Existence is Identity

[Randall]

I've been re-reading OPAR, and was confused by the claim that existence is identity, but yet they remain as different concepts. Peikoff claims that it is common practice in Philosophy to use two concepts to explain the same existent, to provide for different angles. I can't find any examples of the use of this technique, and why it's a valid technique. Perhaps I'm thinking of it too much like a computer program, where if a=1 and b=2 and you set a=b, then b is 1? Essentially, my question comes down to: how can two concepts be identical and different at the same time?

--Randy

Edited October 7, 2007 by Randall

[Nate T.]

Do you have the 2nd edition of IOE? There's a section in the workshop discussion in the last third of the book that deals with the exact issue of "existence" and "identity" being different concepts with the same referents.

[intellectualammo]

Essentially, my question comes down to: how can two concepts be identical and different at the same time?

Those two axioms "existence" and "identity" are inseparable but *not* identical. They merely consider one fact, the same fact, from different perspectives or aspects.

All "existence" says is that something exists - but - this fact implies "identity", because "identity" says that it exists, that an existent exists. Existence as such says *nothing* about the nature of an existent, only that something exists.

Why, one might ask, use two concepts to identify one fact? [...] When men have several perspectives on a single fact, when they consider it from different aspects or in different contexts, it is often essential to form concepts that identify the various perspectives. (bold mine)

[existence]this axiom does not tell us anything about the nature of existents; it merely underscores the fact that they exist.

'Identity' indicates not that it is, but that it is.

Edited October 8, 2007 by intellectualammo

[Nate T.]

Peikoff claims that it is common practice in Philosophy to use two concepts to explain the same existent, to provide for different angles. I can't find any examples of the use of this technique...

I remembered an example of two concepts with the same referent which are distinct by the method of their formation: "chordate" and "renate", meaning organisms having spines and hearts, respectively. These concepts are justified by their importance in classification in biology. However, it happens that every chordate is a renate and every renate is a chordate. This doesn't mean that having a spine is the same thing as having a heart, though.

[JMeganSnow]

There are thousands of terms in English that take the same referents from slightly different angles. Look up just about any word in the thesaurus and you'll see what I mean.

[Randall]

Do you have the 2nd edition of IOE? There's a section in the workshop discussion in the last third of the book that deals with the exact issue of "existence" and "identity" being different concepts with the same referents.

I'll check IOE for this. Thanks for the tip.

[Randall]

Those two axioms "existence" and "identity" are inseparable but *not* identical. They merely consider one fact, the same fact, from different perspectives or aspects.

All "existence" says is that something exists - but - this fact implies "identity", because "identity" says that it exists, that an existent exists. Existence as such says *nothing* about the nature of an existent, only that something exists.

Intellectualammo, I appreciate your reply. I do understand those things. But the idea is that existence is identity (as stated in the book), which means existence = identity. But they're not. Perhaps I'll understand it better after researching IOE.

--Randy

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

I've been re-reading OPAR, and was confused by the claim that existence is identity, but yet they remain as different concepts.

Think of it in terms of to be is to be something: to be (existence) is to be something (identity). What this means is that once something exists, it has an identity. This applies to anything in particular and to all of nature as a whole (existence as one thing or one place, so to speak). Given the nature of existence, it would be impossible for there to exist something which is not something; it would be impossible for something to be without it having identity. However, identity is not something separate from the fact that it exists. Unlike a big mistake of Aristotle and the Alchemists, there is no essence of something making it what it is that (by implication) can be removed and placed into something else, thus making it that original something (i.e.one cannot transmute lead into gold by removing the essence of gold and placing it into lead, since there is no such identity essence existent or stuff).

It is basically one fundamental fact understood from two different perspectives: that it exists and that it is something; and the understanding that one cannot have one without the other. Something that does not exist has no identity, and in order for it to exist it must be something. The two are inseparable metaphysically in much the same way that the roundness of a coke can cannot exist without the coke can (or some other round object); to be a coke can is to be round, flexible, red, silver, etc. and one cannot have these attributes without the coke can (or something like it) existing.

[Randall]

Think of it in terms of to be is to be something: to be (existence) is to be something (identity). What this means is that once something exists, it has an identity. This applies to anything in particular and to all of nature as a whole (existence as one thing or one place, so to speak). Given the nature of existence, it would be impossible for there to exist something which is not something; it would be impossible for something to be without it having identity. However, identity is not something separate from the fact that it exists. Unlike a big mistake of Aristotle and the Alchemists, there is no essence of something making it what it is that (by implication) can be removed and placed into something else, thus making it that original something (i.e.one cannot transmute lead into gold by removing the essence of gold and placing it into lead, since there is no such identity essence existent or stuff).

It is basically one fundamental fact understood from two different perspectives: that it exists and that it is something; and the understanding that one cannot have one without the other. Something that does not exist has no identity, and in order for it to exist it must be something. The two are inseparable metaphysically in much the same way that the roundness of a coke can cannot exist without the coke can (or some other round object); to be a coke can is to be round, flexible, red, silver, etc. and one cannot have these attributes without the coke can (or something like it) existing.

Thomas, just to clarify, I understand the concept that is being put across. I understand existence, and identity, and how they are inseperable. However, it is the concept of saying two concepts are the same when they are different concepts. I don't see how that is logically valid. The square peg is not fitting into the round hole for some reason.

[DavidOdden]

However, it is the concept of saying two concepts are the same when they are different concepts. I don't see how that is logically valid.

I don't understand the source of the confusion. The "things" are the same, but the concepts are not. Remember that a concept is not the things themselves, it is the mental units (which is why one concept can refer to the same existents as a different concept, because the concepts differ in their mental focus. Not referent). Hence the concept "apple" is not the same thing as an actual apple, or all actual apples. Actual apples are tangible fruits, the concept "apple" is a mental object lacking in real taste or crunch.

[Bold Standard]

The use of two or more concepts to explain the same existent from different angles is common practice in philosophy. Often, philosophers use the adverb "qua" to emphasize that this technique is being used. "Qua" means "in the capacity of." Thus a philosopher might discuss "existence qua existence" when referring to existence from the angle of existence, or "existence qua identity" to discuss existence from the angle of identity.

To use a different example, consider the concept "man." The most essential definition of man is "the rational animal," so when discussing man in this respect, one might say "man qua rational animal," or, since it is the most essential definition, simply "man qua man." But man is also other things. Man is the only animal that talks, for example. So when discussing man in this regard, one might say, "man qua vocal animal," etc. There were some Greeks who observed that man is a featherless biped and considered this to be important, so they might discuss "man qua featherless biped."

Each of those concepts could have its own word if it were considered important enough.

Look through any thesaurus and you will find many slightly or sometimes significantly different concepts for the same type of entity (especially in sections for nouns).

I've been re-reading OPAR, and was confused by the claim that existence is identity, but yet they remain as different concepts. Peikoff claims that it is common practice in Philosophy to use two concepts to explain the same existent, to provide for different angles. I can't find any examples of the use of this technique, and why it's a valid technique. Perhaps I'm thinking of it too much like a computer program, where if a=1 and b=2 and you set a=b, then b is 1? Essentially, my question comes down to: how can two concepts be identical and different at the same time?

--Randy

[Leonid]

Those two axioms "existence" and "identity" are inseparable but *not* identical. They merely consider one fact, the same fact, from different perspectives or aspects.

All "existence" says is that something exists - but - this fact implies "identity", because "identity" says that it exists, that an existent exists. Existence as such says *nothing* about the nature of an existent, only that something exists.

To be is to be something. Entity cannot be nothing in particular. How you separate thing from its shape,size,colour,smell? All these things constitute an entity,make it exist.

[intellectualammo]

To be is to be something. Entity cannot be nothing in particular. How you separate thing from its shape,size,colour,smell?

Existence only shows that something exists, that it exists. In OPAR, Dr. Peikoff points out that existence as such does not tell us anything about the nature of the existent (the shape, size, color, smell), only that it exists. That's what "identity" is for.

All these things constitute an entity,make it exist.

They don't *make* it exist. They are attributes, they are the nature of the existent, which existence as such says nothing about. Existence only says that something exists. Identity is what talks and has something to say about the nature of an existent/entity.

Edited October 17, 2007 by intellectualammo