Where does A is A come from?

[agrippa1]

This is an abuse of the concept "watch". A tree cannot "watch" the sun, even though it may absorb EM energy from the sun. You can't even "watch" an object if you're asleep but your eyes are open. Watching is an active mental state, and a visual receptor does not have a mind, so it cannot be aware or "watch" anything.No, again, they cannot "report", anymore than tree roots "report" the existence of water to a tree. Reporting is a conscious action of a mind. The pattern I'm seeing here is that you're using inappropriate metaphorical extensions, anthropomorphisations of bodily functions.

That's a fair objection (although we could have lively debate on whether a root "reports" water to a trunk!). I didn't intend to imply a conscious effort on the part of the rods and cones. The visual cortex crosses into a gray area. Fundamentally, sensing, perceiving and thinking all involve the same physical, electro-chemical mechanisms - nerves and neurons. Where does Objectivism draw the lines between what are apparently automatic functions (translation of stimuli into electrical signals, transmission of signals into the visual cortex), what are apparently conscious efforts (identification, concept formation, higher functions), and what lies between (integration of sense organ signals into perception of entities)? And how does it justify those lines?

I suggest trying to figure out what "entity" refers to. An illusion doesn't have mass or definite physical extent. I don't think the answer is trivial -- we know that mental objects are existents, but they don't have mass. First sort out your ontology -- what are the classes of existents.

Hmmm... (scratch, scratch) Aah... That's exactly what I'm trying to do here. But it doesn't matter to me what a term means to me, it only matters to me what it means to you. It's only through precise understanding of each others' terms that we can understand each others' concepts. So my ontology is immaterial, only our shared ontology has philosophical relevance. Which leads me (finally) to realize that I need to read and understand your epistemology before I can efficiently engage in discussions here.

What you should be apologizing for is egregiously misunderstanding me. The visual perception of infrared is not the same as the perception of heat. A man with no eyes can still feel heat created by infrared radiation, but not be able to visually perceive IR radiation (as, I think, pit vipers can do).

I apologize for misrepresenting you. I still think I'm right, but I'll give the benefit of my doubt and go try to learn how you think about these things.

Thanks, all, for the illuminating discussions. I intentionally left ITOE off my reading list (I've read just about everything else), because, frankly, Rand intimidates me with her incision and clarity. I wanted to wait until I thought through some of the issues on my own before delving into the scriptures. I think I've gained enough here to be intellectually honest in my reading.

I appreciate your patience,

~A

[DavidOdden]

I didn't intend to imply a conscious effort on the part of the rods and cones.

Since I just got done ranting about George Mitchell, I'm on a theme. Okay, so I accept that you weren't trying to sneak something evil past us. One thing I'm certain of is that metaphorical language is like nitroglycerine. It can be useful, in the right context: I'm developing the conclusion that it is never useful in exploring philosophical or scientific ideas.

Fundamentally, sensing, perceiving and thinking all involve the same physical, electro-chemical mechanisms - nerves and neurons.

Uh, what? You're either being too reductive, or not reductive enough. Fundamentally, sensing, perceiving and thinking all involve the same physical entities: leptons, bayons and forces. Same with trees growing and rocks falling. I don't see the value of inquiring into the physics of thought, at this point. I do see the value of inquiring into the physics of the sense organs up to the point that signals get into the head, after that there is virtually nothing useful that can be said about perception (much less thought) at the cellular level.

Where does Objectivism draw the lines between what are apparently automatic functions (translation of stimuli into electrical signals, transmission of signals into the visual cortex), what are apparently conscious efforts (identification, concept formation, higher functions), and what lies between (integration of sense organ signals into perception of entities)?

The line is drawn thusly: "That which is in fact automatic is automatic, that which requires a volitional consciousness is that which does in fact require a volitional consciousness". Objectivism does not have any position on the visual cortex or the nature of transduction from optic nerve signals to mental representations. That's 'cuz Objectivism is a philosophy, not a branch of brain science.

But it doesn't matter to me what a term means to me, it only matters to me what it means to you.

In other words, you're saying that meaning is completely arbitrary and dog plank eat both of traveler, at random. I suggest instead that we should simply look at the categories of existents: actions, attributes, entities. Am I missing anything? I'd suggest that an "illusion" is, indeed, an entity. Of course the genus "entity" admits of multiple species, so that "tree" and "illusion" can be eventually distinguished.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Thanks, all, for the illuminating discussions.

You're welcome, but I'm not sure we are getting anywhere because you are starting in mind-stream instead of observing what you perceive.

When you look out at the world, you do not perceive your eye lens, your retina, your optic nerves or your visual cortex -- you perceive what you are looking at. And that is where you have to start in philosophy; not at the level of high-level abstractions, such as optic nerves. What do you perceive when you are aware of existence? Similarly, you do not perceive your tongue when you taste something, you perceive the taste of the object inserted into your mouth. Likewise for feeling something with your fingers, it is not your fingers that you are perceiving, but rather the shape and texture of the item being held.

And while it is true that the brain is composed of neurons, we are not aware of those neurons when we think or imagine, we are aware of our consciousness and what it is doing.

In other words, as I related on my website, our sensory equipment in the processing of information about the world are completely transparent to the mind when we are perceiving. I do not see my retina, I do not taste my tongue, I do not smell my nose, I do not feel my skin, I do not hear my ears, etc. We perceive the entity and its attributes.

And, no, the constellations are not entities. The spacial relationship between the stars are observed, and the shapes we see up there is just a spacial relationship, not an entity. It is our imagination that draws those imaginary lines together to form things like Leo or Scorpius.

This all gets very frustrating when you try to start in mind-stream. No one is denying the optic nerves etc., what we are trying to tell you is to observe reality. And then you will see that we do not perceive our sensory organs when in the process of perceiving the world at large (unless we are looking in a mirror, then we can see our eyes and ears, and nose, etc.). But when you look at that Coke can, you are perceiving the Coke can and not your means of perception.

[Robert J. Kolker]

This all gets very frustrating when you try to start in mind-stream. No one is denying the optic nerves etc., what we are trying to tell you is to observe reality. And then you will see that we do not perceive our sensory organs when in the process of perceiving the world at large (unless we are looking in a mirror, then we can see our eyes and ears, and nose, etc.). But when you look at that Coke can, you are perceiving the Coke can and not your means of perception.

However someone else can perceive your sensory organ parts and you can perceive the parts of someone else's sensory organs. My opthalmologist does this when I visit him for an eye examination. On the other hand you are the only person in the entire cosmos who is aware of your mind. No one has ever perceived a mind in a body that is not his. We may well suppose other people have minds, but we have no direct perceptual evidence to that effect.

I have three sets of images from an MRI scan of my skull (with resolution good to a millimeter) and an image from a PET scan of my own skull I had made several years ago. Nowhere in this image do I perceive even the faint outline of my mind. Objectively speaking my mind is nowhere to be seen. It apparently does not occupy space and time which is damned strange for something that is supposed to exist. Or maybe I don't have a mind. I know for sure I have a brain though.

Perhaps you have had more luck than I have. Has anyone perceived your mind?

Bob Kolker

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Nowhere in this image do I perceive even the faint outline of my mind. Objectively speaking my mind is nowhere to be seen. It apparently does not occupy space and time which is damned strange for something that is supposed to exist. Or maybe I don't have a mind. I know for sure I have a brain though.

Perhaps you have had more luck than I have. Has anyone perceived your mind?

You completely missed the point. However, if you want to claim that your mind doesn't exist, I might be willing to take you at your word at that

[agrippa1]

When you look out at the world, ... you perceive what you are looking at.

...

And, no, the constellations are not entities. The spacial relationship between the stars are observed, and the shapes we see up there is just a spacial relationship, not an entity. It is our imagination that draws those imaginary lines together to form things like Leo or Scorpius.

So let me get this straight...

I observe a constellation, but it is not an entity, just a spatial relationship.

I perceive a coke can, and it is an entity, not just a spatial relationship of light and dark, red and white shapes.

My mind knows how to differentiate an entity from something which is just a spatial relationship, or a product of my imagination, because it knows the difference between a percept and an observation.

But my mind can only differentiate entities, which are the primary objects of perception.

So, therefore, I must perceive the individual stars and my consciousness arranges them in a spatial pattern which emulates an archer, or a bear, or a lion.

So why don't I perceive the corners of a box as entities, and my mind arrange them to form the spatial relationship that we call a cube?

Is there a missing principle at work here? If the lines connecting the spatially related points are not imagined, then it's an entity, if they are, then it's not? Is a corner an entity, or is a box, or both, or neither? It seems to depend on your definition of entity, which changes from poster to poster here, and, sometimes from post to post. That would be okay, I guess, since it's difficult to get to a precise definition, very difficult, it seems; except that something extremely special and unique is being claimed for those things called entities, so you really have zero leeway in your definition, if you hold to that special distinction.

Here's a problem: a constellation is not an entity, a solar system is not an entity, an asteroid belt is not an entity, the rings around Saturn are not entities, or maybe they are, depending on how close I am when I see them.

The milky way is not an entity, just a pattern of fine stars, unless I squint. If I shrunk myself to the size of a water molecule, this monitor would disappear into a pattern of spatially related molecules. I would perceive these particles (given that I could see), but my observation of "monitor" would be merely a spatial relationship of particles. (Of course that could never happen, I'm just trying to get the hang of it)

Yes, I'm being facetious. But the point is not ridicule, it's that there is a principle missing in this philosophy, in my opinion. And no, that's not an indictment of Objectivism (which I don't actually know to this level), just an observation... err, logical conclusion? It's not as simple as "we see what we see and that's reality." The line between the automatic and the conscious is not, in my opinion, a razor sharp one (he said, drawing a deep breath).

Cheers

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

That would be okay, I guess, since it's difficult to get to a precise definition, very difficult, it seems; except that something extremely special and unique is being claimed for those things called entities, so you really have zero leeway in your definition, if you hold to that special distinction.

An entity in the primary sense means something that you can pick up and hold the whole thing in your hands, like a Coke can, a glass (of water), a cigarette, a lighter, a baseball -- something that you can grasp quite easily via perception.

Once you grasp that these are entities, then you can move on up to bigger things that you cannot get the whole thing of, like the earth (unless you are in deep space), a house (which can be grasped perceptually as one thing if you are far away), an ocean liner or an aircraft carrier, etc. These are all one thing, one entity.

Objectivism also recognizes entities in a secondary sense, which means considering something apart from the rest of it -- i.e. a two foot square section of your yard, or your toe nail, or your thumb. But these are not true entities in the primary sense, it's just that we can mentally isolate out those pieces of a whole, and they can only be called entities in that sense.

I think the Solar System is closer to an entity in the secondary sense, since the planets and the sun are not really physically attached to one another.

In the case of considering something like the constellations, they might, and I stress might, be considered entities in the secondary sense (in the sense of mentally focusing in on that batch of stars), but they are most certainly not physically attached to one another.

In the case of things like atoms, these are not considered entities in the primary sense unless they are separated out from other atoms they can interact with. For example, your glass in front of you is one entity. It is not six trillion atoms hovering in space. It is one thing.

Scale is a very important consideration for deciding is something is an entity or not. For example, I think our galaxy can only be considered to be an entity in the secondary sense, because there is so much space in between each of the stars that comprise it.

I sincerely doubt if that answers your question. Not that I didn't answer it, but since you are being quite the skeptic about everything I write, then it will not answer you, even though I have answered the question.

But again, and I keep stressing this, if you want to know what an entity is, then look at reality -- that Coke can right in front of your face and held in your hands is an entity, it is not a constellation of different colors that happen to follow each other around as you move it.

[agrippa1]

I sincerely doubt if that answers your question. Not that I didn't answer it, but since you are being quite the skeptic about everything I write, then it will not answer you, even though I have answered the question.

By skeptic, I assume you mean one who requires proof of purported fact, and not one who denies the possibility of real knowledge.

We're not supposed to get nasty here, after all.

Thanks for the answer. I'll consider it.

[agrippa1]

Uh, what? You're either being too reductive, or not reductive enough. Fundamentally, sensing, perceiving and thinking all involve the same physical entities: leptons, bayons and forces. Same with trees growing and rocks falling.

True enough, but trees growing and rocks falling do not entail electro-chemical neural transmitters, as far as I know. Sensing, perceiving and thinking all do. Remember Einstein: "Things should be kept as simple as possible, but not simpler."

If I reduced beneath neurons, I'd be too general (what's a bayon? I thought it was a place in France) If I didn't reduce to that level, I wouldn't have a common element to tie the three together.

In other words, you're saying that meaning is completely arbitrary ...

No, no no! The exact opposite! Words are the precise translation of concepts. Problem is that a word cannot be defined precisely except as a relationship between other words, or a directed reference to at least one physical entity. The more precise and abstract the meaning of the term, the more complex that relationship must be. To use a metaphor, in communicating, we are carving stone with stone tools; the finer our work, the more and delicate strikes we must make.

...we know that mental objects are existents, but they don't have mass...

I'd suggest that an "illusion" is, indeed, an entity.

We've had a whole series of messages on this thread, and just when I think I know what is meant by "entity" you toss in the perception itself, the concept and the illusion as entities. And I ask myself, "if we perceive entities of reality, and the perception of an entity is itself an entity, and the perception of an illusion is an entity, that means that reality is in the same class of existence as a perception, whether it be of a "real" entity or of an illusion. So how do I distinguish an illusion from reality, when all I have is reality and illusions to compare and differentiate? Since the identification of an entity is a conscious act, and since conscious identification is subject to faulty logic (isn't it?), is it now in the realm of possibility that I am misidentifying illusions as metaphysical entities (term?) and/or vice versa?" (And to whom am I writing this, anyway?)

I am led (erroneously, I know) to a contradiction, so obviously, my understanding of your definitions is lacking. Just as obviously, trying to glean the precise definitions from a series of loosely organized posts is not getting me to the right level of understanding, so I need to sit down with univocal, detailed description of the terminology (ITOE). I don't think you can help with this; I have to hammer it out on my own.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

The problem here is that the existence of entities is self-evident to perception, and the existence of consciousness is self-evident via introspection. Neither one requires proof in the sense of giving a logical train of thought to verify their existence.

Agrippa1 is trying to figure out what an entity is, when it is a clear as looking at the world; and Robert is trying to figure out what consciousness is by looking at a medical scan. Both of you are starting at the wrong place -- in mid-stream.

Look at the world to verify that there are entities and be introspective to verify that you have a consciousness.

It's really as simple as that, but you both want a logical argument.

Well, sorry, there isn't one to be had for the self-evident.

One does not deduce that there are entities and one does not deduce that one has a consciousness.

[agrippa1]

Agrippa1 is trying to figure out what an entity is, when it is a clear as looking at the world

Imaginary conversation, with my imaginary son:

"Dad, what's the definition of entity?"

"It's self-evident!"

"Okay, but what is it?"

"An entity is a thing you perceive!"

"Like a galaxy?"

"No, you have to hold it in your hand!"

"What about a pile of acorns?"

"No, that's more than one entity! You perceive each acorn, and your mind makes up the concept 'pile!'"

"What if they're glued together and I pick them up in one piece."

'That's a secondary entity - you perceived the acorn first, the pile is secondary, even if they're glued!"

"What about a popcorn ball?"

"Caramel or marshmallow? - no, wait, ... doesn't matter - entity!"

"What about a forest, is that an entity?"

"That's a secondary entity, because the trees aren't all one thing!"

"But if I see it from a mile up, I can't see the trees."

"Okay, then it's an entity!"

"What if I see it from half a mile up?"

"Then the trees are entities, and you make up the forest!"

"What if the guy next to me is short-sighted, and can't see the trees, is it a forest to him, and trees to me?"

"No! There's only one reality, and it's not different for different people!"

"Well then, which is it?"

"You're normal; he's abnormal. Secondary!"

"What if it's on TV?"

...

(etc.)

Yup, I'm still trying to figure out what an entity is...

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Imaginary conversation, with my imaginary son:

<snip>

Yup, I'm still trying to figure out what an entity is...

I've been debating with myself as to whether or not I should even respond to this, since you are being a smart ass; but the hell of it is, even though you were being a smart ass, you almost got it right.

Returning to the topic of this thread, where does A is A come from; well, it comes from the observation of entities, and effectively says that an entity is what it is: A thing is itself. So, if you don't grasp what an entity is, then you are not going to get "A is A".

In other words, the side tracking of the discussions to entities was not irrelevant, but was very much germane to the topic of the thread.

A drinking glass is a drinking glass, it is not a puff of attributes hanging around together or constructed from our sensory manifold or constructed from our consciousness -- it exists and it is one thing. If one drops it and it shatters, then each pieces -- each little sliver of glass -- becomes an entity, becomes many things. But the glass is not many things when it is all one thing, it is a drinking glass.

When you grasp that, then you will be on the road to recovery and can begin to take Objectivism seriously.

[Robert J. Kolker]

Agrippa1 is trying to figure out what an entity is, when it is a clear as looking at the world; and Robert is trying to figure out what consciousness is by looking at a medical scan. Both of you are starting at the wrong place -- in mid-stream.

Having a working human brain is sufficient for knowing what consciousness is. I was looking for a mind in the scan. I did not find it.

Bob Kolker

[agrippa1]

I've been debating with myself as to whether or not I should even respond to this, since you are being a smart ass; but the hell of it is, even though you were being a smart ass, you almost got it right.

Sorry, I know I was being a smart-ass, but intended no disrespect. The point of the dialog was to illustrate that the concept "entity" evades attempts at specific exemplary definitions. (or maybe just examples of what they are not)

Even Peikoff falls into the trap when he states that air is not an entity*. That example leads us to an entity-less attribute (hot or humid), which contradicts Rand's definition of 'attribute.' The contradiction forces us to challenge the premises:

1 - Air is not an entity.

2 - No attribute can exist without an entity.

3 - Air has attributes.

I assert that metaphysically, (3) is true. Therefore, either (1) or (2) must be false, because (1) and (3) disproves (2), while (2) and (3) disproves (1). So which is false? Choosing the principle over the example, I'm forced to accept that attributes belong to entities, and that air is therefore an entity.

This leads me to the next tough question: Does an entity exist without perception? If so, and I believe Rand's answer is 'yes,' then the definition of entity as "what is given in sense perception" leads to another contradiction. If the illusions we spoke of earlier are not "entities" then how can they be "given in sense perception." This leads us perhaps to a refinement of entity as "a thing existing in reality which is given in sense perception." This leads us in turn to a new challenge, which is defining "existing in reality" in terms of our sensory perception. That is where the hard work of philosophy takes place, and at first glance I believe it has to do with a recognition of the non-contradictory nature of "real" percepts.

(Moderator, since this discussion is off-topic, would it be worthwhile to split it off into "what is an entity?")

*:

"An entity, in the primary sense, is a solid thing with a definite boundary—as against a fluid, such as air. In the literal sense, air is not an entity. There are contexts, such as when the wind moves as one mass, when you can call it that, by analogy, but in the primary sense, fluids are not entities."

- Leonard Peikoff, "The Philosophy of Objectivism" lecture series (1976), Lecture 3.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Does an entity exist without perception? If so, and I believe Rand's answer is 'yes,' then the definition of entity as "what is given in sense perception" leads to another contradiction. If the illusions we spoke of earlier are not "entities" then how can they be "given in sense perception." This leads us perhaps to a refinement of entity as "a thing existing in reality which is given in sense perception." This leads us in turn to a new challenge, which is defining "existing in reality" in terms of our sensory perception. That is where the hard work of philosophy takes place, and at first glance I believe it has to do with a recognition of the non-contradictory nature of "real" percepts.

I stress once again, that the term "entity" is defined ostensibly -- by pointing to things that exist; i.e. a drinking glass, a baseball, a cigarette, a small rock, an acorn, etc. The fact that it is given ostensibly is why there really is no formal definition of the term "entity". And once again I will stress that entities are not created via perception; so, sure, there are entities out there that we do not perceive directly -- i.e. dust mites, bacteria, atoms, etc.

However, the reason we don' t consider air (or other fluids) to be an entity is that it is not one thing and doesn't act as one thing. One can get eddies and currents in fluids, which you don't get in entities -- i.e. if one spins a glass and stops it, it stops; whereas if one stirs a glass of tea, and then stops stirring, all kinds of eddies and currents begin to form, so it is not acting as one thing.

You might consider this to be some sort of philosophic problem, but it isn't; the problem is in your grasp of existence, and the fact that you refuse to start at the perceptually self-evident.

To answer Robert, the existence of the mind is also self-evident and does not require any knowledge of the brain in order to be confirmed. One day, we will better know the relationship between the brain and the mind; and with modern medicine for easing or curing of mental disorders are one such connection. In other words, due to research, it can be shown that a chemical imbalance or a brain disorder can lead to improper thinking, or at least make proper thinking difficult. If the hardware isn't functioning properly, then the workings of the mind are not functioning properly either. Nonetheless, one does not start in understanding this relationship at the level of the brain, but rather at the level of introspection such that one is aware that one is aware -- i.e. that one has a consciousness. Otherwise, the existence of the brain and its functionality is unrecognized. Introspection is what leads us to realize that we have a mind; a combination of introspection and extrospection leads us to realize there is a connection between mind and brain. But without introspection and the ready knowledge that we are aware that we are aware, then knowledge of the brain has no purpose. In other words, without the realization that we have introspection, the benefits of certain medications would be unknown to both the researcher and the patient. People take certain medications because they realize that by taking these medications they can think more clearly -- i.e. they realize the medication is working, not by looking at a brain chart, but by their direct experience, as is confirmed by asking them.

[agrippa1]

I stress once again, that the term "entity" is defined ostensibly -- by pointing to things that exist; i.e. a drinking glass, a baseball, a cigarette, a small rock, an acorn, etc. The fact that it is given ostensibly is why there really is no formal definition of the term "entity". And once again I will stress that entities are not created via perception; so, sure, there are entities out there that we do not perceive directly -- i.e. dust mites, bacteria, atoms, etc.

However, the reason we don' t consider air (or other fluids) to be an entity is that it is not one thing and doesn't act as one thing. One can get eddies and currents in fluids, which you don't get in entities -- i.e. if one spins a glass and stops it, it stops; whereas if one stirs a glass of tea, and then stops stirring, all kinds of eddies and currents begin to form, so it is not acting as one thing.

You might consider this to be some sort of philosophic problem, but it isn't; the problem is in your grasp of existence, and the fact that you refuse to start at the perceptually self-evident.

If air is not an entity, but air has attributes, then the attributes of air are entity-less attributes.

If I'm wrong, where is my error?

But Rand asserts:

"Attributes cannot exist by themselves, they are merely the characteristics of entities"

- Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 18.

How is this not a contradiction?

(This is not an attempt at a trap, but a serious question. I do take Objectivism seriously, which is why I question any premise which leads to a logical contradiction.)

Thanks,

~A

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

If air is not an entity, but air has attributes, then the attributes of air are entity-less attributes.

If I'm wrong, where is my error?

The problem is that you are being rationalistic in order to try to confirm for yourself that attributes can exist without being attributes of entities. But, there are no floating attributes.

Air can certainly be considered an entity in the secondary sense -- and it is in this sense that it can have attributes -- i.e. the air in my room is 70 degrees, or this patch of air near the thermometer is 32 degrees. Something like temperature does not exist without there being something there that can be hot or cold. This is true even for radiation, like infrared radiation, which is not an entity in the primary sense but can be spoken of as if it is an entity (entity in the secondary sense).

But if you are not going to start with the perceptually self-evident, you are just not going to get it.

Sometimes I wonder why people are that way -- why they want to reject Objectivism or aspects of Objectivism. I don't think the answer is always that they are being evasive, but rather that they have accepted ideas that divert them from perceiving existence first-hand. Somewhere, you have accepted the idea that the sensory manifold or consciousness creates entities. Or that it is by integrating attributes by a conscious effort that you get entities. You need to check those premises.

[agrippa1]

The problem is that you are being rationalistic in order to try to confirm for yourself that attributes can exist without being attributes of entities. But, there are no floating attributes.

I'm not sure what is meant here by "rationalistic," but it appears to be a substitution of an imprecisely chosen word* with negative connotations for the more applicable word: "rational."

The method used by the rational mind to perceive, identify and integrate the material provided by the senses is: logic. Logic is the art of non-contradictory identification.

So let me restate using the correct term: "The problem is that you are being rational in order to confirm for yourself that attributes can exist without being attributes of entities."

Yes, I believe I'm being rational, but no, the conclusion is merely one of the two conclusions to which a rational resolution of the contradiction leads. The other is that anything which has perceivable attributes is an entity. And that is the conclusion I chose, by putting principle above example and checking again for contradictions (do you see any?).

Peikoff's exclusion of fluids from entities leads to contradictions which are resolved only through the fudging of terms. To allow contradictions to exist under the cover of an undefined modifier, "secondary," is a violation of logic and an abrogation of reason. Without a precise definition, "secondary" is a floating abstraction, which apparently means: "any entity which does not meet my definition of entity." A kind of circular anti-reasoning. I've searched for a definition of "secondary," and the closest I've found is "an entity composed of other entities," referring, in two cases, to "society" and "culture." These are abstractions which can only be recognized by the rational integration of perceived entities. I suspect that was the original intent of "secondary," and it is indeed a useful and discriminatory term. Air does not meet this definition of "secondary," because I can see it (in the presence of suspensions of solid or liquid particulates) and I can feel it, not only its radiated heat, but haptically and kinesthetically, when it blows against me. Water, another apparently excluded entity, most certainly can be touched and seen.

This observation is not a rejection of Objectivism; it is meant to explore and resolve an apparent contradiction in a specific interpretation. (which contradiction I don't believe existed in Rand's writing)

* This assumes that we have the same concept in mind when using the term "rationalistic": "The doctrine that reason alone is a source of knowledge and is independent of experience."

[Robert J. Kolker]

Peikoff's exclusion of fluids from entities leads to contradictions which are resolved only through the fudging of terms. To allow contradictions to exist under the cover of an undefined modifier, "secondary," is a violation of logic and an abrogation of reason. Without a precise definition, "secondary" is a floating abstraction, which apparently means: "any entity which does not meet my definition of entity." A kind of circular anti-reasoning. I've searched for a definition of "secondary," and the closest I've found is "an entity composed of other entities," referring, in two cases, to "society" and "culture." These are abstractions which can only be recognized by the rational integration of perceived entities. I suspect that was the original intent of "secondary," and it is indeed a useful and discriminatory term. Air does not meet this definition of "secondary," because I can see it (in the presence of suspensions of solid or liquid particulates) and I can feel it, not only its radiated heat, but haptically and kinesthetically, when it blows against me. Water, another apparently excluded entity, most certainly can be touched and seen.

I am surprised by this. While I am no L.P. fan, I find it amazing that L.P. would deny that fluids are entities. Fluids turn out to be ensembles of simpler entities (molecules) but as an ensemble, fluids have very specific attributes and characteristics (density and viscosity). Any little child who has splashed the water in his bathtub or watched as the soapy stuff circles the drain knows that water, the fluid, is -something-. Some of the pre-Socratic Greek philosophers identified water (not water qua H20, but water as instantiation of fluidity) as the basic Stuff of the world. Earth is just water with an infinite viscosity, so to speak and air is water with low density etc etc.. So the early Greek thinkers used fluids and fluidity to comprehend the sensible stuff of existence. Does L.P. deny thinghood to fluids just because they are collections of simple things? That sounds like a rather gross error.

Could you provide a reference for the presumed defect in what L.P. is teaching?

Thank you.

Bob Kolker

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

I'm not sure what is meant here by "rationalistic," but it appears to be a substitution of an imprecisely chosen word* with negative connotations for the more applicable word: "rational."

You continue to be rationalistic; and, no, by that I do not mean rational. There are no floating attributes. Period. End of story.

You've got this notion in your mind that you can have attributes without entities, when all you have to do is look at the world and perceive that there is no such thing. That's why it is rationalism -- or the idea that one's ideas are superior to existence. And then you try to make arguments based on a misunderstanding of a key aspect of Objectivism, leading to further rationalism.

Stop thinking about how attributes fit together, and start looking at the world.

Once again, a Coke can is not a set of attributes that somehow cling to one another. It is an entity. And one cannot grasp the attributes of an entity without first grasping the entity qua entity. Concepts of attributes are abstractions from abstractions. One conceptualizes the entity, and then one can move on to conceptualizing its attributes.

One aspect of being rationalistic is to overlook the obvious; like someone trying to deduce that we don't have free will because we are made of matter, when free will is as clear as you being aware of your own mind. Similarly, it is a clear as day that there are entities, but you would rather come up with an argument for their existence, instead of simply perceiving them.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Does L.P. deny thinghood to fluids just because they are collections of simple things? That sounds like a rather gross error.

The gross error is yours, because Dr.Peikoff did not say nor imply that fluids do not exist. He said they are not entities -- at least not in the primary sense.

[Robert J. Kolker]

The gross error is yours, because Dr.Peikoff did not say nor imply that fluids do not exist. He said they are not entities -- at least not in the primary sense.

Did you bother to see that I was asking the prior poster to document his claims?

Bob Kolker

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Did you bother to see that I was asking the prior poster to document his claims?

I'm not questioning the source. I'm saying I agree that a fluid is not an entity.

If one has a block of solid ice, that is an entity. If it melts and runs all over the place, it is no longer an entity. If the block of ice sublimates, it is no longer an entity. Neither the puddle of water nor the water gases are acting as one thing. In a secondary sense, one can say that the puddle is an entity, in the sense that one can mentally isolate it from the dry areas of the floor, but it is not one thing. Likewise,if the gases tend to stay in one certain area, say near the floor if it is cold, then one can mentally isolate the fog from the clear air, but the fog is not an entity, except in the secondary sense of the term "entity."

Both the water and the fog are something, as opposed to being nothing, but neither is an entity.

[agrippa1]

I am surprised by this. While I am no L.P. fan, I find it amazing that L.P. would deny that fluids are entities. Fluids turn out to be ensembles of simpler entities (molecules) but as an ensemble, fluids have very specific attributes and characteristics (density and viscosity). Any little child who has splashed the water in his bathtub or watched as the soapy stuff circles the drain knows that water, the fluid, is -something-. Some of the pre-Socratic Greek philosophers identified water (not water qua H20, but water as instantiation of fluidity) as the basic Stuff of the world. Earth is just water with an infinite viscosity, so to speak and air is water with low density etc etc.. So the early Greek thinkers used fluids and fluidity to comprehend the sensible stuff of existence. Does L.P. deny thinghood to fluids just because they are collections of simple things? That sounds like a rather gross error.

Could you provide a reference for the presumed defect in what L.P. is teaching?

Thank you.

Bob Kolker

"An entity, in the primary sense, is a solid thing with a definite boundary—as against a fluid, such as air. In the literal sense, air is not an entity. There are contexts, such as when the wind moves as one mass, when you can call it that, by analogy, but in the primary sense, fluids are not entities."

- Leonard Peikoff "The Philosophy of Objectivism" lecture series (1976), Lecture 3.

I want to stress that this is not an argument against Objectivism, only against a specific interpretation by one individual.

You continue to be rationalistic; and, no, by that I do not mean rational. There are no floating attributes. Period. End of story.

I know that you do not mean "rational" when you write "rationalistic." I think I made the distinction perfectly clear. Could you please provide a definition of "rationalistic?"

[agrippa1]

You've got this notion in your mind that you can have attributes without entities (etc.)

Nothing could be further from the truth.

I'll quote myself from my post:

"Yes, I believe I'm being rational, but no, the conclusion [that you can have attributes without entities] is merely one of the two conclusions to which a rational resolution of the contradiction leads. The other is that anything which has perceivable attributes is an entity. And that is the conclusion I chose, by putting principle above example and checking again for contradictions (do you see any?)."

Where in that do you find me claiming that attributes exist with entities?

The gross error is yours, because Dr.Peikoff did not say nor imply that fluids do not exist. He said they are not entities -- at least not in the primary sense.

Could you please provide a definition of "primary" and "secondary" in this context?

I'm not real good with floating abstractions.

Thanks,

~A

Edited December 22, 2007 by agrippa1