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semm

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Individuals have rights. The mother has rights. The fetus is part of the mother, so it doesn't have individual rights.

Saying that the fetus has rights that the mother has to follow against her will is a contradiction.

Bob Jones and Semms' argument is that you have individual rights, just as long as your a fetus, then you lose them.

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A fetus could be destroyed by the human it is a part of too. As Betsy stated, there many times when one does not choose to become pregnant. If you don’t choose to sign the contract, the contract is not valid. What if you did chose to have a child (choose to sign the contract) and at some point you realize that the other half of the contract was not going held up? Maybe the child will be born with some disease, mental or physical, or maybe you find out that the pregnancy will be a threat to your life, or maybe something happened in your life, loss of income, loss of significant other, etc. My point here is if you choose to sign a contract you can choose the circumstances of that contract before you sign it.

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QUOTE (m0zart @ Jan 5 2004, 05:43 AM)

The newly conceived is a human being, a member of the species homo sapiens sapiens, from the moment of conception, from a scientific standpoint.  There is hardly a textbook in the field of human embryology which doesn't make that immediate classification.

That's only half right. A fetus is definitely human, but it is not yet a being. It cannot exist -- i.e., it cannot be -- apart from the mother. It is as biologically dependent on her as is her elbow is.

The fetus is human at conception, an elbow is only a part of a human, and could be destroyed by the human it is a part of. 
Until it is born, a fetus is only part of the mother. It can likewise be destroyed by the human it is part of. Once the baby is born, however, it is not dependent on the mother and other people can care for it.

as I stated previously, I have seen no compelling reason why physical independence is required for something to have rights. 

So why don't elbows have rights?

Deciding to become "unpregnant" is like deciding to "unsign" a contract.  It is violating the rights of the fetus, which has rights by virtue of being human, irrespective of independence.

So you have asserted, but not yet proved.

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The main point is that the contract is valid contingent upon the fetus not holding the status which we confer rights on.

My point about being able to become pregnant or unpregnant dependant on whether it assaults another's rights depends on:

A the fetus having rights or not

B any outside party's rights being violated, ie in which some "contract" or other agreement which would apply to the nature of one's relationship, whether there was some consent that if conception occurred the pregnancy would be terminated etc., most of this has to deal with property rights though, such as a sperm donor not having rights to the unknown child or whether a surrogate mother can choose to break an agreement, keep a child, etc.

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as I stated previously, I have seen no compelling reason why physical independence is required for something to have rights. 
So why don't elbows have rights?

I apologize for not being clear.

I think that anything human has rights. As I stated before, a fetus is allways human. An elbow, on the other hand, is not human. It is merly a portion of a human. Also, being attached to something is not the same as being part of it. A fetus, unlike a heart or liver, performs no useful fuction for the mother, and does not interact with the mothers body other than to gain food and remove waste. A fetus is its own entity (by virtue of being human) that is living within the mother, not part of the mother (like the mother's heart and liver).

I agree that all your arguments would be valid if the fetus had no rights.

I repeat my earlier logic behind my belief that a fetus must have rights

It seems to be a contradiction that some level of independence (the baby being born) is required before a woman is responsible for her baby, yet it is when full independence is achieved (the baby becoming mature enough to care for himself) that the woman's responsibility ends.

I would argue that the mother's responsibility is inversely proportional to the level of the new humans independence. (a mother has the most responsibility immediately after conception, which decreases until the human can care for himself)

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I think that anything human has rights.  As I stated before, a fetus is allways human.  An elbow, on the other hand, is not human.  It is merly a portion of a human.  Also, being attached to something is not the same as being part of it.  A fetus, unlike a heart or liver, performs no useful fuction for the mother, and does not interact with the mothers body other than to gain food and remove waste.  A fetus is its own entity (by virtue of being human) that is living within the mother, not part of the mother (like the mother's heart and liver).

Bob, rights arise from the fact that human beings can gain values from each other through proper interaction. Rights define the boundaries of proper interaction (proper interaction is limited to conceptual interaction).

You expalin how a being which is attached to and inside of another person is capable of interaction, and then you explain how you will prevent abortions without violating the rights of the mother, and then perhaps Objectivists will listen to what you have to say.

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Bob, rights arise from the fact that human beings can gain values from each other through proper interaction.  Rights define the boundaries of proper interaction (proper interaction is limited to conceptual interaction). 

You expalin how a being which is attached to and inside of another person is capable of interaction, and then you explain how you will prevent abortions without violating the rights of the mother, and then perhaps Objectivists will listen to what you have to say.

Hmm...if "proper interaction" is limited to conceptual interaction, as you say, then because, e.g., a newborn infant is incapable of such conceptual interaction with others, it has no rights.

If so, I think you need a better argument. This dog won't hunt.

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Hmm...if "proper interaction" is limited to conceptual interaction, as you say, then because, e.g., a newborn infant is incapable of such conceptual interaction with others, it has no rights.

We have all our rights at birth given our nature as conceptual beings interacting with other conceptual beings, but our exercise of those rights is limited in inverse proportion to our conceptual development.

The full exercise of our rights depends on the full development of our conceptual faculty, which is why, for instance, we do not recognize the right of a child to enter into a contract until he is eighteen years of age. Full conceptual interaction develops over time and so its restricted until that time.

Now, your objection seems to be that an infant has no conceptual ability and would therefore have no rights. That's dropping context. The fact is, he has no ability to exercise his rights, because he has no conceptual development, but he most certainly has those rights - he's a conceptual entity by nature and is interacting with other conceptual individuals. But the execution of those rights is entrusted to his parents until he can exercise them.

At birth, a baby's parents have full exercise over his rights. Does that mean they can dispose of him as they wish? Of course not. They are guardians of his rights - they are not him.

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I apologize for not being clear.

I think that anything human has rights.  As I stated before, a fetus is allways human.

You are still merely asserting and not proving your contention.

Ayn Rand demonstrated what facts of reality give rise to individual rights and the reasons why rights should be recognized. None of those facts or reasons apply to a fetus. As a result, Ayn Rand staunchly supported a woman's right to an abortion.

If you base your advocacy of rights on something other than the facts and reasons presented by Ayn Rand, what are they?

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If you're going to argue that the infant is a conceptual entity by nature than could you not just as well argue the fetus is conceptual by nature, in both cases you're saying there is a potentiality for conceptual activity but that it hasn't been arrived at yet.

If it wouldn't trouble you too much, read what I wrote: rights arise from conceptual interaction. A man alone on an island has no rights, even though he is conceptual. A fetus is inside of and attached to a human being - it cannot act, interact, or do anything else relevant to the issue of rights. Rights arise in reference to the survival needs of individuals in a social context. How in God's name that's supposed to apply to a fetus I can't imagine.

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rights arise from conceptual interaction.  A man alone on an island has no rights, even though he is conceptual.  A fetus is inside of and attached to a human being - it cannot act, interact, or do anything else relevant to the issue of rights.  Rights arise in reference to the survival needs of individuals in a social context. 

If rights arise from conceptual interaction, than any time someone is not interacting with others, he would have no rights :blink: Also, babies do not interact conceptually for quite a while after birth. If what you are saying is right, then babies after birth would also have no rights for several years.

A fetus in the days immediately preceeding birth is as much a conceptual entity as a baby in the days immediately after birth. The difference is one is physically independent, the other is not.

We have all our rights at birth given our nature as conceptual beings interacting with other conceptual beings, but our exercise of those rights is limited in inverse proportion to our conceptual development

babies are not conceptually interacting with other conceptual beings

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Bob Jones writes:

If rights arise from conceptual interaction, than any time someone is not interacting with others, he would have no rights :blink:
I can only hope you're joking. The question of rights obviously wouldn't arise when one is not interacting with others. But that's beside the point, since I said rights arise because we interact with other conceptual creatures. That's why we have them. But we no less have rights when we are not with other than we do not have a consciousness when we are sleeping.

Also, babies do not interact conceptually for quite a while after birth.  If what you are saying is right, then babies after birth would also have no rights for several years.

No, once you have a conceptual entity interacting with other conceptual entities, that entity has rights. A child is a conceptual entity, even if his faculty of conceptualization is not developed - but, by the same token, he is unable to exercise his rights (fully) to that degree. His parents are therefore the guardians of his rights. Even if you argue that a fetus is a conceptual entity, you still have two problems: (a) it's not an entity, and (B) by virtue of being attached to and inside of individual, it is outside a social context, i.e., a context of conceptual interaction.

A fetus in the days immediately preceeding birth is as much a conceptual entity as a baby in the days immediately after birth.  The difference is one is physically independent, the other is not.

Well that's one hell of a difference, is it not? After all, if human beings were physical dependents, how could we defend individualism? What about egoism? Man is a certain kind of entity - a conceptual individual. He is not a biological dependency living within the body of another.

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Man is a certain kind of entity - a conceptual individual. He is not a biological dependency living within the body of another.

These two sentences tell you evertyhing necessary to know that neither a fetus nor animal has rights.

If an entity has no means of even knowing rights exist, it has none.

If Entity-A's entire existence is facilitated by Entity-B, Entity-A has no rights of it's own - only the rights granted to it by Entity-B.

I don't know why this is so hard to understand. It's pretty clear.

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I don't know why this is so hard to understand. It's pretty clear.

It's even more clear if you look at what each policy means in practice. In practice, the supposed rights of the fetus mean the destruction of women. It means, government control of each woman's body, for the purpose of turning her into a breading machine. She's no longer a woman, but an incubator.

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Hmm...if "proper interaction" is limited to conceptual interaction, as you say, then because, e.g., a newborn infant is incapable of such conceptual interaction with others, it has no rights.

If so, I think you need a better argument. This dog won't hunt.

Granted that Don's words could have been more precise, but I do not think it takes much of a struggle to discern his meaning. I think he is saying (properly) that rights arise in the context of human interactions, and those interactions are those which are appropriate to man functioning as man. As Peikoff writes in OPAR (pp. 351-352):

"If a man lived on a desert island, there would be no question of defining his proper relationship to others. Even if men interacted on some island but did so at random, without establishing a social system, the issue of rights would be premature. There would not yet be any context for the concept or, therefore, any means of implementing it; there would be no agency to interpret, apply, enforce it. When men do decide to form (or reform) an organized society, however, when they decide to pursue systematically the advantages of living together, then they need the guidance of principle. That is then context in which the principle of rights arises."

I think this is the sense that Don meant "conceptual interaction." (Don can correct me if I am wrong.) Clearly, a fetus is not "interacting" in any sense of the word applicable to man, whether in a broad social context or otherwise. A fetus is simply a part of a woman's body and it does not interact in any social context with man until it is born. As Ayn Rand said [The Objectivist, "Of Living Death," Oct. 1968, published December 1968]:

"An embryo has no rights. Rights do not pertain to a potential, only to an actual being. A child cannot acquire any rights until it is born. The living take precedence over the not-yet-living (or the unborn)."

You do not have to like it, but that is Objectivism.

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I can only hope you're joking.

Unfortunately, I do not think so. Bob has consistently misconstrued the principles which Objectivists have communicated, and then misapplies such principles to irrelevant concretes. Giving no serious consideration to Objectivist ideas, he then simply reasserts his own beliefs, absent of any rational evidence in support.

This is religion, not philosophy. You cannot argue against faith.

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As Ayn Rand said [The Objectivist, "Of Living Death," Oct. 1968, published December 1968]:

"An embryo has no rights. Rights do not pertain to a potential, only to an actual being. A child cannot acquire any rights until it is born. The living take precedence over the not-yet-living (or the unborn)."

You do not have to like it, but that is Objectivism.

Stephen Speicher writes:

Granted that Don's words could have been more precise, but I do not think it takes much of a struggle to discern his meaning. I think he is saying (properly) that rights arise in the context of human interactions, and those interactions are those which are appropriate to man functioning as man.
Yes. Exactly.

I think this is the sense that Don meant "conceptual interaction." (Don can correct me if I am wrong.)

I was trying to stress three things in using the phrase "conceptual interaction":

(1) That rights arise in a social context

(2) That they arise to protect the peaceful dealings among men, which are made possible by reason, i.e., conceptualization

(3) That rights apply only to man, because only he is a conceptual being

Which is just another way of saying, yes, you got it exactly right, Stephen.

Clearly, a fetus is not "interacting" in any sense of the word applicable to man, whether in a broad social context or otherwise. A fetus is simply a part of a woman's body and it does not interact in any social context with man until it is born.

What more can one say? Incidentally, my mother just informed me the FDA approved the morning after pill and the Bush administration blocked it. I was speechless. That man is truly vicious.

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We have all our rights at birth given our nature as conceptual beings interacting with other conceptual beings, but our exercise of those rights is limited in inverse proportion to our conceptual development.
Well, okay. We have rights at birth because of our nature as conceptual beings. I'm good with that, but it begs the question of whether we also have rights in the minutes, days, weeks, or even months prior to birth, at least during the period that the fetus is viable (i.e. can live outside the womb).

The full exercise of our rights depends on the full development of our conceptual faculty, which is why, for instance, we do not recognize the right of a child to enter into a contract until he is eighteen years of age. Full conceptual interaction develops over time and so its restricted until that time.

I agree. But having rights, and the extent to which he can exercise these rights, are two separate issues. I'm focused on when a person first has rights, and why.

Now, your objection seems to be that an infant has no conceptual ability and would therefore have no rights. That's dropping context. The fact is, he has no ability to exercise his rights, because he has no conceptual development, but he most certainly has those rights - he's a conceptual entity by nature and is interacting with other conceptual individuals. But the execution of those rights is entrusted to his parents until he can exercise them.
I think we both agree that he has rights at birth. Now, what about, say, a week prior to birth? two weeks? a month? His conceptual nature doesn't change in this period, only his physical location does. By what objective criteria do we draw the line and say that after this point in his development, and no sooner, he has rights?

At birth, a baby's parents have full exercise over his rights. Does that mean they can dispose of him as they wish? Of course not. They are guardians of his rights - they are not him.

Right. Certainly by the time of birth. Which again begs the question of whether birth is the line that we draw, and if so why. I think the answer needs to be something better than that he has a conceptual nature.

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If you're going to argue that the infant is a conceptual entity by nature than could you not just as well argue the fetus is conceptual by nature, in both cases you're saying there is a potentiality for conceptual activity but that it hasn't been arrived at yet.

Exactly.

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Incidentally, my mother just informed me the FDA approved the morning after pill and the Bush administration blocked it.  I was speechless.  That man is truly vicious.

Yes. God forbid that a woman should benefit from science!

If men got pregnant, the pill would have been the second thing invented, right after pizza.

It's that ol' time religion.

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A fetus is inside of and attached to a human being - it cannot act, interact, or do anything else relevant to the issue of rights. 

Well, at the risk of asking what may be a really dense question, isn't the fetus here literally interacting with its mother?

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Exactly.

"Exactly" what? Is there an Objectivism-related argument which goes with that one-word proclamation?

Don did not argue the point which you quote, so why should that statement be relevant to the issue? Surely you must know that the Objectivist position is not the potential for being, but the actual being. Why acknowledge a straw man? Is the real issue that you object to abortion per se?

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"An embryo has no rights. Rights do not pertain to a potential, only to an actual being. A child cannot acquire any rights until it is born. The living take precedence over the not-yet-living (or the unborn)."

I understand the part about embryos having no rights, and I understand Peikoff's argument that a potential is not an actual. The devil, however, is in the details of determining when the potential becomes an actual, either generally or more specifically for purposes of ascertaining when an actual first has rights. As for drawing this line at birth, well, Ayn Rand did say it so I guess that's that, right?

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