Jump to content
Objectivism Online Forum

Essences as ontological or epistemological

Rate this topic


Recommended Posts

What function do the sense organs perform, then?
I assume you're asking a physical question. The ear, for example, is physically structured to transduce pitch and amplitude into electrical signals transmitted by the auditory nerve to the cochlear nuclei, which is in the brain stem. I can't give you much more detail, other than to say "stuff happens", because that's not my area. The sense organs present sensations to the brain, which are the "input" to the mind.
How does the mind (I assume) perceive?
I don't know if that's a meaningful or answerable question. If you're not asking about the physical process that corresponds to a mind perceiving, then I think the answer is simply that "it does", i.e. perception is, in terms of the mind, the fundamental process. As a philosophical question, it's sufficient to say that the mind perceives, and then you can engage in scientific research to understand the underlying physical mechanism.
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I assume you're asking a physical question. The ear, for example, is physically structured to transduce pitch and amplitude into electrical signals transmitted by the auditory nerve to the cochlear nuclei, which is in the brain stem. I can't give you much more detail, other than to say "stuff happens", because that's not my area. The sense organs present sensations to the brain, which are the "input" to the mind.I don't know if that's a meaningful or answerable question. If you're not asking about the physical process that corresponds to a mind perceiving, then I think the answer is simply that "it does", i.e. perception is, in terms of the mind, the fundamental process. As a philosophical question, it's sufficient to say that the mind perceives, and then you can engage in scientific research to understand the underlying physical mechanism.

If you're saying that the mind by itself perceives reality, doesn't that render the sense organs superfluous to the process of perceiving reality? Isn't that tantamount to saying that all my experience is mental? And if that's so then how do you know there is a world out there external to your mind?

And merely to propose that "it does" begs the question of how it perceives -- which is exactly the job of epistemology, I thought..

Link to comment
Share on other sites

... how it perceives -- which is exactly the job of epistemology, I thought..
No, at that level, it is a question for Biology.

You take your sense perception for granted all the time. When you tell the Burger-King guy you want "fries with that", you pretty much know you will get fries. That's so complicated, compared to the simpler ideas you're considering. And, on the occasions that you do not get fires, if you were to investigate the reason, you'll never find it is because the guy knew English, heard what you said, remembered, but put a Sundae in, looking at it closely and thinking it must be fries. How do we see fries and smell them? Most of the details are questions for Biology.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

If you're saying that the mind by itself perceives reality, doesn't that render the sense organs superfluous to the process of perceiving reality?
You will probably notice that I didn't say that the mind directly perceives the external universe, without a contribution from the sense organs. For example, if you pluck out a man's eyes, he will not hear. But I'm sure you knew that, so your question makes no sense.
And merely to propose that "it does" begs the question of how it perceives -- which is exactly the job of epistemology, I thought..
No, that is not the job of epistemology. That is the job of the science cognitive psychology. (They will consult with biologists and anatomists, of course). The "how" question entered the real of specialized science over 150 years ago.
Link to comment
Share on other sites

As a point of clarification, I was not trying to imply that the human mind is aware of existence without sensory perception. What I was trying to get across is that the sense organs are connected to the brain, and it is via this connection and the interaction of the outside world with the senses that we are able to be aware of existence. The eyeball, by itself, does not see; seeing is something done by the visual system that makes it possible for us to see by opening our eyes. Because the process of perception is automatic and not open to volition, the perceptual level is the given, the starting point of all knowledge; and sensory perception is axiomatic -- i.e. one cannot get beneath them epistemologically. We start with perceptual awareness, and all the knowledge about how the senses work does not get beneath our perceptual grasp.

So, due to our perceptual abilities, we can directly perceive existence and directly perceive similarities. There need not be any explanation of why they are similar; the grasp of the similarity is the beginning point of concept formation. But this is only true for the perceptually self-evident -- i.e. this --> A and this --> A are similar, because they are similar as given in perception. For higher-level similarities, such as grasping that fundamental Augustinian Catholicism is similar to communism requires more evidence and a reasoning process, it is not the given.

Going back to the title of the discussion, an essence is epistemological, as that characteristic about something that explains the most about that item within a context. But there is no essence in the sense of something there that makes it what it is -- it is what it is, including everything that it is. On an epistemological level, one can say that the program (or the ability to run a program) is the essence of a computer; on a metaphysical or ontological level a computer is everything that goes into the machine -- all the nuts and bolts, wires, light bulbs, etc.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

So, due to our perceptual abilities, we can directly perceive existence and directly perceive similarities.

You're saying we perceive similarity as a sensible fact, not as a relation constructed by the mind on the basis of reality. In like fashion why don't we also observe identity or causality ,e.g.?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

You're saying we perceive similarity as a sensible fact, not as a relation constructed by the mind on the basis of reality. In like fashion why don't we also observe identity or causality ,e.g.?

and

Then what is the purpose of epistemology, if not to account for the validity of man's knowledge?

Yes, identity and causation are given in perception, insofar as one observes an entity (identity) and observes that entity doing something (causality).

When you ask if similarity is constructed by the mind, no it is not. Similarity is observed and does not require any reasoning to be observed. You observe and you perceive a similarity; it does not require any conscious intent on your part, nor do you have volitional control over it.

Perceiving similarities, perceiving entities, and perceiving those entities acting does not require you mentally thinking about them with your conscious, volitional mind.

Epistemology is there to outline and to validate the rational process -- i.e. what your conscious mind does volitionally in order to acquire and retain knowledge. Epistemology is not -- repeat not -- about how the senses operate or how volition operates or how things act. It is about what the mind does in forming concepts and reasoning -- and perception is not reasoning.

Seeing these word does not require an act of reason; understanding what these words refer to in existence and following a rational argument does require an act of reason.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

This is handwaving in lieu of failure to provide an epistemological account of perception.
When you're told about cones in the eye and optic nerves, and the way the ear works, you don't want to discuss that, saying you are not interested in the mechanics. Yet, the "mechanics" is simply the physical way it happens. If you don't want to discuss how humans perceive similarities etc., what do you want: some type of spiritual explanation? If you want to include that type of research under the subject of Epistemology, that's fine -- then get the right type of Biology book, label it "Epistemology", and read it. You'll get what you're looking for.
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Yes, identity and causation are given in perception, insofar as one observes an entity (identity) and observes that entity doing something (causality).

Seeing these word does not require an act of reason; understanding what these words refer to in existence and following a rational argument does require an act of reason.

And apparently understanding what existence and indentity refer to doesn't require an act of reason, insofar as they are given in perception.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

And apparently understanding what existence and indentity refer to doesn't require an act of reason, insofar as they are given in perception.

Well, you have to be careful about this formulation. Observation of existence does not require reason -- animals, for example, have perception and can make observations. However, conceptualizing observations does require reason (non-contradictory identification). One observes that existence exists, but to form the axiom "existence exists" fully and conceptually requires an act of reason.

On a little bit easier level of grasping (for many people), seeing the color yellow is perceptual and does not require reason; forming the concept "yellow" and using it properly in a sentence does require an act of reason.

For causality, an entity acts according to what it is. We can observe an entity acting -- say a basketball bouncing -- and this is given in perception and requires no act of reason. But forming the conception of causality does require an act of reason; and further, figuring out how hard one must push on the basketball to shoot a basket does require an act of reason; and certainly coming up with the Newtonian laws of motion require an act of reason.

I can directly observe a cigarette, and directly observe it burning -- this is identity and causality as it is given in perception. Figuring out that it is made of dried leaves and paper and this is why it burns easily requires an act of reason. And further, coming up with chemistry and the chemistry of burning requires an act of reason.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I find that the Objectivist problem of essences to be quite substantial. The nature of the problem is this: Aristotle interpreted essences of objects (the property or properties an object must have if it is to be what it is) as merely a matter of language and definition. But Rand, perhaps mistakingly, interprets essences of objects as ontological, or existing in objective reality, independent of language. If Rand had no basis for this assessment and it is merely an assumption, the entire Objectivist philosophy could topple down with the support of its Axiom of Identity, which states that "a thing is what it is", which must necessarily be ontological.

I just saw this post, and haven't read the other replies. But I want to say a few quick things on the basis of my own fresh glance.

First, I don't know where you're getting the idea that Aristotle interpreted essences as "merely a matter of language and definition." The historically traditional interpretation is that he was a metaphysical realist about essences. Now in fact that interpretation has fallen into question in recent years. It looks like Aristotle may see essences as more epistemological than has been previously appreciated. But that does not mean they are "a matter of language and definition." For Aristotle, definitions are definitely epistemological (they represent a process of deductive proof that results in episteme), and language does not even figure as a central feature in his philosophy.

That's more of an aside. As for Rand, I imagine that other commentators by now have disputed your claim that Rand took essences to be metaphysical. For a quick reference that explains why she doesn't--and also draws comparisons to Aristotle's view--see here:

http://www.bristol.ac.uk/metaphysicsofscie...rs/gotthelf.pdf

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.

Guest
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.

Loading...
  • Recently Browsing   0 members

    • No registered users viewing this page.
×
×
  • Create New...