Jump to content
Objectivism Online Forum

Life and Value

Rate this topic


cmdownes

Recommended Posts

It is only an ultimate goal, an end in itself, that makes the existence of values possible. Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action. Epistemologically, the concept of "value" is genetically dependent upon and derived from the antecedent concept of "life." To speak of "value" as apart from "life" is worse than a contradiction in terms. "It is only the concept of 'Life' that makes the concept of 'Value' possible.

Why is life the only candidate for an end in itself? Presumably the answer is the claim exemplified by this line from Galt's speech: "There is only one fundamental alternative in the universe: existence or nonexistence—and it pertains to a single class of entities: to living organisms." Value is by Rand's definition "that which one acts to gain and/or keep". Rand further claims that non-existence doesn't require action, whereas continued existence does (Anyone have a citation for this? I don't have access to my books, I'm finding these quotes online). It follows (at least, I think Rand says it does) from these premises that we have to choose life to have value. I want to try and outline this rigorously, and see if we can get Rand's conclusions to follow. I'll bracket all my concerns about the truth of Rand's premises and save that for the debate forum. Here's a first stab at reconstructing the argument.

V(ab) = a values b

K(ab) = a acts to gain or keep b

B(a) = a is a volitional being

C(a) = a chooses to exist

N(a) = a chooses not to exist

f(a) = a's life

(P1) (x)(y) V(xy) <-> K(xy) (value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep)

(P2) (X) C(X) -> K(a,f(a)) (If someone chooses to exist, they value their own life)

(P3) (x) B(X) -> C(X) v N(X) (If someone is a volitional being, they either choose to exist or choose not to exist)

(P4) (X) ~(C(X) & N(X)) (One can't both choose to exist and choose not to exist)

(C1): (x) (Ey) ~ (V(xy) & ~(V(x,f(x) & B(x)) (It cannot be the case that someone is a volitional being, they value something, and they do not value their own life.)

Only problem is that I don't think this follows from the premises as I've outlined them. I've been trying to do a proof with this premise set for a while, and I don't think one is possible. So have I gone wrong in translating one of Rand's premises? Do I need an additional premise? The main problem is that it doesn't follow from "X values something" that "X values their life" - at least not with the premises Rand supplies. And we can't just supply it as a premise, because that would amount to assuming our conclusion (namely, that life is an end in itself). Any thoughts?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The minute I see philosophy expressed in equations ---> I think rationalism.

I think that all depends on the equations you use. If we had a sufficiently developed field of mathematics for dealing with concepts then we could have an equation that proves Rand's convictions. Rand herself said that the process of concept formation was mathematical.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

You don't get anything extra by trying to use mathematics. Language is precisely precise enough to communicate fully what needs to be communicated.

(C1): (x) (Ey) ~ (V(xy) & ~(V(x,f(x) & B(x)) (It cannot be the case that someone is a volitional being, they value something, and they do not value their own life.)

Only problem is that I don't think this follows from the premises as I've outlined them.

That conclusion is certainly incorrect. Some people value things outside of, above, and independent of their own lives. For example, suicide bombers. However, this does not pose a problem for Rand's philosophy. Those people are simply irrational.

I admire your attempt to be mathematically rigorous, but you're making it harder than it is.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I think that all depends on the equations you use. If we had a sufficiently developed field of mathematics for dealing with concepts then we could have an equation that proves Rand's convictions. Rand herself said that the process of concept formation was mathematical.

As I said: rationalism. Reason is not a string of syllogisms, or a set of formulas. Just because concept formation may be mathmatical doesn't somehow now make reason itself such. That would be the fallacy of composition.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

brassdragon

Reconstructing an argument in formal logic is useful for at least two reasons. First, it can make fallacious reason more apparent than it is in natural language. Second, it helps one develop a rigorous understanding of the argument instead of an excessively general one. It's not about using math, it's about breaking an argument down into its step by step components so that one can see precisely what reasoning is employed.

People can misidentify what is valuable for them, but I thin Rand would deny that it's possible to have a system of values if you don't value your own life. That's what I take her to mean when she gives this example:

"...try to imagine an immortal, indestructible robot, an entity which moves and acts, but which cannot be affected by anything, which cannot be changed in any respect, which cannot be damaged, injured or destroyed. Such an entity would not be able to have any values; it would have nothing to gain or to lose; it could not regard anything as for or against it, as serving or threatening its welfare, as fulfilling or frustrating its interests. It could have no interests and no goals."

On Rand's view, if you don't need to take action to preserve your life then you're incapable of having any goals whatsoever. I'm not sure what this means the nature of a suicide bombers action is, but Rand is fairly clear that the decision to act to preserve one's life is a necessary precondition of value.

The minute I see philosophy expressed in equations ---> I think rationalism.

Rationality isn't rationalism. Why does formal logic make you think of rationalism?

Edited by cmdownes
Link to comment
Share on other sites

The minute I see philosophy expressed in equations ---> I think rationalism.

Rationality isn't rationalism. Why does formal logic make you think of rationalism?

I love mathematics, but an algebraic equation doesn't contain the type of information that is needed to describe the universe conceptually and philosophically. It can only describe the universe physically because an equation can't take volition into consideration because volition by its very nature isn't determinate. And a mathematical equation correctly describing the universe can only be determinate. Therefore, mathematics can't be used for philosophy involving volition.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

On Rand's view, if you don't need to take action to preserve your life then you're incapable of having any goals whatsoever. I'm not sure what this means the nature of a suicide bombers action is, but Rand is fairly clear that the decision to act to preserve one's life is a necessary precondition of value.

Only for a rational person. You would need to add this to your premises in your logical equation. But then, there are tons of things you would need to add to your premises in your equations. They just randomly start from nowhere and randomly lead to nowhere. This is why they are rationalistic.

Ultimately, Objectivism is based on the observation of reality. You cannot deduce it from a set of axioms. You must induct from things you observe in reality. Mathematical equations can't capture this kind of thinking; they end up missing the induction part and thus are rationalistic. Mathematics is better suited to deduction.

Note, of course, that I'm no professional philosopher. But this is my best explanation of the issue.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I love mathematics, but an algebraic equation doesn't contain the type of information that is needed to describe the universe conceptually and philosophically. It can only describe the universe physically because an equation can't take volition into consideration because volition by its very nature isn't determinate. And a mathematical equation correctly describing the universe can only be determinate. Therefore, mathematics can't be used for philosophy involving volition.

But this isn't algebra or number crunching - this is formal logic. It's another beast entirely. It's the symbolic representation of propositions in natural language. I'm not trying to derive volition from algebra or anything similarly loony, I'm converting English sentences into a symbolic form that let's me determine their consequences and locate contradictions more easily. That's it.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Only for a rational person. You would need to add this to your premises in your logical equation. But then, there are tons of things you would need to add to your premises in your equations. They just randomly start from nowhere and randomly lead to nowhere. This is why they are rationalistic.

They don't start from nowhere. The premises of the argument are the ones Rand adduces in her text, and which she argues for elsewhere. I'm assuming their truth and seeing if the conclusions she derives from them follows. It's not rationalistic to say, "Assuming for the moment the truth of A, B and C, does D follow?". I'm not saying, "OMG the fact that value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep IS AN A PRIORI TRUTH WHAT CAN I FIND OUT NOW". I'm just trying to see if Rand's premises validate the conclusion she derives from them.

Ultimately, Objectivism is based on the observation of reality. You cannot deduce it from a set of axioms. You must induct from things you observe in reality.

Then it's a jolly good thing I'm not trying to deduce Objectivism from axioms, but rather reconstruct an argument of Ayn Rand's.

Mathematical equations can't capture this kind of thinking; they end up missing the induction part and thus are rationalistic. Mathematics is better suited to deduction.

I'm not spewing quadratic equations at you, I'm trying to do LOGIC. The fact that I write (X) C(X) -> K(X,f(X)) instead of, "For any X, if X chooses to live then X values their own life" is just a different symbolic expression that has precisely the same semantics. It happens to be a convenient one that allows quick and accurate determinations about the validity of arguments.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

What is (Ey) ?

In fact, man, I'm rusty on my symbolic logic. What are the alternating upper and lower case parenthetical X at the start of each statement?

Edited by Greebo
Link to comment
Share on other sites

(P1) (x)(y) V(xy) <-> K(xy) (value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep)

(P2) (X) C(X) -> K(a,f(a)) (If someone chooses to exist, they value their own life)

P2 is part of the problem I think.

A value is that which one acts to gain and or keep. That can, I think, be restated as:

If one values X, one will act to gain and keep X.

This is an if, then relationship, not an if and only if relationship. In other words, this does not say that one can not act to gain and or keep that which one does NOT value. For example, a nihilist may not actually value ones own life, and yet continue to eat in order to sustain it. (I think).

Therefore, I think that P2 is incorrect, that C(X) does not imply V(x, f(x)).

I'm rusty at this, and I'm also struggling to fully understand values, objectively speaking, however, so I am probably way off the mark here.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

P3 is flawed. A person can also not choose. The proper opposite of 'a chooses to exist' is 'a does not choose to exist', not 'a chooses not to exist.'

(P3) (x) B(X) -> C(X) v ~C(x) v N(X) would be the more correct formulation, which is probably useless for your proof.

This is an interesting idea, I'm going to have to think about this one.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Also, your conclusion as you've typed it is missing parentheses, and I'm having a little difficulty understanding exactly what you're trying to conclude. Based on your English version, I came up with this:

(C1) (ExEy) ~(B(x) & V(xy) & V(xf(x))) (For some x and y, it cannot be that x is volitional, values y, and does not value x's life.)

But I share BrassDragon's concern that this conclusion is invalid. Any Christian is proof of it's invalidity. In addition, I don't think volition has anything to do with an entity being able to value something - a dog can't choose what to value, but it values it's own life and, therefore, the things needed to sustain it. (Please, someone correct me if I'm wrong here.)

Edited by miseleigh
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Any Christian is proof of it's invalidity.

How?

Christians value many things, especially their own life, as a gift from God. They believe in free will, they just rationalize where that freedom of will comes from.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

P3 is flawed. A person can also not choose. The proper opposite of 'a chooses to exist' is 'a does not choose to exist', not 'a chooses not to exist.'

(P3) (x) B(X) -> C(X) v ~C(x) v N(X) would be the more correct formulation, which is probably useless for your proof.

This is an interesting idea, I'm going to have to think about this one.

Hmm. I think you're on to something here.

A volitional being may or may not make the choice to exist. However, a volitional being may also choose not to exist. (Example: Cheryl Taggart's suicide)

I also don't think the Postulates lead to the conclusion. None of the postulates say that valuing something implies valuing ones own life. (Am I repeating myself here?)

I think this is an interesting exercise, but I think we would be better served by starting a new thread, and beginning at the beginning, with the 3 givens: existence, identity, and consciousness, and then see if we can't logically reconstruct the arguments. (If this has not already been done.)

Also, since some do *not* take the three givens as given, I think it would be beneficial to review them, and the arguments against them, and "prove the axioms" if you will.

I'm finding that there are some who consider Rand's philosophy flawed because it began with the end in mind. As proof, they offer up that AS, TF and the other fictions came first, which only proves publication order, of course, not the order of her thinking.

However, beginning at the end or not, if the foundation is true, and the logic is true, then the conclusions are true. If so, then Rand had the amazing foresight to reach the right conclusions first, then prove them. (I also question how many other philosophers started with an end in mind, if such a starting point is proof of invalidity).

Anyway my point is, if we could create a logical and correct mapping of the arguments, it'd be very satisfying to respond to the "Rand was a lightweight philosopher" with, "Oh really? Here's a link to the logical proof of her philosophy. Go find it false, then call her a lightweight."

And, of course, if we can't, then to be true to ourselves, we have to consider those implications as well.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

A value is that which one acts to gain and or keep. That can, I think, be restated as:

If one values X, one will act to gain and keep X.

This is an if, then relationship, not an if and only if relationship. In other words, this does not say that one can not act to gain and or keep that which one does NOT value. For example, a nihilist may not actually value ones own life, and yet continue to eat in order to sustain it. (I think).

Hm - this is actually a tricky point that I'm not clear on. Rand says value is what you act to gain or keep - I had interpreted that to mean that "things I value" and "things I act to gain or keep" refer to precisely the same thing. Under your reading, there are things we act to keep that we don't value. But then I think we're getting away from the empirical notion of value that Rand is articulating. That is, we can look at something, watch what it acts to gain, and from that we can infer what it values. Your reading would make that kind of reasoning invalid, because it could always be the case that whatever we see somebody acting to gain isn't *really* something he or she values. I'm genuinely unsure of whether the alternative you're suggesting can capture what Rand is arguing.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

P3 is flawed. A person can also not choose. The proper opposite of 'a chooses to exist' is 'a does not choose to exist', not 'a chooses not to exist.'

(P3) (x) B(X) -> C(X) v ~C(x) v N(X) would be the more correct formulation, which is probably useless for your proof.

This is an interesting idea, I'm going to have to think about this one.

First, I apologize for the crappy syntax. It was written in haste, I'll rewrite it in the morning.

But anyways - I read Rand as thinking that if you do not choose to exist, then you choose not to exist. If you don't make the basic pre-moral decision to value your own life, you wont act to preserve it, and you'll cease to exist.

But, if you're right, then it's really unclear how Rand is motivating her claim that a person's life is an end in itself for that person. Because you're right, that revised premise isn't terribly helpful for the proof. The possibility of a genuine third option other than choosing existence or non-existence (just refraining from choice) is going to undermine her argument to the extent that her argument relies on confronting us with something like: You can live or die! Oh, don't want to die? Well then you must want to live. Welcome to egoism. If I can just not choose either of those things, then that lets me have essentially arbitrary values. That fundamental dilemma wont take logical priority on my other decisions and life wont be an end in itself.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

There's nothing wrong with evaluating the formal logic of an argument. The main trouble here is that you have no outlined any argument Rand actually makes. You've just put together a few different things she may or may not say and outlined an argument of your own. Why not read her essay "The Objectivist Ethics," make a normal outline of the main point of each paragraph, and try to determine the outline based on that? I guarantee you'll get a different result.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

How?

Christians value many things, especially their own life, as a gift from God. They believe in free will, they just rationalize where that freedom of will comes from.

Like you said, Christians value their lives as gifts from God. Because of this, they do not value their lives as ends in themselves - instead, the idea is that their lives have value because of what they can do for others. This is inconsistent with the Objectivist view of valuing their lives. If Christians truly valued their lives, why would committing suicide be a sin? (But let's not get side-tracked here, if you want to discuss this more we can start a new topic elsewhere.)
Link to comment
Share on other sites

The possibility of a genuine third option other than choosing existence or non-existence (just refraining from choice) is going to undermine her argument to the extent that her argument relies on confronting us with something like: You can live or die! Oh, don't want to die? Well then you must want to live.

I think that third option is generally called 'death-avoidance.' This is when a person doesn't really want to die, but doesn't want to live, either, and so acts to prevent death but does not act to preserve life. Think of Keating, or James Taggart. This is a clear example of a contradiction to your conclusion. James Taggart had some (irrational) values - he wanted to tear Cherryl down, for example, and acted to do so - but he did not value his own life. He simply tried to avoid death.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Like you said, Christians value their lives as gifts from God. Because of this, they do not value their lives as ends in themselves

The question didn't say "as ends in themselves". It just said "value their lives". I think this is an important distinction. However...

instead, the idea is that their lives have value because of what they can do for others.

I think this is mistaken.

Christians value their lives as gifts from "God". The purpose of Man in the Judeo/Christian mythology is live in Glory to "God". I don't see this as effectively being much different than valuing their life as an end unto itself. For a Christian to live in Glory to "God", he must act to gain and keep his life. This idea of ones own life being most highly valued is repeated in other sentiments, such as that of the body being a temple. This comes from the first Old Testament Commandment, "I am the Lord thy God, thou shalt have no other God before me"

Of course, the purpose of "God" is a blankout - presumably its to create humans to worship him or her or it or whatever.

So I conclude that a Christian *does* value his life as an end in and of itself: "a value gained and kept by a constant process of action".

I'm thinking a hedonist would be a better example of someone who acts to gain and keep a value (sexual pleasure) while not valuing his life (self-destructive behavior).

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.

Guest
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.

Loading...
  • Recently Browsing   0 members

    • No registered users viewing this page.
×
×
  • Create New...