Does free will contradict Objectivist causality?

[Tenure]

Your valuable contributions will be sorely missed.

[Capitalism Forever]

Now if someone actually wanted to make a valuable contribution, I would be interested in the definition of the word "deterministic."

[KendallJ]

Tenure, normally I am up for a "good debate," but the problem here is that you've utterly failed to comprehend my post. It would take a post of approximately essay length to attempt to unravel the twisted strings which somehow connect your reply to the actual content of my post. On top of that, most of the content of your replies was absurd. Discourse is impossible under such a circumstance so I'm not going to reply.

That's odd, my response was going to be almost identical to Rory's (save his usual British wit ). So maybe the issue is with a failure to make your point clear, else a failure on your part to understand his reply. Those are also relevant possibilities. I'm wondering why you eliminated those from considerations.

I usually find that critical issues are actually very easy to summarize in a few sentences, so I'm always intrigued when someone starts out with the "You're so confused it would take too long to explain it to you." (which by the way is nothing more than argument from intimidation). Maybe with a few more posts under you belt and a reputation for honest debate, the exasperation would fly, but right now it's mostly just rude.

If you post again, I'll ask the mods to split the thread into the debate thread where it soooo obviously belongs, based upon your tone, and substance.

[Freddy]

I'm not going to start a long debate here, however the original essay linked to in the first post do point out a substantial issue which have not been addressed, and I think it can be worth pointing it out. The point of the essay is that there is some incoherence in the way Objectivism uses the law of identity to derive the scope of determinism. This quote from the essay contains the whole problem:

As far as metaphysical reality is concerned (omitting human actions from consideration, for the moment), there are no 'facts which happen to be but could have been otherwise'... Since things are what they are, since everything that exists possesses a specific identity, nothing in reality can occur causelessly or by chance. The nature of an entity determines what it can do and, in any given set of circumstances, dictates what it will do.

The latter part of the quote says in effect that all entities are subsumed under determinism, and the only premise used is the law of identity: "since everything that exists possesses a specific identity", thus there is no room for exceptions. Yet, the first part says that humans are not determined.

Determinsim is the following position:

Determinism is the theory that [an etities actions are] necessitated by previous factors, so that nothing could ever have happened differently from the way it did, and everything in the future is already pre-set and inevitable.

We can call the negation of this undeterminism, thus when the actions of an entity are not completely necessitated by previous factors, then the entity is undetermined. An action caused by free will is undetermined, thus there is at least one cuased and undetermined system in the universe, thus there is no necessary contradiction in being caused and undetermined. So a particle or whatever acting caused and undetermined cannot be ruled out by the law of identity alone, contrary to the explicit assertion in the quote above above.

[KendallJ]

The latter part of the quote says in effect that all entities are subsumed under determinism, and the only premise used is the law of identity: "since everything that exists possesses a specific identity", thus there is no room for exceptions. Yet, the first part says that humans are not determined.

And you don't think that parenthetical "(omitting human actions from consideration, for the moment)" might not be just a wee bit relevant to context?

You're confusing the nature of an entity with previous factors in your discussion of "undetermined".

Edited November 3, 2007 by KendallJ

[Capitalism Forever]

We can call the negation of this undeterminism

That would be a very ill-advised choice of words. The negation of determinism is causality applied to humans--and that is because determinism is the negation of causality as far as humans are concerned.

An action caused by free will is undetermined

See, this is why it is not a good idea to use such names. First you use the word "undeterminISM" refer to an idea--a philosophical view--then, before you know, you begin to use a related word, "undeterminED," to describe actions and entities. "The negation of socialism is anti-socialism. This means that all individuals are anti-social." Can you fail to see the fallacy in THERE?

All actions are determined--determined by the entity that acts, and none other, when the entity acts, and not before.

[Freddy]

And you don't think that parenthetical "(omitting human actions from consideration, for the moment)" might not be just a wee bit relevant to context?

Yes of course, that why I said that the incoherence is contained within the quote. The latter part contradicts the first part. Look what the latter part says, and look specifically at what grounds it gives for exceptions:

1) "Since things are what they are, since everything that exists possesses a specific identity."

Can you make an exception for humans here? Doesn't humans posses a specific identity?

2) "[...]The nature of an entity determines what it can do and, in any given set of circumstances, dictates what it will do."

And this is determinsm restated, the specific outcome is necessitated by previous factors. And since 2 is supposed to follow from 1, then that leaves no ground for free will, because 1 leaves no room for exceptions. Thus the argument doesn't work.

Edited November 3, 2007 by Freddy

[Freddy]

That would be a very ill-advised choice of words. The negation of determinism is causality applied to humans--and that is because determinism is the negation of causality as far as humans are concerned.

You are stepping ahead here. First let's change the vocabulary a bit:

Determinsm is when when an outcome is completely necessitated by previous factors.

Differism is when when an outcome is not completely necessitated by previous factors.

Do you agree that this is a valid distinction?

Objectivism would say that a tennis ball is subsumed under determinism, while humans are subsumed under differism. On what ground do you claim that humans and only humans can be subsumed under differism. Why is any other system in the universe precluded?

[RationalBiker]

Why is any other system in the universe precluded?

The proper question would be; why is any other known system in the universe precluded?

However, in reverse; why must one system be deterministic just because all other known systems are?

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Determinism is when when an outcome is completely necessitated by previous factors.

Differism is when when an outcome is not completely necessitated by previous factors.

There is no need whatsoever in making up words here in this discussion. The reason some people cannot grasp the distinction between volitional man and non-volitional matter is that they are thinking about causality in terms of something acting on something thereby giving a specific reaction action. That is not the Objectivist understanding of causation.

An entity is what it is, and it acts the way it does because it is what it is. This is true for man and it is true for everything else in the universe. An entity's identity -- what it is -- determines what it will and can do, not the prior conditions. In other words, there is no causal separation between man and other things under this view of causation -- everything and anything is what it is and acts the way it does because it is what it is. Man being what he is gives him the capability of deciding what to do; however, once the decision is made, even man can only act one and only one non-contradictory way. Even for man, once the choice is made, he cannot do and not-do in the same way and in the same respect. One cannot reply and not-reply to this post. If you decide not to reply, then you won't; if you decide to reply, then you will.

Likewise for everything else in the universe, including sub-atomic quarks -- they cannot act x and not-x at the same time in the same respect. Why? Because it exists -- even it is something. And one can't say that it is something such that it is not something -- i.e. that it has some indeterminate nature, and therefore can act in a contradictory manner.

I sometimes think that the issue of determinism versus non-determinism is a canard for those who want to claim that the universe is not understandable -- to them. Maybe they can't help not knowing things because they are determined not to know anything. I like the way that came out!

So, in a nut shell, man cannot be subsumed under determinism because he has free will, and even non-man cannot be subsumed under determinism in the sense that it, too, acts the way it does because it is what it is; rather than acting that way due to prior conditions.

Due to these issues, I prefer not to even use the term "determinism" and instead use the term causation; especially since in English it is a little vague what being determined to do something means. For a man, he can be determined to make an issue clear; however, he is not determined to do this. Likewise, an egg is determined to become hard boiled; even though it is not determined to do this.

See what I mean?

[Freddy]

The proper question would be; why is any other known system in the universe precluded?

First of all, I'm not making the claim that humans are subsumed under determinsm. I'm trying to clarify a valid point made in the essay linked to in the first post in the thread. When Peikoff (I think) is trying to derive the scope of determinism, he is using an argument from the law of identity that implies determinism for humans as well.

I suppose the answer to your question above is that humans are the only known entitiy with free will and that free will is the only known exception to determinsm. I'm fine with that, you are basing your conclusion on observations. But this is not what Peikoff does in the qoute I gave, he bases his conclusion on the law of identity alone, and that just cannot work.

[Freddy]

There is no need whatsoever in making up words here in this discussion. The reason some people cannot grasp the distinction between volitional man and non-volitional matter is that they are thinking about causality in terms of something acting on something thereby giving a specific reaction action. That is not the Objectivist understanding of causation.

You claim that no non-volitional matter is subsumed under differism. Is that correct? If so, then exactly on what grounds are you basing this conlcuion. Observation or something else?

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

You claim that no non-volitional matter is subsumed under differism. Is that correct? If so, then exactly on what grounds are you basing this conclusion. Observation or something else?

I'm saying that Objectivism is a new philosophy, which requires a new way of thinking about everything. We reject determinism as the proper grasp of causation because it comes right out and says that man does not and cannot have volition. So, as an improper concept not related to actual existence, the term "determinism" is out. And this would include any concept that is supposed to be anything other than determinism -- i.e. "differism." One cannot have a definition that means everything other than what I just named. That is, one cannot have the concept "red" and then claim that everything that is not red is ned (short for not-red). "Ned" in this case is clearly undefinable as it has no referent. Similarly, "differism" has no referent.

So, we can say there is causation, because everything acts according to what it is.

According to prior usage, then, one can say that there is either causation or nausation.

[KendallJ]

2) "[...]The nature of an entity determines what it can do and, in any given set of circumstances, dictates what it will do."

And this is determinsm restated, the specific outcome is necessitated by previous factors. And since 2 is supposed to follow from 1, then that leaves no ground for free will, because 1 leaves no room for exceptions. Thus the argument doesn't work.

This is the part where you should have paid attention to the second part of my post, and where you are incorrect. This statement is NOT determinism restated. Maybe "circumstances" is too close to "dictates" in the above statement or the comma is not clear.

Determinism

Previous factors (i.e. actions of other entities on an entity) -> actions of an entity

Objectivism

A entity's nature -> actions of an entity

If you look at the quote from OPAR that I posted earlier, you'll see that Peikoff already allows for mutliplle forms of "causation" within the law of identity. And in fact, that is all that this statement you've pulled also says. Determinism is not "derived" from the law of identity. That would be rationalistic. The nature of things, i.e. looking about at reality, would tell us the particulars. Soo, if you want to show us an entity that is neither deterministic nor volitional, that would be your proof, and I'd be happy to discuss it. Regardless, such a thing would still have a specific nature, and still act according to it.

[Freddy]

The problem the original essay points out is that the argument is incoherent either way. We have two interpretations. My interpretation is that 2) says that all enities are subsumed under determinsm, and you agree that this argument would fail because it would leave no room for free will.

Before we look at your interpretation we have to look at what was intended with the argument. Peikoff starts out with:

As far as metaphysical reality is concerned (omitting human actions from consideration, for the moment), there are no 'facts which happen to be but could have been otherwise

Here Peikoff does say that everythng but humans are subsumed under determinsm. That's clear. In the subsequent argument (which I gave in my first post) he tries to motivate this distinction. And if we take my interpretation it will fail becuse it will preclude free will. Now if we take your interpretation his argument will fail because "facts which happen to be but could have been otherwise" would be perfectly consistent with the argument. It would allow for a particle whose actions are not necessitated by previous factor, and thus would represent a metaphysical fact that happened to be but could have been otherwise.

Thus, the argument is incoherent either way.

Determinism is not "derived" from the law of identity. That would be rationalistic. The nature of things, i.e. looking about at reality, would tell us the particulars.

I agree, but Peikoff doesn't say: "as far as we know there is distinction between the "man made" and " the metaphysically given", but this distinction is not necessary, it could very well be that we sooner or later will come to know metaphysical facts thet could have been otherwise ". The argument he gives is to assert the distinction, and then he goes on to "prove" it with the law of identity as his only premise.

[Capitalism Forever]

You are stepping ahead here. First let's change the vocabulary a bit:

Determinsm is when when an outcome is completely necessitated by previous factors.

Differism is when when an outcome is not completely necessitated by previous factors.

Do you agree that this is a valid distinction?

It is a valid distinction of philosophical views, but one that misses the essence. The essential distinction, the one that the Objectivist definition of "determinism" actually refers to, is whether your philosophy recognizes the fact that each action is caused by the entity that acts, or whether you view actions as determined by outside forces. Your "previous factors" is just one form of the various external forces that various philosophers have lined up in their denials of Aristotelian causality.

Objectivism would say that a tennis ball is subsumed under determinism, while humans are subsumed under differism.

You are still committing the error of mixing up concepts that happen to be expressed by related words. Please try to keep in mind that an anti-socialist is not necessarily an anti-social person, and likewise, determinISM is something very different from an action being determinED by an entity, both of which in turn are something very different from an entity acting determinISTICALLY.

The genus of the concept "determinism" is a philosophical view--so what can be subsumed under determinism is not tennis balls or humans, but the specific ideas of specific people with regard to how actions are caused. Tennis balls and similar entities would be subsumed under determinISTIC--a concept I would be interested in seeing an exact definition of.

On what ground do you claim that humans and only humans can be subsumed under differism. Why is any other system in the universe precluded?

You said: "Differism is when when an outcome is not completely necessitated by previous factors." I had said--in the very post you were responding to:

All actions are determined--determined by the entity that acts, and none other, when the entity acts, and not before.

That's the exact opposite of what you claim I am claiming. I am saying that ALL entities, humans and non-humans, are "differistic."

[KendallJ]

The problem the original essay points out is that the argument is incoherent either way. We have two interpretations. My interpretation is that 2) says that all enities are subsumed under determinsm, and you agree that this argument would fail because it would leave no room for free will.

Before we look at your interpretation we have to look at what was intended with the argument.

Well, and here is your final basic error of method. Your reliance on an out of context discussion to your ends, and not the original ends that Peikoff was intending with the essay. You're right, you do have to look at the intended argument, which is not your intended argument, but Peikoffs, and it wasn't a discussion of free will vs. determinism, but rather a retutation of the concept of necessary truths as per the analytic synthetic dichotomy. HIs statements are made toward that end, not yours, and they are tailored as such. You are pulling a singled few sentences from a much broader contextual discussion which was not aimed at your end.

Here Peikoff does say that everythng but humans are subsumed under determinsm. That's clear. In the subsequent argument (which I gave in my first post) he tries to motivate this distinction. And if we take my interpretation it will fail becuse it will preclude free will. Now if we take your interpretation his argument will fail because "facts which happen to be but could have been otherwise" would be perfectly consistent with the argument. It would allow for a particle whose actions are not necessitated by previous factor, and thus would represent a metaphysical fact that happened to be but could have been otherwise.

Thus, the argument is incoherent either way.

I agree, but Peikoff doesn't say: "as far as we know there is distinction between the "man made" and " the metaphysically given", but this distinction is not necessary, it could very well be that we sooner or later will come to know metaphysical facts thet could have been otherwise ". The argument he gives is to assert the distinction, and then he goes on to "prove" it with the law of identity as his only premise.

Well, I've provided a quote that already shows that he in fact did intend just this. The question is NOT did his ommision here create an error in the argument you're trying to make, but rather did it make an error in the one HE was trying to make as regards necessary truths. And the answer is that it does not, therefore qualifying his statement to address your issue is unnecessary in his context for the argument he was making.

This is equivalent to having to append any statement of knowledge with "given the context of our knowledge today..." It's unnecessary in most contexts. Omitting it does not commit an error, when you take into accoutn context. The statement is only incoherent, when you pull it out of context, which is your error.

Whenever an essay pulls a select passage from one source and then from another and does not integrate the two as well as the context in which they were originally stated, then beware, you know he's trying to drop context to assert an error.

[Freddy]

I agree that it is a good thing to know about the context, but I don't think context is an issue here. I admit I've not read the essay from which the quote is pulled (the Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy), but I cannot help but think that the argument is still rather clear, but I may be wrong. However, if we look at the first part of the quote it says:

As far as metaphysical reality is concerned (omitting human actions from consideration, for the moment), there are no 'facts which happen to be but could have been otherwise

Is the context of the essay such that this quote does not say that everything except humans are subsumed under determinism? A perfectly valid restatement of determinsm is to say that it doesn't allow for things to have been otherwise, and that seem to sqaure with necessary truths as well. And here Peikoff obviously contrast this to humans, whose actions could have been otherwise (and we know he means that it is thanks to free will). Thus I fail to see how this quote could be interpreted in any other way than to provide the following distinction;

Any natural phenomenon, i.e., any event which occurs without human participation, is the metaphysically given, and could not have occurred differently or failed to occur; any phenomenon involving human action is the man-made, and could have been different.

And given this, the point in the original essay stands, when Peikoff tries to derive where to draw the line between things that could have been different an thing that could not have been different, he uses an argument with the law of identity as his only premise, and that argument fails as shown i previous posts, it's either contradictory (ie. implying determinism for humans) or pointless (ie. it contributes to the issue at hand as much as the proposition "A is A" contributes to the answer to whether there is life on other planets or not, that is, "A is A" is perfectly consistent with either possibilty and therefore contributes nothing). Now, If you claim that I am wrong, can you give an interpretation of this quote that would make it coherent?

As far as metaphysical reality is concerned (omitting human actions from consideration, for the moment), there are no 'facts which happen to be but could have been otherwise'... Since things are what they are, since everything that exists possesses a specific identity, nothing in reality can occur causelessly or by chance. The nature of an entity determines what it can do and, in any given set of circumstances, dictates what it will do.

How does the latter part of the qoute relates to the first in a coherent and substantial manner? Maybe the part left out from the qoute clarifies matters?

[Freddy]

It is a valid distinction of philosophical views, but one that misses the essence. The essential distinction, the one that the Objectivist definition of "determinism" actually refers to, is whether your philosophy recognizes the fact that each action is caused by the entity that acts, or whether you view actions as determined by outside forces. Your "previous factors" is just one form of the various external forces that various philosophers have lined up in their denials of Aristotelian causality.

The distinction I'm trying to put words on has already been put on the table by Leonard Paikoff. In Objectivism this distinction is referred to as Metaphysical vs. Man-Made. Peikoff describes the first category to be things that could not have been different, and the second as things which could have been different. The fist category is what is commonly known as determinism. I tried to find a name for the second and used differism. When Peikoff tries to motivate that the line between between differism and determinism should be drawn between humans and everything else, he is employing an argument that fails.

[KendallJ]

I agree that it is a good thing to know about the context, but I don't think context is an issue here. I admit I've not read the essay from which the quote is pulled (the Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy), but I cannot help but think that the argument is still rather clear, but I may be wrong. However, if we look at the first part of the quote it says:

OK, I'm going to stop right there. If you want to agree that context is important, and then proceed through the exact same argument, committing the exact same errors that everyone has already pointed out, then the reality is, you don't think that the context is that important.

What you're doing is not much different than saying that Rand said the words "I", "love" and "Communism" at some point in her life, therefore she's being totally incoherent when she rails against it. Yes, when you put them together it looks very compelling. It is an error of method.

Peikoff does not derive determinism from the law of identity. Stop implying that this is what he's doing in the statements. It is not and cannot be his premise. A few minutes spent with OPAR on axioms and their validation would show you that quickly.

[Capitalism Forever]

When Peikoff tries to motivate that the line between between [the man-made] and [the metaphysically given] should be drawn between humans and everything else, he is employing an argument that fails.

In what way? Where is the proper place to draw that line?

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

With a special thanks to David V (aka Greedy Capitalist) I was able to get my computer up and running again. After having various problems re-formatting my hard drive and starting over again, I called him asking for his advise, and he recommended replacing the CPU to Hard drive bus cable, which I did and the re-started worked out well.

At any rate, what does this have to do with this discussion?

I occurred to me that replacing a part -- the bus cable on my computer and the oil pressure sensor on my car -- is implicitly using the Aristotelian idea of causation -- of something acting (or acting up) according to its nature. See, I don't know what made the bus cable break. Maybe it was handled too often and one of the wires broke, but I really don't know. However, I do know now after replacing it that the cable being broken was a primary reason my computer was acting up. Likewise for my oil pressure sensor, which was telling me I had low oil pressure when I really didn't. Qua part, these were not acting correctly (an entity in the secondary, epistemological manner), giving false information to both myself (in terms of the oil light coming on) and my computer (my hard drive which was not functioning with the CPU properly).

In order to identify the cause of the malfunction according to the short-hand version of determinism, I would have to figure out what was acting on the cable and the sensor to cause them to break. Under the more Objectivist understanding of causation and the nature of the entity, I just have to identify that a part went bad and replace it. In other words, the cause of the problem -- in both cases -- was a bad part.

Also, I think we need to be careful about the "dividing line" between the man made (which could have been otherwise) and the metaphysical (which, having no free will had to turn out the way it did, with no choice in the matter). After having many pets as a child, it is hard for me to believe that animals other than man are mere biobots doing what they were programmed to do (either by their genes or by those who teach them). I mean, higher-level animals do have a consciousness -- they are aware of existence and act according to their understanding of existence. They don't have volition in the human sense of the term -- i.e. they cannot decide the content of their consciousness, like we can -- but I don't think they merely act according to a programming. One's computer definitely acts according to a programming (provided all the parts are functioning correctly), but it has no consciousness.

In other words, if you gesture to your dog to come over so you can pet it, is it really just responding to a programming? Or is the dog consciously aware that being petted feels good, and that playing fetch is fun? Was the dog pre-determined to wag it's tail when you pick up the leash to take it for a walk?

There is definitely a distinction between the metaphysical and the man made, in the sense that the creation of the solar system was destined from the moment several stars went supernova approximately seven or eight billion years ago (their dust collided and condensed, forming our solar system), but the formation of the World Trade Center (or it's destruction) was not pre-determined by that cosmic event. And me deciding to write this essay was not pre-determined by that cosmic event.

But, I guess what I'm asking is this: Was the dog wagging it's tail when you picked up the leash pre-determined (aside from the actions of man raising the dog) by that cosmic event billions of years ago? And did your cat jump upon your lap because of that cosmic event billions of years ago? That's basically what the idea of determinism claims (and for man's actions, too).

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Here is another way of phrasing the issue I raised in my last post: If a bear craps in the woods, was that action completely pre-determined by the cosmic collisions of dust and gas 8 billion years ago?

To a die-hard determinist, the answer would be yes -- of course the bear crapping in that exact spot at that exact time was pre-determined by events that happened billions of years ago.

And let's say that we take man out of the equation due to volition for the time being, and ask a question about a bear in the woods, say, ten million years ago, when there weren't any human beings. Did that stardust give rise to the bear's actions?

In one sense, we can say yes, in the sense that neither the earth nor the bear nor the woods would exist if it wasn't for that collision. But did events that happened billions of years ago lead to that particular action of that particular bear at that particular moment?

For things like the creation of mountains on the earth, I have no problem saying yes, those mountains exist because of that collision billions of years ago that gave rise to the earth and everything that it does qua planet (including plate tectonics).

But, are living beings and their actions completely determined in the same sense? Life of a certain type arising on earth billions of years ago gave rise to an oxygen rich atmosphere, because that life metabolized the atmosphere and excreted oxygen. And that had to happen given the nature of that life and the conditions it was formed under. But, is a bear merely reacting in a biobot manner? It ate those berries and those fish and excreted precisely then and there because that collision took place?

I'm just giving further examples of why I dislike determinism.

For simple life, sure there are definitely no options. Blue-green algae did what it did because it was pre-determined to arise and to excrete oxygen, and it could not have happened otherwise given the conditions of the earth billions of years ago. But did the bear eat precisely two fish instead of four because stardust collided billions of years ago?

[Freddy]

In what way? Where is the proper place to draw that line?

What is proper is related to what argument you use as support for your position. The original essay pointed out that Peikoff apparently motivates that entities subsumed under "the metaphysicaly given" must obey determinism by some reasoing including more or less only the law of identity. The author gives support for his views with qoutes from both OPAR and "the analytic synthetic dichotomy".

As far as metaphysical reality is concerned (omitting human actions from consideration, for the moment), there are no 'facts which happen to be but could have been otherwise'... Since things are what they are, since everything that exists possesses a specific identity, nothing in reality can occur causelessly or by chance. The nature of an entity determines what it can do and, in any given set of circumstances, dictates what it will do.

So, the author of the essay thinks that Peikoff tries to support the first statement of the quote with the argument presented in the latter part. KendallJ takes issue with this interpretation and claims that Peikoff is not arguing for the correctness of the distinction at all. I suppose it is possible that Peikoff is not trying to defend his position but is merely restating it in a different wording. Maybe you can shine some light on the issue?

Anyway, if Peikoff do intend his argument as some kind of proof, then it won't work, which is made clear in the conclusion of the essay:

That every entity always acts in accordance with its nature tells us nothing about how it will in fact act, including whether or not there is more than one possible way for it to act. It does not, for instance, rule out the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics: all one needs to say is that it is in an electron's nature (for example) to behave unpredictably. Nor would it be contradicted by a helium-filled balloon that fell. If a balloon ever acted this way, then that would merely show that such behavior is part of its nature. Or, in other words, no matter how anything acts, it is by definition acting in accordance with its nature.

Thus, the law of identity cannot be used to infer where to draw the line between determinsim and differsim.

[Robert J. Kolker]

But, I guess what I'm asking is this: Was the dog wagging it's tail when you picked up the leash pre-determined (aside from the actions of man raising the dog) by that cosmic event billions of years ago? And did your cat jump upon your lap because of that cosmic event billions of years ago? That's basically what the idea of determinism claims (and for man's actions, too).

Even if strict determinism were the case (which I doubt) we could not make use of it. Consider this example: Take a mole of enclosed gas (say 16 grams of O2) and try to predict its future state by purely deterministic mechanism. To do so would require that one determine the position and momentum of 10^24 (approximately Avagadro's number) molecules without disturbing them (fat chance!). Then with this data, actually calculate where all the molecules will by a second from now (a fatter chance!). We have neither the measuring instruments nor the computational power to do so. Which is why we use either classical thermodynamic or statistical thermodynamics and deal with average moementa and distributions of velocities. Statistics is the only way we can handle the problem and it works out pretty well. Bottom line: Even if determinism is true, that truth cannot do much of anything useful to us.

Second example: Lorenz Convection Equations. They are non linear but totally deterministic. As Ed Lorenz discovered in 1962, unless one has the initial conditions -perfectly- i.e. to an infinite number of decimal places, the predictions from the equations become less and less accurate over longer time horizon. This discovery was the revival of chaotic dynamics in its latest incarnation. Poincare, the French mathematician, determined by in 1905 that over very long time horizons three body predictions (using Newtonian Gravitiation) could not be made. So even a deterministic system of equations cannot be exploited unless infinite accuracy for the boundary or initial conditions can be achieved (don't hold your breath).

And in addition there is much more evidence to support quantum indeterminism than there is to support strict determinism.

Conclusion: Forget strict determinism in the physical domain. We can't use it even if it is true.

Bob Kolker