Free Will Revisited

[agrippa1]

Here is what Ayn Rand said about axiomatic concepts:

This describes volition. There is no proof, there are no concepts, there is no philosophy, there is no man, without volition.

Volition is the choice to think. It is the faculty of non-deterministic generation, evaluation and execution of alternative courses of actions, based on the perception of a situation of reality. I don't have to point at things to explain what free will is, in fact, I can't point at anything to explain it. I can't stomp my foot, for instance, and say, "see, there it is."

Free will is not implicit in all facts and in all knowledge, though it is implicit in rational interaction with reality.

All proofs and explanations do not rest on free will.

I agree with you in one respect, in that the concept of free will can not be denied without being entailed. But the entailment consists of a recognition that denial of free will logically leads to an abrogation of reason, which denies the existence of the concepts of existence, identity and consciousness (but not the existence of existence, identity and consciousness.).

[Marc K.]

Volition is the choice to think.

Do you not see a problem with this sentence? Is it not circular?

Volition is an ability; the ability to choose. You are already using your volition once you have chosen to think. The primary choice, which is the choice to think (or focus) or not, is a choice.

Free will is not implicit in all facts and in all knowledge, [...].

All proofs and explanations do not rest on free will.

The concepts proof and explain both presuppose a volitional consciousness, they are meaningless in the absense of a volitional consciousness. You cannot prove or explain anything to a dog and a dog cannot prove or explain anything. I'm willing to discuss this with you if you rephrase it in the form of a question. But since you have decided to directly contradict Ayn Rand, I'll simply say that I disagree with you. If you want to continue on in this vein we'll have to move it to the debate forum.

[agrippa1]

Do you not see a problem with this sentence? Is it not circular?

There is no contradiction here. Choices can be and are made automatically all the time. To say that "choice" entails free will is to assert that dogs, computers and magic 8 balls have free will (of course, Magic 8 balls can't take actions based on their "choice"). A choice is a selection between alternatives. Free will implies a choice not made by automatic logical mechanism. To say that dogs do not choose is to arbitrarily limit the scope of the word "choose," in which case I invite you to provide another term for what a dog does when he ____'s one milkbone over another, and I'll substitute that term in for "choice." That should eliminate the circularity you see.

But since you have decided to directly contradict Ayn Rand, I'll simply say that I disagree with you. If you want to continue on in this vein we'll have to move it to the debate forum.

Now your getting nasty...

Seriously, though, as far as I've read, Ayn Rand has never commented specifically on the axiomatic status of free will. She does explicitly list existence, identity and consciousness as axioms. If you can find a more explicit statement, then I'll have to reconsider, but I have searched every word of her essays and other works, and I have yet to find a significant contradiction, with regard to this or any other issue.

She does have something to say about defining concepts as axiomatic:

The anti-conceptual mentality takes most things as irreducible primaries and regards them as “self-evident.” It treats concepts as if they were (memorized) percepts; it treats abstractions as if they were perceptual concretes. To such a mentality, everything is the given...

-Ayn Rand, “The Missing Link,” Philosophy: Who Needs It, 38.

That's not to say that your identification of free will as axiomatic is anti-conceptual, only that we should be extremely careful about which concepts we claim are axiomatic. If there is a way to define a concept using other concepts, or, even better, a way to prove the existence of a concept without self-reference, then we should absolutely remove it from our list of axioms, which should remain as small as possible.

I believe Rand was very clear and consistent on her definitions of axioms, and to claim that her list is incomplete would seem more of a contradiction than to avoid making that claim.

Edited August 20, 2008 by agrippa1

[Grames]

I can't stomp my foot, for instance, and say, "see, there it is."

But you just did. In acting or refraining you have provided exactly the same kind of demonstation of volition as foot-stomping does of existence.

[agrippa1]

But you just did. In acting or refraining you have provided exactly the same kind of demonstation of volition as foot-stomping does of existence.

If I program a robot to stomp its foot and say, "see, there's free will," does that demonstrate free will?

There's a harder problem here that no one seems to want to address. That is, not the what of choice, but the why. Say I just did stomp my foot. Why did I do it? I wanted to demonstrate (or not) free will. Was my free will in stomping my foot based on nothing more than an earlier suggestion, or was it in choosing to follow that earlier suggestion? If the latter, why did I choose that way? Was it because earlier in this thread the same demonstration was urged to convince someone that they had free will? Did I recognize a subtle contradiction in telling someone to do something so as to demonstrate their own free will? To put it shortly, did the sum of my perception from birth to today form a set of competing values, logical perception and predictive ability that led me to create the option, choose it and execute it? Is "free will" possibly nothing more than the execution of actions based on a code of values unique to me, or is it something more? If nothing is innate, and all knowledge and values derive from the sum of our perceptions, if the value we put on thinking, and which compels us to weigh it against the alternative, and thus to choose to think or not to, is derived explicitly from the sum of all our previous experience, do we really have free will, or are we slaves to the values we've accrued, and continue to accrue, over the course of our lives?

If what I just posited is possible, then the concept of free will is not self-evident, and must be derived logically from the facts of reality.

[aleph_0]

Those who decide that free will does not exist can be expected to either destroy themselves, or to destroy so many of their fellow men that they meet with retributive destruction. It's the middle-of-the-roaders, the undecideds, who allow a mixture of slavery and freedom to propagate through history.

Aleph_0, sad to say, is one of them.

(edit: typos)

This smacks of melodrama, I must say.

In any case, I suppose if were a man in 1940's America and I were "on the fence" about whether it were humanly possible to travel to the moon, I guess I'd be one who either destroys himself or his fellow men? If I have no answer to whether AIDS can be effectively cured in all human beings without first killing the patient, I suppose I kill myself and others? If I rationally, responsibly await further evidence and argument on a given subject so that I am sure not to over-reach the limits of my knowledge, I then allow some measure of slavery?

Quite the jump in logic, I must say.

[agrippa1]

This smacks of melodrama, I must say.

In any case, I suppose if were a man in 1940's America and I were "on the fence" about whether it were humanly possible to travel to the moon, I guess I'd be one who either destroys himself or his fellow men? If I have no answer to whether AIDS can be effectively cured in all human beings without first killing the patient, I suppose I kill myself and others? If I rationally, responsibly await further evidence and argument on a given subject so that I am sure not to over-reach the limits of my knowledge, I then allow some measure of slavery?

Quite the jump in logic, I must say.

Since "humanly possible" can only be proved, and never disproved, your examples don't make much sense.

Since a rule about a particular subject is not necessarily generally true for all subjects, they make even less sense.

Since I said that if you're on the fence about free will, you're not the one doing the destruction, you're one on the fence watching someone else do it; they make no sense.

As for not taking any actions until you are "sure not to overreach the limits of [your] knowledge," I'm not sure how that relates specifically to free will, but you not only allow "some measure" of slavery, you damn well deserve it!!

[aleph_0]

Since "humanly possible" can only be proved, and never disproved, your examples don't make much sense.

Since a rule about a particular subject is not necessarily generally true for all subjects, they make even less sense.

Since I said that if you're on the fence about free will, you're not the one doing the destruction, you're one on the fence watching someone else do it; they make no sense.

As for not taking any actions until you are "sure not to overreach the limits of [your] knowledge," I'm not sure how that relates specifically to free will, but you not only allow "some measure" of slavery, you damn well deserve it!!

They make sense because, in the examples, one hasn't enough information to make a justified affirmation or negation--just like the topic of whether humans have free will. And since you said that "[they (one of whom is aleph_0)] can be expected to either destroy themselves, or to destroy so many of their fellow men," I would maintain that they make perfect sense.

[agrippa1]

They make sense because, in the examples, one hasn't enough information to make a justified affirmation or negation--just like the topic of whether humans have free will. And since you said that "[they (one of whom is aleph_0)] can be expected to either destroy themselves, or to destroy so many of their fellow men," I would maintain that they make perfect sense.

Okay, you misread my post.

I said:

Those who decide that free will does not exist can be expected to either destroy themselves, or to destroy so many of their fellow men that they meet with retributive destruction. It's the middle-of-the-roaders, the undecideds, who allow a mixture of slavery and freedom to propagate through history.

Aleph_0, sad to say, is one of them.

The antecedent of them is "the middle-of-the-roaders, the undecideds," not "those who decide that free will does not exist."

You've never claimed to have rejected that free will exists, only to not be sure one way or the other. By taking this stance, you accept the possibility that free will might not exist, and you give those who would operate on this premise the cover they need.

On edit:

But let me ask you something, do you think the men who put us on the moon and dedicated their lives to curing AIDS believed that they could do it, or were they "on the fence?"

Do you think a "rational, responsible" skepticism would have served them well in their endeavor? Should they have "awaited further evidence and argument" before dedicating their lives so as not to "over reach the the limits of their knowledge?" Would it have been rational, ethical, moral to question their own abilities? Surely, those who rejected the possibilities outright would have loved to shut down those hopeless wastes of money, effectively destroying them (and by extension themselves), but what about those fence-sitters? Would they not have given the nay-sayers the cover to cancel the space program and the AIDS-cure efforts?

(btw, thanks for the analogies!)

Edited August 22, 2008 by agrippa1

[Stethoscope]

We are rational animals, it's evolution. The dominance of species.

[aleph_0]

Okay, you misread my post.

True, you then say that I allow slavery rather than enforce it--though this is still embarrassingly melodramatic, or poorly argued at the least, since the denial of free will does not necessitate the belief in enslaving human beings. Human beings, without free will, are still most free and happy under capitalism.

But let me ask you something, do you think the men who put us on the moon and dedicated their lives to curing AIDS believed that they could do it, or were they "on the fence?"

Perhaps--I don't know them. My question is, does it matter? Who cares on what side of the fence they sat, if any? Take Hilbert's Program: He was certain that arithmetic could be finitely axiomatized, and whoops, turns out he was wrong. Provably wrong. Still, before Godel's Incompleteness proof, hundreds if not thousands of mathematicians spent decades trying to finitely axiomatize arithmetic--each and every one of whom, I am sure, believed that it could be done.

Perhaps the people researching AIDS believe that we can effectively cure it in all people before killing the patient, and perhaps we can. Perhaps we can't--I don't have enough information to judge that. Until someone brings me further evidence, I don't think the scientists have enough information to judge that either. Whether they believe one way or another is irrelevant.

Now should Hilbert or these scientists sit around passively waiting for more information to form in front of them? I don't see how anything I have said implies it. Certainly we should investigate the universe, and certainly we should try to find out whether there is free will. I'm just not convinced yet.

Now in your picture, Godel sounds like something of a destroyer--of himself and/or others. Yet he ended a decade-long wild goose chase that would have otherwise meant the pointless consumption of valuable time of countless mathematicians, not to mention budgets in academic institutions, and it would have been the source of some unimaginable frustration. [Note: Someone may want to point out that Godel effectively committed suicide and so, in a sense, he was a destroyer. Yet this was not due to his proof, but rather his long-entrenched paranoia and psychological illness. He believed the government was controlling people by contaminating their food, and starved himself. Many people today accept his proof without accepting his suicidal paranoia, myself included.]

(btw, thanks for the analogies!)

Any time.

[Marc K.]

Now your getting nasty...

No, I really wasn't, just matter of fact. If you are going to knowingly contradict Ayn Rand then we must take it to the debate forum. If you don't know that that is what you are doing then we can stay here.

Besides, if I really wanted to get nasty I would say: "now my what is getting nasty?" (sorry, pet peeve)

There is no contradiction here. Choices can be and are made automatically all the time. To say that "choice" entails free will is to assert that dogs, computers and magic 8 balls have free will (of course, Magic 8 balls can't take actions based on their "choice"). A choice is a selection between alternatives. Free will implies a choice not made by automatic logical mechanism. To say that dogs do not choose is to arbitrarily limit the scope of the word "choose," in which case I invite you to provide another term for what a dog does when he ____'s one milkbone over another, and I'll substitute that term in for "choice." That should eliminate the circularity you see.

I have no idea what position you are arguing. First, there is no such thing as an "automatic logical mechanism". And I think you know that computers and magic 8 balls don't choose. Neither do dogs. You want me to believe that since a dog can't eat two bones at once that that means he chooses one over the other and demonstrates free will? I'm sure he'd be happy to eat both bones. That is not the test. The test would be if you put out a bone and a bowl of poison. The dog will never "choose" the poison. A dog does not choose it acts, always in one direction, always in the way that promotes its life, there is no alternative to it so there is no choice. It cannot choose to act in a way that harms its life, man can.

Do you not see a difference between the way a man acts and the way a dog acts? You see what you're doing right? You are confirming the axiomatic status of volition by asking me to prove volition by means of non-volitional things.

Seriously, though, as far as I've read, Ayn Rand has never commented specifically on the axiomatic status of free will. [...] If you can find a more explicit statement, then I'll have to reconsider, but I have searched every word of her essays and other works, and I have yet to find a significant contradiction, with regard to this or any other issue.

Ayn Rand approved of the lectures from which OPAR was created and as I said: "Leonard Peikoff describes it further in OPAR pg.69 in the section 'Volition as Axiomatic'". I don't know about you but I certainly allow Leonard Peikoff the widest latitude and benefit of the doubt when considering Objectivism.

Also Ayn Rand certainly implies the existence of other axiomatic concepts when she says: "The first and primary axiomatic concepts are 'existence', 'identity', (which is a corollary of 'existence') and 'consciousness'" -- ITOE, 73. By saying "the first" she is implying there are more.

You have already acknowledged one hallmark of an axiomatic concept, namely that free will must be accepted in order to be denied. So I guess you are just hung-up on whether free will is implied in all facts and all knowledge. Now I have already acknowledged that perception is automatic, so setting that aside, let us consider conceptual knowledge. As far as concepts are concerned can you name one fact grasped by a conceptual consciousness or one piece of knowledge retained by a conceptual consciousness that doesn't entail a conceptual consciousness, meaning: that doesn't entail volition?

Volition is required in order to form concepts. There are no concepts without volition. The existence of concepts presupposes a conceptual consciousness and a conceptual consciousness requires volition in order to work.

Also, just curious, which insignificant contradictions have you found?

If I program a robot to stomp its foot and say, "see, there's free will," does that demonstrate free will?

[demonstration of determinism]

If what I just posited is possible, then the concept of free will is not self-evident, and must be derived logically from the facts of reality.

What you posited is not possible since it is determinism and it denies that a baby can become a man or that a drug addict can rehabilitate himself. The concept of free will is not self-evident but free will itself is. The concept itself must be validated but since it is at the base of all knowledge it cannot be derived either. Free will is in our nature and is not dependent upon its validation. A child uses free will whether it has validated it or not.

As to the first part, free will can only be validated by introspection. So in this sense you are right that the action itself does not demonstrate free will. To validate free will you must observe your own mind consciously and very deliberately and think about acting and then either act or don't. Once you have thought about performing an action and envisioned what that action will be you have used your free will to focus, then it doesn't matter whether you actually perform the action or not.

For instance, you probably never thought to slap yourself in the face so it was never an issue and you never had to think about it. However once I ask you, as a demonstration of free will, to slap yourself, it is in your mind and you have to use your free will to think about actually slapping yourself and then use your free will to either perform that action or not.

[agrippa1]

I've conflated non-rational potentialities with options and choice.

Oops.

[agrippa1]

And I think you know that computers and magic 8 balls don't choose. Neither do dogs.

I'm still chewing the free will problem (as axiomatic) over, now that I've realized my mistake.

In the meantime I've been shamed into admitting that this place is worth $50/yr. (that's a lotta milkbones...)

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

I'm still chewing the free will problem (as axiomatic) over, now that I've realized my mistake.

I think you have to leave aside the issue of whether or not other living beings have free will. You only have direct access to your own consciousness, and it is only via introspection that you can realize that you, in fact, make choices.

And, to counter an earlier comment by Aleph O, just to be able to say "I," as in "I am not aware of my own will," is self-contradictory; because what in the world is meant by self-consciousness of one's own consciousness aside from the fact that you can say I and that it means you and that you can choose to reply to a post or not? Dogs and cats don't go around saying "I" anything. They are aware of themselves, as in being able to know if someone is touching them or not, and they might be aware that they are conscious on some level -- i.e. be aware of the difference between being asleep and being woken up suddenly, but they seem to have no awareness of their own consciousness as it is operating; so you could never ask them, "Hey, puppy, do you have free will or not?" because it wouldn't mean anything to them at all.

What can be done once you have affirmed that you have the power of choice is to assess whether or not those entities with consciousness can make choices on the perceptual level -- i.e. do dogs and cats chose in some way between playing with you or getting a drink of water or taking a nap. But until you know for a fact that you have free will, then you cannot assess whether anything else has free will, not even other people. And that is because you only have direct access and awareness of your own consciousness.

So, the whole approach of trying to decide if you have free will or not -- or if it even exists as a possibility -- via extrospection alone is a non-starter. How would you even know what a choice is if you were not aware of making choices? Is a car making a choice to turn left once you turn the wheel left? What would that mean if you were not even aware of making choices? The term would be completely meaningless.

By the way, I don't think anyone ought to be "shamed" into donating their money to this forum. It would depend on your values and if you have funds to spare. Right now, I have much more time and expertise to spare than money, so my donation consists of writing to the forum

[aleph_0]

And, to counter an earlier comment by Aleph O, just to be able to say "I," as in "I am not aware of my own will," is self-contradictory; because what in the world is meant by self-consciousness of one's own consciousness aside from the fact that you can say I and that it means you and that you can choose to reply to a post or not?

This is nothing more than the exact same argument you've repeated at least twice here, and to which I've already devoted a response on a separate topic.

[Marc K.]

I've conflated non-rational potentialities with options and choice.

Oops.

I'm still chewing the free will problem (as axiomatic) over, now that I've realized my mistake.

In the meantime I've been shamed into admitting that this place is worth $50/yr. (that's a lotta milkbones...)

I'm glad and I'd be happy to discuss it with you. I'll even cut you more slack in the future, I just wasn't sure where you were coming from -- in fact I just now realized that we are already in the debate forum. Doh!

I guess it's a harder problem than I thought. There is a long discussion about it on HBL currently and I can see that there are some very learned people struggling with it. So I apologize for judging you harshly, especially if you felt shamed by me.

I'm interested, what was it that clicked in your head? Was it something specific that I said? Different things click for different people. What was the mistake that you realized? Is it contained in the first quote above? If so can you explain that some more.

[Jake]

I'm interested, what was it that clicked in your head? Was it something specific that I said? Different things click for different people. What was the mistake that you realized? Is it contained in the first quote above? If so can you explain that some more.

I can't speak for agrippa1, but I hit a similar snag while reading this thread and thinking about free will. I found my problem was definitional. The dictionaries I checked define choice as selection, and selection as choice (not very helpful). Also, the definitions I found of choice and selection were not explicitly predicated on free will.

If you realize that choice entails awareness of one's value-comparing processes and the ability to affect those processes, then non-human animals obviously don't choose anything. So, in my case, it was agrippa1's "Oops" post that persuaded me to check my definition of choice, and correct myself.

[agrippa1]

I'm interested, what was it that clicked in your head?

It was when you wrote "And I think you know that computers and magic 8 balls don't choose. Neither do dogs."

I was replying that automatic logical choice does exist, using the example of a digital logic gate, and explaining that it "chooses" its output state based on the sum of the states of its inputs (much as a dog "chooses" based on the sum of its instinctual and trained influences) when I realized that in both examples, the gate and the dog, the output is an automatic function of the inputs, and not a rational choice between multiple options. I was making the mistake of perceiving potentialities as possible outcomes from which the gate or the dog "chooses."

Click, click, click - the tumblers fell and I realized that I had a mistake in my definitions that was screwing with my reasoning.

Now I'm still working on "where" free will occurs - is it in the will to think (I believe that is more precise than the "choice" to think), or in the generation of optional courses of action, or in the forecasting of consequences, or the evaluation of the risk/benefit of multiple consequences based on my values, or in all of these.

[hunterrose]

Who made [a man's] identity what it is? If it were his inborn nature or his environment we're obviously not dealing with free will. The only other option is that he creates his own identity.

Just so I understand: by "identity", here you mean values/preferences/reasons for choosing x over y?

I argue a disjunction. Either there is no free will, or if there is, it creates itself.

Again, correct me if I misinterpret:

If man has free will, then he creates his own (initial?) values.

I think that (if a person passively and volitionally allows it) one's environment/nurturing can affect the things a person values, as your America vs. Eastern countries example suggests.

But I do not think, even if one's initial values are wholly/partially created by one's environment/nurturing, that such origination means that one doesn't have free will, or that this initial set of values can't be volitionally altered.

I believe the disjunction to be a false dichotomy: I don't see why not volitionally creating one's initial values precludes one from having free will. I think I understand your argument for the disjunction, but since I've already assumed a lot, it's better that I explicitly ask. Why do you feel that

Either there is no free will, or if there is, it creates itself.

this is true? (If I've indeed misinterpreted your argument, please explain where I've misunderstood you, particularly what you mean by "it creates itself.")

At any rate, this is an interesting topic

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Either there is no free will, or if there is, it creates itself.

I think there is a lot of confusion about free will on the side of those who oppose it, along the lines of what causes free will, as if will is there ex nihilo. But that is not what Objectivism is saying at all. Free will is an ability that we have because we are human. Without the human there is no will; that is, without you having been born a human being, there is no human consciousness and no ability to direct it. In short, the cause of free will is that you are human, the effect is you directing you own consciousness and those actions you can direct derived from the ability to control your consciousness.

I still haven't decided if it is evasion, rationalism, or an attempt to reject the supernatural that leads some people to outright deny an ability that they do have. I suppose that if one came from a cultural seeped in the idea that there is no human will, there is only GOD's WILL, and one throws out the God approach, then on might be tempted to throw everything out that was taught since day one -- i.e. if the only will is God's Will, and there is no God, then there is no will. This would still be a form of rationalism, but for someone to come right out and say, "I am not aware of my own will," then something is amiss. At least I do not understand someone who is so non-introspective that they don't even know who they are! like some on these boards who have claimed that they don't have a mind because it doesn't show up on a medical brain scan! How in the world could you even go through life without knowing that you have a mind and that you can control it?

[agrippa1]

Again, correct me if I misinterpret:

If man has free will, then he creates his own (initial?) values.

This gets close to the heart of the question, but I'm not sure that values is where we "find" free will. In my mind, (to use the colloquial) free will is proven by the fact that knowledge (or assumption) of free will is self-affirming. If you don't believe in free will, to use the more compelling side of the argument, you lose the motivation for exercising that free will. The question that Aleph_0's assertion raises is: is knowledge of free will necessary for its existence? I would argue no, that lack of consideration of the existence (or non-) does not eliminate free will, it merely removes it from our conceptual model of reality.

This is the reason I find the axiomatic basis of free will difficult to accept. If you deny free will, really deny it, you lose the ability to deal rationally with reality, but you don't entail free will, except notionally, in the asserted "choice" to not think. I guess I'm saying that denial of free will may destroy it, but it does not follow that recognizing free will creates free will.

[agrippa1]

This is the reason I find the axiomatic basis of free will difficult to accept. If you deny free will, really deny it, you lose the ability to deal rationally with reality, but you don't entail free will, except notionally, in the asserted "choice" to not think. I guess I'm saying that denial of free will may destroy it, but it does not follow that recognizing free will creates free will.

After discussing this at length with my better half last night, I realize there is a contradiction here.

Is "free will" tautological?

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

After discussing this at length with my better half last night, I realize there is a contradiction here.

Is "free will" tautological?

It depends on what you mean by tautological. A tautology is basically A is A, a thing is itself. But I think at root to this discussion is the idea that you and others are looking for something more fundamental than free will, so that you can say something like free will is X, or free will is the functioning of X. But since free will -- the ability to be aware of your own consciousness and to be able to direct it -- is a primary, in the sense that you are directly aware of your consciousness and your ability to direct it, then there is no getting beneath it epistemologically.

Let me give you an analogy to sight. You open your eyes and look out at the world and you see what you see. But we certainly know that sight is made possible because we have eyes, an optic nerve, the visual cortex, and whatever else the brain is doing that makes it possible for us to see. Without eyes and the rest of it, we do not have the power of vision. However, this does not mean that vision is the eyes, the optic nerve, etc. Vision is something we are directly aware of and is the starting point of any investigation into the power of sight. That is, an epistemological starting point into this investigation of what makes sight possible is the fact of sight and vision, that we can see.

Likewise with volition. It is a fundamental fact that we are aware of our consciousness and that we can direct it. This is free will. We seem to have localized that down to the prefrontal cortex. That is, people who get damage to this region of the brain are no longer aware of their own mind and have no control over it. But this does not mean that consciousness is the brain or that free will is the frontal cortex, any more than eyes are sight. The awareness of consciousness and the power to direct it are the epistemological fundamental into any scientific investigation of what makes it possible. Consciousness and free will in man are the powers we have, so long as we have a normally functioning equipment. In that sense, one cannot get beneath it, because the starting point is the awareness of our own mind and the ability to direct it.

Vision is the power to see and volition is the power to direct your own mind, but you cannot get beneath that because these are powers that we have that we are directly aware of having simply by being man.

[Jake]

Likewise with volition. It is a fundamental fact that we are aware of our consciousness and that we can direct it. This is free will.

I was thinking about this before reading your post, and then I hit the above sentence.

I was wondering: Is our ability to direct our consciousness inextricably linked to our awareness of our consciousness (i.e. can one be self-aware, but incapable of self-direction?) I'm inclined to say no, but I can't defend that position. Is self-direction a necessity or logical result of conceptual consciousness?

I'm having a Deja Vu feeling as I type this, as if my question has already been answered in another thread, but I can't find it...