In Defense Of Dresden

[aynfan]

IN DEFENSE OF DRESDEN

By Robert Wolf

Collateral damage has been the subject of much discussion as it relates to the Iraq war; but debate on this topic is certainly not new. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the decision by the RAF to carpet bomb during WWII are the usual examples in the debate.

Objectivists justify collateral damage during wartime as a way of demoralizing the enemy and foreshortening the war. They rightly argue that attempts to shield civilians unnecessarily costs American lives. Nor, as is often argued, is the civilian population of the enemy innocent. First, they support an immoral government and second, their labor benefits the enemy’s war effort.

But, while this is generally true, it is not always true. Actions during wartime should not have carte blanche sanction. It is important to distinguish between purely personal acts and strategic military actions. The fire-bombing of Dresden, in 1945, is one of those exceptions. Not only did the action against that city not achieve its objective of demoralizing the enemy (impossible in a population long since demoralized), it resulted in the deaths of thousands of eastern European refugees fleeing the war and destroyed one of Europe’s most beautiful cities; a trove of historical art and treasure.

Arthur Harris

Although, the decision to use these bombs early in the war and for the specific action against Dresden came from the very top, it was based in great measure on recommendations by the Chief, or Head of RAF Bomber Command during WWII, Arthur Harris. His biography is not unimportant to this discussion.

He was the son of a civil servant. When he was seventeen he moved to Rhodesia where he worked variously as a gold miner, a livery man and a laborer in the tobacco fields. When the World War I broke out he joined the 1st Rhodesia Regiment and fought in the campaign the succeeded in stripping South West Africa from the Germans. He returned to England in 1915 and joined the British Airforce (Royal Flying Corps). In 1919 Harris was a squadron leader in the newly created (RAF).

Over the next few years he served in India, Iraq and Iran, before serving on the staff overseeing the entire Middle East from 1930-32. During this period the RAF used terror bombing, including gas attacks and delayed action bombs, on the Iraqi tribes rebelling against British rule. Harris insisted that "the only thing the Arab understands is the heavy hand." He was fond of a "heavy hand" and put it to better use against Germany during World War II. By the time the war began, Harris had reached the rank of Air Vice-Marshal, and in then in 1942, replaced J. E. Baldwin as Head of the Command.

Harris was at best an autocrat, certainly not a diplomat. He clearly preferred getting his own way, to the more disciplined process of developing the qualities of leadership required to persuade. Under his leadership of the RAF, his "heavy hand" was perfected, he fought all attempts to be dissuaded from carpet bombing in favor of precision bombing. Harris argued that the main objectives of night-time blanket bombing of urban areas was to undermine the morale of the civilian population and attacks were launched on Hamburg, Berlin, Cologne and other German cities between 1940-43, and Dresden in 1945. According to the Oxford Companion to WWII, “when they (Britain) reverted to the Combined Chiefs in September, it was decided to concentrate them (the bombings) on precision targets, especially oil plants. However, Harris disagreed with this approach, preferring to pursue the area bombing of German cities. It was a wrangle which remained unresolved. Attacks on German cities continued, including Dresden, though precision raids did take precedence over them when operational conditions allowed. Only the cessation of hostilities avoided the dismissal of Harris. . .”

“Despite a sustained effort, which cost Bomber Command heavy casualties, little was accomplished by the offensive. Reports from Germany, including those of neutral observers, cast doubt on RAF damage claims, and the British Air Staff's own investigation, the Butt Report, demonstrated that just one aircraft in five got within five miles of its target. Over the Ruhr only one in ten dropped bombs "within the 7, square miles surrounding the target." (Ibidem) The tremendous loses suffered in these night time raids, coupled with a suspicion that something other than military necessity might lay behind Harris’ intransigence, provoked the US to negotiate an agreement (The Eaker agreement of 1943) which established that the Brits would carpet bomb at night and the US would perform more precise targeting by day.

The Attack on Dresden

On the 13th February 1945, 773 British planes bombed Dresden at night. During the next two days during daylight hours the USAAF sent over 527 heavy bombers to follow up the attack. With the degree of precision possible in this era, they struck specific military targets, and unlike the British effort, actually contributed to the war.

Harris in his memoirs described it thus: "An attack on the night of February 13th-14th by just over 800 (sic) aircraft, bombing in two sections in order to get the night fighters dispersed and grounded before the second attack, was almost as overwhelming in its effect as the Battle of Hamburg, though the area of devastation -1600 acres - was considerably less; there was, it appears, a fire-typhoon, and the effect on German morale, not only in Dresden but in far distant parts of the country, was extremely serious. The Americans carried out two light attacks in daylight on the next two days." Notice how his effort produced an "extremely serious" effect on German morale, which the Americans carried out two "light" attacks. An honest account, you decide?

Dresden was nearly totally destroyed, as a result of the fire bombings. Afterwards, it was impossible to count the number of victims. Research suggests that 135,000 were killed but some German sources have argued that it was over 250,000. Whatever the figure, it was larger than the 51,509 British civilians killed by the Germans during the London air raids or the 70,000 instant deaths at Hiroshima after the first atomic bomb. The entire carpet bombing campaign killed an estimated 600,000 civilians and destroyed or seriously damaged some six million homes during the course of the war. Highly dangerous to friend and foe alike, the British Bomber Command lost over 57,000 men.

Churchill mused that the bombing of "communication centres in eastern Germany might aid the Soviet advance on Berlin", and, "cause confusion in the evacuation from the east" and "hamper the movements of troops from the west". By "evacuation from the east", he was not talking about retreating troops. He was referring to civilian refugees of various nationalities fleeing the advancing Russians. The refugees did not contribute to the German war effort, if anything they were a drain on it, but were considered targets simply because attacking them might create enough chaos to prevent German reinforcements from reaching the Eastern Front--a lot of speculation.

Aftermath

It is significant that only a few weeks after the raid on Dresden, on 28 March 1945, Churchill tried to dissociate himself from the destruction. He issued a memorandum denouncing the bombing of cities as "mere acts of terror and wanton destruction". But, notice that he makes no distinction between cities bombed early in the war, and Dresden which was attacked in 1945. He doesn’t understand the distinction and simply dismisses the entire action, never comprehending that one was justified and the other not.

The war was over and hypocrisy had reached new heights. The British lion was ready to lie down with the lamb. He was ready to cloak himself in the Christian ethic and proclaim, in hindsight, that turning the other cheek would have been the higher moral duty, clearly a case of situational ethics. The Prime Minister who had actively supported the bombing campaign all along continues, "It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, should be reviewed. Otherwise we shall come into control of an utterly ruined land,” his true feelings.

Arthur Harris became a marshal of the RAF in 1946 and soon afterwards retired from active duty. He published his war memoirs, “Bomber Command”, in 1947. In it he explains why he ordered the bombing of Dresden in February, 1945, "I know that the destruction of so large and splendid a city at this late stage of the war was considered unnecessary even by a good many people who admit that our earlier attacks were as fully justified as any other operation of war. Here I will only say that the attack on Dresden was at the time considered a military necessity by much more important people than myself, and that if their judgment was right the same arguments must apply . . . “ No pride here in his ‘heavy hand’; he was only following orders. If Harris was innocent, so was Adolph Eichmann. They both offered the same defense.

©2004 by Robert Davison Wolf. All rights reserved.