Subject-Object Distinction

[brandonk2009]

On another forum I was discussing the axiom of existence and a member began maintaining that the axiom is flawed because it fails to distinguish between the subject (the entity that perceives) and the object(the thing which is perceived). He also asserted that most of our knowledge is flawed because we have never fully distinguished the subject from the objects. From what I could gather from the internet, Kant inversed traditional knowledge theory, proposing that instead of the subject perceiving the object (in an attempt to understand the object) the possibility of knowledge came from the subject itself rather then from the object itself.

Does anyone else have any insights on this? Can anyone help me to understand what it means and its flaws?

[intellectualammo]

On another forum I was discussing the axiom of existence and a member began maintaining that the axiom is flawed because it fails to distinguish between the subject (the entity that perceives) and the object(the thing which is perceived).

Fails, how so? The axiom of existence exists completely independent of consciousness, but consciousness, is utterly dependent upon existence, as such. Consciousness only arise from that which is in existence, and can only perceive that which is already in existence. It cannot exist separately from existence. Existence can definately exist independently from consciousness. Existence can exist without conscious beings.

[SpiralTheorist]

Isn't saying that the concept of existence is flawed because it fails to distinguish between existents a bit like saying the concept of ice cream is flawed because it doesn't distinguish between vanilla and chocolate?

The whole point of forming a concept is to put aside the differentiations between its units. If I understand his argument correctly, it isn't just a denial of the existence axiom; it's a total denial of conceptualization.

-- Spiral Theorist --

[-archimedes-]

Objectivism, or metaphysical objectivism, is the view that there is a reality or realm of objects and facts existing wholly independent of the mind. Stronger versions of this claim might hold that there is only one correct description of this reality; they may or may not hold that we have any knowledge of it. If it is true that reality is independent of the mind, the reality of Objectivism is thus inclusive of objects which one may not know about and are not the intended objects of mental acts.

Objectivity in referring requires a definition of what is true, and is distinct from the objects themselves which cannot be said to be true or false. An object may truthfully be said to have this or that attribute, such as the statement "This object exists", whereas the statement "This object is true" or "false" is meaningless. Thus, only references, or the statements one makes about objects without assigning truth value to the object itself, are true or false. Essentially, the terms "objectivity" and "objectivism" are not synonymous, with objectivism being an ontological theory to which a method of objectivity would apply.

In this perspective, it is a matter of whether or not the "subject" possesses the mental faculty to perceive the existence of the "object" as failing to do so does not preclude the actuality of the "object's" existence, imperceivable though it may be to the "subject's" mental acuity, as existence does not require acknowledgement thereof, e.g., as an infant you/we were unable to perceive the existence of the automobile, aeroplanes, homes, clothing, our sexual orientation, the sky, the Earth, etc., etc., etc., however, once our minds developed the mental acuity to perceive their existence, they then became real to us though they had nonetheless always been so.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

On another forum I was discussing the axiom of existence and a member began maintaining that the axiom is flawed because it fails to distinguish between the subject (the entity that perceives) and the object(the thing which is perceived). He also asserted that most of our knowledge is flawed because we have never fully distinguished the subject from the objects.

I think one would have to know something of the history of philosophy to understand what he is getting at and why it is wrong. Basically, from early on, there was a distinction made between what we observe something to be and what it actually is. For example, is the apple really red or does it only appear to be red because we have eyes of a certain type? Does the sweetness of the taste of the apple have anything to do with what it actually is or does it taste sweet because we have a tongue and taste buds? Expand this out to all of the senses and realize that we form concepts based on what we perceive, and you can begin to see that what they are arguing is that we are blind because we have eyes, deaf because we have ears, and ignorant because we have a reasoning mine.

In other words, even the axioms are based on perception, and if one believes that the senses do not give us accurate information about that which we perceive, then all of our concepts, including the axioms, are based on wrong data -- or data that we get only because we are human, and we have no way of getting away from being human. They don't think one could have any kind of accurate conception of existence because our conception of existence is always moderated by our modes of perception and conception.

I would suggest reading or re-reading the beginning of OPAR to get a better grasp of the Objectivist response to these types of accusations. But, basically, our senses are accurate because they are causal and have no volition. We perceive existence in a particular way, but the particular way -- hearing, vision, odorous, etc. -- is causally perceiving existence, and not just something conjured up by our mind.

And I would say that if they really believed the Kantian BS, then they ought not to be participating in any dialog with any other human, since how do they know it is actually a human they are discussing their tripe with -- I mean, it might just be something they conjured up, and have no baring on what is actually there. If we take them at their word, then that is how they ought to be treated.

[Robert J. Kolker]

Fails, how so? The axiom of existence exists completely independent of consciousness, but consciousness, is utterly dependent upon existence, as such. Consciousness only arise from that which is in existence, and can only perceive that which is already in existence. It cannot exist separately from existence. Existence can definately exist independently from consciousness. Existence can exist without conscious beings.

I assume you mean to say that Existence exists completely independent of consciousness. The -axiom- of existence is an assertion of the foregoing, and requires an asserter. Axioms are propositions and therefore artifacts produced by sentient beings.

Bob Kolker

[-archimedes-]

Objectivism, or metaphysical objectivism, is the view that there is a reality or realm of objects and facts existing wholly independent of the mind. Stronger versions of this claim might hold that there is only one correct description of this reality; they may or may not hold that we have any knowledge of it. If it is true that reality is independent of the mind, the reality of Objectivism is thus inclusive of objects which one may not know about and are not the intended objects of mental acts.

Objectivity in referring requires a definition of what is true, and is distinct from the objects themselves which cannot be said to be true or false. An object may truthfully be said to have this or that attribute, such as the statement "This object exists", whereas the statement "This object is true" or "false" is meaningless. Thus, only references, or the statements one makes about objects without assigning truth value to the object itself, are true or false. Essentially, the terms "objectivity" and "objectivism" are not synonymous, with objectivism being an ontological theory to which a method of objectivity would apply.

In this perspective, it is a matter of whether or not the "subject" possesses the mental faculty to perceive the existence of the "object" as failing to do so does not preclude the actuality of the "object's" existence, imperceivable though it may be to the "subject's" mental acuity, as existence does not require acknowledgement thereof, e.g., as an infant you/we were unable to perceive the existence of the automobile, aeroplanes, homes, clothing, our sexual orientation, the sky, the Earth, etc., etc., etc., however, once our minds developed the mental acuity to perceive their existence, they then became real to us though they had nonetheless always been so.

By way of reaching a wider audience, I submit a layman's purview of the above referenced Objectivist principle of subjectivity vs. objectivity couched in the form of a well known, commonplace query/riddle (which has actually come up in a conversation elsewhere on this forum) in hopes of making the principle's distinction more so relative, i.e., "If a tree falls in the forest and no one is around to hear it, does it still make a sound?"

The answer, of course, is YES!

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

By way of reaching a wider audience, I submit a layman's purview of the above referenced Objectivist principle of subjectivity vs. objectivity couched in the form of a well known, commonplace query/riddle (which has actually come up in a conversation elsewhere on this forum) in hopes of making the principle's distinction more so relative, i.e., "If a tree falls in the forest and no one is around to hear it, does it still make a sound?"

The answer, of course, is YES!

I think what you are struggling with is the idea of perception or awareness of something creates that something. This was begun, I think, by Berkley (to be is to be perceived) and expanded upon by Kant (the sensory manifold creates the objects of awareness). In Objectivism, both premises are rejected on the grounds that perception does not create anything, but rather is the awareness of something that already exists; and that it exists before being perceived (i.e. consciousness is not required for something to be -- or consciousness does not create ontology or beingness).

In other words, our perception of the tree falling does not create either the tree or the sound that it makes when it falls. Perception is not a creative process. Awareness is an active process in the sense that we must focus our consciousness in a certain way in order to be aware of a particular entity and its actions, but that focus does not create either the entity nor its actions.

How do we know this? Well, via observation of existence and introspection. One can differentiate perception (a non-creative process) from imagination (which is a creative process). As an adult, we realize that something in reality doesn't disappear merely by closing one's eyes to it; you know, like a child claiming that you can't see them because they have covered their eyes believing that by doing so that have hidden themselves from you.

Reality doesn't work that way.

[intellectualammo]

I assume you mean to say that Existence exists completely independent of consciousness. The -axiom- of existence is an assertion of the foregoing, and requires an asserter. Axioms are propositions and therefore artifacts produced by sentient beings.

Correct Bob. I shouldn't have said axiom of existence, but existence. Thank you for pointing that out.

[aleph_0]

Isn't saying that the concept of existence is flawed because it fails to distinguish between existents a bit like saying the concept of ice cream is flawed because it doesn't distinguish between vanilla and chocolate?

I would agree with the above in the following way:

The subject-object distinction is still possible in Objectivism--indeed, Piekoff fleshes it out a bit in OPAR. The mistake that your correspondent made is that he seems to regard the subject, or predicate, as a kind of independent Platonic being. A good example of the subject-object distinction is any predicative assertion, say, "The ball is red." The object is the ball, which is subject to the description "red" (Note: I'm not sure that the reason the distinction is named "subject-object" because the object is "subjected to" the predicate. I just choose this way of writing because it flows and helps the explanation.). In this example, your friend would be asserting that there is some kind of thing that is "redness" that is not accounted for in the axiom of existence--only the object, the ball, is accounted for.

This could lead to a whole conversation about Platonism, which has its place, but not necessarily when discussing the axiom of existence. Case in point, the axiom of existence, were it accepted by a Platonist, could also make a claim on the existence of Platonic forms.

So the axiom is not challenged at all, but rather the question is raised, "What, exactly, exists?" Or perhaps otherwise put, "Can anything exist that is not extended in space or endures through time?"

Interestingly enough, though, I had a grad student friend at Duquesnes who wrote a fairly persuasive argument that the subject-object distinction can be eliminated by set-theory notation. E.g. {the Eiffel Tower} = {made for the Universal Exhibition} (intersection) {in Paris} (intersection) {tall}. I would argue that, though it's now hidden in the grammar, the idea or the form of the Eiffel Tower is manifest, which is to say the subject has an object, and so the distinction is merely painted over.