So where's the solution to the 'Problem of Universals'?

[Ogg_Vorbis]

First, it would be helpful if you told us to what you refer when you speak of one man having "the same" rational faculty of another man. Regardless, Rand tells us that the fact that men possess rational faculty is a characteristic that justifies us in regarding them as members of the same class. The degree of a man's intellegence (assuming that is what you were refering to) is not an essential characteristic.

No two colors of red are exactly identical. How do you know to call them 'red'? That answer is easy. But in the case of a rational faculty which you cannot even sense, the question becomes ponderous. Imagine that there are degrees of rationality, and as you know not everybody engages in identification and integration 24/7. Some people hardly seem to do it at all. Why are they still considered rational animals? Only because we idealize them into a mental compartment known as 'rational,' even when this requires a great deal of straining when trying to fit such square pegs into a round hole.

Could you define "knowledge?"

The sum-total of all that is known, which is awareness of facts and theories about reality.

[Ogg_Vorbis]

What is that you mean by "straight"? Doesn't straight refer to a particular shape? A relationship between two or more points? What, specifically, is the "impossibility" you refer to?

Dan

You missed some of my earlier posts. A straight line is the distance traversed between two points without ever deviating from the course. You can see that in reality straight lines only tend toward straightness, with straightness itself, having an infinite degree of precision in measuring off the path, serving as a standard with which to accomplish the task. But an infinite degree of precision doesn't exist in reality, it is a mental construct.

[Pianoman83]

Think about the concept of time. You cannot touch, smell, tastes, see, or hear time. However, by observing how an entity (such as the sky or a plant) was, is, and might be you can learn the concepts of past, present, and future. From those concepts you can infer the concept of time. You can even learn to measure time by relating it to changes in the attributes of an entity (i.e. reaching the concepts of night and day by observing changes in the sky.) Time is a unique attribute as it applies to all entities past, present, and future.

In physical reality, attributes do not exist apart from the entities that embody them. It is only through a process of abstraction that we deal with attributes.

The question then is, how does a property follow all the members of a class? For example, if you have two red books, the property 'redness' is shared between them as members of the class of red books. However, upon closer examination you

may notice that they are not precisely the same color red, that one instance of red is a little darker than the other. In order to classify the books under the same category of red it is necessary to ignore subtle perceptual distinctions. Here's another example: again you are given two books, both books are identical in title, author, cover, publisher, and year of publication, such that you can say that they are both Atlas Shrugged written by Ayn Rand, paperback edition, etc. However, one of the books has its front cover torn off. How are the books identifiable under the same class, and why can they still be considered the same book?

The answer lies in the fact that there are many different alternatives in classifying specific entities. That a book may or may not be red, have a cover or not, etc; is irrelevant to what a book essentially is. In essence a book is stacked papers bound together along one side. Thus a universal property of all books is that they employ a method of binding a stack of papers together. From there we can discern different types of books and divide them into classes such as books with substantial printed information (such as magazines, textbooks, novels, booklets) and books without substantial printed information (i.e. notebooks, journals, photo albums etc.). Then we look at books with printed information and consider the classes of non-fiction and fiction.

Having chosen fiction, we organize the class of fiction book by author, then by title. Looking at the specific books we can compare the text and conclude that they share the same text, method of binding, and page layout and conclude they are the same book despite one missing the cover and copyright pages and thus are similar paperback editions of Atlas Shrugged by Ayn Rand. So in this route of classification they are properly in the same class with only a few minor differences that are irrelevant.

Another route is possible where after considering books with substantial amounts of printed information as opposed to books that are mostly blank, you consider only those printed books that have covers vs. those printed books that do not so as to distinguished between a stolen book and a legitimate one. In this case, the two editions of Atlas Shrugged are properly not in the same class though they are copies of the same book. In both cases the classification is correct, the difference lies in what classifications we considered to be important for our purposes.

Each class heading names the property that is universal for all entities subsumed in that class. However there are many different ways of classifying that can be broken down depending on how specific one wishes to make the list of requisite properties and what purpose we have classifying such entities. So it is possible of similar entities with similar properties to be in the same class or not depending on one's purpose of classification.

Remember, one cannot say 'entities' without pronouncing 'tities.'

[softwareNerd]

And 'straightness' implies an impossibility.

Are you acknowledging that you do not use the term straight, or that when you do so it is meaningless? If you use it and mean something by it, then you need to introspect what you mean. I think my son was 4 years old or less when he could tell a curved line from a straight one. I warrant you can do the same. Either admit that you're fooling yourself, or figure out what measurements you are using. This really isn't rocket science!

[Ogg_Vorbis]

I think if you re-check, you will see that that is false. I advocate using direct quotations, which tends to catch those errors. Straight lines, numbers, etc are all existents.

'An existent is a concrete. "Existent" is a very convenient term in that it subsumes entities and attributes and actions and even mental events.' [241]

In that case, 'existent' is synonymous with 'concrete,' which is whatever Rand said it is. It is difficult to integrate her notion that mental "events" are concretes too, which I would instead classify as tangibles (vs. the intangibles: products of conscious activity, etc). It was kinder of me not to quote Rand in this instance.

No, "tree" is a concept which reduces to particular wooden entities. Don't confuse the things you can do with a concept -- communicate or obfuscate X -- with a concept which is in fact a method.

Is the concept of 'concept' a concept of consciousness or a concept of method?

Your concern is misplaced; and I see you returning to that theme of "definition". The fact of identification is primary, and definition is secondary. You don't need to know that the rational faculty in one man is the same as the rational faculty in any other men, all you need to be able to do is identify a man.And yet, you can't name any aspect of an epistemology that is missing from ITOE. I'll help you with the one thing I know of -- she did not develop the distinction between possible, probably and certain, which was done in OPAR. She did dispose of the so-called "problem of universals", by proposing a theory of concept formation (which then leaves no unresolved matters of substance in the "problem of universals").

Only based on her personal definition of the problem, which is then easily knocked down as a strawman. She was concerned with finding the man-ness in men, when that is not the problem at all. 'Where is the "manness" in men? What, in reality, corresponds to the concept "man" in our mind?' Those questions do not properly spell out the problem, therefore she did not properly resolve it.

Is the redness of that book identical with the redness of this book?

Is the rationality of that man identical with the rationality of this man?

Is it the same property of red? Is it the same property known as reason?

If they are not identical, then how can they be classified together?

If they are identical, then how do you know it? This last question is, of course, truly a matter of epistemology. It is the question Rand failed to ask. She never asked it, thus she never got her epistemology off the ground.

[dbc]

Why are they still considered rational animals? Only because we idealize them into a mental compartment known as 'rational,' even when this requires a great deal of straining when trying to fit such square pegs into a round hole.

I do not know what you mean by "idelize[ing] them into a mental comparment". It appears you are suggesting some kind of classification of men based, not on observable similarities but on some kind of psychological convenience.

Yet, we cannot intellegently speak of a "degree of rationality" without assuming the existence of a rational faculty.

Have you read Rand's account of measurement omission in ITOE? This is a key tenet to Rand's theory of concepts. You seem to either not be aware of the role of measurement omission in her theory of concepts or you have dismissed it out of hand. If you have read it and disagree, please tell us what specifically you find objectionalbe.

Dan

[Ogg_Vorbis]

Think about the concept of time. You cannot touch, smell, tastes, see, or hear time. However, by observing how an entity (such as the sky or a plant) was, is, and might be you can learn the concepts of past, present, and future. From those concepts you can infer the concept of time. You can even learn to measure time by relating it to changes in the attributes of an entity (i.e. reaching the concepts of night and day by observing changes in the sky.) Time is a unique attribute as it applies to all entities past, present, and future.

In physical reality, attributes do not exist apart from the entities that embody them. It is only through a process of abstraction that we deal with attributes.

You are following Rand's method of reducing the universal to the general or abstract, the property to the attribute. I am not concerned here with the attributes of entities, but with the universal properties pertaining to classes of entities.

The answer lies in the fact that there are many different alternatives in classifying specific entities. That a book may or may not be red, have a cover or not, etc; is irrelevant to what a book essentially is.

I am asking if the qualia of red in one instance is the same qualia of red in another instance. Thus color is relevant. If I am to classify them both under the category of red books, then how can I know that their redness places them in identical classes, that is, how can I know that the attribute of redness is a property they share in common?

As you see, this is a question of knowledge, of epistemology, and not merely of concept-formation, thus proving that Rand never got around to discussing the title of her own book.

In essence a book is stacked papers bound together along one side. Thus a universal property of all books is that they employ a method of binding a stack of papers together.

I don't see how a method of binding a stack of papers could be considered a property or even an attribute of anything.

From there we can discern different types of books and divide them into classes such as books with substantial printed information (such as magazines, textbooks, novels, booklets) and books without substantial printed information (i.e. notebooks, journals, photo albums etc.). Then we look at books with printed information and consider the classes of non-fiction and fiction. Having chosen fiction, we organize the class of fiction book by author, then by title. Looking at the specific books we can compare the text and conclude that they share the same text, method of binding, and page layout and conclude they are the same book despite one missing the cover and copyright pages and thus are similar paperback editions of Atlas Shrugged by Ayn Rand. So in this route of classification they are properly in the same class with only a few minor differences that are irrelevant.

You have stated that they are similar editions, but not that their properties are identical such that they are classifiable under the same category. I wanted to know if they were the same book, not similar books.

The essence of similarity was the easiest part of ITOE to understand, it was a complete no-brainer, every mathematician knows it already. But the problem of universals isn't that easy.

Another route is possible where after considering books with substantial amounts of printed information as opposed to books that are mostly blank, you consider only those printed books that have covers vs. those printed books that do not so as to distinguished between a stolen book and a legitimate one. In this case, the two editions of Atlas Shrugged are properly not in the same class though they are copies of the same book. In both cases the classification is correct, the difference lies in what classifications we considered to be important for our purposes.

Each class heading names the property that is universal for all entities subsumed in that class. However there are many different ways of classifying that can be broken down depending on how specific one wishes to make the list of requisite properties and what purpose we have classifying such entities. So it is possible of similar entities with similar properties to be in the same class or not depending on one's purpose of classification.

Is 'stolen' versus 'legitimate' a valid distinction made about properties? Can a book have the property of being stolen goods?

Remember, one cannot say 'entities' without pronouncing 'tities.'

Ok.

[Ogg_Vorbis]

I do not know what you mean by "idelize[ing] them into a mental comparment". It appears you are suggesting some kind of classification of men based, not on observable similarities but on some kind of psychological convenience.

Yet, we cannot intellegently speak of a "degree of rationality" without assuming the existence of a rational faculty.

Have you read Rand's account of measurement omission in ITOE? This is a key tenet to Rand's theory of concepts. You seem to either not be aware of the role of measurement omission in her theory of concepts or you have dismissed it out of hand. If you have read it and disagree, please tell us what specifically you find objectionalbe.

Dan

A theory of concept-formation does not do justice to the problem of universals. I have no problem with the discussion of similarity, its truth is a no-brainer. The easiest example is that of two similar squares possessing different measurements. In order to see that they are similar it is necessary simply to omit their particular measurements, retaining the essential fact of squareness (a figure with four equal sides having inner angles adding up to 360 degrees).

But the problem of universals asks this question: is the property of squareness of the one square identical to the property of squareness of the other? Are they identical properties, and how do you know?

Now you have a problem of epistemology, and not just concept-formation.

Edited February 18, 2008 by Ogg_Vorbis

[Ogg_Vorbis]

Are you acknowledging that you do not use the term straight, or that when you do so it is meaningless? If you use it and mean something by it, then you need to introspect what you mean. I think my son was 4 years old or less when he could tell a curved line from a straight one. I warrant you can do the same. Either admit that you're fooling yourself, or figure out what measurements you are using. This really isn't rocket science!

I never thought ITOE was like rocket science, that's why I consider it the easy answer, or non-answer, to a difficult question that Rand never got around to asking.

Yes it is child's play to intuit the difference between curved and straight (although some curved lines may look straight and vice versa, as many optical illusion problems have been designed to show). But I have argued that things in reality are only relatively straight, that they stand relative to an ideal of straightness in which the path the line takes from one point to another never deviates from the course, otherwise you have an arc. How is it, then, that the property of straightness can be shared by very dissimilar things? How do you know that the property of straightness is identical with each entity? Is it or is it not the same straightness, and how do you know it?

That is the problem of universals, the first question of epistemology which Ayn Rand never got around to asking.

[agrippa1]

Red and orange are precisely distinguishable from each other: red is a color in the wavelength range of roughly 625–740 nm; orange is a color at a wavelength of about 585 – 620 nm. (Source = wikipedia.)

You do understand why those are incomplete, and thus false definitions of the concepts "red" and "orange," right?

[Ogg_Vorbis]

You do understand why those are incomplete, and thus false definitions of the concepts "red" and "orange," right?

I never said they were definitions, only that the colors are distinguishable in terms of their respective wavelengths. And anyway, I was more concerned with the perceptual distinction between the two colors, for which there is - precisely - no definable terms, thus there is no "true" definition. Since you cannot define 'red' or 'orange' in words - only by pointing - it looks as if we're stuck with the scientific description after all. And since concept-formation requires at least two similar members of a set ("A unit is an existent regarded as a separate member of a group of two or more similar members"), the concept of 'existence' is no concept either.

[DavidOdden]

Is the redness of that book identical with the redness of this book?

Yes, it is; they cannot be distinguished. (You could at least point us to the two things you're talking about)

Is the rationality of that man identical with the rationality of this man?

Presumably you mean "the extent of acting rationally"; no, it is not. She behaves more rationally than he does.

Is it the same property of red? Is it the same property known as reason?

"Red" and "reason" are different things, so they can't be the same as each other. The "red" of this book is the same as the "red" of that book.

If they are not identical, then how can they be classified together?

On the basis is their similarity.

If they are identical, then how do you know it?

Because I have sense organs. BTW there are no "qualia".

[agrippa1]

You missed some of my earlier posts. A straight line is the distance traversed between two points without ever deviating from the course. You can see that in reality straight lines only tend toward straightness, with straightness itself, having an infinite degree of precision in measuring off the path, serving as a standard with which to accomplish the task. But an infinite degree of precision doesn't exist in reality, it is a mental construct.

Must a person have infinite height in order to be "tall?" Does a 6'8" man only "tend towards tallness?"

The point is that all measurements are relative to standard of measurement. Your assumption that the standard of straightness is an infinitely straight line is as invalid as an assertion that the standard of "longness" is an infinitely long distance.

[agrippa1]

I never said they were definitions, only that the colors are distinguishable in terms of their respective wavelengths. And anyway, I was more concerned with the perceptual distinction between the two colors, for which there is - precisely - no definable terms, thus there is no "true" definition. Since you cannot define 'red' or 'orange' in words - only by pointing - it looks as if we're stuck with the scientific description after all.

We're not "stuck" with wrong definitions. Defining a color in terms of wavelengths specializes the context of the definition to pure light sources. Orange can be made up of pure orange light, or of pure red light and pure green light (as in your television) or of a random sample of wavelengths centered around the wavelengths you mention (as in the case of sunlight reflected from an orange book). Your mistake (in my opinion) is in making (presumably infinite) "precision" an attribute of "true" definitions. By that standard there are no "true" definitions, including, foremost, the definition of "true." In which case we'd be having a hard time communicating right now. (Hmmm... perhaps you have a point)

And since concept-formation requires at least two similar members of a set ("A unit is an existent regarded as a separate member of a group of two or more similar members"), the concept of 'existence' is no concept either.

You realize you are asserting here that nothing exists. (or at least not more than one thing - your consciousness perhaps?)

[Ogg_Vorbis]

Is the redness of that book identical with the redness of this book?

Yes, it is; they cannot be distinguished. (You could at least point us to the two things you're talking about)

Two red books. I have stated that their respective shades of red are distinguishable, and in fact I have also stated that no two objects can be exactly the same shade of red down to the nth degree. But since your answer is 'yes,' my next question, which does involve epistemology, is, "And how do you know the two properties of redness are identical such that both books may be classified as red books?"

Is the rationality of that man identical with the rationality of this man?

Presumably you mean "the extent of acting rationally"; no, it is not. She behaves more rationally than he does.

The problem of universals is concerned with properties, so my question concerned the property of rationality supposedly held universally by all men. Is it always the same property identical to all men? The two books aren't precisely the same shade of red, and every man acts differently according to the extent of his rationality. Nevertheless, their respective properties are considered identical: it is the same property of redness, such that all red things can be classified in terms of that universal property; and the same property of rationality, such that all men, no matter how irrationally they behave, can be classified universally as rational beings. The question then is this: how do we know it? On the basis of perceived similarities?

Is it the same property of red? Is it the same property known as reason?

"Red" and "reason" are different things, so they can't be the same as each other. The "red" of this book is the same as the "red" of that book.

I'll ignore the crack about red and reason being two different things, unless you were just Randizing the question into a strawman easy to knock down -- like the question behind ITOE itself.

The property of redness is identical to both books, and yet there is a subtle though distinguishable difference in shade. On what basis can you then assert that the property of redness is identical?

On the basis is their similarity.

We know that the two colors are very similar, but how are the properties of color identical?

Because I have sense organs. BTW there are no "qualia".

If you knew what you were saying there you'd never say it, because the latter implies that you have no sense organs, or they don't function.

http://classes.colgate.edu/pgregory/phil34...glossary.html#P

"Qualia - Often referred to as 'raw feels', qualia are those subjective, qualitative properties of mental states such as sensations and emotions the 'what it is like' to see red, feel pain, be angry. Such mental states are thought to have intrinsic qualitative features by which we identify them through introspection."

So apparently, if there are no qualia, then you have no idea what it is like to see red, feel pain, and be angry.

Edited February 18, 2008 by Ogg_Vorbis

[Ogg_Vorbis]

Must a person have infinite height in order to be "tall?" Does a 6'8" man only "tend towards tallness?"

The point is that all measurements are relative to standard of measurement. Your assumption that the standard of straightness is an infinitely straight line is as invalid as an assertion that the standard of "longness" is an infinitely long distance.

You are apparently just mixing up categories here, so I refuse the comparison of straightness with tallness or longness as invalid. The latter two are concepts of relative distance, straightness is not.

[Ogg_Vorbis]

We're not "stuck" with wrong definitions. Defining a color in terms of wavelengths specializes the context of the definition to pure light sources. Orange can be made up of pure orange light, or of pure red light and pure green light (as in your television) or of a random sample of wavelengths centered around the wavelengths you mention (as in the case of sunlight reflected from an orange book). Your mistake (in my opinion) is in making (presumably infinite) "precision" an attribute of "true" definitions. By that standard there are no "true" definitions, including, foremost, the definition of "true." In which case we'd be having a hard time communicating right now. (Hmmm... perhaps you have a point)

I only made the point about infinity regarding straightness, and only because it is a mathematical problem. Infinity belongs to the mathematical realm, as do straight lines which are only mental constructs. There is no infinite standard to set for the property of color or reasoning, and they are not in the mathematical realm. In fact, I'm not even concerned with the idea of definitions, true or false, since it is topical to ITOE and I have already stated that such topics don't answer the problem of universals.

You realize you are asserting here that nothing exists. (or at least not more than one thing - your consciousness perhaps?)

I am only showing the fact that, given Rand's own method of concept-formation which requires the formation of a unit from two or more similar existents, "existence" is not a concept.

[DavidOdden]

But since your answer is 'yes,' my next question, which does involve epistemology, is, "And how do you know the two properties of redness are identical such that both books may be classified as red books?"

Because I can see that they are the same, and indistinguishable. The evidence of the senses is primary, and we are only minimally concerned with different quantum states. When two things cannot be distinguished even at the sensory level in terms of their conceptual classification, they are clearly the same. This versus this is more interesting because they are distinguishable by the sense organs, but still subsumed under a single color (although you might also opt to assign them to different color species -- I'll leave that level of subdivision up to the art students). Recall that differentiation is optional, and only done when it serves the purposes of cognitive economy.

The question then is this: how do we know it? On the basis of perceived similarities?

Yes. Two or more units with shared similarities may be organised into a concept, omitting differences, based on those shared similiarities.

The property of redness is identical to both books, and yet there is a subtle though distinguishable difference in shade. On what basis can you then assert that the property of redness is identical?

Since in your quote you didn't give an example, I took the liberty of finding two indistinguishable reds. Like this and this.

We know that the two colors are very similar, but how are the properties of color identical?

Whether they can be distinguished with the sense organs. For another example, a 100 Hz sine wave can be distinguished from a 101 Hz sine wave, and a 10,000 Hz sine wave cannot be distinguished from a 10,001 Hz sine wave. I can post examples if you'd like.

"Qualia - Often referred to as 'raw feels', qualia are those subjective, qualitative properties of mental states such as sensations and emotions the 'what it is like' to see red, feel pain, be angry. Such mental states are thought to have intrinsic qualitative features by which we identify them through introspection."

Those are just sensations; we don't need a new technical-sounding concept "qualia" to describe them.

[Acount Overdrawn]

A theory of concept-formation does not do justice to the problem of universals. I have no problem with the discussion of similarity, its truth is a no-brainer. The easiest example is that of two similar squares possessing different measurements. In order to see that they are similar it is necessary simply to omit their particular measurements, retaining the essential fact of squareness (a figure with four equal sides having inner angles adding up to 360 degrees).

But the problem of universals asks this question: is the property of squareness of the one square identical to the property of squareness of the other? Are they identical properties, and how do you know?

Now you have a problem of epistemology, and not just concept-formation.

Particular entities have attributes, but when considered members of the same class these attributes are known as properties. The problem of universals deals with the question of properties, not attributes.

I don't understand the significance of calling something a "property" when considering it a member of a class, as opposed to observing or inferring attributes. When we identify things as members of a given class, we're saying that they share a certain range of (explicit or implicit) measurements in common with one another; they possess the same attribute, but in different degrees and the abstraction includes these measurements by not specifying one particular measurement as necessary for something to be included in the class.

By specifying what's essential about these units, that which explains all or most of the other attributes ascribed to the units, the need for finding out if identical properties exist seems to be a mood point. Or rather, it seems to make "property" out to be more like a metaphysical essence which conforms objects into being somehow "identical," with the "problem" then being our ignorance as to whether this exists and how we know it does.

If Rand's interpretation of the "Problem of Universals" is correct, or her correction about it being an epistemological rather than metaphysical issue is correct, then I think she has solved this problem. If your interpretation is correct, then I do not see how a solution could be made. Even "properties" like "red" are specific ideas, specific concepts--if there is no valid means of speaking about concepts, why bother discussing the validity of properties?

Also, you've stated that concept-formation does not solve this problem. What aspect(s) of epistemology, in your opinion, do?

Edited February 18, 2008 by Acount Overdrawn

[Acount Overdrawn]

I only made the point about infinity regarding straightness, and only because it is a mathematical problem. Infinity belongs to the mathematical realm, as do straight lines which are only mental constructs. There is no infinite standard to set for the property of color or reasoning, and they are not in the mathematical realm. In fact, I'm not even concerned with the idea of definitions, true or false, since it is topical to ITOE and I have already stated that such topics don't answer the problem of universals.

I am only showing the fact that, given Rand's own method of concept-formation which requires the formation of a unit from two or more similar existents, "existence" is not a concept.

I don't have the relevant quote, but the concept "existence" is formed by observing things, and abstracting the fact that they "exist." Like "7," there's no thing which is just "existence." "Existence" is not a first-level concept, it is the highest-level abstraction, with its units being all entities, all events, all attributes, all actions, and all relationships. The same goes for the concept "identity" it has the exact same units as "existence"; namely, all things which exist.

"Existence" is irreducible; to form the concept "existence" one notes the similarity that objects/actions/etc. exist, with the difference being the comparison of these things not existing. The only way to discuss existence is to merely restate what it is, as is true of all axioms. Unless you disagree about Rand validated why "existence" etc. are axiomatic concepts, I don't think your conclusion that existence is not a concept holds (actually, I don't think it holds either way).

[Pianoman83]

Ok, the stolen vs. legitimate was a bad example of what I was trying to illustrate as stolen implies a relationship (stolen from whom, stolen by whom) but not an inherent characteristic of the book.

Now as for whether or not they are the same book, I would say yes. The lack of a cover is a non-essential detail. What matters is the text. The same applies to red. That you have two different shades of red does not alter the fact that they are red. The idea of redness being applied is the same in both books although the specific instance of that red may be different.

As for method of book binding, replace method with type. Are the pages bound with glue, stapled, or both, etc? Now can you see how type of binding is an attribute of books? If not, then how are you defining attribute?

But I have argued that things in reality are only relatively straight, that they stand relative to an ideal of straightness in which the path the line takes from one point to another never deviates from the course, otherwise you have an arc. How is it, then, that the property of straightness can be shared by very dissimilar things? How do you know that the property of straightness is identical with each entity? Is it or is it not the same straightness, and how do you know it?

You're ass backwards in this. We infer what straight is from looking at objects that have that property. From there, we can look at a new object and apply the concept of straight to it and know whether or not it is straight. Thus the straightness is the same in every encounter of it. What makes that straightness the same is the process of measurement omission that occurs when forming/applying the concept. You start with a floating abstraction of what straight is and that is why you're having the confusion. You're introducing measurements that are irrelevant to the problem of perceiving something as being straight, or being red. By starting with the abstractions of 'straight' and 'red' you are in effect, treating these as first level concepts that exist apart from any specific entity.

In order to conceptualize, a man must expend effort; he must engage in the kind of mental work that no stimulus can necessitate. He must struggle to relat, connect, process an ever-growing range of data—and he must leart to do it correctly. Further: in such processing the basic method he uses, measurement-omission, is dictated by the nature of his cognitive faculty, not by reality. The result is a human perspective on things, not a revalation of a special sort of entity or attribute intrinsic in the world apart from man. Take away the mechanism of human consciousness, and the realm of concepts, universals, abstractions is thereby erased. The concretes that exist, the objects of perception would still remain—as concretes; but the perspective that regards them as units would be gone. —Peikoff, page 111 of OPAR

In other words, only concretes exist. The abstractions we use to classify them do not. There is no such thing 'straight' or 'red' that exists in and of itself apart from any entity.

You are following Rand's method of reducing the universal to the general or abstract, the property to the attribute. I am not concerned here with the attributes of entities, but with the universal properties pertaining to classes of entities.

Okay. What is the difference between property and attribute? What is the difference between a a specific property of an entity and that property applied to the class of entities which subsume that entity? What makes a property universal as opposed to being just an attribute?

[edited at 10:09 p.m to correct grammar]

Edited February 18, 2008 by Pianoman83

[Ogg_Vorbis]

Ok, the stolen vs. legitimate was a bad example of what I was trying to illustrate as stolen implies a relationship (stolen from whom, stolen by whom) but not an inherent characteristic of the book.

Now as for whether or not they are the same book, I would say yes. The lack of a cover is a non-essential detail. What matters is the text. The same applies to red. That you have two different shades of red does not alter the fact that they are red. The idea of redness being applied is the same in both books although the specific instance of that red may be different.

As for method of book binding, replace method with type. Are the pages bound with glue, stapled, or both, etc? Now can you see how type of binding is an attribute of books? If not, then how are you defining attribute?

I'm not concerned with attributes except insofar as they can be considered properties universal to a class of entities. It helps that you changed 'method of binding' to 'type of binding,' since only the latter could be considered a property of books. Now, since you believe they are the same book, I have to ask about the nature of the relationship between your paradigm of the book and the actual book, since there is no perfect paradigm of the book matching with reality only in thought. I get two different answers from you which vary from case to case. In the case of the two books, they are identical, but in the case of the straight lines, you say below it is a floating abstraction.

The problem of universals poses such a paradox, in that both answers are "correct" until we may arrive at an understanding of the relationship between universal and reality. It is the unresolved issue which divided philosophers into two camps, empiricists and rationalists. Whether your answer is 'yes' or 'no' places you in one or the other camp, because it concerns your method of accounting for 'ideal' entities such as the paradigmatic representation of the straight line, and this has nothing to do with being an Objectivist.

But I have argued that things in reality are only relatively straight, that they stand relative to an ideal of straightness in which the path the line takes from one point to another never deviates, otherwise you have an arc. How is it, then, that the property of straightness can be shared by very dissimilar things? How do you know that the property of straightness is identical with each entity? Is it or is it not the same straightness, and how do you know it?

You're ass backwards in this.

I'll keep that in mind. However, also keep in mind that this is a problem of knowledge, epistemology and not concept-formation unless you want to work on the problem of how to arrive at the concept of a straight line with no real examples of straight lines to operate from.

We infer what straight is from looking at objects that have that property. From there, we can look at a new object and apply the concept of straight to it and know whether or not it is straight. Thus the straightness is the same in every encounter of it. What makes that straightness the same is the process of measurement omission that occurs when forming/applying the concept. You start with a floating abstraction of what straight is and that is why you're having the confusion. You're introducing measurements that are irrelevant to the problem of perceiving something as being straight, or being red. By starting with the abstractions of 'straight' and 'red' you are in effect, treating these as first level concepts that exist apart from any specific entity.

In other words, only concretes exist. The abstractions we use to classify them do not. There is no such thing 'straight' or 'red' that exists in and of itself apart from any entity.

'An existent is a concrete. "Existent" is a very convenient term in that it subsumes entities and attributes and actions and even mental events. They exist.' (ITOE2, 241)

So even according to Rand the class property of straightness exists, or to use your language, a 'floating abstraction' exists, despite the fact that it doesn't exist physically as there is nothing to match the paradigm of what straightness is. The paradigm, of course, must have the line never deviating or else it is no longer a straight line, whereas in reality all "straight" lines deviate. The problem of universals is to determine its relationship to reality so that the property of straightness is no longer 'floating.'

Okay. What is the difference between property and attribute? What is the difference between a a specific property of an entity and that property applied to the class of entities which subsume that entity? What makes a property universal as opposed to being just an attribute?

Attributes belong to entities, properties are attributes belonging universally to classes of entities; a property is "a basic or essential attribute shared by all members of a class." http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=property

Apples share the property of being bruised easily. A bruise may or may not be a characteristic or attribute of a particular apple. Being shared by all members of the class converts attributes into universal properties. An attribute may or may not be a universal. If, let's suppose, all apples were by their very nature bruised, then that attribute (bruisedness, the quality of being bruised) would be universal to the class of apples.

Edited February 18, 2008 by Ogg_Vorbis

[dbc]

Attributes belong to entities, properties are attributes belonging universally to classes of entities; a property is "a basic or essential attribute shared by all members of a class." http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=property

Apples share the property of being bruised easily. A bruise may or may not be a characteristic or attribute of a particular apple. Being shared by all members of the class converts attributes into universal properties. An attribute may or may not be a universal. If, let's suppose, all apples were by their very nature bruised, then that attribute (bruisedness, the quality of being bruised) would be universal to the class of apples.

The "property" you refer to is still an attribute; it is our ability to regard the attribute as a unit that seems to be at the root of (at least one) complaint.

A particular apple may not be bruised; yet, as you correctly point out, the property of being easily bruised belongs to all apples. What allows for this shared "property"? The apples are easily bruised because of their chemical makeup--they share the same chemical composition that allows for being bruised. We may properly regard the apples' chemical composition as an attribute and all apples (all apples that ever existed, exist now or may exist in the future) share the attribute.

Dan

[Ogg_Vorbis]

Because I can see that they are the same, and indistinguishable. The evidence of the senses is primary, and we are only minimally concerned with different quantum states. When two things cannot be distinguished even at the sensory level in terms of their conceptual classification, they are clearly the same. This versus this is more interesting because they are distinguishable by the sense organs, but still subsumed under a single color (although you might also opt to assign them to different color species -- I'll leave that level of subdivision up to the art students). Recall that differentiation is optional, and only done when it serves the purposes of cognitive economy.Yes. Two or more units with shared similarities may be organised into a concept, omitting differences, based on those shared similiarities.Since in your quote you didn't give an example, I took the liberty of finding two indistinguishable reds. Like this and this.Whether they can be distinguished with the sense organs. For another example, a 100 Hz sine wave can be distinguished from a 101 Hz sine wave, and a 10,000 Hz sine wave cannot be distinguished from a 10,001 Hz sine wave. I can post examples if you'd like.

Is the purpleness of one "this" the same purpleness as the other "this"?

Those are just sensations; we don't need a new technical-sounding concept "qualia" to describe them.

Since the topic is properties as univerals, qualia is the appropriate word to use in this context according to the definition at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/qualia.

1 : a property (as redness) considered apart from things having the property : universal

2 : a property as it is experienced as distinct from any source it might have in a physical object

Redness is a quale, a universal property of red things.

[DavidOdden]

Is the purpleness of one "this" the same purpleness as the other "this"?

Yes; there is just one purpleness. If something is purple then it's "purpleness" is the same as that of any other purple thing.