Laissez-Faire Capitalism

[DavidOdden]

I thought about what rights are, and i know rights are anything that I can freely do WITHOUT interfering in another individuals rights.

If I own a widget, Smith wants to buy the widget because it's crucial to his goal of building a veblitzer, but instead I elect to sell it to Jones, does my action interfere with Smith's right to build a veblitzer? What definition of "interfere" are you assuming that would say that this is not "interfering"?

I conclude that an initiation of force/coercion is anything that violates a RIGHT.

So do you take "a right" to be primary and force is defined as "anything that violates a right"? We had that discussion here recently.

I can then conclude that laws in an LFC system are NOT force or coercion as they do not violate rights.

But that implies that Rand was mistaken when she said "All the reasons which make the initiation of physical force an evil, make the retaliatory use of physical force a moral imperative" and "A government is the means of placing the retaliatory use of physical force under objective control—i.e., under objectively defined laws."

[AndrewRyan]

"If I own a widget, Smith wants to buy the widget because it's crucial to his goal of building a veblitzer, but instead I elect to sell it to Jones, does my action interfere with Smith's right to build a veblitzer? What definition of "interfere" are you assuming that would say that this is not "interfering"?"

To the first question, no it does not. Smith should offer more money, attempt to purchase the widget from Jones, or build one himself. I'm not violating Smith's rights by exercising my property rights and doing whatever I want with my property. It would only be interfering if I somehow prevented him from buying another widget through fraud or force.

"So do you take "a right" to be primary and force is defined as "anything that violates a right"? We had that discussion here recently."

Individual rights are primary to other concerns, and yes force is anything that violates a right.

"But that implies that Rand was mistaken when she said "All the reasons which make the initiation of physical force an evil, make the retaliatory use of physical force a moral imperative" and "A government is the means of placing the retaliatory use of physical force under objective control—i.e., under objectively defined laws." "

I'm not sure how anything I wrote implies Ayn Rand was mistaken. I agree with both those statements, and my statement "I can then conclude that laws in an LFC system are NOT force or coercion as they do not violate rights" doe not contradict either of Rand's statements.

[DavidOdden]

I'm not violating Smith's rights by exercising my property rights and doing whatever I want with my property. It would only be interfering if I somehow prevented him from buying another widget through fraud or force.

Then you're saying that "interfering" depends on there being force or fraud? We can't know if something is interfering until we know if there is force, and we can't know if there is force until you know what a right is (see below). I'm trying to understand your logic. That seems wrong, because the concept of "interfering" applies to non-humans and even inanimate objects.

Individual rights are primary to other concerns, and yes force is anything that violates a right.

Actually I was asking about what you think is logically primary. For example, "consciousness" is logically primary in the relationship of "consciousness" and "knowledge". So you're saying that, given "rights", "force" and "interfering" that "rights" is the primary (most fundamental, most primitive) concept which the other terms must presuppose. So how does one know what "a right" is?

I'm not sure how anything I wrote implies Ayn Rand was mistaken. I agree with both those statements, and my statement "I can then conclude that laws in an LFC system are NOT force or coercion as they do not violate rights" doe not contradict either of Rand's statements.

If one has a right to defend oneself, then that act cannot involve force, by your definition. Yet Rand acknowledged that use of force in self defense is both force (self-evidently) and is a right.

The solution to this apparent pickle, the one that Rand adopted is that "force" is used literally, to mean "force", and that "rights" are defined in terms of the moral principle that man has the right to live according to his nature -- by reason, free from force. Thus "rights" are defined in terms of absence of force, whereas you want to define force as violation of rights. That leaves you with the problem of explaining what a right is, for example, if you say that I have the right to own that which I create, how do you show that that is a right -- since you can't appeal to "force" in your justification (remember that under your definition, we can't understand what "force" is until we know what rights are).

[JeffS]

Agreed.

So, you're arguing that government can interfere in the economy and it would still be LF capitalism?

(If this was Ms. Rand's intent, she couldn't have made it less clear.)

I don't disagree that government must exist, it must have a monopoly on retributive force, and there must be objective laws which codify when government can use this force. If we can simply argue government can interfere in the economy and it would still be LF capitalism, that this type of regulation isn't really regulation, then we're left with the conclusion that what differentiates "allowable" interference from "disallowable" interference comes to a question of the purpose of that law - an ends justifies the means argument. If we disagree on any one law, it would be a disagreement on the purpose of that law. You might have a different intent for law than I.

I'm going to assume how you would answer this: You would probably argue, "Yes, and the purpose of law is to protect individual rights. Therefore, a law which serves only to protect individual, natural rights, would not interfere in the economy, nor would it be an initiation of force. A law which served to do something other than protect individual rights would probably interfere with the economy and would be an initiation of force."

If this is your argument, then I agree. In convincing someone that laws are not an initiation of force, we would have to begin by agreeing that the true purpose of government is to protect individuals' rights. This, I think, gets to what Andrew is saying. If we begin with the premise that government must protect the rights of its citizens, and these rights are only natural rights, i.e. rights which preclude abridgment of any others' rights, then the only laws which it can codify are laws which, by necessity, must be laws which would not abridge any others' rights. Therefore, no law (under a proper system so described) would be coercion, and therefore not force, and therefore not an initiation of force, because no law would abridge anyone's rights and would not force them into any action.

I see the point, I think, but I don't think I'm quite there. Please, consider this exchange:

Capitalist: In LFC, the government does not interfere in the economy.

Collectivist: Then, you're arguing for anarchy.

Capitalist: Of course not. Governments are necessary, as are objective laws.

Collectivist: But laws interfere in the economy by coercing people into a particular action. Like a mugger, they proscribe what action is and is not acceptable, and then proscribe what force will be used if the unacceptable path is taken.

Capitalist: [blank out. The only out for the Capitalist is to acknowledge that the government does, in fact, interfere in the economy.]

I think my difficulty lies in the free-will component of coercion. Coercion isn't like physical force. Physical force implies, as mentioned, an object acting in such a way on another object as to make impossible any other course of action. For example, I can force someone to come with me by picking them up and carrying them. But coercion has an element of free-will to it. I can coerce someone into coming with me by offering money, or some enticement, but whether they come with me or not is up to them; they have to choose whether or not to come with me. In a sense, most of the force claimed by collectivists is a form of coercion: e.g. an employee is forced to work long hours because if he doesn't he'll be fired and the employer will find someone who will work long hours. Is this force in the sense of going against someone's rights? No, but it is coercion. So we're left with, when is coercion not force?

[DavidOdden]

So, you're arguing that government can interfere in the economy and it would still be LF capitalism?

Clearly, that's not my position. In fact, I have been crystal clear that your notion of "interfering" obscures the truth. Rights and the proper nature of government is not defined in terms of "interfering", it is defined in terms of force: initiation, and retribution. That tells you that the government should enforce contracts, and prohibit assault, and should not prevent the sale of alcohol. The reason why you're having a hard time understanding these point is because you cling to this fuzzy notion of "interfering".

I think my difficulty lies in the free-will component of coercion.

Why do you care? No moral principles are defined in terms of "coersion".

Try to rethink your problem in terms of rights, and define rights in terms of using force; adopt the specific principle that no man has the right to initiate force, and that it is the purpose of government to objectively regulate retaliatory force ("retaliatory" implies "in response to other force"). This should solve all of your problems. If you persist in clinging to "coercion" and "interfering" as the defining elements of "what you may not do", then of course you are going to end up in the hell that is anarchy.

[JeffS]

Clearly, that's not my position. In fact, I have been crystal clear that your notion of "interfering" obscures the truth.

Would you prefer the term "regulate?"

Rights and the proper nature of government is not defined in terms of "interfering", it is defined in terms of force: initiation, and retribution.

Is coercion not force?

[softwareNerd]

Is coercion not force?

Jeff, I think you're using the concept "force" and "coercion" in a way that Objectivism does not. Take this small, non-business example:

When the government says: Murder is defined as ..... and it is a crime that will result in .... <some reasonable punishment>

That is not governmental coercion, nor is it "initiation of force" ... not if one uses the terms as the opposites of "upholding rights".

OTOH, if you want to call rights-upholding laws "coercion", then you have to rephrase your principle to say that there's a class of coercion that is within the legitimate purposes of government, and that certain instances of the "initiation of force" are fine ... using the concept that way would cause confusion, rather than aid thinking.

Edited January 5, 2009 by softwareNerd

[DavidOdden]

Is coercion not force?

So what? Retributive force is just, as a response to the initiation of force.

[JeffS]

So what? Retributive force is just, as a response to the initiation of force.

I'm not questioning the justice, or the injustice of force. I'm not discussing the proper nature of government. I'm not discussing rights in any way. Perhaps our difficulty lies in your belief that I am.

I'm merely trying to justify laws in laissez-faire capitalism. I accept retributive force is just. I also accept initiative force is not. If it is not, and if laws are coercive, and if coercion is force, then laws are initiative force and unjust. Unless I can find some way around it.

I notice you mentioned nothing about whether you preferred the term "regulate." Regulate means (for our purposes): control or supervise by means of rules and regulations. Would not laws meet this definition? If not, how? If laws do control or supervise action, even business action, and laws are made by governments, doesn't this mean government is always regulating business, and the economy, even in laissez-faire capitalism?

[softwareNerd]

I accept retributive force is just. I also accept initiative force is not. If it is not, and if laws are coercive, and if coercion is force, then laws are initiative force and unjust. Unless I can find some way around it. (emphasis added)

The way out is to realize that the bold text is false, by the terms being used. There is no way you can justify the notion that "initiative force is unjust", given the way you're using the various concepts.

Drop that principle, and you'll solve the logical puzzler. (Alternatively, you could change the meaning of the concepts and retain the principle.)

Edited January 5, 2009 by softwareNerd

[JeffS]

Jeff, I think you're using the concept "force" and "coercion" in a way that Objectivism does not. Take this small, non-business example:

When the government says: Murder is defined as ..... and it is a crime that will result in .... <some reasonable punishment>

That is not governmental coercion, nor is it "initiation of force" ... not if one uses the terms as the opposites of "upholding rights".

OTOH, if you want to call rights-upholding laws "coercion", then you have to rephrase your principle to say that there's a class of coercion that is within the legitimate purposes of government, and that certain instances of the "initiation of force" are fine ... using the concept that way would cause confusion, rather than aid thinking.

So, you're arguing "force," and "coercion" are opposite of "upholding rights?" That using force (perhaps we should say "using initiative force") is anathema to rights; that the use of initiative force would be necessary to violate rights. Therefore, laws could not be coercive, and therefore not initiative force, if they pertain only to protecting (natural) rights. In this way, it can be said laws which pertain only to the protection of rights do not interfere in LFC.

Do I have that right? If so, I think this is a point many have been trying to make. I addressed this in my post #54, fifth paragraph. I'm still not sure I'm there yet and wonder if it might have to do with the positive/negative nature of laws. Whereas a mugger's coercion is positive in that it requires the victim to act, objective laws protecting natural rights would be negative in that they require no action on the anyone's part. It is only when action is taken that consideration of the law must be taken into account. Laws are not coercive, and therefore not force, and therefore not initiative force because they are not (when properly codified) requiring any action.

[JeffS]

The way out is to realize that the bold text is false, by the terms being used. There is no way you can justify the notion that "initiative force is unjust", given the way you're using the various concepts.

Why not? Initiative force is unjust because force requires a man to abandon his reasoning mind, to accept a bullet instead of reason, to accept a threat instead of his own values (if I'm paraphrasing Rand correctly). If a man abandons his values he can be said to have abandoned morality. What could be more unjust than to abandon all understanding of justice?

[softwareNerd]

In this way, it can be said laws which pertain only to the protection of rights do not interfere in LFC.

Yes, the protection of individual rights is the starting point of legitimate government, the foundation upon which all else is based.

Therefore, while we know that some men use their minds to figure out how to mug others, we do not hold that they have the right to do so. The concept of rights says: we will draw a line around certain things and men may not act -- regardless of what their reason tells them -- in certain ways. Rights delimit the action of some, to protect others.

Initiative force is unjust because force requires a man to abandon his reasoning mind, to accept a bullet instead of reason, to accept a threat instead of his own values (if I'm paraphrasing Rand correctly).

Well, I do not see how it is unjust. There seems to be a step missing in this argument. Also, as an example, I do not see how saying "do not mug" is unjust.

[TheOpposition]

JeffS - I think there is a problem with how you are communicating your question, which is leading to this confusion. So, before I go on I have a question.

Let's just say for the moment that I go to some public place and make the announcment: "If anybody here punches me in the face, I will punch you back." or "If anyone Initiates force(coercion) against me, I will use retalitory force(coercion) as a response."

Am I initiating force?

[AndrewRyan]

Then you're saying that "interfering" depends on there being force or fraud? We can't know if something is interfering until we know if there is force, and we can't know if there is force until you know what a right is (see below). I'm trying to understand your logic. That seems wrong, because the concept of "interfering" applies to non-humans and even inanimate objects.Actually I was asking about what you think is logically primary. For example, "consciousness" is logically primary in the relationship of "consciousness" and "knowledge". So you're saying that, given "rights", "force" and "interfering" that "rights" is the primary (most fundamental, most primitive) concept which the other terms must presuppose. So how does one know what "a right" is?If one has a right to defend oneself, then that act cannot involve force, by your definition. Yet Rand acknowledged that use of force in self defense is both force (self-evidently) and is a right.

The solution to this apparent pickle, the one that Rand adopted is that "force" is used literally, to mean "force", and that "rights" are defined in terms of the moral principle that man has the right to live according to his nature -- by reason, free from force. Thus "rights" are defined in terms of absence of force, whereas you want to define force as violation of rights. That leaves you with the problem of explaining what a right is, for example, if you say that I have the right to own that which I create, how do you show that that is a right -- since you can't appeal to "force" in your justification (remember that under your definition, we can't understand what "force" is until we know what rights are).

Well that certainly make things clearer for me. Thank you for pointing out my errors.

[DavidOdden]

I'm not questioning the justice, or the injustice of force. I'm not discussing the proper nature of government. I'm not discussing rights in any way. Perhaps our difficulty lies in your belief that I am.

I'm merely trying to justify laws in laissez-faire capitalism.

You ought to be able to see the contradiction here. If you do not understand the distinction between just and unjust, the proper nature of government, and the impropriety of the initiation of force, you cannot understand why laws are justified.

If it is not, and if laws are coercive, and if coercion is force, then laws are initiative force and unjust. Unless I can find some way around it.

I have explained this to you many times and you have not shown any sign of understanding the most basic point, which is that not all forms of force are the initiation of force. An example is retributive force. Laws are the threat of retributive force, and just.

[JeffS]

JeffS - I think there is a problem with how you are communicating your question, which is leading to this confusion. So, before I go on I have a question.

Let's just say for the moment that I go to some public place and make the announcment: "If anybody here punches me in the face, I will punch you back." or "If anyone Initiates force(coercion) against me, I will use retalitory force(coercion) as a response."

Am I initiating force?

No.

[JeffS]

You ought to be able to see the contradiction here. If you do not understand the distinction between just and unjust, the proper nature of government, and the impropriety of the initiation of force, you cannot understand why laws are justified.

Not all laws are justified in LFC.

I have explained this to you many times and you have not shown any sign of understanding the most basic point, which is that not all forms of force are the initiation of force. An example is retributive force. Laws are the threat of retributive force, and just.

I understand not all forms of force are an initiation of force; I wrote it many times. A law could be an initiation of force - e.g. tax law, or it could be simply a statement of consequences should a certain action be taken - e.g. a law against murder. The latter prescribes the use of force should initiatory force be used, and is therefore retributive force and just. The former threatens physical force if a certain action is not taken. It is a threat, therefore coercion, which is used to elicit action, and is therefore an initiation of force and unjust.

If all laws were "threats of retributive force," they would all be coercive, initiatory, and unjust. A threat is a declaration of intent to cause harm. It implies the threatened is forced into choosing a certain action or physical force will be applied. This is coercion. Since the threat comes prior to any action on the part of the threatened it must be an initiation of force. Since it is an initiation of force, it is unjust.

Some laws are the codification of consequences should certain actions be taken, and are therefore prescriptions of retributive force and just. Some laws are threats of force to be used if certain actions are not taken, and are therefore not retributive but initiatory and unjust.

[Nate T.]

Some laws are the codification of consequences should certain actions be taken, and are therefore prescriptions of retributive force and just. Some laws are threats of force to be used if certain actions are not taken, and are therefore not retributive but initiatory and unjust.

The "consequences" in the case of either a just or an unjust law is the threat of force (being arrested and thrown into jail for murder is force, just as much as being mugged)-- that what makes it a law as opposed to something with no legal consequences, like a resolution. The only issue in deciding propriety is whether that use of force is retributive (hence proper) or an initiation of force itself (hence improper). You decide based on whether the law in question prohibits violations of individual rights.

Identifying certain actions as "threats" or "coercion" as a means of delegitimizing them is confusing the issue. Put differently, being a "threat" or "coercive" on its own is not sufficient to make an action or law improper.

Edited January 5, 2009 by Nate T.

[Nate T.]

There is another aspect of your post I'd like to comment about:

The latter prescribes the use of force should initiatory force be used, and is therefore retributive force and just. The former threatens physical force if a certain action is not taken. It is a threat, therefore coercion, which is used to elicit action, and is therefore an initiation of force and unjust.

It seems that you are drawing a distinction between just and unjust law based upon whether obedience of the law requires an action. If I follow you correctly, a law based on murder would be proper in your view because it requires you to perform a certain action in order to warrant legal action (here, murdering someone); you are compelled not to take an action under threat of penalty, and if you do nothing, no harm will come to you. Similarly, the mugger example is an instance of force initiation because you are compelled to take some action under threat of penalty.

At the primary level of physical force this may be a plausible enough distinction to make; if you hit me, I'll hit you back, otherwise I won't. However, when you start getting into types of force being used further from the perceptual level, this criterion for determining proper and improper force is incorrect. The example I'll give is the example you originally gave me: fraud. You can agree to deliver goods and then "do nothing" by collecting money and not delivering goods. This is an instance of "not doing anything" that is nonetheless a rights violation by virtue of the voluntary agreement you've entered into (as in my original reply to this example). Another example would be for a company to knowingly withhold knowledge of a products' possibly fatal side effect.

Edit: A third example ties in to this thread: if there is only one job immediately available for a person in a small town to take, and it pays very little, is the employer "forcing" the person to take the job or starve to death? If so, is the employer no better than the mugger?

Because of this, I submit that the "forces you to act"/"forces you not to act" distinction is at best non-essential for deciding propriety of laws. A more fundamental criterion is the one that David, I, and others on this thread have given, which is that protection of individual rights and only protection of individual rights merits the use of force.

Edited January 5, 2009 by Nate T.

[JeffS]

Nate -

I understand your point, but I'm not sure I'm arguing the distinction is between "forces you to act"/"forces you not to act." I think it's more like "forces you to act" vs. "has no force one way or the other - it neither forces you to act, nor forces you not to act." The distinction might be minor, and may result in the same conclusion, but it's closer to my argument.

A mugger on the street really gives no choice in how you act - both choices, your money or your life, are not actions a rational person, under normal (natural?) conditions could expect to have to choose between. The mugger forces you to make a decision. But a law not to murder, or not to defraud, or not to lie, doesn't have the same force aspect. The law doesn't force you into choosing between murder and a death sentence, or fraud and freedom, or a lie and freedom, nor does it force you to make any other decision. It simply gives you information as to what might happen if you choose to murder, defraud, or lie.

Consider a law against murder. Let's suppose someone commits murder. The law didn't force this person not to commit murder - he committed the murder. It is only when he is caught, tried, and convicted that the actual force comes into play. The same can be said, I think, for laws against fraud. Even with a law against fraud, someone can still commit fraud, and only if they're caught will force be used.

We can agree on the murder example, but fraud might have another component to it. Rand describes fraud as having a physical component of force in that the person committing fraud, in order to commit fraud, would have to hold onto the money AND the goods. In this case, physical force is being used because the fraudster has taken property from another just as surely as a thief takes property. She might argue (and this pure conjecture) that a company withholding information about a product's possibly fatal side effect would have to actively hide that information - much like a person has to work to hide a lie. This too would require some physical application of force.

Because of this, I submit that the "forces you to act"/"forces you not to act" distinction is at best non-essential for deciding propriety of laws. A more fundamental criterion is the one that David, I, and others on this thread have given, which is that protection of individual rights and only protection of individual rights merits the use of force.

I think before we can determine whether or not law is a proper use of force, we must first decide if law is force. I'm beginning to think law, properly made, is not force. It may prescribe force, but if it starts as being force then I can't see any way of getting around the fact that it is initiatory force since it must exist before any other force is used. If we determine law is force, and that it is initiatory force, we can then discuss whether it's a proper use of initiatory force. I agree, that discussion would hinge upon individual rights.

[Nate T.]

JeffS,

A mugger on the street really gives no choice in how you act - both choices, your money or your life, are not actions a rational person, under normal (natural?) conditions could expect to have to choose between. The mugger forces you to make a decision. But a law not to murder, or not to defraud, or not to lie, doesn't have the same force aspect. The law doesn't force you into choosing between murder and a death sentence, or fraud and freedom, or a lie and freedom, nor does it force you to make any other decision. It simply gives you information as to what might happen if you choose to murder, defraud, or lie.

What difference does it make if the government "might" catch you or not-- how does this make the threat of retributive force any less of a threat? The mugger also "might" kill you in that you might disable him first, or you might run away and he might miss. The important thing is the existence of the threat of force, not when it is ultimately carried out. In the end, both agents are stipulating you a choice: behave in a certain way or you will pay a price. The difference is in the behavior they want to elicit. I don't think their ability to carry out their threats is essential here.

We can agree on the murder example, but fraud might have another component to it. Rand describes fraud as having a physical component of force in that the person committing fraud, in order to commit fraud, would have to hold onto the money AND the goods. In this case, physical force is being used because the fraudster has taken property from another just as surely as a thief takes property. She might argue (and this pure conjecture) that a company withholding information about a product's possibly fatal side effect would have to actively hide that information - much like a person has to work to hide a lie. This too would require some physical application of force.

I think you're right about the fraud example-- it's not particularly illustrative, and insofar as you've reduced fraud to physical force you're correct. I'm not so sure about the "withholding information" example, since an irrational company could simply decide to be stupid and go ahead with rolling out the product with no warning label. Any unfortunate person who uses that product was not placed in a dilemma to use it by the company, but the company nonetheless initiated force against that person.

I'm more interested in what you think of the third example, that of the employer "forcing" the man to decide between a badly-paying job and starvation. If the man decides that working under those conditions would damage his life and the only alternative is starvation, is the man being placed by the employer into a "false choice" that constitutes force?

I think before we can determine whether or not law is a proper use of force, we must first decide if law is force. I'm beginning to think law, properly made, is not force. It may prescribe force, but if it starts as being force then I can't see any way of getting around the fact that it is initiatory force since it must exist before any other force is used. If we determine law is force, and that it is initiatory force, we can then discuss whether it's a proper use of initiatory force. I agree, that discussion would hinge upon individual rights.

I don't understand at all this notion of law being force. A law is a declaration by a government stating that if certain actions are carried out, the government will apply force; laws are descriptions about how the government uses force. Depending on whether the law is just or not, the force then used will be either retributive or initiative. I mean, can you give me an example of a law which does not ultimately threaten force if some conditions are not met?

[Marc K.]

David has already pointed out this inconsistency:

I'm not questioning the justice, or the injustice of force. I'm not discussing the proper nature of government. I'm not discussing rights in any way. Perhaps our difficulty lies in your belief that I am.

I'm merely trying to justify laws in laissez-faire capitalism.

but I thought I'd follow-up since this is what the rest of us are talking about. A proper government is Capitalist in nature. It is just and it is based on the principle of individual rights. Or (thanks again to David) as Ayn Rand put it:

Capitalism is a social system based on the recognition of individual rights, including property rights, in which all property is privately owned. -- [Ayn Rand]

In order for you to discover what Capitalism is, you need to investigate the nature of individual rights. They have very specific characteristics that are incompatible with the initiation of force.

Laws that protect an individual's rights are just and can be part of a proper government.

Laws that violate an individual's rights are unjust and would not be part of a proper government. Regulations fall in this category.

[JeffS]

What difference does it make if the government "might" catch you or not-- how does this make the threat of retributive force any less of a threat? The mugger also "might" kill you in that you might disable him first, or you might run away and he might miss. The important thing is the existence of the threat of force, not when it is ultimately carried out. In the end, both agents are stipulating you a choice: behave in a certain way or you will pay a price. The difference is in the behavior they want to elicit. I don't think their ability to carry out their threats is essential here.

Good point. But this would imply laws are force. If the government is making a threat of retributive force, or any other kind of force, it's still making a threat - which would mean it's using a form of force regardless of what you do. That would be initiatory force.

I think you're right about the fraud example-- it's not particularly illustrative, and insofar as you've reduced fraud to physical force you're correct. I'm not so sure about the "withholding information" example, since an irrational company could simply decide to be stupid and go ahead with rolling out the product with no warning label. Any unfortunate person who uses that product was not placed in a dilemma to use it by the company, but the company nonetheless initiated force against that person.

Yes, I think the company rolling out the potentially fatal product is initiating force.

I'm more interested in what you think of the third example, that of the employer "forcing" the man to decide between a badly-paying job and starvation. If the man decides that working under those conditions would damage his life and the only alternative is starvation, is the man being placed by the employer into a "false choice" that constitutes force?

I don't think this is force. Having to suffer consequences of reality can't be considered force. The employer isn't forcing the man to starve, and he's not forcing the man to work for him. The man has choices - limited choices, to be sure - but that's a function of other choices he's made in his life (like deciding to live in a one-company town, to begin with). I'm not sure how we can relate this to laws.

I don't understand at all this notion of law being force. A law is a declaration by a government stating that if certain actions are carried out, the government will apply force; laws are descriptions about how the government uses force. Depending on whether the law is just or not, the force then used will be either retributive or initiative. I mean, can you give me an example of a law which does not ultimately threaten force if some conditions are not met?

I can't give you an example. I think the proper answer to my question is: laws are never force, nor coercion, nor threats. Like laws of physics, or chemistry, laws merely describe causes and effects. They codify what is considered intolerable in society and prescribe what force will be used as punishment. Since laws are not force, or coercion, or threats, the government can never be said to be initiating force, or regulating, or interfering with the free-market for just having laws.

The government can be said to be initiating force if a law prescribes force for a crime which does not abrige individuals' rights. In that case, the government would be initiating force when it attempted to apply the force prescribed in the law. The individual convicted of the crime (perhaps even simply being accused of the crime would suffice) would not have initiated force in any way because he hasn't abridged anyone's rights.

However, if the law merely codifies what an initiation of force would be, and prescribes punishment for initiating that force, then the law is merely describing cause and effect. Someone would first have to initiate force before the government could apply retributive force, and when it does apply force it would necessarily be retributive force and just.

Any objections to my conclusion?

[JeffS]

David has already pointed out this inconsistency:

but I thought I'd follow-up since this is what the rest of us are talking about. A proper government is Capitalist in nature. It is just and it is based on the principle of individual rights. Or (thanks again to David) as Ayn Rand put it:

In order for you to discover what Capitalism is, you need to investigate the nature of individual rights. They have very specific characteristics that are incompatible with the initiation of force.

Laws that protect an individual's rights are just and can be part of a proper government.

Laws that violate an individual's rights are unjust and would not be part of a proper government. Regulations fall in this category.

I am not arguing these points. I agree with all of them.

Are laws force?