Free speech vs libel

[brian0918]

Should one be liable for libel? Do the current defamation laws infringe upon our right to free speech? What does Objectivism have to say about libel/slander?

[Benpercent]

I've wondered about this too. As far as I know, writing a nasty thing about someone in an article does not violate anyone's natural rights and should be respected as freedom of speech, but of course they should be taken to task if they write lies.

Now that I think of it, have the Brandens been exposed as liars? People still use their lies in ad hominids I know.

[Mimpy]

I have never really given the issue much thought, but my immediate reaction is:

I think expressing your opinion about someone is an expression of your right to free speech. If that opinion happens to be particularly nasty, then so be it. However, I do not think one has the right to say something incorrect about an individual. That is why tabloids are sued so often. I think it constitutes a kind of fraud.

So basically, I don't think you should be able to publish or publically announce lies, while insisting you are telling the truth. Obviously such publications, such as "The Onion," are excluded from this rule because they admit what they are doing.

[KendallJ]

Should one be liable for libel? Do the current defamation laws infringe upon our right to free speech? What does Objectivism have to say about libel/slander?

If you lie about someone, and that lie causes them damage, then what is the issue? Does freedom of speech include the freedom to evade the reality of a thing?

I also think there is a difference between a lie and an opinion. And insinuation is somewhere in the middle.

[DavidOdden]

If you lie about someone, and that lie causes them damage, then what is the issue? Does freedom of speech include the freedom to evade the reality of a thing?

I'll step up to the plate and say "yes". Legally, it does. See here. Liars are unquestionably immoral, and a certain species of lying, namely fraud, is properly in the purview of the law. Lying about a person is not, per se, a kind of fraud (although if you lie about Jones in negotiating with Smith in order to secure a contract and that lie is material, then it is fraud). The best argument that I have seen is the "reputation as property" argument (and "best" doesn't mean "good enough").

The only alternative line justifying anti-defamation that I can see is a radical "right to privacy" argument, which say that you have no right to (and should be legally prevented from) speak of a third party without their consent, with the concept of "implicit consent" being invoked when that person speaks in public (posts on a forum, writes a letter to a newspaper, speaks at a meeting, runs for office). This does not mean that I think such an argument is defensible, just that it's worth thinking about.

[KendallJ]

I seem to remember we've discussed this before, but I don't remember your position exactly. Libel as "on the edge" of being valid, or invalid altogether?

I think the concept is possibly valid, analogous to fraud. The obvious difficulty is showing damage as a direct, specific causal result of someone's specific lie.

Edited March 13, 2008 by KendallJ

[D'kian]

Your reputation is a valuable asset. Any attacks on it can damage it and thus lower it's worth. If said attacks are false, then the intent was to cause damage and is akin to initiating force on someone. A surgeon could loose his livelyhood if, say, a newspaper were to run a fraudulent article claiming the surgeon engages in unsafe or unsanitary practices. You don't have a right to spread lies about someone, no matter who or why. it is fraud and it causes, or can casue, real damage on many levels.

[DavidOdden]

I seem to remember we've discussed this before, but I don't remember your position exactly. Libel as "on the edge" of being valid, or invalid altogether?

That's the link I just gave; the top post has some links, then more links within links. Basically, I have concluded that there is no properly justified legal concept that results in liability for defamation. I have no question about the moral status of dishonesty, the only question is whether the government should use force to prevent all forms of immorality. Well, obviously not -- for the reasons spelled out in those other posts, I do not see the case that defamation falls within the scope of proper use of legal force.

[DarkWaters]

Legally, it does. See here. Liars are unquestionably immoral, and a certain species of lying, namely fraud, is properly in the purview of the law. Lying about a person is not, per se, a kind of fraud (although if you lie about Jones in negotiating with Smith in order to secure a contract and that lie is material, then it is fraud). The best argument that I have seen is the "reputation as property" argument (and "best" doesn't mean "good enough").

I certainly see contexts where it seems like legal compensation for being a victim of libel or slander is appropriate, even if no contract was terminated in the immediate future. For example, a profession such as a medical doctor, a lawyer or a personal finance consultant. In each of these fields, to launch false accusations against an individual's character is to hurt his integrity, which is used to market his individual services to patients or clientele. If a woman falsely and publically accuses a dentist of molesting her when she was rendered unconscious, it will probably cripple his chance to retain or acquire new patients despite the fact that the allegations are false.

Anyway, I am not sure of how this could be codified into objective law. Moreover, I certainly see the problem with being able to file lawsuits for "loss of reputation" as then joe nobodies can attempt to sue for minor accusations that do not impede their career pursuit. The law should explicitly restrict the awarding of compensation for unjust damages to professionals whose reputation is a cornerstone of the success of their business.

[DavidOdden]

You don't have a right to spread lies about someone, no matter who or why.

You do have that right. Speaking an untruth is not the initiation of force.

it is fraud and it causes, or can casue, real damage on many levels.

It is not fraud.

[noumenalself]

Liars are unquestionably immoral, and a certain species of lying, namely fraud, is properly in the purview of the law. Lying about a person is not, per se, a kind of fraud (although if you lie about Jones in negotiating with Smith in order to secure a contract and that lie is material, then it is fraud). The best argument that I have seen is the "reputation as property" argument (and "best" doesn't mean "good enough").

You seem to be assuming that you need to actually be party to a contract in order for an act to count as fraud (or to be on the same legal footing as fraud). But other forms of the initiation of force don't need to be between contractors.

1. For example, suppose that A contracts with B to provide widgets in exchange for money. Now suppose that C comes along and purloins the widgets after B has already paid for them. A is now technically in violation of his contract, but of course C is the one who is culpable for the act, and C should be punished for it.

2. Now, change the example to an uncontroversial example of fraud. B wants to buy widgets from A. There doesn't even need to be an explicit contract involved here: A just makes fake widgets and collects money from B for them. Obviously A is committing fraud, and using force indirectly by compelling B to give him money he wouldn't otherwise give if he knew these weren't real widgets. A should be punished.

3. Now, another example of fraud, but involving party C. B wants to buy widgets from A. Suppose that A doesn't actually sell widgets and doesn't even advertise that he sells widgets. But C lies and tells B that A sells widgets, so B buys some. In this case, even though C is not a party to the exchange, he has defrauded B of his money. C should be punished.

Do you see where this is going? Slander and libel laws don't outlaw just any form of lying--only the kinds that cause material damage. I submit that just about any instance of slander and libel can be understood as involving indirect fraud in the same way as example 3. One party is damaged (by buying something he doesn't want, for example) as a result of the lie of another.

4. To make things even clearer, notice that in the previous example, it's the buyer who's damaged. But the seller could be damaged by a lie, too. Suppose B wants to buy widgets from A. A actually makes and advertises widgets, but C lies to B and tells him that A's widgets are fake. As a result, B doesn't buy the real widgets from A that he would otherwise buy, all because of C's lie.

The difference between #3 and #4 is almost imperceptible. Yet #4 is the example that most libel/slander suits look like. Only these suits usually deal with lies of a more general nature, not about a person's widgets, but about his character. But these lies can have the same kind of effect, only bigger. So consider:

5. B wants to buy widgets from A. A actually makes fine widgets. But C lies to B, telling B that A clubs baby seals and cheats on his wife. In fact A does neither of these things, but B doesn't want to patronize anyone who does. If B had known A's true character, he would have bought the widgets. But because A's true reputation has been damaged by C's lie, B doesn't buy the widgets he otherwise would. Maybe C tells this lie to lots of people, and so nobody buys anything A sells. Now A is really in trouble.

I submit that there is no important difference between 5 and the case where someone is defrauded because he buys something he wouldn't otherwise buy if he knew what he was buying. Both involve losing a value one would otherwise gain if a lie hadn't been told. Both parties of an exchange are harmed in this way when an exchange that shouldn't happen does, or when an exchange that should happen doesn't.

Edited March 13, 2008 by noumenalself

[D'kian]

The law should explicitly restrict the awarding of compensation for unjust damages to professionals whose reputation is a cornerstone of the success of their business.

The problem with that is fasle accusations can end anyone's career. A day laborer can find it impossible to obtain emplyment if he's falsesly accused of being a child molester, even if his reputation is not the cornerstone of his career.

If you want guidelines, here are some:

1) Libel requires knowingly telling lies. An error is not a lie. Repeating something you read or heard is not the same as telling a lie, either (otherwise you could sue, say, Newsweek and all its readers for libel)

2) The fasle accusations or claims must be widely diseminated. Say through mass publications (including the internet) or some other form of mass campaign (as in handing out leaflets or putting up a billboard). Malicious gossip that doesn't go beyond a handful of people doesn't qualify.

3) the plaintiff must proove damage not only to his reputation but also to his career, livelyhood, income or property.

4) as with every suit, the plaintiff carries the burden of proof in all instances.

5) Opinions that don't cite facts to suopport them are not libel. Say you call an actor 8either popular, obscure or a has-been) untalented. That could cost him future roles, but how do you go about proving that opinion false? Claiming you didn't like the food from a particualr chef is also an opinion, and a matter of taste, that can damage a restaurant's business, but it is truthful. Claiming the food made you sick is a statement of fact and has to be proved.

Feel free to add to this list.

[brian0918]

Speaking an untruth is not the initiation of force.

How about if someone shouts "BOMB!" or "FIRE!" in a crowded theatre (knowing that there was no such danger), causing a stampede and trampling?

Edited March 13, 2008 by brian0918

[DavidOdden]

You seem to be assuming that you need to actually be party to a contract in order for an act to count as fraud (or to be on the same legal footing as fraud).

I think so, at least as far as "fraud" goes. I'm not sure what things are on the same footing, yet are not fraud. I'm contending that defamation can't be subsumed under fraud, and that it cannot be subsumed under any notion of initiation of force unless one considers a reputation to be property (and as I've said, that is the most credible position I've seen).

1. For example, suppose that A contracts with B to provide widgets in exchange for money. Now suppose that C comes along and purloins the widgets after B has already paid for them. A is now technically in violation of his contract, but of course C is the one who is culpable for the act, and C should be punished for it.

And B has a cause of action against C for that initiation of force. That has never been in question.

2. Now, change the example to an uncontroversial example of fraud. B wants to buy widgets from A. There doesn't even need to be an explicit contract involved here: A just makes fake widgets and collects money from B for them. Obviously A is committing fraud, and using force indirectly by compelling B to give him money he wouldn't otherwise give if he knew these weren't real widgets. A should be punished.

Again, because the transfer of property was conditional: conditioned upon A providing widgets. B gives the money, A does not give the widgets, B keeps the money by force, and the ownership of the money has not changed because the crucual premise that the transfer was founded on was not satisfied.

3. Now, another example of fraud, but involving party C. B wants to buy widgets from A. Suppose that A doesn't actually sell widgets and doesn't even advertise that he sells widgets. But C lies and tells B that A sells widgets, so B buys some. In this case, even though C is not a party to the exchange, he has defrauded B of his money. C should be punished.

This case doesn't make sense, and here's the problem: "so B buys some". From whom? From A? If A offers widgets and accepts B's money, but has no widgets (your scenario denies that) then A has committed simple fraud, end of story. Your scenario seems to cut A out of the loop, making him a passive bystander, but then I don't see how B can buy from A. If you had in mind that C is a party to the fraud by A, that's different. For instance, C can proffer widgets sold by A, A can fraudulently take the money without overtly saying "I do hereby receive this money on the promise that I will give you widgets"; but all A has done is knowingly engage an accomplice in the fraud, relying on B interpreting C as being A's agent. That is still simple (albeit more clever, inferential) fraud -- the stuff of movies.

I submit that just about any instance of slander and libel can be understood as involving indirect fraud in the same way as example 3.

I agree, unfortunately, meaning that it is not a case of fraud, nor was case 3 a case of indirect fraud. It was direct fraud. Defamation is not fraud, because it does not involve the transfer of property being conditional upon something that the receiving party lied about.

WRT #4, yes, either a buyer or seller can be damaged by a third parties false statements, if they are believed and not investigated. Similarly, a party can be damaged by false praise. If A falsely praises B's work (in a substantially false manner, e.g. "he built a structurally sound back porch in a week and caused no damage to the yard" when in fact he built a rickety heap taking 6 months and trashing the neighborhood), then C may rely on that statement and "fraudulently" receive a major disvalue. In addition, contractor D may be damaged by C's reliance on A's false statement, by not getting the contract that he would have gotten without the "fraud".

4. To make things even clearer, notice that in the previous example, it's the buyer who's damaged. But the seller could be damaged by a lie, too. Suppose B wants to buy widgets from A. A actually makes and advertises widgets, but C lies to B and tells him that A's widgets are fake. As a result, B doesn't buy the real widgets from A that he would otherwise buy, all because of C's lie.

Many people can lose a value that they would otherwise gain if a lie hadn't been told, and I have no question that dishonesty is immoral. My question is whether truthfulness should be enforced by law (specifically, liability for damages that arise from speaking an untruth). Is the proper function of government to prevent a person from acting in a way that causes harm to others, or is it narrowly to prevent the use of force. Actual fraud falls within the sphere of force -- keeping property by force, when it is not your own (because the conditions for transfer of property were not satisfied).

[noumenalself]

Let's talk about the crucial case, #3:

This case doesn't make sense, and here's the problem: "so B buys some". From whom? From A? If A offers widgets and accepts B's money, but has no widgets (your scenario denies that) then A has committed simple fraud, end of story. Your scenario seems to cut A out of the loop, making him a passive bystander, but then I don't see how B can buy from A.

But my hypothesis was that A doesn't advertise what he's selling. B just comes asking for whatever he sells, and A sells. This isn't a totally unrealistic situation. Suppose A sells some chemical, XYZ. He clearly states that he sells chemical XYZ. Now C tells the buyer that XYZ can be used for making fabulous martinis. It turns out that XYZ is a deadly chemical. So B buys some XYZ from A on B's authority, and makes a deadly martini. A hasn't committed any fraud. He's just selling the chemical. Who is to blame for B's martini-induced demise? Clearly C. Words are not just words. Information is a form of action that can also wield force.

Defamation is not fraud, because it does not involve the transfer of property being conditional upon something that the receiving party lied about.

Why is it so important that the receiving party be the one who tells the lie? C receives nothing in my example above. But he's responsible for depriving B of a value through his falsehood. You should also deal with the "Fire!" in a crowded theater example.

WRT #4, yes, either a buyer or seller can be damaged by a third parties false statements, if they are believed and not investigated. Similarly, a party can be damaged by false praise. If A falsely praises B's work (in a substantially false manner, e.g. "he built a structurally sound back porch in a week and caused no damage to the yard" when in fact he built a rickety heap taking 6 months and trashing the neighborhood), then C may rely on that statement and "fraudulently" receive a major disvalue. In addition, contractor D may be damaged by C's reliance on A's false statement, by not getting the contract that he would have gotten without the "fraud".

I don't get what you're saying here, because it seems to support my case. If you concede that these examples of false praise/blame from third parties constitute fraud, why isn't libel/slander equally fraudulent? Are you just saying that these are examples of *accessory* to fraud? OK, but then you need to deal with my example of XYZ, which looks like third-party fraud that isn't just an accessory to fraud.

Many people can lose a value that they would otherwise gain if a lie hadn't been told, and I have no question that dishonesty is immoral. My question is whether truthfulness should be enforced by law (specifically, liability for damages that arise from speaking an untruth). Is the proper function of government to prevent a person from acting in a way that causes harm to others, or is it narrowly to prevent the use of force. Actual fraud falls within the sphere of force -- keeping property by force, when it is not your own (because the conditions for transfer of property were not satisfied).

You seem to be assuming that the definition of force depends on the definition of property, and that the definition of property depends on specified transfer conditions. I suspect that this is not the right hierarchy. There can be force where there is no property, and certainly there can be force when there is no property with transfer conditions. I don't need to say that I have a "property right" to my body to explain why assault and battery is wrong. I certainly don't need to specify the "transfer conditions" for your fist. Look up the notion of "reasonable reliance" in the common law for more on this.

[DavidOdden]

How about if someone shouts "BOMB!" or "FIRE!" in a crowded theatre (knowing that there was no such danger), causing a stampede and trampling?

That, as well as sedition or using the N word in the wrong neighborhood, is really the topic of a separate thread, not one about defamation. It's best that we not let these things spin out of control.

[brian0918]

That, as well as sedition or using the N word in the wrong neighborhood, is really the topic of a separate thread, not one about defamation. It's best that we not let these things spin out of control.

I was simply replying to "Speaking an untruth is not the initiation of force" in an attempt to show that that statement is incorrect.

[DavidOdden]

Suppose A sells some chemical, XYZ. He clearly states that he sells chemical XYZ. Now C tells the buyer that XYZ can be used for making fabulous martinis. It turns out that XYZ is a deadly chemical. So B buys some XYZ from A on B's authority, and makes a deadly martini. A hasn't committed any fraud. He's just selling the chemical. Who is to blame for B's martini-induced demise? Clearly C. Words are not just words. Information is a form of action that can also wield force.

This is a massively common circumstance, it seems. Maybe not so common that deadly chemicals are misrepresented as martini ingredients, but certainly, to take one example, the organic food industry does benefit from the lies told by organic-food advocates. The responsibility lies on the buyer to investigate the product. I'm assuming that what you have in mind is that seller A doesn't even have moral blame, that is, he isn't deliberately relying on the martini claim to make his sales. Except, there is a real question about whether A can be innocent. For example, if A is selling cyanide and sells the substance as cyanide, he has no further obligation to the customer, since everybody knows that cyanide is deadly. If A sells the product under the name "Splangonium" and does not represent the product as anything (leaving it to the buyer to figure out what he might do with the product), then A is entirely innocent and the buyer is an idiot for having bought a random object without checking if the product is a decent martini ingredient. Except in the case where A misrepresents the product as being something else, A is innocent, and unless C is colluding with A to commit fraud, C is also innocent.

Why is it so important that the receiving party be the one who tells the lie?

Because that is what fraud is. A transfers ownership of X to B on condition that B transfer ownership of Y to A. (In a general sense: including "transfer of labor"). But B does not transfer ownership of Y to A, B pretends to do so.

You should also deal with the "Fire!" in a crowded theater example.

Yes, but not here and now.

If you concede that these examples of false praise/blame from third parties constitute fraud, why isn't libel/slander equally fraudulent?

No, I'm afraid that I may have misled you. The scare quotes were intended to indicate that these are not actually examples of fraud. The point was that making false statements of various kinds can result in damage. False praise is not defamation. I'm not sure where you want to go with your argument, but it looks to me like you can't really support laws against defamation since they don't include other forms of damage (false praise types of statements). I invite you to set forth the correct legal principle. Not trying to put words in your mouth, but here is an example. "A person who knowingly makes a false statement is legally responsible for any damage caused by other parties accepting that statement". This is basically an extension of perjury law, where we are under oath at all times. Is that your proposal?

You seem to be assuming that the definition of force depends on the definition of property, and that the definition of property depends on specified transfer conditions. I suspect that this is not the right hierarchy. There can be force where there is no property, and certainly there can be force when there is no property with transfer conditions.

I'm not assuming that definition of force depends on the definition of property; I am asserting that fraud "consists of obtaining material values without their owner's consent, under false pretenses or false promises", "of one man receiving the material values, goods or services of another, then refusing to pay for them and thus keeping them by force (by mere physical possession), not by right—i.e., keeping them without the consent of their owner".

[DarkWaters]

The problem with that is fasle accusations can end anyone's career. A day laborer can find it impossible to obtain emplyment if he's falsesly accused of being a child molester, even if his reputation is not the cornerstone of his career.

I think you have made a valid point. I agree with your assessment.

[noumenalself]

This is a massively common circumstance, it seems. Maybe not so common that deadly chemicals are misrepresented as martini ingredients, but certainly, to take one example, the organic food industry does benefit from the lies told by organic-food advocates. The responsibility lies on the buyer to investigate the product. I'm assuming that what you have in mind is that seller A doesn't even have moral blame, that is, he isn't deliberately relying on the martini claim to make his sales. Except, there is a real question about whether A can be innocent. For example, if A is selling cyanide and sells the substance as cyanide, he has no further obligation to the customer, since everybody knows that cyanide is deadly. If A sells the product under the name "Splangonium" and does not represent the product as anything (leaving it to the buyer to figure out what he might do with the product), then A is entirely innocent and the buyer is an idiot for having bought a random object without checking if the product is a decent martini ingredient. Except in the case where A misrepresents the product as being something else, A is innocent, and unless C is colluding with A to commit fraud, C is also innocent.

This is the reply I thought you'd make. But it's easy to circumvent. First, it's easy to suppose that the chemical in question is something obscure that not many people know about, one that has a variety of (non-martini-making) uses, and the seller is just selling it as-is. Now it may well be that in many cases like this, the buyer is just being stupid and irresponsible. But there are two points to consider:

1. Even if he is stupid and irresponsible, this doesn't relieve his buddy Mr. C from blame. If you put a weapon in the hand of a drunk knowing that he might accidentally shoot himself, you are culpable for the crime (maybe not murder, but at least manslaughter). And the same is true with the handling of information. Mr. C can tell stupid, irresponsible Mr. B to buy the chemical for his martini, knowing what he's going to do with it. If that's the case. Mr. C is surely a murderer.

2. But suppose further that Mr. B isn't stupid or irresponsible. Suppose he knows that Mr. C is an expert on chemistry and mixed drinks. So knowing that he can trust Mr. C on these matters, he asks Mr. C what makes good martinis. Even though Mr. C knows XYZ will kill Mr. B, he tells him to use it. He is a murderer! Maybe you think it's irresponsible for Mr. B to look to only one authority. Then my point 1 comes into effect: irresponsibility doesn't absolve the knowing authorities from responsibility. And besides, imagine a conspiracy of all of the chemists in the country to kill Mr. B. Mr. B ardently goes from chemist to chemist, and they all agree he should make an XYZ martini. Mr. B has no chance--all of the reliable testimony he can gather says this is a safe drink. Now it is quite clear that this conspiracy of chemists is culpable for this corrosive cocktail!

Because that is what fraud is. A transfers ownership of X to B on condition that B transfer ownership of Y to A. (In a general sense: including "transfer of labor"). But B does not transfer ownership of Y to A, B pretends to do so.

OK, maybe libel/slander are not literally fraud. Maybe fraud requires an actual exchange between two parties. But then my point is just that libel and slander are enough *like* fraud to outlaw them. Both involve an indirect use of force, just like Mr. C's poisoning conspiracy.

Yes, but not here and now.No, I'm afraid that I may have misled you. The scare quotes were intended to indicate that these are not actually examples of fraud. The point was that making false statements of various kinds can result in damage. False praise is not defamation. I'm not sure where you want to go with your argument, but it looks to me like you can't really support laws against defamation since they don't include other forms of damage (false praise types of statements). I invite you to set forth the correct legal principle.

If false praise results in damage, it should also be illegal. Actually Mr. C's praising of XYZ is just one example. Maybe this doesn't count as defamation, since that usually involves false criticism. But then there is some more general concept that describes both defamation and false praise. I don't know if there's a term for it, or why it matters. My point is that if you accept that Mr. C's false praising of XYZ should be punishable by law, then certainly someone's false criticism of something that results in similar damage should also be.

Not trying to put words in your mouth, but here is an example. "A person who knowingly makes a false statement is legally responsible for any damage caused by other parties accepting that statement". This is basically an extension of perjury law, where we are under oath at all times. Is that your proposal?

I don't know why you're bringing perjury into this. We're not talking about false statements leading to damage while under oath. There's no oath in the case of Mr. C, but he's still clearly responsible. I don't know what an oath adds to it, legally. An oath is just another promise that can be broken, not a special case.

I'm not assuming that definition of force depends on the definition of property; I am asserting that fraud "consists of obtaining material values without their owner's consent, under false pretenses or false promises", "of one man receiving the material values, goods or services of another, then refusing to pay for them and thus keeping them by force (by mere physical possession), not by right—i.e., keeping them without the consent of their owner".

OK, but then my point is just that defamation is bad for the same reasons that fraud is bad, and both should be illegal.

[DavidOdden]

Maybe some tidying up & reordering with indices inserted will help.

[1]OK, maybe libel/slander are not literally fraud.

[2]But then my point is just that libel and slander are enough *like* fraud to outlaw them. Both involve an indirect use of force, just like Mr. C's poisoning conspiracy.

[3]If false praise results in damage, it should also be illegal.

[4]But then there is some more general concept that describes both defamation and false praise. I don't know if there's a term for it, or why it matters.

[5]I don't know why you're bringing perjury into this.

Regarding 1, that's good enough. Defamation isn't fraud; whether it falls under a broader concept is another matter. Point 2 is really the crucial one, and I don't get the "indirect use of force" argument. Back to that soon. Your acceptance of point 3 leads to point 4 -- and specifically, what is that concept. Or, almost-concept. There is no word for this idea, for many reasons, not the least of which being that we have yet to fully and clearly identify the idea. I've suggested a principle about one's legal obligation to speak the truth, and I don't know if that is what you have in mind as the principle underlying laws against defamation and false praise. It doesn't yet matter to me if we don't have a name for it (if we come up with a decent identification, I'll come up with a name for it). On 5, the reason for bringing perjury into the picture is that the aforemention truthfulness principle is in fact a generalization of the law of perjury. Perjury prohibits the knowing statement of a matter that the person does not believe, as long as the person has taken an oath before a competent officer. The generalization removes the "oath before a competent officer" part -- it is a broader concept subsuming perjury ("under oath") as one of its cases, "false statement to authorities" (18 USC 1001), as well as defamation and praise (and fraud).

Anyhow, leaving aside the more inclusive generalization, so you accept the principle "A person who knowingly makes a false statement is legally responsible for any damage caused by other parties accepting that statement" as a valid legal principle, something that should be part of an objective legal system?

I will come back to the case-3 poisoning, soon I hope.

[D'kian]

BTW it's important to note that libel is and ought to remain entirely a civil matter, not a criminal one. False testimony in court or legal proceedings, perjury, is a different matter entirely.

[noumenalself]

Anyhow, leaving aside the more inclusive generalization, so you accept the principle "A person who knowingly makes a false statement is legally responsible for any damage caused by other parties accepting that statement" as a valid legal principle, something that should be part of an objective legal system?

I will come back to the case-3 poisoning, soon I hope.

I think I would also add that not only does the slanderer know that what he's saying is false, he also knows (or ought to know) that it will cause the harm that it can be proven to cause. That gives the crime mens rea. And yes, I think that should be part of an objective legal system.

[mrocktor]

Libel and slander do not violate any rights. They are not crimes and, therefore, should not be made illegal.

If someone makes untruthful statements about you, your right to life is not violated. Even if you are in a neighborhood populated by black people, he convinces them you are KKK and they proceed to murder you, he has not commited a crime. Unless he actually incites them to kill you, telling the lie is not the crime. The crime is the murderer's alone. In other words, people who act on false information are not automatons. No amount of false information should lead anyone to violate another's right to life.

The exception to this rule is when the lie causes people to believe there is a state of emergency. The cry of "fire" in a theater is an instance of this. Since as a reaction to a state of emergency individuals may morally act in violation of others' rights, the creator of this false emergency is responsible for the results.

If someone makes untruthful statements about you, your right to freedom is not violated. You remain capable of acting in any way you choose, so long as it does not violate the individual rights of other people. While other people may, as a result of the false information, choose not to associate with you, you don't have a right to that association in the first place.

Finally, if someone makes untruthful statements about you, your right to property is not violated. Everything you own remains under your complete control. Now, others may value the goods and services you can provide differently as a result of the lie. But you don't have a right to a job, a wage or the monetary value of wharever you might wish to sell. You only have a right to use your property as you see fit, and conduct mutually agreeable transactions. This right is in no way violated by libel and slander.

A doctor may suffer great financial harm due to a false accusation. But he loses nothing he owns, only what he might have gained otherwise. There is no right to future or potential property, only to actual property.

In sum, one does not have a right to a reputation. That would be a right over the content of the minds of others. If they are misled, that is their problem. A reputation must be earned, and kept.

In a country without anti-defamation laws, people would be a lot more skeptical about accusations, demanding a higher standard of evidence before believing anything they hear. The reputation of whoever makes the accusation, be it private individual or media source, would also be on the line - with everyone elses. An exposed false accusation is as damaging to the accuser as to the accused. Probably more, if known or suspected to be intentional.

Edited March 13, 2008 by mrocktor

[DavidOdden]

I think I would also add that not only does the slanderer know that what he's saying is false, he also knows (or ought to know) that it will cause the harm that it can be proven to cause. That gives the crime mens rea. And yes, I think that should be part of an objective legal system.

I think that mens rea ought to be a meta-principle that needn't be stated with each law, but yeah, that too; I assume your use of "slanderer" doesn't restrict the principle to just defamers, but also to praisers.

Looking forward to the next level of analysis, what is the justification for this (concrete) principle as a matter of law? Here's why I care: I want to see if that same justification sanctions laws against cheating on your girlfriend or boyfriend (overt cheating and hidden infidelity may have to be considered separately). You have reliance, harm and scienter. If not, why not?