isn't an integration of two or more units into a single abstraction, measurement omitted. I would agree with Peikoff's characterization, that truth is the identification of a fact of reality. A fact of reality could be general (conceptual) or very specific -- refering to just one concrete. But what is essential is that there be an identification by a mind. A sensation isn't an identification by a mind, rather the mind makes an identification (yields a percept) given a sensation.

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"George Bush is president","If George Bush is president then the sky is pink" therefore "the sky is pink" is perfectly valid as an argument, though in the sense of content (particularly the assumptio that "If GB is president then the sky is pink") might be questionable.

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George Bush is president AND the sky is NOT pink. Therefore the implication: if George Bush is President then the sky is pnk is false. If A is true and B is false then A -> B is false where -> means material implication. To use Modus Poens

A, A->B |- B

Both A and A->B must be true.

Which means we cannot detatch (in the sense of infer) a false conclusion from a true premise and a true implication.

Logic 101.

Bob Kolker

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On the other hand, there are "sensations", which give rise to percepts when the mind operates on them and turns them into "data"

That is what I was referring to. I wasn't referring to silly homunculi peering at screens, though on a related issue I do have to watch against flipping over to referring to the biochemical signals as data.

so can I assume you mean that sensations are valid but not truths?

Yes. They're valid because a sensation is always of something, which is an instance of consciousness as being conscious of something. But they are not true because (as you point out) they aren't actual identifications - they're just there, as far as consciousness is concerned.

The problem with your connection to conceptual-level statements that I think it would mean that assertions about concretes can't be true, so "It's John" can't be true or false, because "John" isn't an integration of two or more units into a single abstraction, measurement omitted.

'John' is not a concept, but 'it' and 'is' are. No sentence can be constructed without a verb, and all verbs are concepts. All statements are conceptual level, even if the subject is a concrete and the verb has no complements (eg 'John exists.') Therefore "It is John's" is conceptual level, and true where "it" refers to some piece of my property etc.

JJM

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Why hasn't anyone brought up a dictionary definition? Even though a lot of times dictionary definitions aren't completely accurate, they are usually a decent place to start. For valid I got:

val·id Pronunciation[val-id] Pronunciation Key - Show IPA Pronunciation

–adjective 1.sound; just; well-founded: a valid reason. 2.producing the desired result; effective: a valid antidote for gloom. 3.having force, weight, or cogency; authoritative. 4.legally sound, effective, or binding; having legal force: a valid contract. 5.Logic. (of an argument) so constructed that if the premises are jointly asserted, the conclusion cannot be denied without contradiction. 6.Archaic. robust; well; healthy.

I think 3 is totally out of the question because I have *never* seen valid used to mean "authoritative". In fact, valid has almost become an antonym for authoritative because connotation-wise it is most often used in a negative sense, as in "that is true but not convincing". Example: "Well, yes, that's a valid method for X, but I think this other method is better."

2 sounds like a poor synonym choice to me. You *could* say something was a "valid antidote" but I'm not sure why you would when there are other choices with better connotations like servicable or functional or even effective.

I think the real synonym for valid would be authentic, and when you validate an idea, you authenticate it.

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  • 10 years later...
On 7/30/2007 at 5:58 AM, JMeganSnow said:

I think the real synonym for valid would be authentic, and when you validate an idea, you authenticate it.

Does "objective" have any relevance in this context?

 

On 7/30/2007 at 12:46 AM, John McVey said:
Quote
so can I assume you mean that sensations are valid but not truths?

Yes. They're valid because a sensation is always of something, which is an instance of consciousness as being conscious of something. But they are not true because (as you point out) they aren't actual identifications - they're just there, as far as consciousness is concerned.

My understanding is that a sensation that is not identified, is not "noticed", at least no noticed for long. I read somewhere, that the Indians watching Columbus's ships approaching did not notice them at all. They did not fit in with anything they had ever seen before.

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44 minutes ago, Easy Truth said:

My understanding is that a sensation that is not identified, is not "noticed", at least no noticed for long. I read somewhere, that the Indians watching Columbus's ships approaching did not notice them at all. They did not fit in with anything they had ever seen before.

Assuming the "Indians" never saw anything on that part of the ocean before, it would make more sense that the ships would have been very noticeable, like a some new unaccounted for island or some inexplicable giant sea bird or other creature, clearly never previously seen in that spot and clearly out of place.  I'd take whatever you read with a huge grain of salt.  Post modernists like to say ridiculous things about perception.

Something noticeable and very out of place does not become invisible simply because it is new to one's conceptual framework.  It's something new for sure... and perhaps one cannot identify or fully understand what they are seeing... but is it still is a something which is seen. 

Whether or not and why they did or did not notice the ships is independent of the fact that they never had seen one before...

new things are not invisible... if that were so humans would be literally blind as newborns and would permanently remain so throughout their lives.

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4 hours ago, Easy Truth said:

I read somewhere, that the Indians watching Columbus's ships approaching did not notice them at all.

It's just a very bad explanation of why the natives didn't make a huge deal about noticing the ships on the horizon. It is not a postmodern thing either, the explorers themselves thought that. I doubt anyone believes it though.

It is possible for something to pass by and you fail to notice completely as if it were invisible. It can happen when your attention is consumed by one activity and you subconsciously filter out excess information. It has nothing to do with having knowledge about the thing you didn't notice. I think the point that matters is that anyone can notice anything as long as they are focusing their attention.

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8 hours ago, StrictlyLogical said:

It's something new for sure... and perhaps one cannot identify or fully understand what they are seeing... but is it still is a something which is seen. 

Then I have a fundamental question about the issue of conceptualization. Supposedly, it is not automatic. Yet for anything to come into your "mind's eye", doesn't it have to be categorized as "something". The fact that it is something implies that it has been identified. I can never "see" a particular "nothing" fly by. Any perception has been transformed into a particular/referent of some concept (at a minimum the concept "something").

Or is there an exception with percepts where they are not integrated as "something", yet "known"?

This is an area that is hard to give examples as anything one perceives, at one point was simply an unconnected perception/unidentified at all. (a pre-something). I can only conclude that, by the time I point to anything, it has been integrated as "something" and later with more accuracy something more specific like a table or chair etc.
 

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1 hour ago, Easy Truth said:

Then I have a fundamental question about the issue of conceptualization. Supposedly, it is not automatic. Yet for anything to come into your "mind's eye", doesn't it have to be categorized as "something". The fact that it is something implies that it has been identified. I can never "see" a particular "nothing" fly by. Any perception has been transformed into a particular/referent of some concept (at a minimum the concept "something").

Or is there an exception with percepts where they are not integrated as "something", yet "known"?

This is an area that is hard to give examples as anything one perceives, at one point was simply an unconnected perception/unidentified at all. (a pre-something). I can only conclude that, by the time I point to anything, it has been integrated as "something" and later with more accuracy something more specific like a table or chair etc.
 

Even disparate sensations prior to being integrated are still sensations caused by something, sensations of a something.  Integrating them into perceptions does not transform them into the something itself, the perception is still caused by something (or some things) and hence a perception of something.  One can be aware of the sensations and the perception and know they are caused by something or things prior to identifying what the something is or the somethings are.  

The point is that you know what your senses reveal are aspects of reality... whether it is some flash of light, a cracking sound, or a feeling against your skin... you don't need to know what aspects are causing the sensations or perceptions for you to experience and notice them and know that something out there is impinging on your senses.

Until you have enough sensory information to have identified what caused it the widest concept indeed is "something" caused it.  But once you have full sensory access to it, you can touch it, feel it, see it,smell or taste or hear (as applicable) it, then you come to understand what in reality you are dealing with.  You can then fit it into your hierarchy in any way that makes sense... whether it be a wooden chair or a useless twisted jumble of bent metal...

Sorry, what does this have to do with conceptualization? 

Edited by StrictlyLogical
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I agree with what you have said.

I made a fundamental mistake in assuming that "knowing" meant holding as a concept. And that if you know, then you know "it" as a concept.

I went back in the thread and saw

On 7/29/2007 at 6:19 AM, DavidOdden said:

The problem with your connection to conceptual-level statements that I think it would mean that assertions about concretes can't be true, so "It's John" can't be true or false, because "John" isn't an integration of two or more units into a single abstraction, measurement omitted. I would agree with Peikoff's characterization, that truth is the identification of a fact of reality. A fact of reality could be general (conceptual) or very specific -- refering to just one concrete.

I was confused by the fact that to know that "it" exists, is to know that "it" is "something". To know that "it" is something is to have integrated it as a referent of the concept something. I thought it meant that "it" is a concept, rather than it being a particular of another concept.

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7 hours ago, Easy Truth said:

 

I agree with what you have said.

I made a fundamental mistake in assuming that "knowing" meant holding as a concept. And that if you know, then you know "it" as a concept.

I went back in the thread and saw

I was confused by the fact that to know that "it" exists, is to know that "it" is "something". To know that "it" is something is to have integrated it as a referent of the concept something. I thought it meant that "it" is a concept, rather than it being a particular of another concept.

I really recommend Piekoff's understanding objectivism... your affinity and skill for abstraction ... the best and the best intentions in you ... can fall victim to the academic culture of rationalism .. by a kind of osmosis, and it can infect even the way one thinks.  I really think you are a thinker and I've seen a lot of great posts from you... and I think LPs UO (and his other stuff) would be great inoculation against a tendency of all thinkers to place ideas above reality (rationalism).

cheers!

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SL, I did get the book per your recommendation, came in yesterday. We'll see how much I understand.

Ideally, if people can indicate specifically where I turn toward that direction, it may be helpful to myself and others that may have the tendency.

In this thread, the idea of "valid" and "truth" are inescapably abstract.

I am sitting in a room, with tables, chairs, walls, curtains, shelves, monitors computers and keyboards and other things, I hear cars, the fan and the click of the keyboard, I feel the breeze of the fan, I feel the chair and the floor, I can't identify a smell only air doing through my nose (so there is "nothing" smell). Now, that is true and that is valid. Is it that simple?

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ET

Peikoff describes a process of chewing.  Going up and down the ladder of abstractions from and to concretes... integrating up and reducing and concretizing down... gathering them up again... thinking.... back and forth.. strengthening the structure of your knowledge all the while.

Although you will be tempted to skip some stuff (it gets a bit bogged down at parts) stick with it... don't skip things... you will find some of it quite illuminating. 

Hope you enjoy it!

 

SL

Edited by StrictlyLogical
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