Your thoughts on Hume's case against induction?

[DavidOdden]

Why should it be valid?  My argument is the rejection of a positive.

I don't understand your answer. I presume you hold that if you did not know of the facts disproving the sun and swan claims, you should still reject the conclusion. That would mean that no statement "all X's are Y" can be valid, and that the only valid statements are cataloguing statements like "All X's that I have observed have turned out to be Y", with no claim that this knowledge has value for future observations. Surely (?) that's not what you're arguing.

[Eddie]

y Feldblum: “The way you used the prhase "nature is uniform" - ie, which concept you were referring to - does not resemble in the slightest the way Betsy used it. "Nature is uniform" means things act predictably, ie, according to their nature…”

When I say “nature is uniform” I mean it pretty much as you say it, that things act in a predictable way, that nature exhibits uniformities across space and time, etc. Using this principle, we are able to make general statements about swan colour, future sun risings and a myriad other things.

E

[Eddie]

Betsy: “I don't see why that should be so. It is the nature of the objects which account for the relationships between objects including the forces between them. I relate differently to men than to women and I relate differently to people than I do to billiard balls.”

So do I, but I was referring to how science goes about quantifying causation. Merely investigating the nature of billiard balls won’t tell you how they act. For that one must carry out experiments of balls in action, and while their “natures” – weights etc – are a necessary feature of such experiments, these are only meaningful in the context of actions and the relationships between the objects in question.

We clearly hold to different views on the nature of causation, but what is significant here is that neither view can be logically validated merely by observation, since such observations are based on those very same views.

Betsy: “The Objectivist view, on the other hand, explains what things are by investigating and discovering what things are resulting in conclusions that are as certain as "A is A."

The issue we’re discussing here is whether induction is a logically valid procedure. We seem to be back to identity, which is where we started on this one (which may itself be a sign that there’s some circular reasoning going on), so it looks like a case of agreeing to differ. Thanks for the discussion.

E

[y_feldblum]

David Odden, I reject the argument of the form: "X yesterday; X today; ergo X everyday; ergo X tomorrow;" or: "this has X has Y; that X has Y; ergo all X has Y; ergo this other X has Y." The first "ergo" does not follow, because it is deduction, invalid as it is, trying to masquerade as induction. But, I do not need reason to reject it: I need evidence that it is valid, evidence for the positive assertion, before I will consider trying to prove that it isn't.

[DavidOdden]

David Odden, I reject the argument of the form: "X yesterday; X today; ergo X everyday; ergo X tomorrow;" or: "this has X has Y; that X has Y; ergo all X has Y; ergo this other X has Y."  The first "ergo" does not follow, because it is deduction, invalid as it is, trying to masquerade as induction.  But, I do not need reason to reject it: I need evidence that it is valid, evidence for the positive assertion, before I will consider trying to prove that it isn't.

Of course the fourth step is irrelevant so it should be dropped. As I said in the previous point, the premises needed to get to the third line are insufficient (though necessary), and with those premises included (the most important being that all of the observations noncontradictorily integrate at the conclusion) the integration is valid.

I don't see in what way this masquerades as a deduction. Inductive generalization is not a deduction.

[Betsy]

Betsy: “I don't see why that should be so. It is the nature of the objects which account for the relationships between objects including the forces between them. I relate differently to men than to women and I relate differently to people than I do to billiard balls.”

So do I, but I was referring to how science goes about quantifying causation.

You don't necessarily need to quantify causally relevant characteristic(s) of entities. You just need to show they are causally relevant.

Merely investigating the nature of billiard balls won’t tell you how they act. For that one must carry out experiments of balls in action, and while their “natures” – weights etc – are a necessary feature of such experiments, these are only meaningful in the context of actions and the relationships between the objects in question.

Well, yeah. Carrying out experiments is how a scientist investigates the nature of billiard balls -- or any other entity -- whose characteristics, actions, and relationships he is trying to understand.

We clearly hold to different views on the nature of causation, but what is significant here is that neither view can be logically validated merely by observation, since such observations are based on those very same views.

My goal is to identify the characteristics of the entity which account for the characteristics, actions, and relationships I am trying to understand. What is the goal of YOUR observations?

Betsy: “The Objectivist view, on the other hand, explains what things are by investigating and discovering what things are resulting in conclusions that are as certain as "A is A."

The issue we’re discussing here is whether induction is a logically valid procedure. We seem to be back to identity, which is where we started on this one (which may itself be a sign that there’s some circular reasoning going on),

So what! There only two possibilities here. Either an inductive conclusion reduces to an identity, which means it is logically valid, or it reduces to a contradiction, which means it is logically invalid. Modern philosophers accept the latter, and call it "falsifiability," but reject identification, dismissing it -- totally unjustifiably -- as "circular reasoning." Why?

Identification is the essence of valid induction.

so it looks like a case of agreeing to differ. Thanks for the discussion.

Giving up so soon?

[Eddie]

Betsy: “You don't necessarily need to quantify causally relevant characteristic(s) of entities. You just need to show they are causally relevant.”

At least as far as science is concerned, in order to show causal relevance, one must quantify those characteristics in the standard scientific way. What other procedure do you have in mind for demonstrating causal relations?

Betsy: “Either an inductive conclusion reduces to an identity, which means it is logically valid, or it reduces to a contradiction, which means it is logically invalid. Modern philosophers accept the latter, and call it "falsifiability," but reject identification, dismissing it -- totally unjustifiably -- as "circular reasoning." Why?”

The principle of identity tells us that a thing is what it is. As such, it is uninformative regarding the content of the external world. Take the identity statement A is A, or more accurately, A=A. The content of A can be anything from tables and chairs to gods and unicorns, and yet the statement remains valid.

Since the identity principle cannot distinguish between fantasy and reality, it has no value as a check on empirical generalisations, although it is invaluable for ordering our thoughts. As to why it is circular reasoning, the expression of the principle -- a thing is what it is – demonstrates its circular character.

Betsy: “Giving up so soon?”

Not at all. I could see your argument was faltering, and my chivalry got the better of me, so I was offering you the opportunity of a graceful exit.

E

[Betsy]

Betsy: “You don't necessarily need to quantify causally relevant characteristic(s) of entities. You just need to show they are causally relevant.”

At least as far as science is concerned, in order to show causal relevance, one must quantify those characteristics in the standard scientific way. What other procedure do you have in mind for demonstrating causal relations?

In order to show causality, you need to learn enough about the entities in question to show how your inductive conclusion reduces to an identity. In some sciences, like physics, the process involves mathematics. In other sciences, like medicine or psychology, much less so.

Betsy: “Either an inductive conclusion reduces to an identity, which means it is logically valid, or it reduces to a contradiction, which means it is logically invalid. Modern philosophers accept the latter, and call it "falsifiability," but reject identification, dismissing it -- totally unjustifiably -- as "circular reasoning." Why?”

The principle of identity tells us that a thing is what it is. As such, it is uninformative regarding the content of the external world.

Not true. We learn a lot in the process of reducing down to a thing's identity. We learn that something is what it is, what it actually is, why it is what it is, and how it is what it is. The entire process of knowledge-seeking, in all areas of investigation, is an attempt to discover what things are.

Take the identity statement A is A, or more accurately, A=A.

Wrong! "A = A" is not the Law of Identity. "A=3" is the same as "3=A" but "All mothers are parents" is NOT the same as "All parents are mothers."

The content of A can be anything from tables and chairs to gods and unicorns, and yet the statement remains valid.

Valid, where? In a word game or in reality?

Since the identity principle cannot distinguish between fantasy and reality, it has no value as a check on empirical generalisations, although it is invaluable for ordering our thoughts.

For those of us who know how to distinguish between fantasy and reality by reference to sense data, that is not a problem.

As to why it is circular reasoning, the expression of the principle -- a thing is what it is – demonstrates its circular character.

So?? Why is it invalid? If you investigate a thing, trying to find out what it is, and you finally get to the point where you can say, "THIS is what it is," you've learned something and accomplished something.

[Fred Weiss]

...The principle of identity tells us that a thing is what it is. As such, it is uninformative regarding the content of the external world...Since the identity principle cannot distinguish between fantasy and reality, it has no value as a check on empirical generalisations, ...

If the laws of physics tell you that a cow cannot jump over the moon, i.e. that the identity of a cow is such that it lacks the propulsive force to break through the atmosphere of the earth, you don't regard that as "informative regarding the content of the external world" or as a fact which distinguishes between a fairy tale and reality?

Modern philosophy tells you that it is not a (logical) contradiction to assert that a cow can jump over the moon. All you have to do is ignore (and contradict) everything we know in the process of uttering such a pronouncement. The essence of such a view is that - logically - there is no distinction between cartoons and fairytales and actual reality. It is in fact the outright denial of the Law of Identity (and its corollary, the Law of Causality) which lies at the heart of modern philosophy and has severed the relationship of logic to reality - leading you to say things like logic has nothing to do with reality.

What Betsy is saying is that once you know the identity of something, it necessarily determines - *logically* if you will - what it can and cannot do. In other words we reside in a universe governed by Identity, not in a Walt Disney cartoon - or in a mystical world subject to miracles.

No, just knowing that everything has identity doesn't tell you what that identity is. That in every instance we have to discover. But once discovered and known...then it is discovered and known. And that knowledge cannot be ignored...cannot *logically* be ignored. Well, except at your peril.

To grasp this principle, stand in front of an oncoming speeding train and wish - wish as hard as you can - that it won't smash you to smithereens. Or stand in a cow pasture and wish that the cows - any cow - will on your behalf jump over the moon. In fact even if you wish very hard, none of them will even be able to jump the fence.

Such is the Law of Identity applied to "empirical reality".

Fred Weiss

[DavidOdden]

What Betsy is saying is that once you know the identity of something, it necessarily determines - *logically* if you will -  what it can and cannot do. In other words we reside in a universe governed by Identity, not in a Walt Disney cartoon - or in a mystical world subject to miracles.

<nitpick>

Buttinsky here. I don't think that your knowledge of a thing's identity has any influence on what it can and cannot do. But it does determine whether you know what it can and cannot do. This is why bumblebees were able to fly, for I suppose hundreds of millions of years, before we sorted out the physics of bumblebee flight.

</nitpick>

[Spearmint]

No, just knowing that everything has identity doesn't tell you what that identity is. That in every instance we have to discover. But once discovered and known...then it is discovered and known. And that knowledge cannot be ignored...cannot *logically* be ignored. Well, except at your peril.

(I was away for a week while moving house, sorry for not replying to the questions directed to me earlier, I'm going to read over this thread during the next few days)

I have trouble with this "knowing the identity" of something, since it doesnt seem to actually escape Hume's argument, it just keeps repeatedly moving back levels without actually stopping. There doesnt seem to actually be a way to determine somethings identity without observing how it interacts with other objects, which entails the sort of 'billiard ball' casuaiton that Hume wrote about. This point was raised in the appendix to IOE, at which point Rand admitted she didn't actually have an answer ("The problem of induction is hard; I havent thought about it enough yet to know for sure", to paraphrase from memory).

Let's take something concrete: in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Hume used the example of a loaf of bread. We know that the bread nourishes humans, but we don't know why (remember this was written in the 18th century before scientists had an understanding of the human body). Therefore, we have no justification for believing that bread will nourish humans in the future, other than the fact that it has always done so in the past. We cannot observe the necessary of the casual connection between 'eating bread' and 'being nourished' - all we observe is the bread being eaten and a human being nourished afterwards - we dont actually perceive whatever it is that binds these events together for all time in a casual manner. This leads directly to the problem of induction

I think you would now say that this may have been correct at the time Hume made the argument, but now we know more about the nature of bread, and can hence give a casual reason why it nourishes humans, in terms of the physical processes involved - ie how the bread breaks down in the body and its nutriants are absorbed etc etc. In this way we reduce the question to one about the identity of the bread. But Hume would claim that you have just moved the problem back a level without actually solving it - he would now assert that you have no reason to assert that these physical processes consitute a law of nature. Again, all you observe is one process occuring after the other without perceiving any necessary connection between them - you have no more determined the casual link or idenitified the identity of bread than you had before, when you simply observed someone being nourished after eating bread.

The problem could then be moved to an even lower level, viz to the nature of these phyiscal processes themselves. The bread is composed of atoms as is the human body, and the reason that bread nourishes humans can be found from observing how atoms interact. In other words, the problem reduces to a question about the nature and identity of atoms. Hume would now say that since you dont actually know the identity of atoms you are back to square one, and have no grounds for asserting that bread will nourish humans, other than that you have always observed a temporal connection between 'eating bread' and 'being nourished' (or between 'bread being broken down', and 'insulin levels in the body rising', or between 'atom A interacting with atom B', and 'atom B doing something', depending on what level you are explaining things at) - in otherwords you dont actually _know_ the identity of the bread, and have no way of finding it out other than by observing the bread interacting with something and producing a result, which Hume's entire argument is designed to show is subject to the problem of induction. In other words your view of agent casuation reduces to one of 'billiard ball' causation when it comes to actually working out what the idenity of an agent actually is.

No, just knowing that everything has identity doesn't tell you what that identity is. That in every instance we have to discover. But once discovered and known...then it is discovered and known. And that knowledge cannot be ignored...cannot *logically* be ignored. Well, except at your peril.

To grasp this principle, stand in front of an oncoming speeding train and wish - wish as hard as you can - that it won't smash you to smithereens. Or stand in a cow pasture and wish that the cows - any cow - will on your behalf jump over the moon. In fact even if you wish very hard, none of them will even be able to jump the fence.

I could imagine that had this conversation occurred 150 years ago, some people might have been devout that the identity of metal precludes it from flying through the air. They might point to Newton's law of gravitation as being proof that flying machines made out of metal are impossible, and would argue that the reason for this lies in the identity of metal, which they had determined inductively. They would probably have called anyone who disagreed an 'irrationalist', and facetiously challenged them to jump off a mountain while holding a bit of metal to find out if it flew. The problem isnt to do with things actually _having_ identity - of course everything has identity. The question is how you can determine the identity of something in a foolproof way.

[Betsy]

I don't think that your knowledge of a thing's identity has any influence on what it can and cannot do. But it does determine whether you know what it can and cannot do.

That's the whole point.

Hume granted that we can see what things have done, but claimed that we can never know WHY they do it nor predict whether they would do it in the future.

[Fred Weiss]

<nitpick>

Buttinsky here. I don't think that your knowledge of a thing's identity has any influence on what it can and cannot do. But it does determine whether you know what it can and cannot do. This is why bumblebees were able to fly, for I suppose hundreds of millions of years, before we sorted out the physics of bumblebee flight.

</nitpick>

Yes, you're right. A bit more than a nit since I had let some "primacy of consciousness" slip into my formulation.

But it is nonetheless important to emphasize in this context that our knowledge, once firmly established, i.e. once we have achieved certainty, and if it therefore constitutes an identification of metaphysical necessity (what Betsy is calling "knowledge of identity"), does impart logical necessity. That is, it then does become a contradiction to deny it.

Fred Weiss

[Fred Weiss]

...There doesnt seem to actually be a way to determine somethings identity without observing how it interacts with other objects,...

That's probably true. So? I don't believe anyone is saying otherwise.

Let's take something concrete: in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Hume used the example of a loaf of bread. We know that the bread nourishes humans, but we don't know why (remember this was written in the 18th century before scientists had an understanding of the human body). Therefore, we have no justification for believing that  bread will nourish humans in the future, other than the fact that it has always done so in the past.

You are really changing the terms of the discussion by bringing in the (indefinite) future, which would presuppose omniscience. Even given conditions in Hume's time and the knowledge of the human body and nutrition which was not yet known, he should have been able to acknowledge the necessary connection between eating bread and nourishing the human body. Starving people survived after eating it. Starving people without it died. Without knowledge of Vitamin C they knew that eating lemons and limes prevented scurvy. They knew there was "something" in them which prevented it.

I could imagine that had this conversation occurred 150 years ago, some people might have been devout that the identity of metal precludes it from flying through the air.

Given the knowledge of the time, they would have been correct.

Fred Weiss

[Capitalism Forever]

I could imagine that had this conversation occurred 150 years ago, some people might have been devout that the identity of metal precludes it from flying through the air.

I would have offered them to settle our disagreement by tossing a coin.

[AshRyan]

The principle of identity tells us that a thing is what it is. As such, it is uninformative regarding the content of the external world.

Are you kidding? It tells us plenty about the external world--namely, that a thing is something definite, i.e. has definite attributes, and (via its corollary, the law of non-contradiction) that a thing is not something other than what it is. (These are pretty important points, seeing as how many influential philosophers have asserted the opposite). The two of them together, along with the axiom of consciousness, imply that things in the external world are knowable.

Take the identity statement A is A, or more accurately, A=A. The content of A can be anything from tables and chairs to gods and unicorns, and yet the statement remains valid.

Sure, if you take the principle as a purely formal principle of logic, and not as a more fundamental metaphysical principle.

Not at all. I could see your argument was faltering, and my chivalry got the better of me, so I was offering you the opportunity of a graceful exit.

Her argument was faltering? This must be a joke.

You claim that induction is invalid. Since all of the premises for deductive arguments must ultimately be gotten by induction, that means that all knowledge is invalid. But if so, that would certainly imply to all of your claims, including your argument that induction is invalid.

In other words, your argument is a classic example of the fallacy of the stolen concept. As soon as you denied induction (not to mention causality), you automatically lost the argument. So your "chivalrous" gestures are just funny--albeit in a kind of sad way. Let's hope you've taken this opportunity to exit yourself--as gracefully as is still possible to you.

[Betsy]

I have trouble with this "knowing the identity" of something, since it doesn't seem to actually escape Hume's argument, it just keeps repeatedly moving back levels without actually stopping.

So what? Omniscience is not the standard and we can know and learn much about a thing without knowing everything about it. When we do induction, we have a problem to solve or a question to answer and when we know enough to solve it or answer it, we can stop. Why am I so sleepy? I stayed up too late last night. Why do people like Peter Keating and the Dean at Stanton act that way? They're second-handers. Etc.

There doesn't seem to actually be a way to determine somethings identity without observing how it interacts with other objects, which entails the sort of 'billiard ball' causation that Hume wrote about.

That's just false. You can often determine something's identity by taking it apart.

This point was raised in the appendix to IOE, at which point  Rand admitted she didn't actually have an answer ("The problem of induction is hard; I haven't thought about it enough yet to know for sure", to paraphrase from memory).

Ayn Rand didn't have a solution to the Problem of Induction. Other Objectivists -- including me -- have been thinking and writing about induction for many years.

Let's take something concrete: in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Hume used the example of a loaf of bread. We know that the bread nourishes humans, but we don't know why (remember this was written in the 18th century before scientists had an understanding of the human body). Therefore, we have no justification for believing that  bread will nourish humans in the future, other than the fact that it has always done so in the past. We cannot observe the necessary of the causal connection between 'eating bread' and 'being nourished' - all we observe is the bread being eaten and a human being nourished afterwards - we don't actually perceive whatever it is that binds these events together for all time in a causal manner. This leads directly to the problem of induction.

I think you would now say that this may have been correct at the time Hume made the argument, but now we know more about the nature of bread, and can hence give a causal reason why it nourishes humans, in terms of the physical processes involved - ie how the bread breaks down in the body and its nutrients are absorbed etc etc. In this way we reduce the question to one about the identity of the bread.

That's right. Now that we have reduced it to an identity, we can be certain that bread nourishes human -- why, how, under what conditions, etc.

But Hume would claim that you have just moved the problem back a level without actually solving it - he would now assert that you have no reason to assert that these physical processes constitute a law of nature.

The original goal was proving that bread nourishes humans. That has been done. No fair moving the goal post back and claiming we didn't score a touchdown.

Again, all you observe is one process occurring after the other without perceiving any necessary connection between them -

That's because the whole idea of "processes" connected by a "necessary connection" is a false view of causality which leads nowhere.

you have no more determined the causal link

There isn't one.

or identified the identity of bread than you had before, when you simply observed someone being nourished after eating bread.

But we have!

Now we know what characteristic(s) of the bread make it nourishing when eaten by humans.

The problem could then be moved to an even lower level, viz to the nature of these physical processes themselves.

What for? The original problem was solved. You can move on to investigate further, but you don't have to.

The problem isn't to do with things actually _having_ identity - of course everything has identity. The question is how you can determine the identity of something in a foolproof way.

There's no way to foolproof any product of human thought. People have free will and can choose to be fools.

[Fred Weiss]

...You claim that induction is invalid.  Since all of the premises for deductive arguments must ultimately be gotten by induction, that means that all knowledge is invalid. 

I'd call that an epistemological knockout punch.

The fact that philosophers claim that valid deductive arguments can be made with totally arbitrary premises (which Objectivism rejects) doesn't effect your point. Even if one grants that assumption, so now they are left with arguments based on invalid premises leading to meaningless conclusions.

Fred Weiss

[Betsy]

Given the knowledge of the time, they would have been correct.

There's an equivocation here.

Metal doesn't fly through the air and it never did. Some things made from metal fly.

If men 150 years ago had claimed that the identity of metal prevents things made from it from flying, what facts could they cite to prove it? How could they reduce "Things made from metal can't fly" to an identity? They couldn't. It would have been an unsupported -- and an unsupportable -- assertion then and now.

[Eddie]

Betsy: “In some sciences, like physics, the process involves mathematics. In other sciences, like medicine or psychology, much less so.”

I was using the term “quantify” in the broadest sense. After all, Rand considered that all concepts, including those of psychology, involve some form of measurement omission, and such omission implies the existence of measurements.

Betsy: “Wrong! "A = A" is not the Law of Identity. "A=3" is the same as "3=A" but "All mothers are parents" is NOT the same as "All parents are mothers."”

Exactly, and this should be a clue to the fact that we’re dealing with different types of statements. The latter, of course, are statements of predication, not identity, and your “the same as” test highlights this very fact. If a statement fails this test it cannot be an identity statement.

Betsy: “If you investigate a thing, trying to find out what it is, and you finally get to the point where you can say, "THIS is what it is," you've learned something and accomplished something.”

When you investigate a thing, you are assuming, first, that a particular bundle of sense-data are in fact a discrete, specific object, and secondly, that the thing in question is what it is. Without these identity assumptions, you can’t even begin the process of investigation. As you say, the information that you gather can tell you what a thing is, but it won’t tell you that it is what it is.

E

[Eddie]

Fred: “If the laws of physics tell you that a cow cannot jump over the moon, i.e. that the identity of a cow is such that it lacks the propulsive force to break through the atmosphere of the earth, you don't regard that as "informative regarding the content of the external world" or as a fact which distinguishes between a fairy tale and reality?”

If it’s the laws of physics that tell us that a cow cannot jump over the moon, then, sure, that sort of knowledge is informative. But if you tell me that cows cannot so jump because that’s the nature of cows, you haven’t been very informative about cows.

Fred: “What Betsy is saying is that once you know the identity of something, it necessarily determines - *logically* if you will - what it can and cannot do. In other words we reside in a universe governed by Identity, not in a Walt Disney cartoon - or in a mystical world subject to miracles.”

Who said anything about Disney or miracles? Leaving aside the implication that knowledge determines reality, you’ve also slipped in a bit of reification, or even anthropomorphism. What is this Identity that “governs” the universe? Is it omniscient, omnipotent etc, or is it merely some sort of caretaker?

Fred: “To grasp this principle, stand in front of an oncoming speeding train and wish - wish as hard as you can - that it won't smash you to smithereens.”

You’re confusing philosophy with psychology. Wishes have nothing to do with either logic or reality. If one regards the “law” of identity as primarily a convention of thought, then of course one will not confuse mind and external reality. One can then apply the laws of physics and act appropriately around speeding trains.

E

[Eddie]

AshRyan: “You claim that induction is invalid. Since all of the premises for deductive arguments must ultimately be gotten by induction, that means that all knowledge is invalid. But if so, that would certainly imply to all of your claims, including your argument that induction is invalid.”

I said that induction is a logically invalid procedure. That doesn’t invalidate knowledge of the external world, nor does it render the conclusions of deductive arguments invalid, merely more or less provisional. What we are seeking in the acquisition of empirical knowledge is a true description of the world. We cannot conclusively claim that our current descriptions really are true (and Rand allows for this with her ‘contextual’ certainty) but we can test for falsity. A description that is found to be inadequate can be replaced by another, via a process of conjecture and refutation.

In other words, what we are seeking in knowledge is the ability to make predictions about the way the world works. In that case, the accuracy of our knowledge is borne out by the success of our predictions, rather than resting solely on antecedent evidence. Therefore, it is not necessary to rely on induction to make generalisations about the world.

AshRyan: “In other words, your argument is a classic example of the fallacy of the stolen concept. As soon as you denied induction (not to mention causality), you automatically lost the argument. So your "chivalrous" gestures are just funny--”

Since I haven’t based knowledge on induction, as above, then I haven’t stolen the concept. As for “chivalrous gestures”, that was a lighthearted response to Betsy’s dig about giving up so soon. Nothing more.

E

[y_feldblum]

When you investigate a thing, you are assuming, first, that a particular bundle of sense-data are in fact a discrete, specific object, and secondly, that the thing in question is what it is.

Just so. Only it's not assuming.

The validity of the senses is axiomatic: the thing in question is what it is, axiomatically.

The perceptual level is the given: the discrete, specific object that you observe is the discrete, specific object that you observe - unquestionably, as an irreducible primary -, whether or no you later analyze that perception to find the particular items of sense-data which it comprises.

[Betsy]

Betsy: “In some sciences, like physics, the process involves mathematics. In other sciences, like medicine or psychology, much less so.”

I was using the term “quantify” in the broadest sense. After all, Rand considered that all concepts, including those of psychology, involve some form of measurement omission, and such omission implies the existence of measurements.

Measurement is not the same thing as quantification. Quantification means assigning a numerical value -- a quantity -- to something. I can measure justice and happiness, but not quantify them.

Betsy: “Wrong! "A = A" is not the Law of Identity. "A=3" is the same as "3=A" but "All mothers are parents" is NOT the same as "All parents are mothers."”

Exactly, and this should be a clue to the fact that we’re dealing with different types of statements. The latter, of course, are statements of predication, not identity, and your “the same as” test highlights this very fact. If a statement fails this test it cannot be an identity statement.

Predication is identity. When you say "Mary is a parent," you are saying something about the identity of Mary. (You are not saying everything about the identity of Mary and that is why it is not an equality. A thing is all its qualities and not just some of them.)

When you investigate a thing, you are assuming, first, that a particular bundle of sense-data are in fact a discrete, specific object, and secondly, that the thing in question is what it is.

The fact is that percepts, i.e., sensations automatically integrated as the awareness of entities, are the form in which you perceive external entities. Are you doubting you are capable of perceiving reality?

EVERYTHING that is, is something specific. EVERYTHING is what it is. The only other option would be that it is what it isn't.

Without these identity assumptions, you can’t even begin the process of investigation.

... and neither can YOU.

As you say, the information that you gather can tell you what a thing is, but it won’t tell you that it is what it is.

It certainly won't tell you that it is what it isn't.

[Betsy]

Fred: “If the laws of physics tell you that a cow cannot jump over the moon, i.e. that the identity of a cow is such that it lacks the propulsive force to break through the atmosphere of the earth, you don't regard that as "informative regarding the content of the external world" or as a fact which distinguishes between a fairy tale and reality?”

If it’s the laws of physics that tell us that a cow cannot jump over the moon, then, sure, that sort of knowledge is informative. But if you tell me that cows cannot so jump because that’s the nature of cows, you haven’t been very informative about cows.

This is all backwards. It is wrong, and the essence of Rationalism, to start with an abstraction and attempt to deduce what reality must be. The actions of cows are not deduced from the laws of physics. A real scientist looks at cows and observes what they do and how they do it.

What is this Identity that “governs” the universe? Is it omniscient, omnipotent etc, or is it merely some sort of caretaker?

It is simply the way things are -- they are what they are. Do you disagree?

If one regards the “law” of identity as primarily a convention of thought, then of course one will not confuse mind and external reality.

Since you do regard the law of identity as primarily a convention of thought, then of course we will not confuse what is in your mind with external reality.