Choosing life

[aequalsa]

This is more of a Meta-ethical question so i apologize if it's in the wrong place. Also if it has been discussed else where.

I have an atheist friend heavily influenced by Dawkins and the new skeptics. In our many discussions, he seems stuck on a point that I can't seem to get around and would like to here any suggestions or even references if it has been discussed before, either here or in literature.

The problem generally rotates around the non-existence of good and evil. That "good" in objectivism is pro-life and evil promotes death. He argues, essentially, that there are no objective grounds for choosing life as the standard of good and to designate life enhancing actions as "good" begs the question.

As some psychological background, he is coming out of a strong religious belief which he rejects deeply and, I think, may be just throwing out the proverbial baby with the bath water. So arguing with him on this point may be too emotionally connected to allow for much progress but, I would like to be "certain" that I have presented the case completely before i shelf the issue.

Note: I retain the right to play a little devils advocate in this thread if I think anyone presents a good track and i know what he will or has said in response. It may help me improve my understanding a bit.

[DavidOdden]

He argues, essentially, that there are no objective grounds for choosing life as the standard of good and to designate life enhancing actions as "good" begs the question.

The problem comes from thinking of "good" as an abstraction, not related to a purpose. The way to avoid question-begging is to start from a simpler and more fundamental fact, so don't start with "good", start with your fundamental choice, your choice to exist. This defines you ultimate goal and therefore makes it even possible to talk about "good" -- now you have a standard for evaluating other actions as "good" or "bad". When you say "That is good", you mean "That action advances my ultimate goal, of existing".

[aequalsa]

The problem comes from thinking of "good" as an abstraction, not related to a purpose. The way to avoid question-begging is to start from a simpler and more fundamental fact, so don't start with "good", start with your fundamental choice, your choice to exist. This defines you ultimate goal and therefore makes it even possible to talk about "good" -- now you have a standard for evaluating other actions as "good" or "bad". When you say "That is good", you mean "That action advances my ultimate goal, of existing".

Thanks David.

I have tried a route similar to that, and we get stuck on the fact that our choices are not a dichotomy. For life or against it. So a person could choose to do something which is 80% for their life and 20% against it. So they can survive, but in a less flourishing way. His major point is that morality is more descriptive in nature. If "I want to live, then " I should "do X." So a person could as easily say, if "I want to kill puppies," then "a nuke is the best way to go." That when morality is descriptive in this way, there is no way to to say that there is any moral difference between going to the movies or killing puppies. The only thing that can be said is that the means of morality achieves the stated goal.

It does not help decide if the ultimate goal is correct.

[kanjmai]

I have tried a route similar to that, and we get stuck on the fact that our choices are not a dichotomy. For life or against it. So a person could choose to do something which is 80% for their life and 20% against it.

I mulled on this for a little bit; I don't know if this is a good response, but this is what I came up with: It is contradictory to value life-negating action if you still choose to live. All action, even life-negating action, is only possible by virtue of the fact that you are alive. To participate in life-negating action is to go against your life; to go against your life is to go against all virtues and values that are made possible by it; life-negating action is such a virtue; therefore, to value life-negating action is to devalue life-negating action. Does that make sense? Essentially, you are destroying the "virtue" of life-negating action merely by practicing it. Logically, it makes no sense to practice any life-negating actions when life remains your fundamental choice.

Therefore, I don't see how a person can remain slightly on the side of death while at the same being slightly on the side of life. It has to be one or the other.

Edited November 15, 2008 by kanjmai

[DavidOdden]

So a person could choose to do something which is 80% for their life and 20% against it.

I don't understand what that would mean. Is this refering to some basically good choice that has some drawback? You can't be 80% alive and 20% dead -- life and death is the ultimate dichotomy. There is always a dichotomy w.r.t. your choice -- either you do X or you don't do X. You should do X is X is better (judged in terms of your ultimate goal) than not doing X. Now of course it's not always instantly obvious which is the better choice, but that doesn't mean we have to be nihilists, we just have to study the situation and look at the facts of cocaine, whether it really does objectively improve your life.

So they can survive, but in a less flourishing way.

I've been thinking about that kind of apparent dilemma, and I'm not sure that there is a real problem. Imagine that you are faced with the choice "Live another 51 years if you eat nothing but raw tofu and boiled spinach, no salt" versus "Live only another 50 years if you live a normal life, eating steakes, drinking whisky and salting your fried foods, in moderation". Well, this is a completely fictional dichtomy, because nobody knows the nature of the human body and the future well enough to conclude that living in food-hell will add a year to your life. So even before we get to the point of asking whether you'd be willing to "sacrifice" a year of existence for a better quality of existence, I even dispute that we have the science to make such a promise. And we must not forget that existence isn't just "pure existence, without identity". As a man, my choice to exist and the fact of being a man implies a number of other things that are proper and necessary to existence qua man, which includes the possibility of gaining values. I don't know for certain how to evaluate the dietary 1-year life extension, but I'm quite certain that given a choice between 51 years of existence being constantly tortured, or 50 years of ordinary existence, I would certainly not choose an extra year of existence. The same goes for 50 years as a free man or 51 years as a slave.

Here's my basic understanding of that choice. My ultimate goal is really another 300 years of blissful goal-seeking productive existence. Fact is, that's not gonna happen (who knows, Pfizer maye come of with great stuff next week that changes that), so I'm looking at choices in terms of what gets me closest to that ultimate goal. Then the question is whether 51 years of torture is closer to that than 50 years of blissful goal-seeking productive existence, just because it lasts longer. It's a mistake to think that "number of seconds of existence" is the unit of measurement for evaluating life.

His major point is that morality is more descriptive in nature. If "I want to live, then " I should "do X."

Maybe. What does "moral" or "morality" mean anyhow? I find it really hard to even talk about what morality is without presuming existence / living. That is, life makes value possible, which makes morality possible. Ask him to simply define the notions of "value", "morality" and "good" without presupposing the choice to exist.

It does not help decide if the ultimate goal is correct.

No, but how could you decide of an ultimate goal is correct. This is the point that Tara Smith makes in Viable Values, that "correct" presupposes a goal, so if you rationalize your ultimate goal by saying "Because X allows me to Z", that means that X isn't really your ultimate goal, Z is.

[aequalsa]

Essentially, you are destroying the "virtue" of life-negating action merely by practicing it.

Christ! I had to read that 3 times to grasp it.

I get what you're saying, but he takes it a step further back. That there is no way to support choosing a long industrious life over a short lazy violent life.

Take the thread about the innate bullies for example. The derive joy from seeing others in pain. If they enjoy sadism, how can it be said to be wrong? At most, he would argue, you can say that they are abnormal. He would even agree that most people prefer to live more or less good lives. It just isn't possible to say that they should. That just happens to be how they feel.

Therefore, I don't see how a person can remain slightly on the side of death while at the same being slightly on the side of life. It has to be one or the other.

His idea is that you could live on welfare, take cocaine moderately on the weekends, donate free time to a soup kitchen and then invent some life saving drug in your bath tub. How is it possible to say that one ought to behave in a life enhancing way when in all probability, acting against your life some times and for it others will not actually cause death or even suffering.(I realize and believe that "true" happiness and joy is improbable when you live a half life, but cannot support that scientifically as quantification of human joy is a little difficult at present.)

[adrock3215]

I think this is basically Robert Nozick's objection to Rand's ethics, and I am not sure entirely how to counter it.

I choose my values in accordance with life promoting action; in other words, I choose my values so that I may live. The entire concept of valuation is impossible without speaking of life. Thus Life is the standard of value, and the standard of good and evil. But I guess Nozick's objection comes down to: What is the reason why I must choose life? Is this choice outside of morality, since life itself is the standard of value? Does this mean that it would be impossible for me to say that choosing life is good? If so, then does it follow that there is no real reason to choose life?

Animals obviously don't encounter this problem, because they don't have free will, and therefore cannot willingly kill themselves. Human beings, on the other hand, do, and many times they choose death, i.e. suicide, over lilfe.

I think this fellow has raised the same sort of question when he states "there are no objective grounds for choosing life as the standard of good" and then says that designating "life enhancing actions as 'good' begs the question. " I don't know how to answer this, but I would like to see thoughts on it.

Edited November 16, 2008 by adrock3215

[aequalsa]

I don't understand what that would mean. Is this refering to some basically good choice that has some drawback? You can't be 80% alive and 20% dead -- life and death is the ultimate dichotomy. There is always a dichotomy w.r.t. your choice -- either you do X or you don't do X.

By 80% I mean to say that you act according to life based principles sometimes. So Hitler ate(life affirming) when hungry and had people murdered(death pursuing) after breakfast.

Here's my basic understanding of that choice. My ultimate goal is really another 300 years of blissful goal-seeking productive existence. Fact is, that's not gonna happen (who knows, Pfizer maye come of with great stuff next week that changes that), so I'm looking at choices in terms of what gets me closest to that ultimate goal.

Why is that ultimate goal "good" outside of the fact that you like life?

He seems to think that Rand, and anyone with an objective sense of ethics is only attempting to justify the way they already feel....which leads quickly to no one's feelings are any better then anyone else's. I think it is derived from an is/ought dichotomy f some sort.

Maybe. What does "moral" or "morality" mean anyhow? I find it really hard to even talk about what morality is without presuming existence / living. That is, life makes value possible, which makes morality possible.

Man, you're telling me?

Ask him to simply define the notions of "value", "morality" and "good" without presupposing the choice to exist.

I have tried to get him to define good. The problem there is that he doesn't really believe it exists. That it is meaningless to say something is good or bad except in that descriptive sense. If you want X then do Y. Values are the same. A value is something you act to gain or keep is something he would accept. That you should act to gain or keep it, he believes is not possible to define except arbitrarily according to you randomly gotten beliefs or "innate moral senses."

No, but how could you decide of an ultimate goal is correct. This is the point that Tara Smith makes in Viable Values, that "correct" presupposes a goal, so if you rationalize your ultimate goal by saying "Because X allows me to Z", that means that X isn't really your ultimate goal, Z is.

This is an interesting track.

So if someone holds something as a high value. Something they would be willing to give their life for. Whether it be fighting against a tyrannical government or securing rights for spotted owls, is it possible to identify one goal as good and the other bad? Or is the very act of valuing it what makes it a value?

I think this is basically Robert Nozick's objection to Rand's ethics, and I am not sure entirely how to counter it.

I choose my values in accordance with life promoting action; in other words, I choose my values so that I may live. The entire concept of valuation is impossible without speaking of life. Thus Life is the standard of value, and the standard of good and evil. But I guess Nozick's objection comes down to: What is the reason why I must choose life? Is this choice outside of morality, since life itself is the standard of value? Does this mean that it would be impossible for me to say that choosing life is good? If so, then does it follow that there is no real reason to choose life?

Yep, that's it exactly. Why should I choose life?

[adrock3215]

Yep, that's it exactly. Why should I choose life?

In a way, this is the central question proposed and answered by all good art. I could definitely make an argument that Hugo was searching for the answer in his work. Evidentally, many canonical writers have also struggled with the answer to this question, off the top of my head Woolf, Faulkner, Whitman, Sartre, Kirkegaard. Isn't it also the Biblical question of Job? I don't think Objectivism proposes an answer. I think Objectivism goes so far as to say: "Given that you do choose life, here is how you must act."

I could be wrong, so I await other replies...

[RationalBiker]

Why is that ultimate goal "good" outside of the fact that you like life?

Correct me if I'm wrong, but Rand doesn't really claim that pursuing life IS the ultimate good. Rand claims that IF you want to pursue life as a man, than there are things which are IN PRINCIPLE good ways to pursue that goal. Objectivism does not command humans to seek to the ultimate 'good' goal of life, it only addresses what to do IF you have chosen that as your ultimate goal.

He can make claims that he can half-heartedly pursue life and still remain in existence, but then by Objectivism's standards he would not be seeking to live life qua man. Also, reality has a way of sneaking up on people who do not pursue life whole-heartedly. For example, his planned intent to simply do cocaine in moderation on weekends can likely end in him doing cocaine every freaking chance he can get.

I'm not sure if this helps you with the argument or not.

[adrock3215]

Oh, By the way, there is the emotion filled reponse to the question Why choose life? that goes something like "Because it is wonderful. Look around at the beauty and all the knowledge available. Think of the feeling you get when you finally solve a difficult math problem, when you achieve something of value, when you listen to Bach, when you watch the sunrise over the ocean, when you make a birdie on a hole in golf, etc." It's as if the answer comes down to a sort of personal emotion that cannot be objectively validated. There is the Rand quote "life is an end in itself", which is obviously true. But this seems to mean that there is no objective reason why one should choose to live, and consequently choose to value, at all. After all, we do, as humans, seem to have that choice...? It's not biologically determined...?

Edited November 16, 2008 by adrock3215

[~Sophia~]

Why is that ultimate goal "good" outside of the fact that you like life?

This analysis was in the past helpful to me.

[RationalBiker]

By 80% I mean to say that you act according to life based principles sometimes. So Hitler ate(life affirming) when hungry and had people murdered(death pursuing) after breakfast.

I've been thinking about this example and I think it illustrates the flawed premises under which Hitler operated (and perhaps your opponent). I'm speculating that if you could ask Hitler today if exterminating Jews was an action he chose to pursue death he would disagree. In Hitler's mind he was pursuing life, the 'good' German life. History demonstrates that he was wrong though.

I don't think someone consciously pursues 80% life and 20% death. I think they are pursuing 100% life with 20% worth of flawed premises which may or may not bite them in the keister at some point.

I've seen people pursue death. Most of them that are seriously committed to achieving that goal are capable of doing so. However, even people who are 100% committed to pursuing death fail sometimes, at least in the short term. And I would assert that short terms goals are as important to death pursuers as long term goals are to those who pursue life. A guy puts a gun to his head and pulls the trigger. He suffers brain damage and loses half his jaw but lives. Now the quality of life that he may have to live with is diminished much more than it was before. I've seen it said on here before that if your goal is death, doing something like putting a bullet through your head could be a "good" thing, agreeing somewhat with your opponent's argument that "good" is measured in terms of the goal. Perhaps your opponent doesn't understand that while the goal may be subjectively derived (80% life 20% death), the means to achieve that goal can be wholly objective.

In a world rife with risk, I take Objectivism to offer the best systematic opportunity, not guarantee, for the 100% life pursers to achieve their goal.

Personally, I don't know that I can answer the question "Why choose life" for everyone else. I know I can answer the question for myself though. And I think that if one has decided to choose life, they should choose Objectivism as the guide.

[DavidOdden]

Why should I choose life?

The concept "should" implies a goal. In order for me to tell you why you should choose life, I have to know what your goal is. That way, I can relate the particular choice to that goal. Suppose you ask "Should I chop down that apple tree?". If you have in mind getting wealthy by selling the fruits from the tree, I'd say that you should not chop down that apple tree. If your goal is to clear the lot and build a store, I'd say that you should chop down that apple tree. The idea that there can be a "should" without a goal makes no sense.

If you believe in god, then "good" is an arbitrary given -- whatever god demands, that is what "good" is. This is comforting, since now you can answer all of those questions about value, "should" and morality, because they all reduce to "the will of god". And of course one cannot question god. I'd like to know why god's commandments are good, but the answer is simply "because he's god, dummy!".

All deontic concepts logically depend on an "ultimate purpose". It is logically incoherent to demand that this purpose then be selected by reference to some deontic concept.

[adrock3215]

The concept "should" implies a goal. In order for me to tell you why you should choose life, I have to know what your goal is.

But aren't goals measured in terms of advancing one's life? If so, then it follows that you cannot choose life in order to achieve some goal, but you must choose goals in order to achieve life.

All deontic concepts logically depend on an "ultimate purpose". It is logically incoherent to demand that this purpose then be selected by reference to some deontic concept.

Right....so, given this logical incoherence, how is such an ultimate purpose selected? is the question.

[RationalBiker]

But aren't goals measured in terms of advancing one's life?

Only if life is your ultimate goal.

[adrock3215]

A conceivable answer to the question could be something like the following: A human, in fact, has no choice about what is his standard of value. The standard of value is man's life, which is given to him by his nature as a human being. He could reject that naturally given standard and choose to die, but doing so would not change the fact that his standard of value is objectively his own life. The choice to value death does not negate life as the standard of value, rather it affirms it. Since life is the factually given standard of valuation, and since to value anything, even death, must be to value it for some ultimate end, it must be the case that in so much as one does value death, one is valuing life, because life is the only ultimate end.

Edited November 16, 2008 by adrock3215

[Grames]

This analysis was in the past helpful to me.

"Axiomatic value". I like that. Every argument about values proceeds on the premise that one must be alive in order to act, even the argument that there are no values and every act is valid. I wonder if anyone here has a further comment on the linked essay?

[adrock3215]

"Axiomatic value".

I think this choice of term is ambiguous and muddies the definition of value, since value presupposes the questions To Whom? and For What?. I could see calling life the axiomatic standard of value or, the axiomatic end; that is to say, the final and ultimate end to which all other ends aim. Perhaps these terms are more clear?

Edited November 16, 2008 by adrock3215

[DavidOdden]

But aren't goals measured in terms of advancing one's life? If so, then it follows that you cannot choose life in order to achieve some goal, but you must choose goals in order to achieve life.

And this is why it makes no sense to try to construct an argument that one should live because it is "good for you" or "the moral thing to do".

[Grames]

I think this choice of term is ambiguous and muddies the definition of value, since value presupposes the questions To Whom? and For What?. I could see calling life the axiomatic standard of value or, the axiomatic end; that is to say, the final and ultimate end to which all other ends aim. Perhaps these terms are more clear?

I think this is the way to phrase it, so that it parallels the other axioms:

It is axiomatic that life is the standard of value.

[adrock3215]

And this is why it makes no sense to try to construct an argument that one should live because it is "good for you" or "the moral thing to do".

Right, so now we're back at the original question proposed in this thread. All you've effectively done is circle around the issue, but the issue is what we are trying to find an answer to. A restatement of the quandry may be appropriate: The fact is that we have a choice to live or die, but since to make choices we must refer to a standard of good and evil, which is life itself, we have no way to objectively validate the choice to live without becoming engaged in a circular argument.

It appears that the best way to answer this is to reject the entire quandry by saying that the choice to die is really an affirmation of life as the standard of value, anyway.

[DavidOdden]

All you've effectively done is circle around the issue, but the issue is what we are trying to find an answer to.

I guess you still don't get it. As I have pointed out from the beginning, there is an invalid presupposition in the question. There is no quandry, and the matter is extremely simple. Rand was very clear on this point in Galt's speech. The question has to be rejected, not answered.

[adrock3215]

Rand was very clear on this point in Galt's speech.

What part of the speech are you referring to?

[DavidOdden]

What part of the speech are you referring to?

P. 933 onwards. I find that her method of presentation is particularly revealing of her philosophy. She starts with the most basic and axiomatic facts -- starting with the fact that existence exists, adding the fact of grasping that statement which implies that a being with perceptual consciousness exists. See especially p. 936: "My morality, the morality of reason, is contained in a single axiom: existence exists—and in a single choice: to live. The rest proceeds from these." The choice to live is not derived from something else.