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Voluntary Slavery

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Daniel, I'm sorry, but that is absolutely ridiculous. 
I don't think so. I'm playing devil's advocate to make sure I really understand this.

Secondly, NO INDIVIDUAL HAS THE RIGHT TO TAKE AWAY ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHTS, whether it be by force or by voluntary consent.

The problem is that I would like to understand better WHY if one agrees to it it would still be taking away one's rights rather than an affirmation of them.

Also, as others have commented, a proper government COULD NOT recognize such a contract as an agreement of one person to be enslaved by another.  The purpose of a proper government is to recognize that every individual has the right to their own life (and all of its consequences and corollaries) and protect that right to life. 
Once again, I am in complete agreement, and only want to understand why the protection of the right to life does not include the right to this specific contract.

The government can not recognize a contract in which you give up your right to life.  They can recognize that you are giving your services for nothing in return, but only as long as you choose to continue to do so. 

So suppose the contract says you offer your services for one year? For five years? Ten years? A lifetime? Are any of these valid?

More importantly, my counterargument is that one already made the choice, at the time of the contract, to offer one's services for a lifetime.

I can see someone agreeing to give their services in exchange for some emergency medical procedure, or some other emergency situation, but who in their right mind would want to just give away their right to life?

Only if the doctor were quite the sadist, I suppose. But it's not the concretes that are important, it's the meaning of rights.

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Based on your statements, I believe that your problem may have to do with an incorrect understanding of the concept of rights.

According to the objective (also referred to as natural) theory of rights, an individual has rights according to their very nature as a human being. Thus, nothing can remove the rights of an individual. This is the point that I believe you do not understand.

An individual does not derive their own rights by their whim, but rather by their very existence as a human being.

An individual's right to life can not be taken away by ANYONE. It can not be taken away by a majority, another individual, or by my own choice. My right to life can be violated, but it can not be erased.

According to your statements, one has the right to their own life only if they recognize that they do, since one can easily deny that they have the right to their own life by giving it away to someone else. This is an incorrect view of the concept of a right.

The right to life exists independently of your whim, or the whim of any group or majority.

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I do understand that you are playing devil's advocate.

The key principle to remember here is that an individual's rights exist not because the individual recognizes them, but rather, becuase that individual exists as a human being.

If individual rights were something that can be given away, they would not be objectively validated rights but rather arbitrary/social constructs which are the result of someone's permission (whether that be the permission of the individual, a group, the majority, or a dictator, they all mean the same thing).

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  • 3 weeks later...
Guest Martin Page
"How could the government enforce a contract between two individuals--if one of them does not have the right to make contracts?"

Two issues come to mind:

What about government intervention to save a voluntary slave? Can an individual withdraw consent to be protected from coercian? (Similar arguments might apply to duelling.)

Don't all contracts by implication limit the rights of the contractor? Does this mean that a government should only enforce contracts that it deems fair or wise?

Cheers

Martin

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  • 2 weeks later...
Guest UA Phil Grad Brennan

I ran across this debate browsing the web. Here are some arguments to consider, though I think it needs better articulation than I've given it.

A contract is an exchange of goods between two consenting individuals. It is defaulted unless both parties provide the goods in question. If one party delivers and the other reneges, the first party's responsibility is void and he is entitled to get his part back.

If I contract with you to be your slave in exchange for some x, there is a logical problem. You are to provide me with x in exchange for, well, me. But if I give you myself, then I don't actually get the x. Since you get me, and since ownership is transitive (if I own P and P owns G, I own G), then you keep the x. You haven't delivered. Some problems: Could I then sell myself into slavery in a contract where I exchange myself for a hamburger, only the contract stipulates that you don't take ownership until I have digested said hamburger? Maybe not, still. On one theory of personal identity, I am a 4-d entity wholly present at any moment. If that's true, then you effectively buy my past, and thus take back the hamburger. Then again, we don't want our theory to rest on some shaky metaphysics.

Self-ownership/the right to life (I think they are identical notions; you might not) are usually thought to be inalienable rights. Inalienable means they cannot be transferred or reneged; not by you or me. Cf. Right to my car. I can give that up by voluntary transfer or simply disposing of the good to the "open access commons".

Another idea: If you sell me you, you have to give up control of you. But you can't actually do this. Your mind stays in there controlling things. It's the equivalent of selling me your car but then refusing to leave your car.

Problems: Instead of agreeing to be a slave, could one instead have a valid contract in which one agrees to work unlimited hours doing whatever one's employer wishes for the rest of one's life? It's not worded as being slavery, though it amounts to the same thing. One important difference, though, is that it's not a valid contract unless the employer pays up, and if I am to do whatever the employer wishes, then the contract entails that he can take back whatever he pays at will. So even a sort of double effect attempt to get around my first argument won't work.

Do as you will with this.

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Going back to what started this thread....

Harry Binswanger, in his Harvard debate about selfishness, stated that there is no right to be a slave. Even if a person signed a contract with another making himself a slave, that contract would be void whenever that person wanted to end his slavery.
“Voluntary Slavery” is a contradiction in terms. Slavery denotes force. If you use the word “slave” or “slavery”, you are talking about a situation where non-retaliatory force is involved, and the initiation of force is wrong under all circumstances. So there is no conceivable situation where it would be moral or legal to either initiate force against someone, or be the recipient of it.

If one wants to commit suicide, one has that right. If one wants to destroy one's own property, one has that right. If one wants to be a slave, one has that right. If I sign a contract to be a slave, what exactly is politically wrong with that contract?

There is no contradiction here. Suicide, and destroying one’s property both involve one’s own property. They don’t cross the barrier into anyone else’s property. They don’t involve your disposal of anyone else’s property, or anyone else disposing of yours. Supposedly signing a contract to making yourself a slave is agreeing to let someone eles initiate force against you or your property. You are letting someone cross that line. So I agree with Dr. Binswanger that any contract signed supposedly forfeiting one’s rights, should be null and void. The whole moral and legal point of the sanctity of contracts is to protect you and your property and to keep others from crossing that line.

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Guest UA Phil Grad Brennan

Here's a clarification of my last post.

If you and I have a contract in which we exchange P and Q, we exchange rights to P and Q at the signing of the contract. I might contract with you to buy your car for $500, and the contract could stipulate that I will give you the money now and won't get the car for two weeks (in which time you still use it). BUT, and this is CRUCIAL, I own the car as of the time I give you the money. If you destroy the car in that two week time, you destroy MY car, not yours. The crucial point is that transfer of right occurs at time of contract, not at time of possession.

Now, going back to me selling ownership of myself for a hamburger. We might agree that I will get to eat the hamburger before you may order me around. But while the exchange of possession does not occur at time of contract, the exchange of right does. I sell myself at the same time that you sell me the hamburger. But this makes no sense. Since I give up myself and all my rights (by becoming a slave), you can't deliver your part of the bargain and give me the right to the hamburger, though you can give me the physical object to eat.

So it's in the nature of rights. It's logically impossible to exchange the right.

What this doesn't solve, though, is just giving yourself up as a slave. You can't sell yourself, but could you transfer your right to your self as a gift?

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Most of the arguments here seem to say that a slave contract would be invalid on logical grounds.

However, a master/slave relationship could still exist as a social fact as long as the slave refuses to retaliate or abscond (or is unable to, due to physical circumstances, e.g. a labour camp)

Does this mean that an objectivist society would 'rescue' voluntary slaves, or simply refuse to enforce such contracts?

M

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Guest UA Phil Grad Brennan
However, a master/slave relationship could still exist as a social fact as long as the slave refuses to retaliate or abscond (or is unable to, due to physical circumstances, e.g. a labour camp)

Does this mean that an objectivist society would 'rescue' voluntary slaves, or simply refuse to enforce such contract

The criticism on logical grounds is that slavery "contract" does not meet the necessary and sufficient conditions for a contract, so it can't be enforceable. The resulting situation is not just because it violates just principles of transfer (since it is a bogus contract). (I am using "justice" the way political, not ethical, philosophers do, in which case a unjust state of affairs is something that force may rightfully be used to rectify.)

Now, let's say you act like a slave for the rest of your life, since you refuse to retaliate or abscond. I may or may not be violating your rights depending on how you describe the situation. If the reason you do not retaliate or flee (e.g. in the labor camp) is because you believe that you will be killed, maimed, or harmed for attempting, then you are under threat of force and I am violating your rights. Similarly, a woman who submits to a large armed man's demand for sex is still raped, if the reason she refused to fight back was because she believed the man was going to kill her if she fought back at all. (We will need a reasonableness criterion for her belief, here, which is a complicated story and is not handled well in U.S. law.) Or, if an armed man asks you for your wallet and you give it to him without protest, it still seems he is violating your rights. It would be odd for him to claim that he was not threatening you and just happened to be armed while making the unusual request for your wallet. Again, we need a reasonableness criterion, but the idea is sound, even if it needs to be more precisely spelled out.

So in those cases, you don't really choose to submit any more than a person who is being mugged chooses to submit. (When a man says, "Your money or your life," you could always decide to have him shoot you, right? But, pace Sartre, you aren't making a free choice.) Thus, answering your question, a just society would rescue such a person, just like they would rescue a mugger's victim.

But let's say you choose to act as my slave voluntarily. You could flee and I will not attack you, and you know this. You just decide to hang around and do whatever I tell you to do (maybe you really like me), but could always leave. Perhaps I beat you occasionally, but only with your permission. (Maybe I do it without asking, but you and I both know that if you told me to stop, I would. Similarly, boxers agree to be able to beat each other without having to ask permission to land each jab, but have rules for stopping the beatings.) In this case, you aren't a slave. You are just acting much like a slave. But you are not under the threat of unsanctioned (by you) force, and you and I know this. Plus, if you decide to leave, the State cannot enforce a contract (say by making you return), as there isn't one. Similarly, my fiancee agrees to hang around and will often do things I ask her to do, but if she leaves I don't have a claim of justice against her.

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Harry Binswanger, in his Harvard debate about selfishness, stated that there is no right to be a slave. Even if a person signed a contract with another making himself a slave, that contract would be void whenever that person wanted to end his slavery.

I don't understand this. Doesn't the right to one's life mean one has the right to do with one's own life what one pleases. If one wants to commit suicide, one has that right. If one wants to destroy one's own property, one has that right. If one wants to be a slave, one has that right. If I sign a contract to be a slave, what exactly is politically wrong with that contract?

To Daniel Shrugged - Aug 8, 2003

If men/women did whatever they wanted regardless of who it helped or hindered, anarchy would reign. I'm not aware that Ayn was an anarchist. We teach our children they have rights and responsibilities. Are we incorrect in doing this? According to what you said, we only have rights and not responsibilities. I hate to think what the world would be like if that was the case. Ayn's view of the thinking man was idealistic. I think some men/women do exist that are like the ones she describes in Atlas. On the other hand, reality is that while we'd hope that people would act out of "enlightened self-interest," many do not. Would Ayn have admired Hank Riordon if he ran a company in which he hired the cheapest labor he could get? I doubt it. He hired the best because he wanted the best. He paid them accordingly. A union wouldn't exist in a Riordon plant. It wouldn't have too.

You may have the right to take your own life. But what about the responsibilities to your family and friends and society. Ayn talked about The Virtue of Selfishness. She assumes that if we act in our "enlightened self-interest" it will be good for everyone even though that might not be our intent. I'm not sure that killing yourself is an act of "enlightened self interest." But I guess it depends on whose point of view you're looking at. Once your dead you are no longer capable of thinking and can't be of the mind.

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Duke

The lives of others are not a claim upon your life. The purpose of your own life is not others. As such, no one has a "responsibility" to live because others may want or need him to live (ie Galt does not have a responsibility to live because Dagny, or the world, wants or needs him to live).

As to the rest of your posts, I would say you have much more reading to do on Rand before you can claim to have grasped her philosophy. Most of what you said is warmed over subjectivism.

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Guest Grantsinmypants

What happens if my slave, whom I bought with his consent, accuses me of shooting a man because he saw me shoot a man, and I say that he's lying, and in fact I ordered him to accuse me (for whatever reason)?

You can't have a society that acknowledges that everyone is responsible for percieving and dealing with the facts of reality independently where some people are, consensually or not, ostensibly not.

A "voluntary slave" is not just an oxymoron, it cannot exist within an individualist society.

Grant Williams

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  • 2 weeks later...
  • 3 weeks later...
Most of the arguments here seem to say that a slave contract would be invalid on logical grounds.

However, a master/slave relationship could still exist as a social fact as long as the slave refuses to retaliate or abscond (or is unable to, due to physical circumstances, e.g. a labour camp)

Does this mean that an objectivist society would 'rescue' voluntary slaves, or simply refuse to enforce such contracts?

M

If a person is willing to sacrifice there life to a someone else, that would not give the 'master' any right to allow himself to treat the other person as a slave. The 'master' would still be an individual and an individual cannot violate the rights of anyone individual no matter how much a person wanted to be a slave. People have explained it better here on the board but rights are inalienable, that is they cannot be given away.

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  • 2 months later...

Hello, I am new here, and I gave this same subject some heavy thought after being challenged on another list.

I think we need to recognize the concrete distinctions that must be recognized between a right and the exercise of a right. The right to own property, for instance, is distinguishable from the actual property that we own. The right to life is distinguishable from the actual life. Though someone may dispose of their life or their property, they cannot dispose of their right to life or property.

In other words, rights are inalienable, not because they were given to us by a creator, or because we possess them, but precisely because rights are part of our very nature, our identity. "Voluntary Slavery" is impossible because it is impossible to divorce ourselves from our own natures. We don't possess rights as much as our rights are a part of us.

I won't go as far as saying that we "are" our rights, but our rights definitely are an unremovable part of us. In order to remove them, you would have to remove the mind in its entirety -- we would have to lose our identity.

Lobotomy anyone?

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Though someone may dispose of their life or their property, they cannot dispose of their right to life or property.

Welcome mOzart, you came to the right place.

I am hard pressed to find anything you have said to be untrue, but I think the post as a whole is imprecise enough on the topic to be somewhat misleading. I don't think you can correctly say what I know you want to say without doing so with both pertinent meanings of the word "right" on the table.

The first meaning I refer to is the most obvious, which is the political right to life that is here and commonly regarded as inalienable. But that is true only in a narrow context. Far less common is consideration of the fact that it is possible for men to live outside of a society, and when they do, they have no political rights at all.

Such situations would include individuals or families or small scattered groups of men living on a remote island, in a remote jungle, in an area isolated by some cataclysmic event (man caused or natural), and someday, small random groups that wander off to this planet or that or wherever man is able to survive on his own.

In that context, force is not managed by a system of reciprocal agreements (political rights) among men, because there are not enough men to make up a third party sufficient to enforce them. Force is managed rather individually by each individual's system of moral rights (and wrongs). When governments are formed, it is these moral rights (moral code) that are institutionalized in the form of a government.

Consequently, it is ultimately only those moral truths that are inalienable (when and if they are accurately defined), and not the manifestation of those truths in the form of political rights. You can be alienated from your political rights in two ways: 1) you can move out of a society, or 2) you can violate the rights of another. Every Objectivist devotee knows that the use of force in self defense is morally sustainable, because one cannot violate a human right without implicitly denying the concept altogether. Meaning, one may not violate the right to life of another and then claim a right to his own life.

I have encountered in a recent thread, some Objectivist wannabe's who deny this explanation of self defense on the grounds that rights are inalienable and cannot therefore be forfeited. That is the danger of being imprecise in the way the preceding post is. They failed to distinguish between the moral truth that is not inalienable, and the contingent promise based on it (political right to life) which is alienable.

I still use the expression "our rights are absolute and inalienable", but always aware of the contexts in which that can be said, and able to explain it when necessary.

PS:

"Voluntary Slavery" is impossible because it is impossible to divorce ourselves from our own natures.

Voluntary slavery is impossible, because it flies in the face of the law of identity. You cannot act according to your will (voluntarily) and contrary to your will (involuntarily qua slave) simultaneously.

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The first meaning I refer to is the most obvious, which is the political right to life that is here and commonly regarded as inalienable. But that is true only in a narrow context. Far less common is consideration of the fact that it is possible for men to live outside of a society, and when they do, they have no political rights at all.
While I understand what you are saying, I am not sure why its relevant. I am not discussing political rights or politics at all, but the moral/meta-ethical considerations. Whatever political rights we have within a society are only justifiable because of the natural rights we have before we even consider the political side.

For instance, if I live in a society where I am considered ownable, it doesn't constitute an override on the meta-ethical problems related with ownership of a sapient being. It only means that the political right is contrary to the ethic that can be objectively derived. The right doesn't go away just because there is no social institution to enforce it, and in the absence of such an institution a violation of a right remains in identity a violation of a right. It only ceases to be a violation of existing law.

Consequently, it is ultimately only those moral truths that are inalienable (when and if they are accurately defined), and not the manifestation of those truths in the form of political rights.

I think I agree with that, if I understand what you are saying correctly. But I am not sure that we draw the line at the same place -- I consider rights to be a function of our nature as thinking, self-conscious creatures. So although I agree that the political isn't the natural, I am not speaking to political rights at all, only the natural.

I am speaking strictly from a meta-ethical perspective. Its useless to say that its impossible to become a slave in political systems as we all know its possible and happens regularly. Its certainly possible to become a slave outside of a political system. When someone speaks to the metaphysical/epistemological contradictions involved in a moral premise, as I was, they are usually speaking to the nature of morality (meta-ethics), not the nature of law (politics).

If I were to apply "rights" strictly in a political context, wouldn't I have to refer to those as merely "privileges"? The assumption is that the right is what is given, which is something I can't agree with except for in respect to positive or particular rights by contract. Since rights are an aspect of my identity, wherever I go they go -- they are hypostasis of my very being. Political rights have to do with being inside a certain jurisdiction, and are not enforceable outside of that.

In any case, politics as a branch of philosophy must come *after* metaphysics, epistemology, and meta-ethics (in that order), and are only justified to begin with on those grounds. When discussing philosophy, I rarely get into the political branch itself unless that is the target of the subject.

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Voluntary slavery is impossible, because it flies in the face of the law of identity. You cannot act according to your will (voluntarily) and contrary to your will (involuntarily qua slave) simultaneously.

Thank you. I agree with that. Its still not entirely what I was trying to say, but its probably put in better terms for the aspect of it that I was trying to express.

Instead of going into what I think on the subject myself, I am going to pose this question differently, using different terms -- in hopes of having this broken down into concretes, and hopefully categorizing the concepts themselves into the proper philosophical branch.

The terms "voluntary" and "slavery", specifically the concepts they represent, cannot exist together because they are contradictory, which you duly noted. The only way the terms can co-exist is if one or both of them lose their meaning and their combination represents a different concept (such as "dry ice", which is at best redundant when considered as adjective/noun combination but not so when it represents a new concept altogether).

Now let's take the term "voluntary debt". I can take on debt, voluntarily, through the exchange of values, or even by just sheer agreement to give to another, by contract (such as contributing to a charity). Let's say I make such a contract to give money to a charity, and then welch on it. The debt is a real debt -- it is by contract. It is no longer voluntary, because I don't want to give it, but there is no moral reason why I can't be forced to do so based on the contract. Any such force used to secure the terms of the contract is responsive, not an initiation, even though I am no longer meeting those terms voluntarily.

So now let's apply this to slavery in general, or let's just use a different word -- "servitude". Let's say that I sell my servitude for the rest of my life (the end of my life being the delimeter) and I do so by contract. Obviously its not slavery, because the servitude was given of my own free will. Now let's say that, ten or twenty years down the road, I change my mind. I want out of the contract.

Maybe I can pay the price of the contract, but a lifetime of servitude is equivalent to a lifetime of earnings -- which means the servitude would, outside of direct control, continue in all of my outside work just to pay the debt. In any case, is the contract enforceable. If not, why not?

As functionally speaking, this situation isn't different from slavery in any meaningful sense, because someone else owns my servitude, and the contract exists showing that it was at least originally voluntary, I think that this is closer to the question that was originally being asked.

I can easily intuit that its impossible for the contract to continue, because servitude cannot be sold. But intution isn't enough -- I want to understand why from an objective perspective. Hence, I have to avoid the political distinction altogether and deal with the ethical one in answering this question: If one contract for an amount of servitude delimited by a specific date justifies the moral response to force, then why doesn't the other one which is delimited by the end of my life?

So -- is permanent servitude by contract morally possible? I say it isn't, and I at least attempted to say why. Its not just a matter of "voluntary" and "slavery" being incompatible concepts, its a matter of differentiation from a moral perspective of two situations becoming involuntary, and only one justifying the moral use of force. If our rights aren't properties of our being, and thus natural, and even thus can be sold, then it seems irrelevant if the servitude is still voluntary or not -- your voluntarism no longer belongs to you. If our rights are properties of our being, and thus natural, voluntary or not, our voluntarism is part of us, and cannot be sold, separated, alienated from us.

Which do you think it is, and why?

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Rights are moral principles sanctioning freedom of action in a social context (AR). They are a necessary precondition for Man to exist qua man - as a rational animal. Where qua man is the good, is recognized as such, and is followed, man exists qua man; where not, not. As such, rights are inherent in the nature of Man.

Being inherent, it directly follows that they are inalienable in, universal to, and equitable among all men. Any supposed right that is denied to some people, that can be seized from some people, or that is applied unequally to some people, is not a right but some other kind of privilege, perhaps legal sanction, perhaps sanction of the crime syndicate.

In violating another person's rights, one in effect rejects morality in totality and cannot claim it in defense of himself; he denies that what he violated is not universal by denying it even to one peron - ergo, he claims that what he violated is not a right, and that there are no rights. In reality, the rights are merely violated, not removed; but the violator has given up any claim to the sanction of morality. That is the nature of forfeiting one's own rights.

Slavery is simply existence not qua man. As a slave, one does not think and one does not follow his own mind and his own faculty of reason; one merely follows the dictates of some other master, be it species-inherited instinct or another man. To differentiate from Homo sapiens, the precursor species Homo erectus was a slave: it did not exist qua man.

Voluntary slavery is by definition giving up the only thing that makes one human. It is suicide, but worse. Enforced slavery is a slow attempt to murder a person as well, a process of eroding his ability to act of his own will, to exist by his own mind, to be Man qua man. Of course it is immoral. Voluntary slavery is perfectly possible: one need only move to the jungle and proceed to immitate the apes. However, voluntary slavery while keeping the mind intact is impossible. Giving up one's freedom to act forces one to give up his freedom to think. As said, it flies in the face of identity: one cannot exist qua man after giving up existence qua man.

"Voluntary debt" of the entire product of one's mind for any specified period of time is by definition complete and utter slavery for that time. One cannot exist as a rational animal without existing by being a rational animal - by consuming the product of his own mind - and so one cannot pretend to exist qua man for the duration of the servitude. As such, if one "wants out", he has been reneging on his debt the entire time by not abdicating his humanity and has been alive in secret, always thinking and acting by his own mind. It is like trying to commit suicide continuously for twenty years and playing dead whenever anyone walked into the room, and then waking up and deciding that "hey, it just wasn't worth it."

It may be possible to die metaphysically for a specified period of time while the body stays alive, and then to be reborn metaphysically into the same body - ie, to be a slave for a specific period of time. But during that time, it is physically impossible to think "hey, I want out."

One cannot sign a contract for the entire product of his mind for a duration of time and expect both to follow it and remain metaphysically alive. One of course can sign a contract for a specified and delimited product, such as for a hundred shipments of a good or for a medical service.

In answer to your question, complete servitude (ie giving up the entire product of one's mind, or slavery) is possible. Only, one ceases being human.

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Rights are moral principles sanctioning freedom of action in a social context (AR). They are a necessary precondition for Man to exist qua man - as a rational animal. Where qua man is the good, is recognized as such, and is followed, man exists qua man; where not, not. As such, rights are inherent in the nature of Man.

I don't disagree with you. In fact, it was the attempted point in my original post. The reason I re-stated the question was to try to understand why getting into the nature of law was necessary at all in a subject that is in the realm of meta-ethics.

I think you answered it very well.

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