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semm

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Can we know when a fetus becomes a person

I don't believe that's relevant. What's relevant is when it has rights. In my view it's when it is an independent being, no longer dependent on the mother's body for its survival and no longer residing in the mother's body. At birth, while it is still dependent, it is no longer dependent specifically on the mother - in that sense it is a separate independent entity - and most importantly in my view, it no longer resides in the woman's body.

At that point, as an (infant) human being, it is a person and has rights.

Even if you concocted some notion of "person" for which a fetus qualified, it would still be the case that it is dependent on the mother and resides in her body - and therefore bestowing any rights on it would require a denial of the rights of the mother upon whom it depends for its existence.

Fred Weiss

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Can we know when a fetus becomes a person (I am taking for granted that the fetus does in fact become a person, or rather, that a person must come into being, because there do not exist invisible people that jump into fertilized eggs, viable fetuses, or newborns)? I say maybe. We might already know, and someone can prove that a fetus becomes a person at such and such time. We may not know now, but later technology will enlighten us. Perhaps the answer is beyond human comprehension. Would this inability to comprehend violate Objectivist epistemology? (That's not a rhetorical question - I would appreciate an answer)

You are correct to raise the question of the relationship between this issue and the Objectivist epistemology, not because the abortion issue points to a flaw in the Objectivist epistemology, but because the Objectivist epistemology is what will enable you to grasp why abortion is properly a right.

Concepts are not written in reality. We do not stare at things until it is revealed to us what they are. Rather, concepts are concretes viewed from a human perspective. We group together similar concretes, i.e., concretes that have common characteristics with differing particular measurments.

To determine whether two things are similar, we need to be able to answer the question: as against what? Things are only similar relative other commensurable existents. Two chairs are only similar compared to a table. In isolation, two chairs are merely different.

In order to group things together, their similarities must be essential. A red chair and a red pepper are essentially different: the facts that are true of chairs are (in the overwhelming majority of cases) not true of peppers even if both are red.

The question then becomes: is a fetus essentially the same as a man or is it essentially different? Consider: it is biologically dependent on another entity for its survival; it is located inside the body of another person; it is without any signficant sensory input and therefore has only a negligable level of consciousness; etc.

Compare that as against man and the differences between man and the fetus, not their similarities, are most striking (and of most consequence). An embryo and a fetus are most similar to an unborn monkey, and even an acorn. They are existents developing into certain kinds of entities. But once they are born, once they are individuals acting and interacting in the world, their consciousness booming with sensory stimulation, they are more similar to man than different and thus have rights.

To put it another way: Before it is born, a baby is developing into a human being. Once it is born, it is developing into an adult. Rights apply in the second case, not the first.

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I agree with Fred Weiss above; I think the crux of the issue is *separateness*.

If a fetus developed, hovering at arm's length from the mother, 3 feet above the ground, then perhaps viability or the onset of conceptual capability would be an issue. But it doesn't. A fetus resides within its mother and any granting of rights to a being which occupies the same space as another necessarily implies contradictions.

The right to abort (and the flip side of the same coin, the right to forego abortion -- relevant to woman in China) is essentially the right of a woman to control her own body. The question of whether the fetus could be kept alive *outside of her body* is irrelevant, until and unless the fetus *is* outside. It's not a scientific debate either, involving quesitons of viability or DNA, etc. The morality of abortion hasn't changed through the ages as technology has allowed for survival of premature babies, or as DNA was discovered. The moral principle rests on such a low-tech issue as: the baby resides in the same space as the mother, and no action can be directed to the fetus without *going through* (literally) the mother.

The first manifestation of the right to one's life must necessarily be the sovereignty of one's own body, including any contents thereof.

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I don't believe that's relevant. What's relevant is when it has rights. In my view it's when it is an independent being, no longer dependent on the mother's body for its survival and no longer residing in the mother's body. At birth, while it is still dependent, it is no longer dependent specifically on the mother - in that sense it is a separate independent entity - and most importantly in my view, it no longer resides in the woman's body.

I stated that by person, I meant that which has rights.

You said "In my view" twice. I'm not willing accept that only a physically independent being just because it is your opinion. My main problem with your assertion is that I don't see how being a person with rights requires physical independence.

Why is there necessarily a contradiction in ascribing rights to a thing located inside the mother's body? It is because of her, whether or not it was her intent, that the ball has started rolling. It has already been established that the parents are responsible for their children because they brought them into the world helpless. A parent is morally obligated to take care of her child whether she wants to or not. Why is this situation not a contradiction, while the former is? Why is a mother not morally obligated to carry the fetus to term? Why does the fetus suddenly become the mother's responsibility once it comes out of her?

Even if you concocted some notion of "person" for which a fetus qualified, it would still be the case that it is dependent on the mother and resides in her body - and therefore bestowing any rights on it would require a denial of the rights of the mother upon whom it depends for its existence.
First of all, I don't plan on "concocting" anything. My intention is to seek the truth. If I concocted a definition of person, it philosophically is meaningless, especially to the Objectivist. My second problem with this statement is that it conceives a situation in which the fetus is a "person" that does not have rights. Further, it gives me no reason why the fetus' should be denied rights and the mother shouldn't be. Why not say that the mother gives up some of her rights in the act of becoming pregnant? In other words, you are pointing to a contradiction that depends on another contradiction - a person without rights.

The question then becomes: is a fetus essentially the same as a man or is it essentially different? Consider: it is biologically dependent on another entity for its survival; it is located inside the body of another person; it is without any signficant sensory input and therefore has only a negligable level of consciousness; etc.

Your question is exactly what I'm asking - except I believe that the definition of man is independent of what we think of it, otherwise man would be able to choose who and what gets rights. Your definition of man includes physical and biological independence, significant sensory input, etc. I would agree with you in a heartbeat if you tell me why these are the essential characteristics of man. An equally valid set of characteristics of man might be ten fingers and toes, head, 4 limbs, eyeballs, conceived of sperm and egg from other man (and woman), etc. Why is your set the correct one?

I see the biological dependence of the fetus on the mother simply as a very high degree of dependence, more than the dependence of a baby on his mother's breast milk, more than the dependence of a teenager on his parents' money, and so on. There may well be a fundamental difference implicit in biological dependence that destroys the humanity of the fetus. What is it? Who are you to say that biological independence is an essential characteristic of man?

There seem to be two separate arguments for the right to abortion here: The spatial arrangement of the mother/fetus and the big difference between man and fetus. Neither of these are sufficiently supported to prove that the fetus does not have the rights of and is not a person.

Ed

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b7b5 says:

"Why is there necessarily a contradiction in ascribing rights to a thing located inside the mother's body?"

I think a lot of the disagreement here stems from an inversion of logical heirarchy. b7b5 seems to be saying "rights exist and they are valid... now who or what should we apply them to?"

Instead, we should start with the life of an actual person -- a woman, let's say -- and realize that "rights" are a concept we use to protect the ultimate value of life. ...Actual people's lives, like that woman over there, for example. Now that woman owns her own life and body, and it follows logically that if she produces a fetus, then that fetus, insofar as it resides in her body and cannot be removed (or otherwise controlled) but by violating her right to life, belongs to her.

She is in the position of Bill Cosby when he said "I brought you into this world, and I can take you out!" That fetus, as a part of her body, can claim no rights of its own, because to do so would be an attack on her sovereign space. In simplest terms, the mother's right to life takes precedent because *she was there first*.

She may grant rights to her fetus by bearing it, and thus removing it from the automatic support of her own body, and by implication accepting the reponsibility to raise it now that it's survival is not automatic. That is her choice.

"Chewing" this issue a little by answering some of b7b5's questions/comments:

b7b5: "It is because of her, whether or not it was her intent, that the ball has started rolling."

So? This is begging the question. One "starts the ball rolling" when one eats tainted meat, too, so is one morally obligated to refrain from vomiting?

b7b5: "Why is a mother not morally obligated to carry the fetus to term?"

For the same reason she's not obligated to carry a cancer to term.

b7b5: "Why does the fetus suddenly become the mother's responsibility once it comes out of her?"

The "fetus", as such, is always her responsibility, just as the contents of one's stomach, for example, are one's responsibility. By giving birth to it though, she changes the nature of the responsibility to an specific obligation of treating it as a human.

b7b5: "Why not say that the mother gives up some of her rights in the act of becoming pregnant?"

For the same reason a person doesn't give up rights by having teeth. To deny rights on the basis of a person manifesting their own capacities -- i.e., to say a human may forfeit their rights by virtue of being a human, by having teeth, or getting pregnant, etc. -- is to undercut rights, and the *reason for rights* at their base.

b7b5: "There may well be a fundamental difference implicit in biological dependence that destroys the humanity of the fetus. What is it?"

Separateness. The fact that a mother's life is a fact, and she does not forfeit that life by virtue of choosing to partially incubate a parasite within her own body. (btw, this question is made somewhat circular by phrasing it "what..destroys the *humanity* of the fetus...", with the implication being that it somehow already is a rights-possessing organism, and what does it *do* to contradict that? In fact, only the mother can grant the fetus "humanity" in this sense, by allowing it to enter the world as a separate entity).

b7b5: "Who are you to say that biological independence [i.e., separateness] is an essential characteristic of man?"

Separateness, i.e. individuality, i.e. *identity*, is an essential characteristic of *anything*. It is especially so if the question is: should a *part* of a person's body possess the right to dispose of the person?

b7b5: "There seem to be two separate arguments for the right to abortion here: The spatial arrangement of the mother/fetus and the big difference between man and fetus."

The two issues are one. The fact that a fetus occupies the space of another human, *is* the big difference between man and fetus (in the context of which posseses rigths).

b7b5: "...Neither of these are sufficiently supported to prove that the fetus does not have the rights of and is not a person."

The connectedness of a fetus is not sufficiently supported?

I challenge you to touch a fetus, without touching the mother. After you have done this, you may then be able to explain to me how granting "rigths" to one does not nullify the "rights" of the other.

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Your question is exactly what I'm asking - except I believe that the definition of man is independent of what we think of it, otherwise man would be able to choose who and what gets rights. 

First of all, please attribute your quotes. The first two were from Fred Weiss, the last one, me. While Fred and I generally agree with each other, and certainly do on this issue, I am sure that Fred doesn't want to be responsible for what I say.

To your main point: a definition can never be literally independent of what we think of it. Definitions do not determine what an entity is: what an entity is helps determine how we define it. I say "helps" because definitions are contextual - they perform the function of enabling us to retain a concept by identifying what distinguishes the concept's units (the differentia), and what we are distinguishing those units from (the genus). Those facts are dependent on our context of knowledge and thus subject to change.

For example, a child's (implicit) definition of "man" could be "walks on two legs and has no fur" or whatever. In the child's context, this definition is appropriate, but as his knowledge grows, it no longer works to distinguish man from all other existents. The child's definition, therefore, must grow as well, until he reaches the adult stage, where "rational animal" serves (for now) as the proper definition of "man."

The point of all this is, your entire approach to this issue is epistemologically invalid. A definition will not tell us which entities have rights and which do not. A definition is really just a pointer - it points us to the things in reality which share certain similarities with each other. So the question is not, "What does reality force us to define as a man?" The question is, as I've explained before, is a fetus essentially the same as a man, or essentially different, in the context of the facts that give rise to man having rights? To answer that question, you can't look at words: you have to look at reality.

Your definition of man includes physical and biological independence, significant sensory input, etc. I would agree with you in a heartbeat if you tell me why these are the essential characteristics of man. An equally valid set of characteristics of man might be ten fingers and toes, head, 4 limbs, eyeballs, conceived of sperm and egg from other man (and woman), etc. Why is your set the correct one?
This is exactly what I'm talking about. My definition of man does not include those things. My definition includes only: rationality and animality. But a concept is not interchangable with its definition. A concept means its referents, including all their characteristics, known and unknown. And more than that, all those characteristics make man what he is: metaphysically, all his characteristics are essential. Biologically, some of his characteristics he can live without (he can lose a leg, lose his hair, etc.). Epistemologically, his essential characteristics are those that explain the greatest number of the characteristics distinguishing him from other animals. In this case, that's rationality.

But none of that matters in this context. Are you starting to see why? Are you starting to see what the correct approach is?

I see the biological dependence of the fetus on the mother simply as a very high degree of dependence, more than the dependence of a baby on his mother's breast milk, more than the dependence of a teenager on his parents' money, and so on. There may well be a fundamental difference implicit in biological dependence that destroys the humanity of the fetus. What is it? Who are you to say that biological independence is an essential characteristic of man?

Who am I to say? That's an invalid question, a point I'll be happy to explain at length if you're interested. That aside, you say you see the biological dependence of the fetus on the mother simply as a very high degree of the dependence seen throughout childhood, but that's not true. You don't see that because it isn't so. You see exactly what I see: a woman with a big belly, and then, a living human being. If you're trying to tell me that the difference between being inside another human being and being breast fed is a difference of degree I just flatly deny it.

There seem to be two separate arguments for the right to abortion here: The spatial arrangement of the mother/fetus and the big difference between man and fetus. Neither of these are sufficiently supported to prove that the fetus does not have the rights of and is not a person.

That's cute: "spatial arrangement." As if being next to the mother vs. inside and attached to her were merely a circumstancial difference of location.

(For Objectivists following this post: anyone notice the similarity between the case against abortion and the case for anarchy?)

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Ok. Points taken. I'll think about all this. At the moment I disagree, because it sounds like you're saying that it is our definition of man that matters, and that this definition is subject to change. Does this mean that abortion is ok now but may not be later if our definition changes?

If that's the case, it might take me a bit longer to agree. We'll just disagree for now and I'll drop it. This argument is exhausting and I've said all I needed to say.

ed

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Ok. Points taken. I'll think about all this. At the moment I disagree, because it sounds like you're saying that it is our definition of man that matters, and that this definition is subject to change.

No, points not taken. In fact, you missed my point entirely. My entire reason for explaining the nature and function of definitions was to make it clear to you why one can't answer this question by looking at definitions: you have to look at reality.

Does this mean that abortion is ok now but may not be later if our definition changes?

Did you actually read what I wrote? A definition can change when our context of knowledge expands, but the expansion of our context of knowledge doesn't alter the facts in any way.

A fetus isn't a rights-bearing entity because he is not a man. He is not a man because he necessarily lacks the essential characteristics that differentiate man from other entities and give rise to him having rights.

A fetus is a potential human being living inside of and attached to the body of the mother. Man is an individual entity acting and interacting in the world. Those are fundamental differences. That's why, if you try to ascribe rights to a fetus, you end up violating the rights of the mother.

And you can't do that.

Not rightfully.

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Fine. I missed your point.

I still disagree with you on what are the essential characteristics of man.

Question: Are the essential characteristics of man facts (not definitions)? Facts that can never change?

To save time: If you say that they are facts, I'm going to claim that we can't know them. I think that the essential characteristics of man are factual and cannot change, but that we cannot know what these characteristics are with 100% certainty. Would I be right to say that definitions are human constructs, approaching the level of "fact" as our knowledge increases?

Finally, I'm arguing a point, not getting on your case in any way. Why are you taking an insulting tone in your reply? I'm not attached to my position for any other reason than that it currently makes the most sense to me. I'm not arguing on behalf of God, and I do not have a pregnant relative. I have no emotional attachment to this issue at all, and I'm not attacking any of you personally for holding a contrary belief.

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Question: Are the essential characteristics of man facts (not definitions)? Facts that can never change?

To save time: If you say that they are facts, I'm going to claim that we can't know them. I think that the essential characteristics of man are factual and cannot change, but that we cannot know what these characteristics are with 100% certainty. Would I be right to say that definitions are human constructs, approaching the level of "fact" as our knowledge increases?

There are several confusions involved here. A definition is a human construct only in the sense that if there were no human beings, there would be no concepts and thus no definitions. But that doesn't make concepts and definitions arbitrary - they are based on facts.

A concept is a mental integration of similar existents. The concept "chair" for example integrates all chairs, past, present, and future, into an inseparable mental unit. This is what gives rise to the human mode of consciousness - the conceptual mode of consciousness. It allows us to deal with an incalcuable number of concretes by reducing them to a single mental unit, enabling us to learn about the characteristics of all chairs, even though we can only experience relatively few of them.

The concept man does the same thing. It integrates all men into a single mental unit, and allows us to treat them as the same in certain respects (as possessing the same characteristics, but to differing degrees).

Before we get to what is included in the concept "man," let us note two points:

(1) A concept is unchanging. Since a concept means its referents, including all their characteristics, known and unknown, a concept does not change with the growth of human knowledge. Except in rare cases of conceptual reclassification, once you form a concept, that's it. You can learn more about the referents, but the meaning of the concept will remain the same.

(2) Higher level concepts are retained by means of a definition, but this does not imply that a concept is interchangable with its definition. A concept means its referents - the actual things in reality it denotes. Nor does a definition list all the characteristics of the concept's referents. That would defeat its purpose (to enable us to easily retain our concepts). Rather, a definition states the characteristic(s) that most fundamentally distinguishes the units of a concept from all other similar existents within the context of our knowledge. This last point is important; it marks the reason why definitions can change.

A definition will change if the characteristics it names no longer serve to distinguish the concept's units. Since the concept "man" does not mean simply "animality plus rationality," but all man's characteristics, if a ten legged creature from Mars lands on earth and happens to be rational, we would not call him a man. Nor would his arrival change what man is. The only thing that would change would be our definition of man (we would probably call him, "The rational earthling.").

The conclusion, therefore, is this: what we need to ask is not what is the definition of man, but are the unborn essentially the same or essentially different from man? The answer to that is rather simple if you understand Rand's epistemology: to answer that question you must ask, as against what?

When we form a concept, we identify similarities among existents by means of differentiation - by observing that the difference between two existents are epistemologically wiped out when compared to the difference between those two existents and another (commensurate) existent. Two men standing side by side are merely different. If a cat walks in front of them, we are able to see them (the two men) as essentially the same.

So the only relevant question, epistemologically, is, what are we differentiating the fetus and the man from? Well, let's say a cat. I maintain that either (1) you will see the man and the cat as more similar than the man and the fetus, or (2) the fetus is simply incommensurate (as is an embryo). I'm not sure which of those I'd endorse, but I am confident that the third option (the fetus and the man as similar) is out.

Finally, I'm arguing a point, not getting on your case in any way. Why are you taking an insulting tone in your reply?

I didn't realize I was, but if that's how you took my reply, I sincerely apologize.

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(For Objectivists following this post: anyone notice the similarity between the case against abortion and the case for anarchy?)

It wouldn't surprise me if there were a similarity since they both take rights as floating abstractions and argue rationalistically to absurd conclusions, so I'd be interested in what you're noticing.

Fred Weiss

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It wouldn't surprise me if there were a similarity since they both take rights as floating abstractions and argue rationalistically to absurd conclusions, so I'd be interested in what you're noticing.

That's more or less correct. Their basic error, epistemologically anyway, is to confuse definitions with the things defined, so they end up looking at words rather than reality. That's how they can reach such absurd conclusions with seemingly convincing arguments.

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That's more or less correct.  Their basic error, epistemologically anyway, is to confuse definitions with the things defined, so they end up looking at words rather than reality.  That's how they can reach such absurd conclusions with seemingly convincing arguments.

I think that's a very good insight. Would you care to elaborate?

Fred Weiss

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Does a fetus come unbidden into the womb?  Is it an intruder or is it invited?  Do human beings have a choice about how they enter the world?

I don't see the importance (or validity) of any of those questions. Would you care to explain?

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QUOTE (aynfan @ Jul 7 2004, 07:47 AM)

Does a fetus come unbidden into the womb? Is it an intruder or is it invited? Do human beings have a choice about how they enter the world?

I don't see the importance (or validity) of any of those questions. Would you care to explain?

If you don't perceive any importance or validity(?) (How can questions be invalid?) what more to you want from me?
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If you don't perceive any importance or validity(?) (How can questions be invalid?)  what more to you want from me?

To answer your basic question, I want you to explain what you're getting at with your questions. In answering them, what conclusion is the reader supposed to draw? What is the argument implicit in your questions?

To answer you sub-question, "How can questions be invalid?" There are many ways in which questions can be invalid. Ayn Rand wrote an entire essay on one category of invalid questions ("Who is the Final Authority on Ethics?") - questions that smuggle in a hidden premise or unjustified assumption. Example: "Do you still beat your wife?"

Other invalid questions are invalid contextually. For example, suppose 19 Islamic radicals flew a couple planes into some of our buildings and killed three thousand Americans. It would be invalid to ask, "Hasn't America made some mistakes?" Such a question is invalid because it has no bearing on the action that should be taken.

Or, some questions are invalid because they are literally meaningless, e.g., "Does ibla exist?"

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Does a fetus come unbidden into the womb? From this you can infer that some thought should be given as to when a choice by the mother is a responsible one. Is abortion just birth control? Is it the most rational way to approach birth control? If birth control is eschewed by the mother and a pregnancy occurs, is it rational to accept the consequences of an irrational act, or to evade the consequences and abort the fetus?

Is it an intruder or is it invited? Is the fetus immoral, is it a trespasser or a parasitical organism that invades the body of an unwilling host? Is the consequence of an evasion of reality, or is it an invited guest?

Do human beings have a choice about how they enter the world. Does the fetus simply act according to its nature by entering the womb? Is it making a conscious decision to seek life, or is it just a blob of protoplasm?

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PS-A question can not be invalid outside of a context.  Hows the weather?

That's because you can't determine what anything means outside of a context. How in God's name is that relevant to what I said?

Just because all errors occur in a context doesn't make all errors context errors.

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Does a fetus come unbidden into the womb?  From this you can infer that some thought should be given as to when a choice by the mother is a responsible one.

Okay, but that's not relevant to the abortion debate. Most of your questions, in fact, confuse two issues: whether abortion is in all cases moral (it isn't), and whether abortion in all cases is a right of the mother (it is). I am a defender of abortion rights - not each abortion.

Is abortion just birth control? 
Sure. It is a form of birth control involving the destruction of an embryo or a fetus. Other forms of birth control prevent the egg from being fertilized. Other forms prevent the fertilized egg from implanting in the woman's uterus.

Is it the most rational way to approach birth control? 

Sometimes it is, sometimes it isn't. It depends on the circumstances. Usually it's better to use a condom or to be on the pill. But if that fails, and you end up pregnant, going on the pill would no longer be the most rational choice. Assuming you didn't want to be pregnant, an abortion would then be the most rational form of birth control (i.e., the only one that would work).

If birth control is eschewed by the mother and a pregnancy occurs,  is it rational to accept the consequences of an irrational act, or to evade the consequences and abort the fetus?
That's an invalid question - it asks me to accept premises I do not accept.

Is it an intruder or is it invited? 

It is neither. Those terms wouldn't apply.

Is the fetus immoral, is it a trespasser or a parasitical organism that invades the body of an unwilling host? 
It's none of those things. It's a naturally occuring phenomenon resulting from fertilization of a woman's egg, and thereafter the growth of that cell inside her womb. The question then is: does she want it? In neither case does that change what it is.

Is the consequence of an evasion  of reality, or is it an invited guest?

You're mixing categories in a way that is almost inexusible. The embryo/fetus is not invited, and it is not invited. It can result from evasion, or it can result from choice, or it can result from an accident. It can be wanted or unwanted. None of those facts affect the relevant question: does it have rights? And the answer is: no it does not.

Do human beings have a choice about how they enter the world. 
Of course not.

Does the fetus simply act according to its nature by entering the womb?

Everything acts according to its nature.

Is it making a conscious decision to seek life, or is it just a blob of protoplasm?

If we're talking about a fetus now, rather than an embryo, it is neither.

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Does a fetus come unbidden into the womb?  From this you can infer that some thought should be given as to when a choice by the mother is a responsible one.

What difference does it make if the fetus doesn't have any rights?

And what's the "responsible" thing for a woman to do who has an unwanted pregnancy, regardless of the reason - suppose she even (horrors) succumbed to passion? Say she's sixteen and has neither the financial means or the maturity to raise a child? Or simply that she has other things to do with her life at this juncture? Suppose either she or her mate did use contraception but it failed?

Fred Weiss

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One who lives life by accident is not a very admirable person. Does the fetus always  have no rights, right up to the moment it exits the womb, one minute no rights the next rights?

Yes, because the one minute it was attached to and inside of a human being. The next it was a biologically self-sufficient entity acting in the world.

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