Quantum Physics / Quantum Mechanics

[Old Soul]

Exactly. Whether Objectivism is right or wrong it cannot be changed, expanded, or shrunk.

Good point, both you and seeker. I hope i clarified what I meant by change, but I was also addressing this type of question of where Objectivism goes from here, and i see now that Objectivism goes no where, but we might.

Edited September 30, 2010 by softwareNerd

[The Guru Kid]

Quick thoughts:

1. So far, no one has mentioned the Wave Particle duality which implies that there is no definite position of a particle. There is an area over which the particle can be found.

2. The uncertainty principle only works because of human interaction. But it also says that such an uncertainty is *built-in* to the system regardless of how powerful our instruments may get. The uncertainty is the *minimum* that has to exist. Most instruments are far weaker in their ability.

3. Physicists are known to use imagination, even mystically so, in order to create theories that can best fit the data. The way to deal with it is to meet it with skepticism not because of its far-fetchedness (?) but rather the amount of proof it has in it.

Vineet Barot

2nd year student of Physics

amateur historian of (modern) physics.

[Qwertz]

1) The observations do not necessitate the conclusion that a single existent is both a wave and a particle in the same time. First, the correlation of position/momentum to particle/wave only follows if the wave and the particle are exactly the same existent. Which is a contradiction. Either it's a wave, or it's a particle, or it's two existents (a wave and a particle, each capable of affecting the other as separate entities). CI says that the quantum is a particle and a wave simultaneously and in the same manner. CI says that the particle is nothing definite. Other interpretations (Bohm's, for example, which is just as old as CI, and to which Einstein objected only due to its non-locality, an issue for later discussion) treat the 'quantum' as a wave and a particle interacting with one another, but separate - this is the wave here, and over here we have the particle. None of this "you got your wave in my particle! You got your particle in my wave" business. The wave guides the particle, giving the characteristic results of the double-slit experiment. (I'm not an expert on Bohm's interpretation, so I can neither endorse nor refute it; I merely use it as an example of one interpretation that is both consistent with experimental data and does not involve indeterminacy and treats the wave and particle as, at least in some way, separate.)

2) The Uncertainty Principle (in general) sets a maximum resolution with which quanta may interact in meaningful, information-carrying ways. Copenhagen postulates then that, above this resolution, there is chaos and indeterminacy, and the laws of reality break down. I think (as did Einstein, Bohm, deBroglie, as does Peikoff, and perhaps Hawking) that above this resolution, there is determinacy (the particle is somewhere), but that I have no means (with current technology, or with any technology within the contemplation of the current physics model: i.e. that there is no meaningful information-carrying method of measurement finer that maximum resolution) of figuring out what that determinate state is (where is the particle?). The idea that consciousness (or more specifically observation or measurement) is required to "collapse the waveform" is the Copenhagen interpretation of the Uncertainty Principle.

And insofar as you say that the CI definition is the proper definition of the Principle, I agree with the way you've phrased it. That's what the Uncertainty Principle says: that above that maximum resolution, everything is uncertain. But its uncertain because we don't know (or have any way to find out), not because the universe is indeterminate on that scale.

3) Non-locality is a big one. I've not enough free time just now to thoroughly examine Bell's theorem and the experimental data supporting it. My thought is that perhaps the conflict could potentially be caused by the other (relativity) side, rather than the quantum side, but I think it more likely that QM's assertion on being internally consistent may be flawed. The whole "spooky action at a distance" thing looks like it could simply be an effect of the measurement apparatus on the experiment. But I'd have to look at the data more closely. This whole paragraph is pure speculation.

On the other topic, I for one am disappointed that there will and can never be an Objectivist philosophy of law, because Rand never promulgated one. However, this does not mean that a philosophy of law consistent with Objectivism is not possible. This is how Objectivism 'grows.' Objectivism is a closed system because 1) it is the philosophy of a dead woman, who isn't here to add to it anymore, and 2) it is written in essentials which must stand monolithically - it either the whole stands or the whole falls. There is no need to add to or subtract from Objectivism, because Objectivists are able to formulate their own philosophies to supplement those areas where Objectivism is silent, and still call themselves 'Objectivist.' Dr. Peikoff has the DIM hypothesis, for example. It is a philosophical theory which is consistent with, but not part of Objectivism. I think this is the key to understanding the charge of dogmatism often levied at Objectivism. Objectivism does not say "Objectivism is the be-all, end-all of philosophy," because it is incomplete. It says that what Objectivism there is (those theories promulgated by Rand and others approved by her within her lifetime) is consistent, both internally and with the facts of reality.

There is some economy in writing an incomplete philosophy. At least, incomplete in that it leaves off higher-level abstract branches, not that it leaves out important, critical fundamentals. Rand created a basic, fundamental philosophy within her lifetime. She left out certain areas (like legal philosophy), but laid the framework from which to build. One day, there will be an Objective philosophy of law (in the sense of being a philosophy of law consistent with Objectivism), but in order to make sure credit is given only where credit is due, it will never be an Objectivist philosophy of law. It will be "Tom G Varik's Philosophy of Law, Based on Ayn Rand's Objectivism." One day. <grin>

-Q

[softwareNerd]

Old Soul, I'll grant that some who call themselves Objectivists sometimes argue against something they perceive as a threat to their philosophy without stopping to understand what the truth is and whether they can integrate it with Objectivism or not.

I submit, though, that you're doing a similar thing w.r.t. to Peikoff's comment. Instead of dismissing it as a knee-jerk, ignorant reaction, give him the benefit of doubt by trying to understand exactly what he is saying, and what aspect he is objecting to. Could it be true that Peikoff is not dismissing the observations that led to the Uncertainity Principle, but commenting on a certain set of faulty conclusions made therefrom?

Edited September 26, 2010 by softwareNerd

[DavidOdden]

Well one thing's for certain -- in the realm of a quantum physics question, I'm gonna have to side Hawking over Peikoff. I mean come on guys -- not only do 95% of us have slim to no relevant knowledge in the shadow of hawking or peikoff's debate, you could say the same about peikoff in hawking's shadow.

I think this is a fundamental error. The question is not who has a broader knowledge of the empirical facts, but whose conclusion is correct. Scientific statements involve both specific technical knowledge and the application of reasoning. I know very well, up close and personal, that command of the facts does not guarantee validity of conclusions. You can know all sorts of wonderful things, and yet, if you have a rotten epistemology, your conclusions might as well be based on entrail-reading. See Eddington's Philosophy of Physical Science for a bit of discussion. It is not just commonplace for scientists to have a dubious philosophical grip of their knowledge, it is for some a badge of honor to reject philosophy in favor of mindless "empirical testing" (see Eddington's Philosophy of Physical Science for a bit of discussion), as though what counts as an "empirical test" is self-evident.

For example, Popper has had a considerable influence on science, as a quasi-palatable form of philosophy that scientists can mouth -- but Popper's nihilism is actually antithetical to what the work-a-day scientist assumes (rightly), that we can indeed know things. The usual defense of Popperian nihilism is that "but nobody interprets him that way". Well, probably not, but his words are also out there for us to see, and we can see that he did actually advocate philosophical principles that are nihilistic at their core. How do we explain the contradiction?

Very simply, scientists are usually more occupied with doing real work in the lab than in philosophizing, and thinking carefully about what they are really saying. They know what they know, and they use some set of socially-accepted metaphors for expressing that knowledge. But sometimes, they let these undigested gobbets of philosophy pass, and then we have to question the distilled conclusion. The Copenhagen Interpretation is an example.

I have never met a scientist (especially a real physicist) who has a good and rational defense of the idea that things happen at random. Admittedly, I don't know a lot of Danes.

Branching off of that, I believe a lot of times objectivists reject what we immediately believe to be pure chance, chaos, collectivism, when really it is much more in depth and ultimately in tune with our beliefs.

That's probably true, that most people are sufficiently ignorant of the scientific details that they do actually think that things happen at random. I even say it myself in class, although I do try to insert the comment that really there are no random events, and that things that seem to be random are simply a reflection of what we don't know. I used to think that random number generators did actually produce random number sequences, until I saw the underlying code. Amazing how a little ignorance can lead you to make up notions like "random happenstance". Edited September 26, 2010 by softwareNerd

[Old Soul]

That's probably true, that most people are sufficiently ignorant of the scientific details that they do actually think that things happen at random. I even say it myself in class, although I do try to insert the comment that really there are no random events, and that things that seem to be random are simply a reflection of what we don't know. I used to think that random number generators did actually produce random number sequences, until I saw the underlying code. Amazing how a little ignorance can lead you to make up notions like "random happenstance".

Yup, you nailed what I was trying to say, and good example. I was just trying to make sure there wasn't an immediate resistance to Hawking because the word "random" or "chaotic" was used, and at deeper levels, as I have stated earlier, I truly believe that it will play out to once again support the axioms of the Objectivist philosophy, as they truly are axioms.

Well, probably not, but his words are also out there for us to see, and we can see that he did actually advocate philosophical principles that are nihilistic at their core. How do we explain the contradiction?

Very simply, scientists are usually more occupied with doing real work in the lab than in philosophizing, and thinking carefully about what they are really saying. They know what they know, and they use some set of socially-accepted metaphors for expressing that knowledge. But sometimes, they let these undigested gobbets of philosophy pass, and then we have to question the distilled conclusion. The Copenhagen Interpretation is an example.

Well put. I just want to make sure that the conclusions/interpretations and the field of QM are separated, and that we don't find ourselves fighting both when it is really the interpretations of the evidence and data that we find troubling. And as we clearly agree, QM will eventually contribute to our overall world view as we let ourselves delve deeper into the field, with appropriate conclusions.

[DavidOdden]

Without implying any endorsement of anybody anywhere about anything, here is a physicist (from god's country, and a product of one of the better physics programs) who is not unfamiliar with Bell's Theorem. Something to remember is that a theorem is a mathematical proof, and you cannot mathematically (i.e. "sans observation") prove the nature of existence; Norsen's paper (first link, "Against Realism" -- don't get confused by the title) would be good reading for anyone interested in the problem of "interpretation", and it's not one of those typical impenetrable math papers.

[Marc K.]

Which brings up another subject. [...] Is one irrational if one disagrees with Ayn Rand (I know you wouldn't be an Objectivist)?

Since Objectivism is a fully integrated, fully rational philosophy of life in reality; if one disagrees with Ayn Rand about her philosophy, then one is most probably irrational in one aspect or another.

I suppose you could make the case that a hard working industrialist with little time to study philosophy is rational.

Even then I would say that if he is fully rational in thought and action, that he is implicitly following the principles of Objectivism.

--------------------

Edit: "one disagrees" was "you disagree" and "one is" was "you are"

Edited January 18, 2007 by Marc K.

[DavidOdden]

Since Objectivism is a fully integrated, fully rational philosophy of life in reality; if one disagrees with Ayn Rand about her philosophy, then one is most probably irrational in one aspect or another.

That would imply either that all men automatically have the same basic knowledge, or that Objectivism is a rationalist philosophy, which does not depend on experiential knowledge of concretes. Neither of those are correct conclusions: so your conclusion needs to be amended to include "or ignorant of something". I have not seen the evidence that the majority of people who do not agree with Rand are actually irrational, but perhaps you can share what knowledge you have that shows this conclusion to you.

[Marc K.]

so your conclusion needs to be amended to include "or ignorant of something".

I would, of course, agree with this when applied to the general public and I tried to cover this case with this:

I suppose you could make the case that a hard working industrialist with little time to study philosophy is rational.

However in the case where someone "disagrees with Ayn Rand about her philosophy" the implication is that they have studied and rejected Objectivism.

If you agree with this:

Even then I would say that if he is fully rational in thought and action, that he is implicitly following the principles of Objectivism.

then I should think that our positions do not clash.

[Franklin]

I must preface my remarks.

First, I must say that Peikoff is right to criticize the philosophical conclusions many people like Reichenbach (though I admire much of Reichebach's work on time and space and his refutations of Kantian epistemology) draw about casuality from Quantum Mechanics. Peikoff, however, does not have the expertise in physics (a man cannot learn all there is to know) to judge the real philosophical implications of the theory from those that many claim result from it. The incorrect philosophical interpretation of a theory on the part of some (even those formulating it) does not neccessarily refute the theory. For example, there are no objectivists who reject evolution simply because of the ethical conclusions of Herbert Spencer (the first major social Darwinist). The theory is separate from Spencer's understanding of its implications; the theory should not be faulted for Spencer's philosophical errors. For this same reason, Quantum Mechanics should not be rejected because of the faulty conclusions some philosophers make from it.

Second, Quantum Mechanics (hereafter QM) accepts that it is only a partial theory. Objectivist epistemology states that partial integrations are frequently needed as one builds his way up to more advanced and general concepts---it is simply necessary that these early concepts be formed in a manner that considers their context and can ultimately be reconciled with the larger abstraction. An example from Joeseph's Introduction to Logic [available at the ARI bookstore], makes my point; a person learns the terms mom and dad before he learns the term human. QM contradicts aspects of relativity theory---scientists are aware of this and are actively trying to solve it. The "Theory of Everything" is really an attempt to create a new theory that is valid in a larger context than QM and RT, replacing the two mutually inconsistent theories with a single theory. Instead of two theories, one for small phenomena and one for large phenomena we will have one theory for both large and small physical phenomena.

This might seem like a violation of the A is A principle; however, I believe that the context dependence of concepts can be evoked to explain this: The two theories were developed in different contexts to explain different phenomena. The fact that they have yet to be reconciled to each other is no more a refutation of them than the fact that psychology has yet to be reconciled with neurology and physics, or that Newtonian Mechanics for a time could not be reconciled with Electro-magnetism. To paraphrase Aristotle, the things more knowable to us and the things more knowable by nature are not one and the same. Once the reconciliation of QM and RT takes place, the ideas are seen as valid in the context under which they were originally formed: The new theory shows how and why the old theory worked. I give you the example of Newtonian Mechanics and Relativity. The errors in their interpretation were really errors in defining the contexts under which they were valid. Both are and will always be valid in the contexts under which they were formed---even if they could not be extended universally to describe all phenomena (which what was originally hoped for)

Schrödinger proposed his cat thought experiment (as far as I know no one has accomplished it) as a criticism of QM. This should be kept in mind. Of course, the assumption that the cat is both dead and alive is absurd---that was Shrodinger's point. Everyone is aware of this problem, and the fact that some scientists lacking philosophical training are likely to celebrate this absurdity says more about the psychology of those scientists than it says about QM. Luckily, the scientific method enshrines certain epistemology assumptions in the very act of performing standardized scientific research---making it difficult for even the extremely philosophically confused to totally mess the process up. Indeed, this is the reason we frequently get results that work well predictively but that are used to justify ridiculous conclusions.

Many scientists discussing QM refer to the "influence of the observer". Sadly, this is very sloppy language since the observer being refered to is not an observer at all but a certain amount of light. This is very different from saying that it is consciousness that interfers with the phenomena. What should really be said is this, For an event to have the quality of being observable in one respect (momentum or position) it is less observable in the other respect since observability of each requires a distinctly different form of interaction that inherently reduces the effectivness of the other. Given the length of the above formulation, which I will explain shortly, one can see why scientists wanted to shorten it into a shorter form, sadly adopting the confusing term "observer effect". Indeed, in rigorous scientific literature the term observer effect is not used for the uncertainty principle.

The basic idea of QM is that light comes in discrete packets, called photons. Like atoms, there is a smallest fundamental unit of light. To know the position requires that one use smaller and smaller wavelengths of light, but since light comes in packets of maximally smallness there is a limit here. Conversly, larger wavelengths are needed to determine the momentum since there is a maximal speed of light. That these two means of measurement pull against each other should be obvious.

Two last points. The idea of superposition should not be taken as a description of what is but rather of what is known. If I say there is a fifty percent chance of a certain thing happening, I am not saying that it is both going to happen and not happen. If I say that a person has a one in ten thousand chance of drawing a royal flush, I am not claiming that before he looks at it the cards are in a state of non-identity. QM---in the interpretation I favor---represents probabalitically what is known about the objects it considers, not its ontological state.

Lastly, the notion of casuality that QM is used to refute is not the Objectivist notion of casuality. Objectivists hold that the law of casuality requires a thing to operate in accordance with its nature since to think otherwise eliminates the possiblility of self-generated action. The kind of casuality that QM is used to undermine is the idea that every action is a byproduct of the conditions surrounding it. While objectivists hold that the surroundings can effect results in certain contexts, this is not always the case. The idea that the atom behaves in accordance with its nature and that some of its actions are self-generated is perfectly consistent with the objectivist idea of casuality; it only violates a strictly deterministic and enviromental view of casuality.

[BrassDragon]

*** Mod's note: Merged with earlier thread. sN ***

Some people I've talked to (fellow undergraduates) claim that reality is predictable only because of statistical likelihood. For example: Something could "fall up," against gravity, but the chance of it doing so is simply very tiny. This is supposedly due to the nature of quantum physics. I don't know much more about the theory (i.e. whether or not it holds that a chair could randomly turn into a potato), but I suspect so (according to the theory). Basically, the theory is that physics has no set rules; things are just most likely to happen in a certain way..

My question - does this particular claim violate the axioms (specifically Identity), and is it otherwise consistent or inconsistent with Objectivist metaphysics? Additionally, if anyone knows anything about the science (or quack science) behind this, please speak up.

Edited August 18, 2009 by softwareNerd
Merged topics

[Prometheus98876]

Well I am not expert in the field, but I do know a little bit about some of the theories that are held. And there have been and still are many different interpretations out there, some extremely irrational.

There is the Heisenbergs Uncertainty Principle which some claim means that subatomic particles do not have precise positions AND momentum at any given moment (unless we observe them). That the state of particles is indetermine until observation occurs. This leads to this sort of thing:

You set up a cat in a box with some poison gas that is released if and only if some radioactive material decays and the poison gas kills the cat. Now according to some QM scientists, until one observes the situation (and whether or not the radioactive decay occurs) the radioactive particles are in some "indetermine " state, they have decayed, yet not decayed, or maybe both and or neither...which means the gas has been released and not released etc..and the cat is alive and dead and yet neither. UNTIL someone looks in the box...then the uncertainty resolves and the radioactive decay occured or not, and the cat is dead or alive.

Then there are the Multiple Universe theories that try to invoke "parallel universes" to explain difficult problems in Quantum Mechanics.

But this is of course insane, what they are doing here is in effect saying "I dont know the answer, I dont care to find it, so I am going to invoke that beyond this reality so thatI will not be called upon to provide the answer". If the answer lies in some other universe how can they be expected to be able to provide it? But the answer cannot lie in another universe.

There can be only one universe (if we use the definition that the universe is all t hat exists), so what they are saying is that the answer lies in some other reality, ie that it doesnt exist, that there IS no answer. It is a blatant evasion of finding an answer by invoking some mystical "other universe"

Then there is some experiment that apparently proves one of the following two assumptions (or both ) are incorrect:

A ) that reality exists while its not being observed (now you know for sure that mysticism is infesting science when this is accepted as a possiblity)

B ) That if you have two entities seperated by some distance, that one particle cannot have a literally instant effect on the other particle (ie the particles cannot interact with each other without SOME amount of time passing).

Now of course, both of these assumptions are clearly correct. Reality DOES exist when not observed, and particles cannot have effects on each other literally instantly..

That is a taste of the sort of irrationality that has been accepted and to some extent stil is in QM. And it indicates just how much trouble modern science is getting into..

On to your original question. yes, proper physics should have definite rules, reality is not governed by probablity as many modern physicists claim. Certain events will cause certain other events, it is nto a matter of random chance but reality obeying definite rules.

Edited May 8, 2007 by Prometheus98876

[BrassDragon]

Thanks for all the good information, Prometheus. All that is helpful but I guess I'm more concerned specifically with the rules of physics always working out of a high statistical probability - putting aside the question of observation of something or not. Also - I'm mainly interested in whether or not such a claim could be axiomatically, metaphysically valid.

[Prometheus98876]

Thanks for all the good information, Prometheus. All that is helpful but I guess I'm more concerned specifically with the rules of physics always working out of a high statistical probability - putting aside the question of observation of something or not. Also - I'm mainly interested in whether or not such a claim could be axiomatically, metaphysically valid.

Sorry, its very late here and Im tired so maybe Im missing the obvious but; what exactly are you asking? I think I know but I want to be completely sure...

[BrassDragon]

Yeah, I'm tired too... been studying for an exam all night.

My question: Is the claim that physics is a probability game (as opposed to a system of rules, properties and principles that we are used to thinking about) compatible with Objectivist axioms and Objectivist metaphysics? Or, can Objectivism disprove this claim?

[Prometheus98876]

Ah gotcha, that is what I thought you were asking. Good...

No, I would say it is not compatible. Objectivist metaphysics revolves around the fact reality obeys set, constant rules. That if event A happens, only certain events will happen, according to the nature of the entities involved. Ie that A will cause B.

"All the countless forms, motions, combinations and dissolutions of elements without the universe - from a floating speck of dust to the formation of a galaxy to the emergence of life - are caused and determineb by the identities of the elements involved [, chance does not at any stage enter into it]."

- Ayn Rand "The Metaphysical vs the the Man Made" [content in square brackets my own addition.]

Some physicts claim certain parts of physics are governed not by the identity of the entities involved but by chance (or paritally by chance). This however is merely an attempt to evade finding the actual causes involved

[DavidOdden]

I think you should nod your head politely and change the topic if someone says that there are no fixed rules in physics. I know of a number of things that seem to "fall up", for example helium balloons. In fact, it's pretty likely that they will fall up and not fall down. Also, Titan missles tend to "fall up", though on occasion they fall down and then you better run.

But apart from that, let's only consider the class of heavy, dropped objects, like a 1 kg. lead sphere, dropped at sea level. It will always fall down. I'm telling you. If your buddies want to say that there is a small but non-zero chance that it will fall up, he should do the math, and show under what conditions this is a possible outcome. Now if all he is claiming is that he heard someone else make the claim, then you probably can't profitably dispute whether he was given that little piece of misinformation.

Here's a test for your buddy. As him if he thinks that it is possible, even remotely, for K+ to decay to π+π-π0 (that's pi, not n), and what is the probability? If he's blowing smoke, he'll just bluster, but if he has a clue, he can compute it.

[Robert J. Kolker]

Then there is some experiment that apparently proves one of the following two assumptions (or both ) are incorrect:

A ) that reality exists while its not being observed (now you know for sure that mysticism is infesting science when this is accepted as a possiblity)

B ) That if you have two entities seperated by some distance, that one particle cannot have a literally instant effect on the other particle (ie the particles cannot interact with each other without SOME amount of time passing).

Now of course, both of these assumptions are clearly correct. Reality DOES exist when not observed, and particles cannot have effects on each other literally instantly..

Please refer to http://www.objectivescience.com/index.htm

and go to the physics articles. The author, Travis Norton is an Objectivist AND a PhD physicist as well. He has some interesting things to say about Locality and the violations of Bell's Inequalities.

Bob Kolker

[BrassDragon]

Here's a test for your buddy. As him if he thinks that it is possible, even remotely, for K+ to decay to π+π-π0 (that's pi, not n), and what is the probability? If he's blowing smoke, he'll just bluster, but if he has a clue, he can compute it.

If I asked him that, then I would be blowing smoke!

Well, OK, everything you've said sounds pretty good. Do you think it would be valid to say that my buddy's claim is in violation of the Identity axiom, or is that perhaps a simplification or misstatement of the axiom?

[DavidOdden]

If I asked him that, then I would be blowing smoke!

Because you don't know why the answer is "0 chance"? The charges are unequal, fyi.

Do you think it would be valid to say that my buddy's claim is in violation of the Identity axiom, or is that perhaps a simplification or misstatement of the axiom?

The claim that an aspect of nature does not have a definite nature is certainly wrong, contradicts the axiom that existence is identity, and is also just not supported. The closes you can come is to say that it's a consequence of a particular model, but god hasn't authoritatively informed us that the mathematical model is in fact correct.

But I am guessing that your buddy isn't really arguing from the technical model, but rather he's working from a version that he heard of at a coffee shop from a guy who took a philosophy class where one of the students had read a popular sci-fi book. In other words, I'm betting that the guy can't actually shut up and calculate, even though doing so is a pointless exercise to start from if you can't validate the model to begin with.

[DragonMaci]

I definately agree with Prometheus. To use an Einstein quote that Prometheus loves to pull out and I am surprised he did not this time, "God [meaning the universe in this case] does not play dice." The bracketed content is my own clarification.

[Prometheus98876]

I definately agree with Prometheus. To use an Einstein quote that Prometheus loves to pull out and I am surprised he did not this time, "God [meaning the universe in this case] does not play dice." The bracketed content is my own clarification.

Ha, good point I thought there was something else that I usually say when I am discussing this...I just couldnt think what it was. I was probably trying to remember that.

Well anyway, God does not play dice as he said. Einstein said this of course to try and point out how Quantum Physics is not in fact governed by chance, but by definite laws. In his later years he was deeply disturbed about the direction Quantum Mechanics was going into after he had basicaly kicked the science off by iproving light came in quantas (small packets, though they later "refined" it to be some sort of weird "particle/wave" thing instead).

[Atlas51184]

Bob Kolker recommended Travis Norsen's writing from Objective Science. I agree. Some of Travis Norsen's more recent papers are here. In addition to Dr. Norsen's writing on QM, I recommend Tim Maudlin's book, Quantum Non-Locality and Relativity. Maudlin has excellent commentary on probability in QM, though the book is specifically about Bell's theorem.

QM does use a lot probability, however saying that nature itself is probabilistic is an interpretation. So far as I understand the issue, some physicists claim that certain laws of QM are stochastic (probabilistic) and provide a complete description of the physical situation. Other physicists argue that the probabilities are a result of ignorance of the physical situation; there is deterministic stuff going on that we do not yet know about (called hidden variables). The problem was, John von Neumann was thought to have proved that no deterministic hidden variable theory could recover the accurate predictions of QM, giving weight to the claim that reality is probabilistic. Actually, as Bell later discovered, von Neumann had proved that no local (local roughly means nothing can go faster than light) hidden variable theory could recover the predictions of QM. A non-local hidden variable theory was still possible. Long story short, in the 1980s it was shown experimentally (based off Bell's work) that faster than light causation exists, and therefore we should believe that quantum mechanics is not a complete description of reality.

I think some of the papers on Objective Science discuss the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation of QM. This theory entails that there are non-local hidden variables, and that the probabilistic features of QM reflect only our current ignorance of physics. Basically, there is no need to believe any of the weirdness of QM that is popular subject matter for Nova documentaries. Good non-Objectivist philosophers of science like Tim Maudlin know this. Quantum spookiness serves as a nice rationalization for out of date philosophical prejudices, but beyond that it is no longer necessary.

[Qwertz]

God does not play dice.

To which Neils Bohr (progenitor of the Copenhagen Interpretation of QM) replied,

Einstein, don't tell God what to do.

Unfortunately, his attitude has been inherited by many modern physicists.

-Q