Free speech vs libel

[noumenalself]

Looking forward to the next level of analysis, what is the justification for this (concrete) principle as a matter of law? Here's why I care: I want to see if that same justification sanctions laws against cheating on your girlfriend or boyfriend (overt cheating and hidden infidelity may have to be considered separately). You have reliance, harm and scienter. If not, why not?

Good and interesting example, cheating. Now of course cheating is grounds for divorce if there is a marriage contract, and that has definite legal ramifications. But I've urged that there needn't be an explicit contract for there to be damages inflicted by deceit. So it would seem that my view implies that cheating ought to be punishable by law (if only through a civil case).

But my first inclination is that this is not a counterexample, because romantic affairs do not (necessarily) involve the exchange of material goods, and so cheating does not result in material damage. It is important that the law only deal with material damage, because that is what is objectively demonstrable in court.

Yes, there are of course material acts between lovers (or so we hope). I suppose that it could be argued that lover A knew that B was not exclusive, he/she would not be having all the sex. That's definitely material, but what is exchanged for the sex is something entirely spiritual: the recognition that other lover is committed to one exclusively. This also helps explain why there can be legal grounds for lawsuit in the case of cheating on a marriage: marriage involves a legal arrangement about the division of property, and so cheating in that context can render real material damage.

This actually speaks to the justification of the principle against libel/slander you've articulated for me. Not only are material benefits/harms the only ones that can be objectively demonstrated in court, but it is only material harm that deprives one of the freedom one needs to live and be happy. Spiritual "harm" is just a response to a fact of reality, e.g., one's recognition that one's lover is not a good person committed to the relationship. One is free to deal with this fact as one sees fit. But physical harm is an attempt to rewrite the facts of reality, to make someone act against one's own rational judgment by trying to rearrange the normal consequences of rational action. The consequence is the destruction of the mind through the destruction of the body, because the mind lives by acting on plans held fixed in material reality. Or something like that...

[noumenalself]

Yes, there are of course material acts between lovers (or so we hope). I suppose that it could be argued that lover A knew that B was not exclusive, he/she would not be having all the sex. That's definitely material, but what is exchanged for the sex is something entirely spiritual: the recognition that other lover is committed to one exclusively. This also helps explain why there can be legal grounds for lawsuit in the case of cheating on a marriage: marriage involves a legal arrangement about the division of property, and so cheating in that context can render real material damage.

Interesting addendum and contrast case: Suppose A finds out that B has been cheating, and as a consequence A acquires an STD thanks to B's mistress. Then I would say there is grounds for some kind of lawsuit! (And I think stuff like this is what we see on Judge Judy all the time.)

[Marc K.]

David:

This gives me some pause:

You don't have a right to spread lies about someone, no matter who or why.

I understand what you are saying but for some reason I am unable to integrate it. In fact I have argued against this idea in one of the threads on "bombing innocents in war", namely: that one has a right to unethical behavior.

It is my understanding that rights are derived from ethical action. So I have a hard time validating a right to live in a dictatorship and if we have a right to lie then how could you outlaw perjury?

However, I do agree that speaking an untruth is not usually an initiation of force, when it is, it should be prosecuted.

I am not sure how to reconcile these two views if you find them to be contradictory, maybe you can help.

My only thought about unethical action is that perhaps one doesn't necessarily have a right to perform it but rather that no one else has a right to prevent you from doing it as long as it doesn't infringe on their rights.

*****************

As to reputation: a reputation is a thing and no one has a right to things, only to actions. So as mrocktor said: one has a right to earn and to keep a reputation -- and at times one must be more active in keeping it than at other times.

It takes a while to earn a good reputation, therefore, a good reputation is something that is not usually erased by one lie.

[DavidOdden]

I understand what you are saying but for some reason I am unable to integrate it. In fact I have argued against this idea in one of the threads on "bombing innocents in war", namely: that one has a right to unethical behavior.

Just so I know what position you're suggesting, are you arguing that one has to right (of any kind) to behave immorally?

It is my understanding that rights are derived from ethical action. So I have a hard time validating a right to live in a dictatorship and if we have a right to lie then how could you outlaw perjury?

First, there are moral actions and immoral actions. Some immoral actions are immoral just because of you, and some are immoral because of others (adultery, being insulting). In the "immoral, involving others" actions, some are of a particularly egregious nature, because they involve a person initiating force against someone else. Those, and only those, are properly against the law. The concept of rights involves this latter limitation on actions of society against an individual.

As far as a "right to live in a dictatorship" goes, a person has a right to be as submissive as they desire, no matter how stupid it is for them to do so, as long as they do so voluntarily. But a dictator is not voluntary. So a supposed "right to live in a dictatorship" means that one is claiming that one has the right to have the government brutalize and enslave others, and one does not have any such right.

Perjury laws derive their authority from the function of government and the fact that the government, and only the government, may properly employ force in the doing of its job. Consider the situation where Jones is assaulted, Smith is suspected, and Williams is a witness. To do its job, the government would try Smith; but to do so, Smith must be involuntarily tried (justice would be impossible if suspects could absolutely refuse to be tried). The government may need to compel Williams to testify (he might be Smith's friend), involving force, and the government needs to establish the condition that Williams must tell the truth (because: what he says in his testimony will very strongly determine whether Smith is punished or not). It is of parmount importance that Smith be punished if and only if he is actually guilty of the assault, therefore it is of parmount importance that Williams tell the truth on the stand. This is what justifies perjury laws.

My only thought about unethical action is that perhaps one doesn't necessarily have a right to perform it but rather that no one else has a right to prevent you from doing it as long as it doesn't infringe on their rights.

One should be legally free to act according to one's judgment unless there's a reason not to. Initiating force against another person is a reason. However, one should also not freely do bad things to other people, even if one is legally free to do so.

I'm still chewing on NS's line. There is a large class of problems connected to the generic presumed obligation to be truthful, which is just one instance of a generic obligation to be rational. The problem is that there are way too many factors for me to isolate, for instance the difference between actual monetary damage, probably monetary damage, and spiritual damage.

[Koustubh]

Since a man's own mind is the only judge of his thoughts, a man should be free to act on his thoughts. Since the only thing that can prevent a man from acting on his thoughts is force, the initiation of force should be banned. This is the only purpose of laws.

Suppose A decides that he needs to lie to further his own interests. He should be free to act on his thoughts unless that lie prevents others from acting on theirs. A lie, being non-material cannot prevent anyone from acting on his thoughts.

A contract is a different issue. It is a voluntary agreement about something that each party in the contract undertakes to do on pain of an agreed penalty. If a lie violates a contract and the contract is legally protected, a court must enforce the penalty.

The fact that a lie is immoral or that it could cause a lot of harm to innocent people has nothing to do with whether it should be legally punishable. It is a fact that the immoral actions of someone can harm innocent people. That is a necessary consequence of living in a society.

[noumenalself]

The fact that a lie is immoral or that it could cause a lot of harm to innocent people has nothing to do with whether it should be legally punishable. It is a fact that the immoral actions of someone can harm innocent people. That is a necessary consequence of living in a society.

You assert this, but please deal with my case of Mr. C, the devious chemist. The fellow who lies to his friend about what chemical to ingest, knowing that it will cause his friend to die. If this isn't a form of murder, then what is? And if causing this kind of harm isn't something that should be outlawed, then why should any force be outlawed? The effect of lying to his friend about the chemical is exactly the same as if he had injected the poison in his friend's bloodstream. The intent is also the same. So what's the difference?

The friend is *not* free to avoid the consequence, not if he is rational. If he's rational, he looks to the best authority he knows about what chemicals to use, and in this case, it's his friend (or even the conspiracy of chemists). Someone faced with the mugger's dilemma "Your money or your life" is also "free" to choose his money or his life. But as in the case of Mr. C, his choices have been arbitrarily rearranged: if he does the rational thing and chooses his life, he loses his money. Just like if Mr. C's friend does the rational thing and follows Mr. C's advice, he loses his life.

The point of political freedom is not to permit the exercise of metaphysical free will. That is a kind of freedom that cannot be removed, no matter what (unless you kill the person). The point is to permit the exercise of unbounded *rational* choices. Our rationality is our source of survival. We need to be free from force to acquire the benefits of rationality. Both the mugger and the lying chemist reconfigure the normal consequences of rational action. They attach physical punishments to doing the right thing. That's why force is bad, and why we need freedom from it.

[Marc K.]

Just so I know what position you're suggesting, are you arguing that one has to right (of any kind) to behave immorally?

(I assume the "has to right" should read: "has no right"). This is what I am trying to figure out. Let me hesitantly propose: No. One does not have a right to act immorally. But before you shoot me down in flames by bringing up countless contrary examples, let me explain how I come to that conclusion.

Rights are moral principles. So in order to define what is right you must first know what is moral. If ethically I must take certain action in order to live, then politically I must be allowed to take that action in society. Rights can only be derived by objectively defining ethical action and sanctioning that action in society. I don't think you can arrive at a theory of Rights by observing immoral action and generalizing it.

I also don't think you can define what is right in reverse by starting with the principle that as long as one is not initiating force, then one is acting by right -- this is the Libertarian approach.

If rights are moral sanctions to positive action, then I don't see how one can have a moral sanction to act immorally.

(And please, I am only explaining my position. I am not accusing you of being a Libertarian. On the contrary, I think you understand and agree with the Objectivist principles I've enumerated, thus my struggle to reconcile our positions.)

So I find it hard to say that I have a right to torture my dog. Rather I find it eminently more accurate to say that since I am not infringing on someone else's rights, they do not have a right to stop me.

Perhaps I am making an unnecessary distinction and maybe "the right to immoral action" requires a deeper understanding and precise explication much as "the right to property" does.

[noumenalself]

Rights are moral principles. So in order to define what is right you must first know what is moral. If ethically I must take certain action in order to live, then politically I must be allowed to take that action in society. Rights can only be derived by objectively defining ethical action and sanctioning that action in society. I don't think you can arrive at a theory of Rights by observing immoral action and generalizing it.

I also don't think you can define what is right in reverse by starting with the principle that as long as one is not initiating force, then one is acting by right -- this is the Libertarian approach.

If rights are moral sanctions to positive action, then I don't see how one can have a moral sanction to act immorally.

I think you're confusing moral and political rights. You're correct that rights are derived from a theory of what is morally right. We need rights because they protect our ability to act morally, i.e., on the best judgment of our rational mind. Freedom from physical force is necessary for this action. But here's the thing: unless you protect the ability to make the wrong judgment, you are not protecting the *freedom* to make the right judgment. Instead, you are ruling out freedom entirely, and saying that people have the "right" to make only one decision. Your position leads to paternalism.

To diagnose your problem: I think you're getting caught up in the mere language that rights are "moral principles" that sanction freedom of action. When AR says that, she doesn't mean that we have only the right to do what is morally right. She is talking about political rights, i.e., our moral claims against the interference of other people. If I have a political right to undertake a certain kind of action, then no one else may *morally* interfere with that action, and the government may *morally* punish others for interference. These moral sanctions also guarantee the *possibility* that I myself might make the moral decision. So rights do not protect only moral action, but they do circumscribe the morality of responses to that action and make morality itself possible (if not necessary).

[Koustubh]

You assert this, but please deal with my case of Mr. C, the devious chemist. The fellow who lies to his friend about what chemical to ingest, knowing that it will cause his friend to die. If this isn't a form of murder, then what is? And if causing this kind of harm isn't something that should be outlawed, then why should any force be outlawed? The effect of lying to his friend about the chemical is exactly the same as if he had injected the poison in his friend's bloodstream. The intent is also the same. So what's the difference?

Yes this is a form of murder. But it is not a form that should be legally punished.

Just like if Mr. C's friend does the rational thing and follows Mr. C's advice, he loses his life.

OK. A person's rational choices led to his death. That is not sufficient reason for the government to step in.

The point of political freedom is not to permit the exercise of metaphysical free will. That is a kind of freedom that cannot be removed, no matter what (unless you kill the person). The point is to permit the exercise of unbounded *rational* choices.

To put it very precisely, the point of laws is not to permit anything. It is to punish actions that prevent people from acting rationally.

The friend is *not* free to avoid the consequence, not if he is rational. If he's rational, he looks to the best authority he knows about what chemicals to use, and in this case, it's his friend (or even the conspiracy of chemists). Someone faced with the mugger's dilemma "Your money or your life" is also "free" to choose his money or his life. But as in the case of Mr. C, his choices have been arbitrarily rearranged: if he does the rational thing and chooses his life, he loses his money. Just like if Mr. C's friend does the rational thing and follows Mr. C's advice, he loses his life.

Free cannot mean free to avoid consequences. Free can only mean free from physical force. In the case of the mugger, the victim is not free from physical force. In the case of the chemist he is.

Both the mugger and the lying chemist reconfigure the normal consequences of rational action. They attach physical punishments to doing the right thing. That's why force is bad, and why we need freedom from it.

If you have immoral friends, the normal consequences of rational action won't always be beneficial. "Normal consequences" presupposes a context.

You have certainly come up with an unfortunate situation. But the purpose of laws is not to eliminate unfortunate situations and it is not to ensure that rational actions are beneficial.

Edited March 16, 2008 by Koustubh

[noumenalself]

Yes this is a form of murder. But it is not a form that should be legally punished.

Excuse me, but this sounds crazy! It's almost certainly legally punished today, and can you imagine what kind of anarchic society we'd live in if it were legal to kill someone through carefully devised lies? Justifying a radical change like that requires quite an argument. But you've not answered my question about what the argument is. So to repeat my question again: "And if causing this kind of harm isn't something that should be outlawed, then why should any force be outlawed? The effect of lying to his friend about the chemical is exactly the same as if he had injected the poison in his friend's bloodstream. The intent is also the same. So what's the difference?"

[Koustubh]

Excuse me, but this sounds crazy! It's almost certainly legally punished today, and can you imagine what kind of anarchic society we'd live in if it were legal to kill someone through carefully devised lies? Justifying a radical change like that requires quite an argument. But you've not answered my question about what the argument is. So to repeat my question again: "And if causing this kind of harm isn't something that should be outlawed, then why should any force be outlawed? The effect of lying to his friend about the chemical is exactly the same as if he had injected the poison in his friend's bloodstream. The intent is also the same. So what's the difference?"

I did answer it. But let me try again.

Force should be outlawed because it prevents a person from acting rationally. A lie doesn't. The point I am trying to make is that the basis of laws is the need to protect every individual's ability to act rationally. It is not to ensure that the consequences of rational action are beneficial.

As to the allegation that we would live in an anarchic society if the goverment did not step in, that is certainly false. Any society that is even slightly rational would ostracize a murderer.

It is very important to restrict the role of a government precisely. Otherwise anything goes. Consider the impossibility of framing objective laws to prevent bad consequences of rational actions. You dont have to imagine anything to imagine the consequences of such laws. We already have plenty of them.

[noumenalself]

I did answer it. But let me try again.

Force should be outlawed because it prevents a person from acting rationally. A lie doesn't. The point I am trying to make is that the basis of laws is the need to protect every individual's ability to act rationally. It is not to ensure that the consequences of rational action are beneficial.

First, I never said that the purpose of law was to ensure that the consequences of rational action were beneficial. You're right that this is not the correct purpose. And you're also right that force should be outlawed because it prevents a person from acting rationally.

That said, I think these premises still lead to my conclusion. Look, it's true that someone shopping for cocktail ingredients can think through his decision, even if he's being lied to. And his decision will lead to his death. But you might have missed the point of my comparison to the mugging situation ("Your money or your life"), and I may have been unclear about it. You agree that mugging is force and should be outlawed. But if what you say about the cocktail shopper is true, then the mugging victim is *also* able to think through his decision, even if that decision leads to his loss of property (or death). So if force should be outlawed because it prevents acting rationally in the sense that you understand it, force is *not* preventing a person from being rational in the mugging case, either. So mugging should be legal. Generally speaking, force is not just the direct laying on of hands. Even the mugger is not doing that. He presents his victim with a choice!

It's not adequate to reply, "But in the mugging case, if there are negative consequences, what leads to the negative consequences is direct force, whereas in cocktail shopping case, what leads to the negative consequences is a lie." That's question begging. We are debating about whether there is any difference between lying and direct force in the first place. You have proposed that what makes the difference is that one involves preventing someone from being rational, and that the other does not. Now I am saying that in the sense that you think a lie doesn't prevent someone from being rational, neither does a mugging.

So what is the solution? I would argue that a person is prevented from *acting* rationally in both cases, if we assign the relevant sense of "acting rationally." It's true that in each case, the person can go through the same thought process as he would if he were really shopping for innocuous chemicals, or if he were really choosing between saving money and spending it on a life-saving surgery. But that does not make the *action* rational in the deepest sense. Rationality is a value because it connects us with metaphysical facts of reality, a connection we need to survive. The mugger forces the victim to choose between his life and his money, when metaphysical facts concerning his survival would ordinarily *not* require a choice (because normally the victim's survival doesn't require the mugger's profit). There is no value to rationality if rationality is just the spinning of thoughts in our head. That kind of rationality is not worth protecting, and there is nothing that can prevent it anyway. Rationality is only valuable if it expresses itself in action.

The point is not that law should guarantee that a person's rationality results in beneficial consequences. No law can guarantee that, for no decision of any kind can guarantee it. Guaranteeing the ability to act rationally also includes guaranteeing the freedom to act on rational decisions that have harmful consequences (e.g., a bad investment, a bad relationship, an unfortunate medical diagnosis.) The point is that law should guarantee that a person be able to act rationally, period, whatever the consequences. But acting rationally is something that can be defined only by reference to a person's best assessment of the metaphysical facts. If someone has rearranged the facts to ensure a man's destruction, no genuine rationality is possible, and if it were, it wouldn't be worth protecting.

[DavidOdden]

Rights are moral principles. So in order to define what is right you must first know what is moral. If ethically I must take certain action in order to live, then politically I must be allowed to take that action in society. Rights can only be derived by objectively defining ethical action and sanctioning that action in society.

Given that we're talking about political rights in this thread, this last statement boils down to saying that a man has no right to act unless he can justify the action (by proving that it is ethical). Thus I hold the position advocated in VOS p. 128:

Under a proper social system, a private individual is legally free to take any action he pleases (so long as he does not violate the rights of others), while a government official is bound by law in his every official act. A private individual may do anything except that which is legally forbidden; a government official may do nothing except that which is legally permitted.

I would not define "what is right" in terms of the non-initiation of force in general; but I take it as not in serious doubt that "The precondition of a civilized society is the barring of physical force from social relationships—thus establishing the principle that if men wish to deal with one another, they may do so only by means of reason: by discussion, persuasion and voluntary, uncoerced agreement."

If rights are moral sanctions to positive action, then I don't see how one can have a moral sanction to act immorally.

I actually would not accept that characterization. I would say (had it not been said) that "a right is the moral sanction of a positive—of his freedom to act on his own judgment, for his own goals, by his own voluntary, uncoerced choice. As to his neighbors, his rights impose no obligations on them except of a negative kind: to abstain from violating his rights".

If the burden is placed on the individual to prove in advance that his proposed actions are rational, this means that men cannot live for their own sake, with their own lives as the standard for judgine action. Clearly, that can't be right. I suggest the apparent difference has to do with the idea that "rights are moral sanctions to positive action", suggesting "action that is objectively morally good".

[Koustubh]

First, I never said that the purpose of law was to ensure that the consequences of rational action were beneficial. You're right that this is not the correct purpose. And you're also right that force should be outlawed because it prevents a person from acting rationally.

Ok, that is out of the way.

Let me address the concrete examples before attempting to generalize.

You say that the mugger presents the victim with a choice and there is no force involved as the victim is still able to think through his decision. Yes, force is not involved in the immediate moment. But threat of force is involved. The victim will not be able to think through in the future should he choose not to surrender. Only one of the choices is free of force.

In the case of the chemist however, no force is involved at any stage. The only issue before the "victim" is of judging all facts to the best of his knowledge.

Yes my sense of rationality is merely thinking through a decision. To put it more clearly, acting rationally involves considering all the relevant facts of reality (including the actions of others) to the best of ones knowledge, evaluating all alternatives by the standard of their utility to one's purpose and choosing the best alternative.

You say that we are debating whether there is any difference between direct force and lies. Just what sort of difference are you looking for? Difference in the way they affect a person's thinking or difference in the way they affect the consequences of his actions. We have already agreed that consequences are not a valid criterion. And there is a big difference in the way they affect his thinking. Force prevents him from thinking. Lies do not affect his thinking at all. Evaluating propositions (which may be lies) is actually what thinking is all about.

You said that my sense of rationality is not worth protecting.

But acting rationally is something that can be defined only by reference to a person's best assessment of the metaphysical facts. If someone has rearranged the facts to ensure a man's destruction, no genuine rationality is possible, and if it were, it wouldn't be worth protecting.

But that is not quite correct. Acting rationally includes an assessment of manmade facts, not just metaphysical facts. I also ask you to rethink what you mean by rearranging facts. Rearranging metaphysical facts is what human actions are all about.

Rationality is valuable and needs protection, not because it is normally beneficial. As I said before, without a context that would not be objective. It is because it is the only course that can be beneficial since any action that is not rational is destructive.

P.S. I am really enjoying this discussion. I had to think for quite a while before I could post.

[Clawg]

But you might have missed the point of my comparison to the mugging situation ("Your money or your life"), and I may have been unclear about it. You agree that mugging is force and should be outlawed. But if what you say about the cocktail shopper is true, then the mugging victim is *also* able to think through his decision, even if that decision leads to his loss of property (or death). So if force should be outlawed because it prevents acting rationally in the sense that you understand it, force is *not* preventing a person from being rational in the mugging case, either. So mugging should be legal. Generally speaking, force is not just the direct laying on of hands. Even the mugger is not doing that. He presents his victim with a choice!

The point is not that he has a "choice" but that the contract (giving the mugger money is a kind of contract) you make with the mugger is not legal. You can appeal against the contract in a court and you will very likely win because the contents of the contract do not reflect your will. In court you won't face the alternatives of loosing the case and death.

[noumenalself]

You say that the mugger presents the victim with a choice and there is no force involved as the victim is still able to think through his decision. Yes, force is not involved in the immediate moment. But threat of force is involved. The victim will not be able to think through in the future should he choose not to surrender. Only one of the choices is free of force.

In the case of the chemist however, no force is involved at any stage. The only issue before the "victim" is of judging all facts to the best of his knowledge.

OK, but what if the victim decides to give the mugger his wallet? Then by your characterization here, he'll still be able to think. And so as long as he makes the right choice, his thinking was never stopped. No force may ever be used on him directly! The mugger may have been just pointing a gun. So on your characterization here, mugging should only be illegal if it actually results in death, not if the victim gives up the wallet and avoids the actual use of force?

Yes, you can say that force is being *threatened* in the mugging case. But then the question is, what's wrong with the threat of force if it doesn't result in actual force? I think you can only explain what's wrong with it in the terms I've described: the mugger has disconnected a man's rational judgment from its usual action-consequence. And that is bad because the man needs to act on his rational judgment to survive and flourish. But--and here's the clincher--the same is true of the lying poisoner.

To push you even closer to my position, consider the following range of cases. Case 1: My earlier example of Mr C., who tells his friend Mr. B to buy poison from Mr. A. Mr. B buys it and dies. Case 2: Mr. C takes poison and injects it directly into Mr. B's coffee, killing him. You think these two cases are very different. But consider Case 3, which is something of an intermediate between them: Mr. C decides to see whether poisonous coffee can kill rats. He laces a few pots of coffee with the stuff and does some experiments. The next day, Mr. B comes over and asks if the coffee is good to drink. Mr. C says sure. Now, Mr. C hasn't even taken any action up to this point to kill Mr. B. The coffee-lacing was to kill rats. Now Mr. B asks for a drink, and all C does is say it's safe. All he's done is tell a lie. Do you still think he shouldn't be locked up? Isn't the difference between Case 2 and and Case 3 also incredibly imperceptible? What possible difference could there be between placing poison in an originally safe cup (which someone thinks is safe) and telling someone it's safe to drink an already poisoned coffee?!?

Notice, incidentally, that Case 3 is also virtually indistinguishable from normal cases of fraud--even though it doesn't involve a contract--and so anyone who thinks that fraud should be outlawed will also have to agree with me that the mere telling of a lie can also constitute punishable murder.

Yes my sense of rationality is merely thinking through a decision. To put it more clearly, acting rationally involves considering all the relevant facts of reality (including the actions of others) to the best of ones knowledge, evaluating all alternatives by the standard of their utility to one's purpose and choosing the best alternative.

But that sense of acting rationally is missing just one thing: any mention of *action*.

You say that we are debating whether there is any difference between direct force and lies. Just what sort of difference are you looking for? Difference in the way they affect a person's thinking or difference in the way they affect the consequences of his actions. We have already agreed that consequences are not a valid criterion. And there is a big difference in the way they affect his thinking. Force prevents him from thinking. Lies do not affect his thinking at all. Evaluating propositions (which may be lies) is actually what thinking is all about.

I'm looking for you to state *any* difference between direct force and intentionally damaging lies that generates a morally and legally relevant difference. You've still not really articulated one. We have not agreed that consequences are not a valid criterion. What I've agreed to is the purpose of law is not to guarantee that the consequence of any act of rationality is beneficial. That's of course impossible. But just because this is true does not mean that law has no relation to consequences! You don't have to be a utilitarian to think that laws are made to improve human life! Objectivism is a philosophy for living on Earth, and law, like every other achievement of man, is made for man's life. Man's thinking is of no value detached from its consequences on his life. We think in order to live. Laws don't guarantee that our thinking is successful, but they are designed to guarantee that we all benefit from our thinking in the long-run. That is the long run consequence that freedom makes possible.

You said that my sense of rationality is not worth protecting.

But that is not quite correct. Acting rationally includes an assessment of manmade facts, not just metaphysical facts. I also ask you to rethink what you mean by rearranging facts. Rearranging metaphysical facts is what human actions are all about.

Yes, rationality can include an assessment of man-made facts: we do have to live with and deal with others. But this is derivative and our fundamental orientation is towards metaphysical reality. If we were to abandon our commitment to the metaphysically given and orient ourselves to meeting the demands of others, we could not survive. This is why productiveness and independence are virtues. And even when we deal with others, the virtue of justice demands that we reward those others who are themselves committed to the metaphysically given, and punish those who reject it. They include, for example, the mugger who tries to detach the cause (your productiveness) from the effect (the wealth he wants to create). And it also include slanderers who seek to profit from the loss of someone else's reputation.

The point is not that he has a "choice" but that the contract (giving the mugger money is a kind of contract) you make with the mugger is not legal. You can appeal against the contract in a court and you will very likely win because the contents of the contract do not reflect your will. In court you won't face the alternatives of loosing the case and death.

There is no contract with a mugger, and you don't need to talk about contracts at all to explain what's wrong with mugging.

[DavidOdden]

This most recent exchange has been rattling around in my head for a few hours. Here is my distillation of NS's statements -- I hope you think it's a fair distillation.

I would argue that a person is prevented from *acting* rationally in both cases

...

Rationality is a value because it connects us with metaphysical facts of reality, a connection we need to survive.

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Rationality is only valuable if it expresses itself in action.

The point is that law should guarantee that a person be able to act rationally, period, whatever the consequences. But acting rationally is something that can be defined only by reference to a person's best assessment of the metaphysical facts. If someone has rearranged the facts to ensure a man's destruction, no genuine rationality is possible

Appealing to the notion of rearranging facts doesn't bring us to a solid understanding of the problem, because falsely saying that some guy is a crook or that some poison is wholesome goods isn't rearranging the facts, it is misrepresenting the facts. Something that is rearranging fact is running a business that creates a new product which makes it possible to store music and data in a very compact form that pretty much obliterates the business of making vinyl musical records (and economically harms people who do not figure out how to work around the rearrangement of musical-business facts). We can't object to that kind of harm resulting from rearrangement of facts.

If another person does act in a way that actually blocks you from acting according to your nature -- applying reason to your knowledge of the world, to decide how to act -- then I accept that it is the function of government to prevent such acts. When force is present -- imminently, or presented as a future outcome -- the rational mind is not free. All "alternatives" are contrary to one's fundamental choice of existence. I think we agree that appeal to force should be impossible in men's lives.

But is a man prevented from acting rationally when he is lied to? I don't think he is. The difference between acting on honestly-given bad advice and dishonestly-given bad advice is the mens rea of the adviser, and I don't see how another person's mental state affects your ability to judge evidence. With whatever knowledge you have (using "knowledge" loosely), you have to decide not just whether the knowledge sufficiently supports a conclusion, but you also have to decide whether to accept the supposed knowledge in the first place. If the evidence you have is not reliable (for any of a number of reasons), then you may very well act in a way that's detrimentally disconnected from reality.

The contested legal obligation to speak the truth would be sensible if men had an enforceable obligation to aid others to reach conclusions rationally by providing the necessary evidence -- that could be in the form of stating facts accurately, or it could be in the form of providing relevant information. Since willfully withholding information can be as detrimental as willfully providing false information to a man's success at connecting action and reality, I don't see the basis for treating the two differently, if law guarantees a person's ability to act rationally and acting rationally is defined in terms of a person's own best assessment of the facts (including man-made facts).

[Koustubh]

You don't have to be a utilitarian to think that laws are made to improve human life!

Laws don't guarantee that our thinking is successful, but they are designed to guarantee that we all benefit from our thinking in the long-run.

You are mixing up the guiding principle for forming laws with the consequences of proper laws.

Let me reiterate:

Laws are not designed to improve human life. Laws are not designed to do anything positive. Laws are designed to prevent anyone from using force to interfere with the choices of others.

A lie does not interfere with anyone's thinking process or actions (making choices).

Force or the threat of force always does. Let me clarify this with your mugging example

OK, but what if the victim decides to give the mugger his wallet? Then by your characterization here, he'll still be able to think. And so as long as he makes the right choice, his thinking was never stopped. No force may ever be used on him directly! (emphasis mine)

How does the victim decide which choice is right? By considering all alternatives. If any of these involves force or a threat of force, the choice is forced.

On the other hand, outlawing lies is certainly an initiation of force against the liar. If the liar judges that lying is to his interest and the law punishes him for lying (obviously by force), the law has initiated force (if you grant that the lie did not initiate force which you must).

No one can deny that lying is immoral. But if you want to make it illegal, you will have to come up with a way of doing it that does not result in the initiation of force against the liar. And that is not possible.

As regards your liar examples, case 1 and case 3 are not initiations of force. Case 2 is. It is a violation of the victim's right to property (tampering with his coffee without his consent).

Although I don't think it is central to the arguement, let me point out that both metaphysical and man made facts are equally important in practising rationality. There is no fundamental orientation towards "metaphysical reality". The difference is important only when one is judging them morally.

[TuringAI]

There's a simple solution to this ordeal, and that is to redefine slander/libel in terms of falsification of evidence rather than merely saying or writing something bad about someone.

[DavidOdden]

There's a simple solution to this ordeal, and that is to redefine slander/libel in terms of falsification of evidence rather than merely saying or writing something bad about someone.

What do you think the current law requires? And how does your suggestion solve the problem of justifying the restriction?

[Marc K.]

David,

I hate to be argumentative but I don't think anything you have said contradicts anything I have said.

I have reviewed the material you cited and some, and after further consideration I am going to stick to my argument.

Judging by this:

Given that we're talking about political rights in this thread,

You apparently are making a distinction between "political rights" and "moral rights". I am unaware of this distinction so if you could provide a citation that would be great. But even so, if these two phrases mean what I think they do, my point remains.

First, the unifying concept is obviously "rights" and I take it there is no disagreement on their derivation as stated by me. Namely that:

If ethically I must take certain action in order to live, then politically I must be allowed to take that action in society. Rights can only be derived by objectively defining ethical action and sanctioning that action in society.

And that it is impossible to:

arrive at a theory of Rights by observing immoral action and generalizing it.

The definition of rights has two aspects, a positive one and a negative one, this must be where the dividing line between moral and political rights lies. The positive aspect of rights refers to what is expected of the individual and entails all of those actions required to sustain one's life. The negative aspect of rights refers to what is expected of others in society with respect to the individual, which is nothing but to be left alone. So "political rights" must consist of just one basic right: the right to be left alone.

If this characterization is correct, then as I said, my point remains. Since "the right to torture my dog" would not be covered as an action required to sustain one's life and nor does it fall under the rubric of being left alone.

Not to be too repetitive but if someone asked me whether he had a right to torture his dog I would say: "No, but luckily for you I have no right to stop you. You do have the right to be left alone as long as you don't infringe on anyone else's rights."

Do you think it would be proper to say: "Yes, it is right that you torture your dog"?

I have more supporting argumentation if you wish but let us see if this suffices.

To answer a couple of other points:

If rights are moral sanctions to positive action, then I don't see how one can have a moral sanction to act immorally.

You are objecting to my formulation of "positive action" but I don't see a problem. I meant "positive" in the same manner you did and knowing that rights pertain only to action I added it to be clear. Would you still have a problem if either "positive" or "action" was removed? If so, I'm fine with that.

If the burden is placed on the individual to prove in advance that his proposed actions are rational, this means that men cannot live for their own sake, with their own lives as the standard for judgine action. Clearly, that can't be right.

I agree. But I have not proposed placing this burden on anyone. In fact I have maintained from the beginning that even though it may not be right to act a certain way, as long as you are not infringing other's rights, the government has no right to stop you.

[Marc K.]

To address the title topic I'd like to quote Leonard Peikoff from Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, page 360:

An individual can be hurt in countless ways by other men's irrationality, dishonesty, injustice. Above all, he can be disappointed, perhaps grievously, by the vices of a person he had once trusted or loved. But as long as his property is not expropriated and he remains unmolested physically, the damage he sustains is essentially spiritual, not physical; in such a case, the victim alone has the power and the responsibility of healing his wounds.

[DavidOdden]

Rule 1 is, always argue if you think you are right (and do so rationally). You have that right.

You apparently are making a distinction between "political rights" and "moral rights".

I'm making a distinction between "rights", which is a necessarily political concept ("Rights are a moral principle defining proper social relationships", VOS 118), and the judgmental attribute "morally right", which means "to recognize his need of a moral code to guide the course and the fulfillment of his own life" and this means identifying "the right goals for man to pursue".

First, the unifying concept is obviously "rights"

This is where we probably disagree. I argue that the unifying concept is "right" which is to say "morally true", and that the concept "right" must be considered from two perspectives, the perspective of the individual, and the individual's relationship to society -- the latter is what I conclude Rand must be referring to in saying that rights are a moral principle defining proper social relationships. Therefore "for every individual, a right is the moral sanction of a positive—of his freedom to act on his own judgment, for his own goals, by his own voluntary, uncoerced choice." There is no "as long as" in this statement, i.e. "his own judgment a long as it is objectively necessary for him to live".

Do you think it would be proper to say: "Yes, it is right that you torture your dog"?

No: I would say that it is not right for you to torture your pup, but that you have the right to do so.

[Marc K.]

Rule 1 is, always argue if you think you are right (and do so rationally).

I'd like to know exactly what you mean by this. Do you think I am breaking this rule?

[DavidOdden]

I'd like to know exactly what you mean by this. Do you think I am breaking this rule?

You seemed to not fully embrace your right to be argumentative in saying "I hate to be argumentative". I'm encouraging you to argue, as you're doing.