Where does A is A come from?

[agrippa1]

Actually, I think the thread has digressed a little, but the points are important nonetheless. For example, according to Objectivism, philosophy is a science -- the most fundamental of all the sciences. In other words, it is one's philosophy that leads to coming to understand nature or becoming a mystic; of studying Darwin or studying Jesus. And it was these men's philosophy that led them to becoming a scientist (in the special science sense) or becoming the founder of a religion.

Objectivism is man centered because the whole point of having a mind like a human being is so that one can live more fully than an animal

I know this is a digression, but I'm starting to get some focus on this issue. The argument is that science and philosophy are complementary. As one who believes in the theory of evolution, I find that using man's current state of development is a bit arbitrary (although I understand the desire, from a philosophic homo-centric point of view).

Is it reasonable to assert that philosophy uses the inputs of our senses and extends that knowledge through reason? If we agree on a definition of science in, say, terms of observation, hypothesis and testing, and say that philosophy lies beyond these concrete, measurables of reality, is there something inherently different between the knowledge we gain from PET scans or particle accelerators and the knowledge that we gain from our direct perception of EM radiation or atmospheric kinetics? In simpler terms, asking whether the Christmas tree lights are on is not a philosophical question, even though we gain that knowledge from our ordinary human senses.

Should the question on whether something if philosophical or scientific depend on whether we need specific sensory inputs to explore it, regardless of whether those are direct inputs or extensions based on man-made sensory equipment?

Sorry to belabor the point, but this seems a very important one to me, and I appreciate the views given here.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Should the question on whether something if philosophical or scientific depend on whether we need specific sensory inputs to explore it, regardless of whether those are direct inputs or extensions based on man-made sensory equipment?

I think you missed the point that man by his nature needs to have a long-term philosophic understanding of existence in order to become human as opposed to an animal. In fact, man cannot even live like an animal since he has no automatic knowledge that he gets from his genes or the fact that he is what he is. Man has to learn everything; he has to learn how to think, because he has no automatic knowledge. The method of leaning how to think -- of how to be rational -- is philosophy, and man has to know that in order to do the special sciences.

It is fully possible -- and had been true for many thousands of years, since the dawn of history -- for a man to be rational and not have a clue about evolution. Aristotle, for instance, was a rational philosopher, but he had no idea about evolution -- not the foggiest; likewise for Thomas Aquinas.

I find it very interesting today that people are expected to have a view of evolution, to have kept up with the latest findings, say, about T-Rex, but are not expected to know if reason or force is the way of resolving disputes, or if Individual Rights are true or not, or if reason is man's only means of knowledge versus faith. And yet, it is the answer to these types of questions that will determine if he is going to be rational or not; of whether he is going to live as a man or live as a beast.

Even though I have studied physics -- I have a BA in both physics and philosophy -- I don't consider it to be extremely important to civilization as to whether or not there are black holes in space. It's an interesting scientific question, but it has no barring on the life of a rational being unless he is simply interested in that sort of thing, as I am, or if he is in the field of astronomical physics. To man qua man, it is much more important for them to realize that reason ought to be supreme and the only means of gaining truth about existence.

Regarding man as he is now compared to where he came from or where he is going to from an evolutionary position, since those types of changes take place over millions of years, they have no barring on man as he is now, and his need for reason. It is not a philosophic question, but a special science question, and it has no barring on how a man ought to live his life. Again, like the black holes, it's an interesting question, and I love to watch science programs that focus on those issues; but the existence of black holes or that we may have come from ape-like creatures does not say one thing about the fact that we need reason in order to survive as man -- because that is what we are.

The special sciences are the result of being rational; not the means of being rational.

[agrippa1]

I think you missed the point that man by his nature needs to have a long-term philosophic understanding of existence in order to become human as opposed to an animal. In fact, man cannot even live like an animal since he has no automatic knowledge that he gets from his genes or the fact that he is what he is. Man has to learn everything; he has to learn how to think, because he has no automatic knowledge. The method of leaning how to think -- of how to be rational -- is philosophy, and man has to know that in order to do the special sciences.

...

The special sciences are the result of being rational; not the means of being rational.

I get a little uncomfortable when people talk in terms of absolutes - not philosophical absolutes, but absolutes about very complex subjects, such as the human mind. If we don't have "automatic knowledge" (I know you could parse that down to meet your needs, but you use it in contrast to animals, who, you imply, do), how do we know to suckle, to eat, to hunt, to have sex, etc. Man is a subset of animal, and has certain similarities with other animals. To believe otherwise is, in my opinion, to fall into a somewhat mystical view of man (that's not the same as saying that man isn't the "ideal"; from our point of view, the only one that matters, he is.)

The statement "man has to learn how to think, because he has no automatic knowledge" is interesting. (Sum ergo cogito?) How do you learn to do something whose faculties you need in order to learn? The ability to automatically integrate concretes into abstracts does not imply the pre-existence of those concretes and abstracts, i.e., knowledge; it merely implies the existence of an ability, i.e., to think. As a (very) crude analogy, you can't build a steel mill without steel girders, but you can't make steel girders without a steel mill. How to start? Trusting the analogy, there is implied a rudimentary ability to think that is inborn, else how to integrate the sensory knowledge you need to refine your thinking process?

I believe the science and philosophy form a cycle of discovery: observation of nature provides the means (knowledge) to be rational, that is, it provides the given premises upon which rational thought is built. In turn, rational thought, philosophy, provides the means to extend our observations beyond our natural abilities, that is, to encode natural observations into scientific language and manipulate them with math, and to construct ways in which to gather more detailed, accurate, focused information about our world.

But to claim that that is the end of the process, that only natural observations may form the premises for rational thought, and that they lead to science, and there you have it, is, in my opinion, incomplete. The special sciences provide us more detailed and specialized knowledge. This, in turn, becomes the the premises for even more finely tuned rationality.

To restate your final assertion as my own, "The special sciences are the result of being rational, and the means of being ever more rational."

To give some examples of this, would we agree that the existence of a creator is a philosophic question? In the absence of fossil evidence and its interpretations, the case for a creator is very strong. The theory of evolution provides a set of natural observations that must be integrated logically into any philosophic argument for or against the existence of a creator. Cosmology, likewise, provides clues about the organization and origins of the universe. Wouldn't you agree that knowledge of a beginning point (or not) of the universe would feed any logical reasoning about the nature of our existence? Scientific studies of economic prosperity in the past few years show a strong correlation between general prosperity in societies and the level of protection of individual rights. Would it be wise to discuss political philosophy without taking into account these studies? Could Ayn Rand have even conceived of the true moral nature of capitalism without having done in-depth studies of the economic sciences?

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

The statement "man has to learn how to think, because he has no automatic knowledge" is interesting. (Sum ergo cogito?) How do you learn to do something whose faculties you need in order to learn? The ability to automatically integrate concretes into abstracts does not imply the pre-existence of those concretes and abstracts, i.e., knowledge; it merely implies the existence of an ability, i.e., to think.

I think this may be where you are making the mistake: There is no automatic integration of concretes into abstractions -- this is what must be learned and it must be learned volitionally, via free will. The faculty of reason is there by birth -- i.e. man gains the capacity to become rational by being born a human, but the workings of his mind are neither automatic nor does the content of his consciousness automatically comply with existence.

Keeping one's mind in compliance with existence requires a method, and that method is logic; something philosophers (primarily Aristotle) have figured out. And that method must be used to discover things like evolution, black holes, and the double helix of DNA.

What you seem to have in mind (or think that I have in mind) is the idea that philosophers just sit around thinking in a basement somewhere without ever looking out at reality. A rational philosopher does not act that way -- he observes existence and the workings of his mind to comprehend existence, and then comes up with the general principles by which he can be assured that the content of his consciousness matches what existence factually is. This method can then be used to further investigate reality.

Part of what you are referring to, however, is what Miss Rand called the spiral theory of knowledge; that so long as one integrates every bit of knowledge with the rest of his knowledge, everything learned compliments everything else that has already been learned. So, sure, the knowledge of DNA, T-Rex, and black holes can augment what he knows and even provide inspiration to continue to learn. For the laymen who is not a scientist and watches TV science programs, these can act as an indication of look what we can accomplish via reason!

When one is an infant, nature provides a kind of head start via the pleasure pain-mechanism, which is automatic -- suckling milk is good because it feels good; but as an adult, a man cannot simply suckle on the teats of reality and get knowledge they way he got milk from his mother. He has to decide to conform to reality in the workings of his mind, or he will suffer the consequences, and sometimes this takes many years of intensive study in order to learn how to do it -- i.e. to solve the equations of Relativity and understand what a black hole is and how to detect them is not something that can be learned by suckling. Digestion is automatic; learning how to think is not.

[agrippa1]

I think this may be where you are making the mistake: There is no automatic integration of concretes into abstractions -- this is what must be learned and it must be learned volitionally, via free will. The faculty of reason is there by birth -- i.e. man gains the capacity to become rational by being born a human, but the workings of his mind are neither automatic nor does the content of his consciousness automatically comply with existence.

Digestion is automatic; learning how to think is not.

I think we're close here, and it sounds like maybe you agree that the source of knowledge (normal man's sensory faculties, or his scientifically extended faculties) is immaterial - so long as the ultimate source of rational thought is reality.

I think where we still disagree (or have a question) is whether the initial integration of sensory signals into a perception of reality and entities is an act of conceptual integration. And possibly, whether the first attempts at rational integration, that is, classifying objects into conceptual categories (kitties, duckies, blocks, people) is really something that needs to be "learned," or if it's a natural ability for differentiation and comparison. After all, my dog knows that a "bed" is a soft thing that lies on the floor and is big enough for him, and he will find the nearest one to lie down on when I give him the command, even if he's never seen that particular one before.

My opinion is that these very primitive forms of integration are the innate building blocks that make up our later, learned attempts at abstract reason.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

I think we're close here, and it sounds like maybe you agree that the source of knowledge (normal man's sensory faculties, or his scientifically extended faculties) is immaterial - so long as the ultimate source of rational thought is reality.

It's not immaterial as to whether it is the province of philosophy or the province of a special science. The examples I gave regarding DNA, T-Rex, and black holes are the province of the special sciences and not of philosophy. Philosophy can have veto power over a scientific conclusion -- i.e. even sub-atomic particles are something specific, leading to a veto power over the idea that the Uncertainty Principle is saying something about the indeterminism of those particles -- but it is not the province of philosophy to say whether or not T-Rex existed. One can be fully rational and not have a clues as to what DNA is or whether or not T-Rex existed 70 million years ago.

I think where we still disagree (or have a question) is whether the initial integration of sensory signals into a perception of reality and entities is an act of conceptual integration. And possibly, whether the first attempts at rational integration, that is, classifying objects into conceptual categories (kitties, duckies, blocks, people) is really something that needs to be "learned," or if it's a natural ability for differentiation and comparison.

There is no inborn concept of kitties, duckies, blocks, or people. For a young human, it is not difficult for them to form these concepts because the entities perceived are at the perceptually self-evident level. Nonetheless, it requires effort on the part of the child. He doesn't just see a puppy and out comes puppy from his mouth without his parents teaching him that word; and then when they see a kitty, point to it and say puppy, because they don't know the difference until they are taught it.

I think you need to read Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology where Miss Rand goes into a lot of details regarding concept formation.

And none of it is automatic.

What is automatic is the perception of the entity; but conceptualizing it requires mental effort.

[agrippa1]

It's not immaterial as to whether it is the province of philosophy or the province of a special science. The examples I gave regarding DNA, T-Rex, and black holes are the province of the special sciences and not of philosophy. Philosophy can have veto power over a scientific conclusion -- i.e. even sub-atomic particles are something specific, leading to a veto power over the idea that the Uncertainty Principle is saying something about the indeterminism of those particles -- but it is not the province of philosophy to say whether or not T-Rex existed. One can be fully rational and not have a clues as to what DNA is or whether or not T-Rex existed 70 million years ago.

I think we're talking past each other. I don't contend that you need the entirety of science in order to be rational, only that knowledge of the nature of reality informs our ability to reason and avoid contradicting proven qualities of reality. Philosophy can have veto power over a conclusion, but only if it takes into account that conclusion and can reason a way around it. For instance, we could assert that "spooky action at a distance" does not occur, that there is in fact an internal (though possibly unobservable) structure to twin particles, but we can only do so if we can reason our way around the EPR paradox.

[Marc K.]

[...] and teach our children how to be rational so that civilization can continue. [emphasis added]

You might want to rephrase this just so that no one gets the wrong idea.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

You might want to rephrase this just so that no one gets the wrong idea.

I take it you mean that children should not be raised for the sake of civilization, but rather for the sake of themselves and being able to understand existence and live their own individual lives rationally and happily. If so, I agree. The result will be a better civilization, but man's life is the standard, not civilization.

[agrippa1]

Let me quote from OPAR p. 289: ...

I argue that attributes cannot be perceived without first perceiving the entity having the attribute, and that attributes are understood and perceived after the entity. Philosophically speaking, I'm right, and scientifically speaking, I invite you to show me the factual counter-evidence that supports your position and refutes mine.It does seem to me that you're approaching the question from a representationalist perspective. This actually isn't as semantic issue, it's a substantive one. You're positing an additional, intermediate step in the causal chain from external object to mental grasp, namely "sensations", or as Cartesians often call it "sense data". There is no reason to believe in such a thing; but maybe it would be more productive for me to refer you to Huemer's dissertation. Although I can't possibly endorse his total misunderstanding of Objectivism, the diss is an excellent disposal of representationalism and skepticism

Here is factual counter evidence: entities do not physically enter your mind. The process for being perceived usually involves the the release of EM energy 92 million miles away, and absorption and reemission or reflection of that energy by the surface of an entity into two transparent fluid-filled lenses which focus the energy on a matrices of specialized cells, each of which generates an electrical signal into the brain which results in the sensation of sight. Inside the visual cortex of the brain there is some automated pattern generation based on color or brightness borders registered over time. One could argue that it is these patterns, generated automatically, that constitute entities. I would counter-argue that the process, though automatic, is not adequate in every case to generate an entity corresponding to reality, and that it takes cognitive effort to force the perceived sensations and patterns into the perception of an entity. It seems the argument is whether the function of the visual cortex alone is sufficient to create the perception of entities, and whether the cortex constitutes a purely sensory function or a cognitive processing function, or a combination. Belief that entity precedes attribute requires an absolutist view of the answers to both these questions. I take a more generalized view, because, as some posters here have pointed out, in some cases I have to consciously transform visual senses into entities. Now I think I have shown that sensing of attributes (in this case the EM reflective and absorptive properties of an entity's surface) precedes the perception of that entity in the brain. Can you provide factual evidence that I perceive the entity *in every case* before I sense the attributes?

Here's a more concrete proof: take away the sense of vision (it's night time, if you wish to object on homo-centric grounds), and tell me whether you perceive an entity when you hear a strange noise, or feel heat on your skin; or, if it takes a conscious, cognitive effort to translate the sensation of heat into the possibility of an emitting entity.

[DavidOdden]

Here is factual counter evidence: entities do not physically enter your mind.

I assume you mean counterevidence to the indirect realist position, not the Objectivist epistemology. The indirect realist position is that there is an actual projection of the external thing, e.g. a little picture or sound wave, and such pictures and sound waves are entities (though they have no mass). But I'm not actually sure what they say these things enter -- they enter your head, and the mind "sees" the internal projected picture. I dunno: I've never actually met a living representationalist.

The process for being perceived usually involves the the release of EM energy 92 million miles away...

I guess: but we could push the causal chain back by referrng to the condensation of matter that gave rise to the sun. I find it best to simply assume that light hits the eys, somehow.

Inside the visual cortex of the brain there is some automated pattern generation based on color or brightness borders registered over time. One could argue that it is these patterns, generated automatically, that constitute entities.

One name for such things is "percept". The notion of "automatic" can refer to two things, "no thinking required" and "no experience required". The former is applicable of visual and auditory perception, the latter is not, though the experience is gained early enough in infancy that people don't remember the good old days.

I would counter-argue that the process, though automatic, is not adequate in every case to generate an entity corresponding to reality, and that it takes cognitive effort to force the perceived sensations and patterns into the perception of an entity.

I on the other hand would counter-counter-argue that in a physically developed post-infant, the process does generate a (mental) entity, that it does correspond to reality, and that the perception of an entity takes no cognitive effort (assuming ordinary lighting conditions). However, the correct identification of the nature of the entity (slotting under concept A vs takes some gognitive effort, for a while.

It seems the argument is whether the function of the visual cortex alone is sufficient to create the perception of entities, and whether the cortex constitutes a purely sensory function or a cognitive processing function, or a combination.

No, that's not the argument, as far as I know it. I don't even need to assume a visual cortex, though I know there is such a thing. The question is, simply, whether an intermediate object in the mind has to be posited, i.e. sets of primitive raw "sensations" of floating "attributes", which the mind stitches together into the perception "there is an entity". I'm saying that there is no evidence for such a thing, and no evidence for the primacy of attributes in perception.

Can you provide factual evidence that I perceive the entity *in every case* before I sense the attributes?

As easily as you can provide factual evidence that anyone can perceive an attribute without perceiving the entity that it is an atrtribute of in any case.

Here's a more concrete proof: take away the sense of vision (it's night time, if you wish to object on homo-centric grounds)

Pfft. All I have to do is close my eyes.

and tell me whether you perceive an entity when you hear a strange noise, or feel heat on your skin;

Okay, yes, I did it. I did. I didn't need to think about it very hard at all. I did indeed perceive a scuffling, breathing, heat-emitting entity. It didn't take any conscious, cognitive effort to figure out which entity it was.

Here's a suggestion. You want to show that man can perceive an attribute without perceiving an entity, so run the experiment. The stimulus would be some attribute, without a corresponding entity. You prediction is that you could perceive an attribute without perceiving an entity, so just use an un-caused attribute in your experiment. Lemme know how it goes.

[agrippa1]

Okay, yes, I did it. I did. I didn't need to think about it very hard at all. I did indeed perceive a scuffling, breathing, heat-emitting entity. It didn't take any conscious, cognitive effort to figure out which entity it was.

Ahh, you've changed the experiment. I said a strange sound or heat. You replaced it with a familiar sound AND heat! I assume it was either Rover or a slovenly office mate? "Figur[ing] out which entity" tips me that the entity in question already existed in your conceptual model, so that's cheating. You're supposed to form a new entity from the sensing of a single attribute. Try it again with just a heat source sensed by your skin.

Other than the heat attribute, what entity do you conceptualize from feeling heat on your skin (assuming you don't just categorize it as a pre-known entity, such as the sun or your dog, or the light over your kitchen table.) What if you feel heat from all sides - are the walls hot? Is the air hot? or is "it" hot? Or are "you" hot? When your mind constructs the sentence "I'm hot" is it attributing heat as an attribute of self? Or is it using the closest conceptual terms to describe a disconnected sensation of heat?

Hmmmm......

Okay, so you're saying that the human mind automatically and innately "knows" that every attribute is caused by an entity?

Doesn't that require inborn knowledge of the nature of reality? (there are no disconnected attributes)

If you're "right," man is born with the concept of entity already firmly established.

If I'm "right," he figures out that attributes always belong to entities, then begins thinking effortlessly in terms of entities.

Both beliefs converge once the concept of entity is established in "my way." So how to resolve this? Faith?

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Here is factual counter evidence: entities do not physically enter your mind.

You've got some pretty bizarre ideas regarding perception, as evident in this posting and the one following it; and I'm beginning to think they come from Kant.

Our sensory apparatus, including our visual cortex, does not create entities out of the sense data; the entities exist and we perceive them. The sensory processing is automatic and requires no conceptual figuring out in order to perceive an entity -- you look and you see it. Conceptually identifying it, in terms of what you think it is, does require conceptual processing; such as the flag flapping in the distance I mentioned earlier. And we do not need to do any conceptual processing -- i.e. thinking -- in order to keep all of the attributes together into an entity. It does not require any thinking on my part to keep this ---> A <--- altogether as one letter "A." Likewise, it doesn't require any conceptual processing for me to keep the weight of an object together with the touch of the object together with the sight of the object, etc. Our nervous system automatically integrates all of those inputs into the perception of the entity.

I think you were trying to point out that our sensory equipment is limited, that we don't perceive an object, say, when we hear a sound. That's true in the sense that we do not perceive objects with sound waves the way bats and maybe dolphins are thought to be able to do. So what? We do perceive objects with our eyes and our tactile equipment (primarily the sensitivity of the hands). It is the very fact that our senses are something that gives them their limitations -- i.e. we cannot perceive radio waves or ultraviolet -- but it is this very same indentity of the senses that makes it possible to trust them, because they exist and are causal. You are making the Kantian argument that we are blind because we have eyes, deaf because we have ears, and idiots because we have a reasoning mind. You might not be intending that, but that is the road you are going down.

We do not start off with a myriad of inputs that we have to consciously decide how to put together before we perceive the world; that happens automatically. And we don't have volitional control over how things appear to us -- i.e. we cannot make adjustments to our sensory inputs so that we perceive an apple as purple when it is red, say, like a computer enhanced image that can be adjusted. Our sense don't work that way.

We perceive existence the way it really is; and we perceive entities, not disconnected blobs of attributes.

And don't ask me to prove it, because it is self-evident. Look, and ye shall see that we see entities.

[agrippa1]

You've got some pretty bizarre ideas regarding perception, as evident in this posting and the one following it; and I'm beginning to think they come from Kant.

Our sensory apparatus, including our visual cortex, does not create entities out of the sense data; the entities exist and we perceive them. The sensory processing is automatic and requires no conceptual figuring out in order to perceive an entity -- you look and you see it. Conceptually identifying it, in terms of what you think it is, does require conceptual processing; such as the flag flapping in the distance I mentioned earlier. And we do not need to do any conceptual processing -- i.e. thinking -- in order to keep all of the attributes together into an entity. It does not require any thinking on my part to keep this ---> A <--- altogether as one letter "A." Likewise, it doesn't require any conceptual processing for me to keep the weight of an object together with the touch of the object together with the sight of the object, etc. Our nervous system automatically integrates all of those inputs into the perception of the entity.

I think you were trying to point out that our sensory equipment is limited, that we don't perceive an object, say, when we hear a sound. That's true in the sense that we do not perceive objects with sound waves the way bats and maybe dolphins are thought to be able to do. So what? We do perceive objects with our eyes and our tactile equipment (primarily the sensitivity of the hands). It is the very fact that our senses are something that gives them their limitations -- i.e. we cannot perceive radio waves or ultraviolet -- but it is this very same indentity of the senses that makes it possible to trust them, because they exist and are causal. You are making the Kantian argument that we are blind because we have eyes, deaf because we have ears, and idiots because we have a reasoning mind. You might not be intending that, but that is the road you are going down.

We do not start off with a myriad of inputs that we have to consciously decide how to put together before we perceive the world; that happens automatically. And we don't have volitional control over how things appear to us -- i.e. we cannot make adjustments to our sensory inputs so that we perceive an apple as purple when it is red, say, like a computer enhanced image that can be adjusted. Our sense don't work that way.

We perceive existence the way it really is; and we perceive entities, not disconnected blobs of attributes.

And don't ask me to prove it, because it is self-evident. Look, and ye shall see that we see entities.

Okay, so "sensory input" in your philosophy is limited to the visual and the tactile. In that case, assuming I accept your new, radical definition of "senses," I probably have to agree with you. I won't comment on your Kantian arguments. They are irrational and disconnected from my line of argument. Don't bother answering that, just know that I argued you are blind when the attribute in question is not visual, and that was the basis of my point. Your view of sensory perception is limited to the visual and the tactile, and so, is limited.

Arguing that my point of view comes from Kant and the "bizarre" smacks of the ad hominem (especially to those of us familiar with Rand's opinion of Kant - which I share), and reminds me of Rand's illumination of the false choice (an observation which has changed my perception of politics). I see you refuse to engage in my experiment of the sense of heat, so I will drop it. We don't have to agree to disagree, since you will only agree that you're "right" and I'm wrong. I will hang on to the rational mind's inalienable right to be skeptical of others' convictions.

I tried the experiment myself, holding my hand up to a heat source. My senses told me that my hand was warm and I volitionally (but not effortlessly) made a connection between my hand feeling warm and imagining a heat source causing that sensation. It was an honest analysis of the process. But maybe my mind works differently from every other human mind on the planet.

Perhaps after I've read Rand's Epistemology I will understand better what you mean, and agree with her point of view. But it will only happen after she has torn down all my objections. If you can't tear down all objections, you haven't made your case.

Thanks for the debate. I think we're at a standstill, so no further comment is needed (though would still be appreciated).

Cheers.

[Robert J. Kolker]

.......because they exist and are causal. You are making the Kantian argument that we are blind because we have eyes, deaf because we have ears, and idiots because we have a reasoning mind. ............

Could you please provide a reference to the book, page and paragraph where Kant writes this. Thank you.

Bob Kolker

.......because they exist and are causal. You are making the Kantian argument that we are blind because we have eyes, deaf because we have ears, and idiots because we have a reasoning mind. ............

Could you please provide a reference to the book, page and paragraph where Kant writes this. Thank you.

Bob Kolker

[agrippa1]

Could you please provide a reference to the book, page and paragraph where Kant writes this. Thank you.

Bob Kolker

Kant doesn't write this, Rand does, in interpreting Kant.

But you knew that.

Interesting syllogism at work here:

A: (I feel) Your argument has a similarity to Kantian philosophy.

B: Kantian philosophy results in a contradictory conclusion. (an assertion which, in ignorance, I will accept as true)

Therefore,

C: Your argument is contradictory. (thus false)

I hope there's something more convincing in ITOE. (hmm... is there a hidden message in that acronym?)

Edited December 12, 2007 by agrippa1

[DavidOdden]

Kant doesn't write this, Rand does, in interpreting Kant.

Could you please provide a reference to the book, page and paragraph where Rand writes this? Thank you. Bob objects to Thomas' fair summary of Kant by implying that Kant did not verbatim use those words; fair enough. But then you shouldn't claim that Rand verbatim used those words in summarizing Kant, without an actual quote.

[agrippa1]

Could you please provide a reference to the book, page and paragraph where Rand writes this? Thank you. Bob objects to Thomas' fair summary of Kant by implying that Kant did not verbatim use those words; fair enough. But then you shouldn't claim that Rand verbatim used those words in summarizing Kant, without an actual quote.

"Even apart from the fact that Kant's theory of the "categories" as the source of man's concepts was a preposterous invention, his argument amounted to a negation, not only of man's consciousness, but of any consciousness, of consciousness as such. His argument, in essence, ran as follows: man is limited to a consciousness of a specific nature, which perceives by specific means and no others, therefore, his consciousness is not valid; man is blind, because he has eyes—deaf, because he has ears—deluded, because he has a mind—and the things he perceives do not exist, because he perceives them."

Ayn Rand, "For the New Intellectual," For the New Intellectual, P.30.

Unfortunately, a critique of her logical progression (pairing the figurative 'deaf' and 'blind' with the physical 'eyes' and 'ears' to manufacture a clear contradiction; twisting Kant's argument against causality into an argument of reversed causality - perception causing or proving non-existence) leaves one in the position of seeming to defend Kant.

Which I can't.

(you're welcome!)

Edited December 12, 2007 by agrippa1

[DavidOdden]

Okay, not too shabby

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Here is the Kantian argument. I'm not making the claim that you are a Kantian, at least not without further evidence, I'm just saying this is the same argument made by Kant. And, no, I'm not going to dig up quotes from Kant; at least not tonight.

Here is factual counter evidence: entities do not physically enter your mind. The process for being perceived usually involves the the release of EM energy 92 million miles away, and absorption and reemission or reflection of that energy by the surface of an entity into two transparent fluid-filled lenses which focus the energy on a matrices of specialized cells, each of which generates an electrical signal into the brain which results in the sensation of sight. Inside the visual cortex of the brain there is some automated pattern generation based on color or brightness borders registered over time. One could argue that it is these patterns, generated automatically, that constitute entities. I would counter-argue that the process, though automatic, is not adequate in every case to generate an entity corresponding to reality, and that it takes cognitive effort to force the perceived sensations and patterns into the perception of an entity. It seems the argument is whether the function of the visual cortex alone is sufficient to create the perception of entities, and whether the cortex constitutes a purely sensory function or a cognitive processing function, or a combination.

Kant argued that we have a sensory manifold, and that it was cognition within the sensory manifold that led to perception, just as you are doing in the bold above. In other words, if that is true, then we have no base point in which to start reasoning from. If the sense are not totally automatic, and requires volitional effort in order to perceive something, then how could we ever know that what we are seeing is what is actually out there or just a figment of our imagination? We couldn't; which is why Miss Rand stated that he claims that we have eyes but are blind, etc.

Perception, as is clear by observing existence and being introspective about it, is not a volitional process. It does not require any volitional effort for you to perceive the Coke can as cylindrical, red and white, cold, shiny, heavy, etc. as one object. You do not have to consciously put all of those pieces together in order to perceive the Coke can.

Now, what you are confusing is perception (which is automatic) with cognition (which is volitional). When you try to identify if it is a Coke can or Joe's Cola, you must use your volitional cognition and compare your memory of Coke cans to Joe's Cola cans, and make a volitional determination as to which one it is. But this process is identification, not perception.

Furthermore, you picked something with your heat example that is not developed well enough for us to be aware of entities qua entities via our heat receptors. We do not perceive entities qua entities with our heat receptors, like some infrared camera that has a clearly defined image; they don't work that way. But they are still accurate in telling us if there is something hot acting on our skin.

Like so many other skeptics, you focus in on something for which no one makes the claim, and then try to say that I said that we perceive entities qua entities via our heat receptors -- which I never said. I said tactile, not heat. And I didn't say we are only limited to sight and touch, I said sight and touch give us entities in an integrated manner. The other senses are not as well integrated physiologically for us to be able to be aware of an entity qua entity, but only some of their attributes (i.e. sweet or smelly or hot or noisy).

The not-so-well integrated senses (hearing, smell, taste, heat sensing) still tell us that there is something there in reality, it's just not perceived as a "solid thing", as compared to the eyes and the fingers. In other words, in order to be perceptually aware of the Coke can qua can, you need vision and / or touching it with your fingers (though certain areas of the skin of the body, such as the back or forearms can perceive an entity qua entity, just not as clearly as touching it with your hands).

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

I said: ".......because they exist and are causal. You are making the Kantian argument that we are blind because we have eyes, deaf because we have ears, and idiots because we have a reasoning mind. ............"

Could you please provide a reference to the book, page and paragraph where Kant writes this. Thank you.

His whole philosophy states that, though if he said it so clearly he would be rejected in a heart beat.

[agrippa1]

Furthermore, you picked something with your heat example that is not developed well enough for us to be aware of entities qua entities via our heat receptors. We do not perceive entities qua entities with our heat receptors, like some infrared camera that has a clearly defined image; they don't work that way. But they are still accurate in telling us if there is something hot acting on our skin.

Like so many other skeptics, you focus in on something for which no one makes the claim, and then try to say that I said that we perceive entities qua entities via our heat receptors -- which I never said. I said tactile, not heat. And I didn't say we are only limited to sight and touch, I said sight and touch give us entities in an integrated manner. The other senses are not as well integrated physiologically for us to be able to be aware of an entity qua entity, but only some of their attributes (i.e. sweet or smelly or hot or noisy).

Okay, fair enough (I'm trying to learn, not to hang on to stubborn convictions, so I appreciate the thought put into this).

The bold quote relates to the apparent automatic generation of gestalts (I'm going by decades-old memory here) by the visual cortex. If I remember correctly, these organize vision into perceived patterns which can correlate to entities in some cases, but can be confused by camouflage or optical illusions in others. (How do you feel about optical illusions that create the perception of an entity, which, on closer inspection does not actually exist? Does the entity exist when we think we see it, then poof! metaphysically disappear when we realize it's not there after all? That is, are entities all in our head, as Kant would assert? Or is an illusion just an illusion, i.e., a faulty perception, with no bearing on the nature of reality?)

But your point about poorly integrated secondary senses leaves open the possibility that integration of sight and touch occurs as an initial stage of learning: I can imagine my mind becoming trained (through a small amount of experience) to integrate the secondary senses, so that if I feel heat on my hand regularly, I start automatically (effortlessly in my introspection of process) perceiving an entity that must be the source of the heat. I didn't do this the first time I tried the experiment, the sense of heat startled my mind and I had to mentally conjure the heat source. The next time I do it, I imagine the source will come to mind more easily, and soon enough I will "see" a heat source when I feel the heat on my hand.

As an example of this, it's been shown that electrode matrices mounted on the tongue of blind subjects, and activated with a camera (to create a 2-D matrix of taste sensation), soon become integrated into a sense of vision by the subjects. (these early experiments developed into matrices mounted directly onto the visual cortex to create true rudimentary vision in the blind). It is reasonable to hypothesize that the same would hold true for heat-generating matrices placed on the skin. How to explain this, except to posit that the human mind has the innate ability to integrate sensory signals and to learn to perceive entities from them? And if it can from the secondary senses, who's to say that it didn't do the same with the primary senses?

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

How do you feel about optical illusions that create the perception of an entity, which, on closer inspection does not actually exist? Does the entity exist when we think we see it, then poof! metaphysically disappear when we realize it's not there after all? That is, are entities all in our head, as Kant would assert? Or is an illusion just an illusion, i.e., a faulty perception, with no bearing on the nature of reality?

Optical illusions are not a problem of perception, but rather a problem with identification.

For camouflage, for example, we perceive the pattern quite easily -- you know, the splotches -- but in a forest setting, it can be difficult to distinguish the pattern on the clothing from the natural pattern of colors, which is why they use camouflage in those settings. The purpose of camouflage is to disrupt the outline of the form of the item (i.e. the man or the equipment), and it works because we naturally physiologically integrate together patterns of similarity.

For other optical illusions, a similar thing occurs, like the one where you perceive either a vase or two faces facing each other. If you focus on one pattern, you see the faces; if you focus on the other pattern, you see the vase. Again, this is not a problem of perception, but rather an unusual situation that makes identification difficult, though the pattern is quite easily perceived.

In general, the optical illusions do not call into question the perception of reality, as many skeptics claim, but rather confirm it. We automatically perceive relationships, and it is possible to take advantage of this and create all sorts of illusions -- like movies in 3D because each eye sees a slightly different image(which normally gives us depth).

I can imagine my mind becoming trained (through a small amount of experience) to integrate the secondary senses, so that if I feel heat on my hand regularly, I start automatically (effortlessly in my introspection of process) perceiving an entity that must be the source of the heat.

You can imagine it, but I doubt that if you went blind that you could perceive the world via infrared. At least no one has ever reported this happening.

Now, if one pinpoints the sense receptors, as your tongue experiment indicated, then yes, something like that might occur; otherwise, something like heat or taste becomes too diffused over the surface area containing the receptors that a clearly sharp differentiation between here and there is not available. In the case where the receptors are pinpointed, the brain automatically integrates together similarities and differences in relation to the surface area in question. In other words, the pattern is given in perception, but the subject must learn to identify the entity via this new perceptual source.

So, I would maintain that in vision, the perception of an entity is given automatically, but what must be learned is identification -- the conceptual processing of information given by the senses. However, the physiological processing is automatic.

One of Kant's other premises is that since the information is processed (via the visual cortex or whatever) then it is unreliable, in part because we don't know what that processing is. So, he would contend that maybe what is really in reality is a purple elephant, but we perceive it as an apple due to the processing. However, Kant never made a single reference to reality, so pinning him down on that is quite difficult.

How to explain this, except to posit that the human mind has the innate ability to integrate sensory signals and to learn to perceive entities from them? And if it can from the secondary senses, who's to say that it didn't do the same with the primary senses?

Again, what is given in perception is the given, but must be identified -- in explicit conceptual terms -- requiring volitional cognition. And the senses do not create an entity, which you have alluded to several times. The entity is there, and we perceive it with the senses. In other words, we don't perceive an output, say on a screen, and then have to interpret what it is that we are watching on our little internal movie screen. We perceive the entity, not a processed image of the entity.

[agrippa1]

Again, what is given in perception is the given, but must be identified -- in explicit conceptual terms -- requiring volitional cognition. And the senses do not create an entity, which you have alluded to several times. The entity is there, and we perceive it with the senses. In other words, we don't perceive an output, say on a screen, and then have to interpret what it is that we are watching on our little internal movie screen. We perceive the entity, not a processed image of the entity.

Actually, I do have a little internal movie screen, called the retina. Only instead of "me" watching it, I have millions of individual visual receptors watching. Each of them reports the level and color of incident light from a particular vector direction to the visual cortex, which based on differences between adjacent levels, discovers discontinuities, then correlates the discontinuities to discover edges, then correlates connected edges to discover shapes, then correlates shape areas to discover entities... etc. But all of that is immaterial because I only know about the rods and cones through the medical sciences, and I can't consider that information in my philosophy, so my perception of entities just happens.

Or something like that?

So I'm still trying to figure out if an illusion is an entity. For instance if twins turn to each other and bring their faces close, is the outline of a vase an entity? Are patterns formed by the random alignment of multiple entities, entities, or just patterns? Is the outline of Orion or Ursa Major an entity? (These are serious questions which seek to establish the precise definition of your terms.)

You can imagine it, but I doubt that if you went blind that you could perceive the world via infrared. At least no one has ever reported this happening.

David Odden did, on Dec 11, at 11:14 a.m. (Sorry, David)

In the case where the receptors are pinpointed, the brain automatically integrates together similarities and differences in relation to the surface area in question. In other words, the pattern is given in perception, but the subject must learn to identify the entity via this new perceptual source.

I think you're wrong there. Imagine feeling a sour spot go from right to left across your tongue. At the same time you hear someone walk across the room, from right to left. Getting an unfamiliar sensory input, your conscious mind makes a connection between the two movements, but it doesn't just automatically correlate and begin perceiving entities by taste, you have to play with it for a while to make sure you really are sensing what you think you are, that is, you're comparing, differentiating, correlating with effort, the movement on your tongue. Once you've determined the sense data is consistent with reality, your mind starts to take over, learning to refine by continuing the correlation process. In other words, it learns to perceive entities through taste, a sense, which by a previous post, you conceded provided attributes only, and not "entities qua entities." (which I take to mean "entities.")

I see you're holding on tenaciously to the entity as the irreducible primitive of perception, although I see some cracks.

By declaring the primacy of entity is self-evident, you are eschewing any need to prove your point of view. I accept that, logically, but I remain skeptical of the asserted principle.

My "problem" is probably that I don't see the Kantian trap from presuming a learned, automated integration of attributes into an entity. The rational mind is obsessed with eliminating contradictions, so in the given example, if you tried to take a bite out of that apple and instead got a purple tusk in the eye, you'd be served with a contradiction between perception and reality. I take it as self-evident that my perception is completely consistent with reality, because I perceive no contradictions, and I can, for instance, correlate all of my senses, pick up a rock and toss it into a drainage pipe 50 feet away. Pink elephants don't routinely appear and disappear in my living room. Every aspect of my perception is consistent with every other aspect, and this completeness, this perfection, proves to me that my perception is representative of reality. I can comprehend intellectually that my senses provide an artificial encoding of attributes, such as color, sound tones, brightness, etc., but regardless of anyone's views on whether they are or are not equal to reality, I can see, hear, feel, etc. that they are representative and consistent, so I don't have any doubts that my perception is "real." To be a metaphysical (term?) skeptic is to abrogate any useful definition of reason, so I reject the irrational conclusions or suspicions of Kant and nihilists.

I believe Rand, in her hatred of Kant, may have overshot the mark when attacking his philosophy, and in doing so rejected his premises and any possibility of a causal (and thus vulnerable) processing chain between reality and perception, when in fact she only needed to recognize the weak links in his logic to reject his conclusions.

But just as a final point (and then I'm done - promise), would you say that your perception of reality is consistent with subatomic physics? If not, do you reject that branch of science as not representative of reality, or do you recognize a limitation of your perception's representation of reality? I don't think this is a minor point of missing senses, like UV, radio, etc., because there are behaviors apparent in QM that truly are counter-intuitive and incompatible with our (my) perception of reality.

Edited December 14, 2007 by agrippa1

[DavidOdden]

Actually, I do have a little internal movie screen, called the retina. Only instead of "me" watching it, I have millions of individual visual receptors watching.

This is an abuse of the concept "watch". A tree cannot "watch" the sun, even though it may absorb EM energy from the sun. You can't even "watch" an object if you're asleep but your eyes are open. Watching is an active mental state, and a visual receptor does not have a mind, so it cannot be aware or "watch" anything.

Each of them reports the level and color of incident light from a particular vector direction to the visual cortex

No, again, they cannot "report", anymore than tree roots "report" the existence of water to a tree. Reporting is a conscious action of a mind. The pattern I'm seeing here is that you're using inappropriate metaphorical extensions, anthropomorphisations of bodily functions.

So I'm still trying to figure out if an illusion is an entity.

I suggest trying to figure out what "entity" refers to. An illusion doesn't have mass or definite physical extent. I don't think the answer is trivial -- we know that mental objects are existents, but they don't have mass. First sort out your ontology -- what are the classes of existents.

David Odden did, on Dec 11, at 11:14 a.m. (Sorry, David)

What you should be apologizing for is egregiously misunderstanding me. The visual perception of infrared is not the same as the perception of heat. A man with no eyes can still feel heat created by infrared radiation, but not be able to visually perceive IR radiation (as, I think, pit vipers can do).