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Yes, this is finally getting interesting. I know Travis must be weary of the fight, but I hope he persists because he has them in a corner. I think Vallicella knows that if he shuts down this campaign the Objectivists will have won and we will post about it elsewhere. Yet he can't shake them off. The "invitation to go away," complete with faint praise for Binswanger, is hilarious. I am glad Travis called him on that.

Anyone who thinks this is a significant battle might want to copy out all the threads for their personal files; Vallicella could easily fully or partially change or remove the whole thing. I am doing it myself.

I feel like one of Jeb Stuart's cavalry soldiers, all blustery and crude, flying the flag, rushing in ahead and getting shot down, but delaying the enemy long enough for the heavy artillery to come up from behind and slug away.

How do I get Travis's email address to send him a support letter? If anyone knows you can send me an email to: john "at" jrdonohue.com

John Donohue

Yes, this is finally getting interesting. I know Travis must be weary of the fight, but I hope he persists because he has them in a corner. I think Vallicella knows that if he shuts down this campaign the Objectivists will have won and we will post about it elsewhere. Yet he can't shake them off. The "invitation to go away," complete with faint praise for Binswanger, is hilarious. I am glad Travis called him on that.

Anyone who thinks this is a significant battle might want to copy out all the threads for their personal files; Vallicella could easily fully or partially change or remove the whole thing. I am doing it myself.

I feel like one of Jeb Stuart's cavalry soldiers, all blustery and crude, flying the flag, rushing in ahead and getting shot down, but delaying the enemy long enough for the heavy artillery to come up from behind and slug away.

How do I get Travis's email address to send him a support letter? If anyone knows you can send me an email to: john "at" jrdonohue.com

John Donohue

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To go back: You said that if "twinzig is entirely undefined", then the argument is "entirely meaningless." I agree with you. However, I am not talking about an evaluation of meaning, I am talking about an evaluation of proper (or improper) deductive reasoning. For example, a statement with essentially no identification in reality:

All members of group A like B

C is a member of group A

Therefore, C likes B.

Well, that's where you make a mistake. The phrases "group A" and "B" in the syllogism would ultimately have to be something you could point to in reality to have any meaning, and without that referent, then, yes, "group A" would be like "twinzig."

Miss Rand is not denying deductive reasoning in her formulation of logic as the non-contradictory identification of the facts of reality as given by observation (and abstractions from observations). What she is saying is that for deductive reasoning to have a foundation, it must be based upon observations -- something one can point to in reality and say,"This is what I mean!" Travis in his most recent post to the Maverick Philosopher is getting there by saying that "Travis is 6 feet tall" is a contradiction to the facts that Travis is actually 5 foot 4 inches tall.

But the analytical philosophers do not recognize a statement like that as being necessitated by non-contradictory identification.

Take the ancient syllogism below, and convince yourself that it would have no meaning if Socrates where identified as not being a man via induction:

All men are mortal

Socrates is a man

Therefore Socrates is mortal

If one did not non-contradictorily identify Socrates as a man, rather than as a potato, then the syllogism wouldn't work as a statement of logic in the Objectivist sense.

Or look at this one:

All men are potatoes

Socrates is a man

Therefore Socrates is a potato

Now, the philosophers arguing with Objectivists would say that the first premise is not true by definition, whereas Objectivist would say that the first premise is not true by induction and concept formation. That is, there are sufficient differences between men and potatoes that they cannot be incorporated into the same concept (either "man" or "potato"). They are staying at the level of definitions, whereas Objectivists get down to the facts of reality. And that is the big difference.

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...

A mod may want to transfer the discussion between Thomas and I into a new thread, since it is a bit off the main topic.

I may not be communicating clear enough Thomas. Take the argument I presented above:

All members of group A like B

C is a member of group A

Therefore, C likes B.

Contrast it with the following:

All members of group A like B

C is a member of group A

Therefore, C likes Z.

Let me present your argument similarly. You said:

All men are mortal

Socrates is a man

Therefore Socrates is mortal

Contrast it with the following:

All men are mortal

Socrates is a man

Therefore Socrates is a zebra.

All of these are deductive arguments. The difference in both cases is that the first argument is valid while the second is invalid. Meaning: in the first arguments, if the premises are true, then the conclusions must also be true, while, in the second arguments, the conclusions do not follow from the premises, regardless of whether or not the premises are true. Keep in mind that the truth of the premises lies within the realm of inductive logic, but I am talking about deductive logic. It seems that you are hesitant to apply the term 'valid' to arguments such as these, because they convey no truth. However, surely one can recognize the distinction between the arguments that use proper deductive logic from those that do not.

To summarize: I am not disputing that truth ultimately rests on the facts of reality and inductive reasoning. Let's move past that issue. What I'm trying to understand is, given Rand's definition of Logic as "the art of non-contradictory identification", how deductive logic fits into the picture. Her definition seems to concern itself with the realm of inductive logic only. Of course deductive reasoning must have a foundation, as you said. But, it seems that there are also standards that apply to the form of an argument which render the reasoning process itself (irrespective of truth) valid or invalid, as I have hopefully shown here.

Edited by adrock3215
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....throwing in my take.....

Yes, the usual formal syllogism is normally considered "deduction" and receives that appellation regardless if it proves a truth about reality. This is what adrock is insisting on and what Thomas is reluctant to accept (and I can see why.)

But we have a special situation in the history of philosophy; deduction has been 'valorized' by the Platonist and induction marginalized.

So any time an Objectivist might agree that a "valid" syllogism -- despite the truth of the premises -- IS deduction, we feed their distortion. We cannot be heard nor cannot have a significant impact unless we bring home the notion that a valid syllogism that does not care about the rational identification of the existents in the premises might be 'valid deduction' in the rationalistic POC world, but is utterly meaningless and useless if intended to prove a truth about objective reality.

So...can it really be called "deduction" if the existents/premises are not real by induction? Right away the rationalist says 'why yes, a syllogism is valid if there is no fallacy in the logic, and that is deduction.' See, the problem is, the Platonist gets to glorify "deduction" either way, by 1) making deliberately absurd premises but supposedly competent logic; and 2) true premises and logic, even though the 'truth' of the premises is through dim definition, Divine revelation, constructed sociology, or 'common sense.' He gets to put the title "deduction" on all this. He has marginalized induction and objective reality.

We have to challenge this orthodoxy. So what is a better way? One could insist that a syllogism with untrue premises but competent logic not be called deduction. It could be called "sound." But that still leaves the word 'deduction' appended to arguments in which the premises are purportedly true and the logic is competent, but the 'truth' of the premises is not by induction.

It might be just too difficult to wrestle away the word 'deduction' from the Platonists as they have developed and glorified it for 2000 years. It might be better to just say, "Well I accept the complete efficacy of deduction too. However, it is a handmaiden to induction; unless you first validate the existents deployed in your premises with induction from the facts of objective reality, your deductions are meaningless."

I think that causes a bigger stir and stronger confrontation.

Adrock: "given Rand's definition of Logic as "the art of non-contradictory identification", how deductive logic fits into the picture. Of course deductive reasoning must have a foundation, as you said. But, it seems that there are also standards that apply to the form of an argument which render the reasoning process itself (irrespective of truth) valid or invalid...."

Would you be willing, every time someone makes a 'valid' deduction per your point, also say: "....yes, valid, but meaningless unless the existents are proven with induction?"

John Donohue

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Note to Moderators: I don't think this is a separate topic but rather is germane to the topic at hand.

I may not be communicating clear enough Thomas. Take the argument I presented above:

All members of group A like B

C is a member of group A

Therefore, C likes B.

Contrast it with the following:

All members of group A like B

C is a member of group A

Therefore, C likes Z.

Let me present your argument similarly. You said:

All men are mortal

Socrates is a man

Therefore Socrates is mortal

Contrast it with the following:

All men are mortal

Socrates is a man

Therefore Socrates is a zebra.

All of these are deductive arguments. The difference in both cases is that the first argument is valid while the second is invalid. Meaning: in the first arguments, if the premises are true, then the conclusions must also be true, while, in the second arguments, the conclusions do not follow from the premises, regardless of whether or not the premises are true. Keep in mind that the truth of the premises lies within the realm of inductive logic, but I am talking about deductive logic. It seems that you are hesitant to apply the term 'valid' to arguments such as these, because they convey no truth. However, surely one can recognize the distinction between the arguments that use proper deductive logic from those that do not.

Yes, I recognize that the term "valid" refers to the fact that given the premises the conclusion must follow. I even used this term in my post to Bill when I said that the following syllogism was valid but was not logical in the Objectivist sense:

All of reality is deterministic

Man is within reality

Therefore man is deterministic

This is a valid logical deduction in the traditional sense of syllogisms, where the conclusion is necessitated by the premises. The one's you gave about therefore Socrates is a zebra is not a valid deduction, since Socrates being a zebra does not follow from the premises. I'm not arguing about the deductive form, I'm just saying that it is meaningless without a reference to reality to affirm or to deny the premises. In fact, the premises are derived from the observation of reality, otherwise, "All men are mortal" has no meaning.

So, I am not saying that a deductive claim brought about by necessity of the premises is not valid without a reference to existence; I'm saying that it is meaningless. I'm saying that form without content has no meaning, if by "meaning" we mean that it has a referent in reality.

Bill and those guys want to use the term "sound" to mean that the conclusion follows from the premises and if the premises are true; but the premises are true by reference to definitions, not to facts. Objectivism says that this is not good enough for it to be logical, that one must point to something in reality in order for it to have any meaning, that if one is not using non-contradictory identification of the facts of reality as given by observation or abstractions based on observations, then there is no content to consider.

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Vallicella's latest reply to Norsen is the most condescending yet. He does not even respond to the veracity of Norsen's claims. He simply asserts a distinction between multiple "truths" without further explanation, and states that if Norsen doesn't accept his distinction, "then so much the worse for [Objectivism]: it is another reason why so few professional philosophers take [Objectivism] seriously."

No further explanation is provided. This can be seen as nothing but an outright dismissal.

He finalizes it by showing how open he is further discussion with Norsen and Binswanger:

Given the various mistakes you have just made, and having read the rest of what you have written I am reinforced in my view that there is no point in any further discussion with you. So please no more comments.

But thanks for the insight into how the Objectivist mind operates.

It'll be interesting if Norsen/Binswanger responds, and if Vallicella allows their comments to be posted. Bill seems more than happy to shelf these discussions.

Edited by brian0918
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Vallicella's latest reply to Norsen is the most condescending yet. He does not even respond to the veracity of Norsen's claims. He simply asserts a distinction between multiple "truths" without further explanation, and states that if Norsen doesn't accept his distinction, "then so much the worse for [Objectivism]: it is another reason why so few professional philosophers take [Objectivism] seriously."

Where does he say this and where does he say he wants no more comments from Objectivists? I've looked on his last page and I don't see it.

Added on edit: Oh, it's on the "next page" link:

http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/mav...age/2/#comments

Where he says:

The notion that the existence of nature exactly as actually configured is built into the very meaning of 'nature' ignores the crucial distinction between the sense and reference of terms, a distinction essential to clear thinking. If your ideology denies this distinction, then so much the worse for it: it is another reason why so few professional philosophers take it seriously.

In other words, the referent is not the meaning of the term. He totally rejects the Objectivist epistemology of concepts refer to specific things in existence, including everything that they are in fact. That is, the term Travis might mean,"the guy replying to the thread" but it does not include that Travis is 5'4" and not 6' tall. Bill and other philosophers like him think that referring to reality is sloppy thinking!

Edited by Thomas M. Miovas Jr.
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I have only to say that I am very glad Vallicella was never my philosophy instructor and that instead I had a preliminary introduction to it in Highschool thanks to the Jesuits (my next encounter would be with Rand, six years later). Had I had Valicella, I would have abandoned the world of philosophy as a world full of people whose primary fetish was making things up- the more convoluted and mystical the better, as opposed to observing the world and achieving an inductive understanding of it. I am actually saddened by the amount of magical thinking he displays, and the fact that somehow he got away with getting a PhD in it. I dropped out of my philosophy classes at my college years ago after I essentially questioned my Platonist professor to speechlessness during one class, and was completely disgusted that such a creature could even presume to teach, when obviously they were more qualified to sweep the classroom floor -and got into some amount of trouble because, big mouth that I am, I told her precisely that...

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Bill and those guys want to use the term "sound" to mean that the conclusion follows from the premises and if the premises are true; but the premises are true by reference to definitions, not to facts. Objectivism says that this is not good enough for it to be logical, that one must point to something in reality in order for it to have any meaning, that if one is not using non-contradictory identification of the facts of reality as given by observation or abstractions based on observations, then there is no content to consider.

Now, I think we should be careful here. As a mathematician, I should point out that imaginary numbers (i=def. sqrt(-1) etc) have no metaphysically given and non-man-made reference, but the deductions from some important proofs established in the theory have led to electronics, among other things, which have advanced humanity. Also, consider the bizarre area of abstract algebra (groups, rings, fields, etc.) and their application to your computer security!

But how do such referents still gain at least some smudge of validity? Suppose I say something totally ill-defined and incomprehensible, such as

1) If all smarks are blarks, I am the Orsh of Mamanota.

2) All smarks are blarks.

3) Therefore, I am the Orsh of Mamanota.

These statements in and of themselves are of course not defined at all, and utterly meaningless (to even myself), but the argument is still valid and still corresponds to reality.

How? Recall that we are assuming that premise (1) and (2) at least have the identities stated (EDIT i.e. we presuppose they at least have some identity even if not defined), corresponding at an (extremely) abstract level with concrete correspondence to particulars as a concept. Furthermore, the fact that the argument is deductively valid means it corresponds to the concept of causality, i.e. identity applied in action, in the abstracted sense epistemologically.

So albeit very abstract, the argument still corresponds to the generalized way reality is, and still uses reality as its King. But, the argument certainly isn't useful, especially when I don't even define my terms. But the latter statement is irrelevant to the case.

Edited by Flagg
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I'm sorry I've taken a few days to respond, and I'm sorry this isn't longer. I only have a few minutes right now.

Yes, I recognize that the term "valid" refers to the fact that given the premises the conclusion must follow. I even used this term in my post to Bill when I said that the following syllogism was valid but was not logical in the Objectivist sense:

All of reality is deterministic

Man is within reality

Therefore man is deterministic

To call this "not logical" is a contradiction. A "logical" statement is a statement that is "relating to, in accordance with, or of the nature of logic." The above statement is in accordance with the nature of deductive logic, therefore it is logical. You continue:

This is a valid logical deduction in the traditional sense of syllogisms...

Previously you wrote that the statement was "not logical", and here you say it is "logical" (relevant parts bolded). Either the statement is logical, or it is not logical, but surely it can't be both simultaneously.

Edited by adrock3215
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Whoops, I forgot to point out something stronger: my whole "deduction models causal interaction" presupposes that both (even meaninglessly defined) premises are granted at least the benefit of non-contradiction: if one denies the conclusion which follows anyway, then one denies at least one of the premises presupposed (by the argument qua argument) to be true.

It isn't related to causation, but of increasing contextual knowledge implied by some A, which is presupposed to not be known by the recipient of the argument: the argument then expands the reader's contextual knowledge to include the wider implications of A (namely, :) in his framework.

It's induction that models causality, my bad.

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I'll reply more fully later, but there is a difference between a set of words or pseudo-words having the form of a syllogism, such as the nonsense "syllogism" above, and getting to the root of why deductive reasoning works. The reason the conclusion must follow the premises in a standard syllogism is in the law of identity and the fact that identifying S involves P, then the involvement is necessitated by the facts identified in the premises. This cannot be done or asserted about undefined and undefinable terms. If one says,"The scubers rolled all over the suallibobs," one has not spoken a sentence. In the same way, saying that, "if Periokes are tubarks, then zecocks are zibooks" is not a premise. It has no meaning. Now what the human mind can do is to treat nonsense as if it were an actual abstraction, something like, "If S then P, S, then P." But S and P in the above stands for something in reality qua abstraction, or at least it ought to if one's concepts are tied to reality. So, the nonsense in the previous post is not a syllogism, since as the terms are unidentified then there is no reason to conclude that the conclusion must follow -- there are no grounds for asserting it.

the square root of -1 is different, in that some equations do wind up necessitating taking the square root of -1. While this has no mathematical solution (no number multiplied by itself will give -1 as the answer), one can still point to i and use it as an algebraic term. In fact, this must be done to get the right answer, as the poster indicated for some electronic equations. But at no point does one actually take the square root of -1, what one does is carry the term to the mathematical conclusion, usually winding up with i X i which does give a real answer, -1. And for those complex terms that still have i in them, they can b e ignored since it has no meaning. So, it is not as if one ever comes up with a mathematical solution to sqrt(-1), but that by using it as a symbol, the solution does not present a problem.

So the issue is what makes something a syllogism? Is it merely the form? or is there some underlying principle identified in reality that necessitates the conclusion. I would argue that necessity, as used by Bill and other analytical philosophers, is a floating abstraction, because what necessity means is that some aspect of reality has been identified and the premises state what this is and that one can draw a conclusion because the same conditions apply throughout.

In other words, nonsense doesn't mean anything, and is not logical by any stretch of the imagination. If you think it does, then logic is a floating abstraction in your mind.

Logic comes down to the non-contradictory identification of some aspect of existence. If you are not saying anything about existence, then you aren't saying anything. It is neither logical or illogical, it is nonsense.

For valid syllogisms in which the conclusion follows from the premises, but the premises contradict reality, then the logic is broken at the roots, since logic is the non-contradictory identification of the facts of reality. One can still call it a syllogism, because it isn't nonsense, but it is not logical because one or more of the premises contain a contradiction -- i.e "All pigs can fly" as a premise already contradicts the facts of reality, and so it is not logical. The correct form is there, but the premise does not follow from an observation of existence, since pigs can't fly. In other words, I would say that it seems to be logical, but it isn't; and the form alone is not sufficient in calling it logical.

Edited by Thomas M. Miovas Jr.
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I would say that it seems to be logical, but it isn't

I would call it syntactical but not logical, in the same way that "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously" is a grammatically-correct statement (ie, syntactical), but non-sensical. It is non-sensical precisely because the concepts being referred to don't consist of any units that fit the context of the sentence - no things that are colorless but also green at the same time and in the same sense; no ideas that sleep, let alone sleep in any emotional state, etc. In the case of gibberish like "if Periokes are tubarks, then zecocks are zibooks", they don't even refer to concepts, and so do not refer to anything in reality. It's a non-starter.

Edited by brian0918
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For valid syllogisms in which the conclusion follows from the premises, but the premises contradict reality, then the logic is broken at the roots, since logic is the non-contradictory identification of the facts of reality.

Why is this the definition of Logic? In general, one tends to think of Logic as the study of the principles of correct and proper reasoning, both deductive and inductive. I'm not really clear on what you're proposing, so maybe we should set these questions aside if possible. I want to try it a different way. Take the following argument:

All pigs can fly.

Bill is a pig.

Therefore Bill can fly.

If you will, I would like you to characterize this, so I can get a clearer picture of what you're saying. To be entirely specific: 1. Does this argument fall within the realm of logic?, 2. Is this argument logical?, 3. Is this argument a syllogism?, 4. Is this argument deductively valid? and, 5. Is this argument deductively sound?

Edited by adrock3215
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1. Does this argument fall within the realm of logic?, 2. Is this argument logical?, 3. Is this argument a syllogism?, 4. Is this argument deductively valid? and, 5. Is this argument deductively sound?

My guess to Thomas's response is that 1 and 2 will be considered synonymous, and the answer to both is "no". As for 3, a syllogism is a logical argument, so "no" again. 4, maybe yes, but 5 no. Who's taking bets?! :P

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Why is this the definition of Logic? In general, one tends to think of Logic as the study of the principles of correct and proper reasoning, both deductive and inductive.

I agree with this assessment, but realize that if you have contradictions in your line of thinking, then you are not thinking rationally or logically. The definition is the one Miss Rand gave, and it includes induction and deduction. To have a contradiction is to invalidate one's mind-- i.e. your mind is no longer in tuned with reality. So, to be off on some aspect of your thinking where you are violating the law of non-contradiction or violating the law of identity means that you are no longer in tuned with reality.

I'm not really clear on what you're proposing, so maybe we should set these questions aside if possible. I want to try it a different way. Take the following argument:

All pigs can fly.

Bill is a pig.

Therefore Bill can fly.

If you will, I would like you to characterize this, so I can get a clearer picture of what you're saying. To be entirely specific: 1. Does this argument fall within the realm of logic?, 2. Is this argument logical?, 3. Is this argument a syllogism?, 4. Is this argument deductively valid? and, 5. Is this argument deductively sound?

I would actually have to look up what Aristotle said or look up what Dr.Peikoff said in his course on logic. I don't remember technically if an obvious contradiction to reality, like pigs flying, is a violation of a syllogism or not. In other words, when Aristotle developed the syllogism in the abstract, did he develop it only from true premises leading to true conclusions (given the context), or did he state that the form alone is sufficient, so long as direct necessity is implied. So, you've got me on that one. Aristotle came from a Platonic background, so he may have focused on the form, but I think he might also have said that one must actually understand the form and necessity (which would come from the law of identity). And it makes a difference if one is talking about the tradition and development of logic from Aristotle on. Frankly, I don't trust rationalistic definitions, and saying it is logic because of the form alone would be rationalistic.

Unfortunately, Ayn Rand never held a logic course, as far as I know, but with her definition of logic as non-contradictory identification, then contradicting reality is already non-logical. So pigs flying is already non-logical. So, at least tentatively:

1) It falls within the realm of logic if one is going to be rationalistic about the issue; but it does not fall within the realm of logic in the rational sense of non-contradiction.

2) Same as #1: Rationalistically it is logical; rationally it is not.

3) Depending on how Aristotle developed the idea of the syllogism, it might be a syllogism.

4) Rationalistically, the argument is deductively valid; rationally speaking it is not; there is no logical conclusion that can follow from a contradiction.

5) Given what Bill said (and I'm not willing to take his word at it), since the first premise is false, then the argument is not sound.

But, again, we are getting into technical philosophic terms that would rely on what the discoverer of logic said; but then again, we can disagree with him. Ayn Rand did say she disagreed with a great deal of Aristotle's philosophy, but she never gave a comprehensive list of what she disagreed with.

If the bottom line, however, is Miss Rand's identification of logic as non-contradictory identification, then saying pigs can fly is already non-logical -- i.e. it is a contradiction to facts.

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This blog is getting quite tedious. Every time a different argument/counter-argument comes up in one of the discussions, Vallicella forks the discussion into another post. He's done it every day for the last 4 days.

Edited by brian0918
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This blog is getting quite tedious. Every time a different argument/counter-argument comes up in one of the discussions, Vallicella forks the discussion into another post. He's done it every day for the last 4 days.

He doesn't seem to have added any blog posts to the Ayn Rand portion of his blog categories, so are you saying he branched out to some other portion of his blog? If so, can you provide a link? I'm not sure I'd want to engage him outside of the portions on Rand, but I am curious as to what you are referring to above.

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He doesn't seem to have added any blog posts to the Ayn Rand portion of his blog categories, so are you saying he branched out to some other portion of his blog? If so, can you provide a link? I'm not sure I'd want to engage him outside of the portions on Rand, but I am curious as to what you are referring to above.

Here's his main blog page: http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/

On there, the four most recent entries are forked out from the Rand discussions. I think he does this because he likes to write long replies but doesn't like having them buried on comment pages - he wants everyone to behold their glory.

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Here's his main blog page: http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/

On there, the four most recent entries are forked out from the Rand discussions. I think he does this because he likes to write long replies but doesn't like having them buried on comment pages - he wants everyone to behold their glory.

Well, it is his philosophical blog, and if he wants to discuss the terms separately, he can certainly do that. His approach is very rationalistic; so if you want to understand how a rationalistic philosopher thinks, he's a good source. But his ideas are a lot better than one can run into in higher level philosophy courses. The frustration comes from Objectivist wanting to point to facts to get a clarification, and him turning to definitions and mental conditions. At some point, as has already happened, each side has to conclude of the other that the other is not thinking clearly. He has already said that about Objectivists in his Ayn Rand comments. I don't see any reason to argue with him continuously, and I think Harry Binswanger and Travis Norsen got involved because he was showing a misunderstanding of Objectivism. It is certainly not fruitful to continually argue with those who do not hold your philosophical foundations, unless you think you can get them to check their premises.

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Well, it is his philosophical blog, and if he wants to discuss the terms separately, he can certainly do that. His approach is very rationalistic; so if you want to understand how a rationalistic philosopher thinks, he's a good source. But his ideas are a lot better than one can run into in higher level philosophy courses. The frustration comes from Objectivist wanting to point to facts to get a clarification, and him turning to definitions and mental conditions. At some point, as has already happened, each side has to conclude of the other that the other is not thinking clearly. He has already said that about Objectivists in his Ayn Rand comments. I don't see any reason to argue with him continuously, and I think Harry Binswanger and Travis Norsen got involved because he was showing a misunderstanding of Objectivism. It is certainly not fruitful to continually argue with those who do not hold your philosophical foundations, unless you think you can get them to check their premises.

Shouldn't it be possible to identify an error in his thinking, to show him why turning to definitions and mental conditions is the wrong approach? I'm not convinced yet that he is simply being evasive, nor do I think that HB and Travis are arguing poorly.

Edited by brian0918
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Shouldn't it be possible to identify an error in his thinking, to show him why turning to definitions and mental conditions is the wrong approach? I'm not convinced yet that he is simply being evasive, nor do I think that HB and Travis are arguing poorly.

I don't know. Is it possible? Yes, if one can get him to turn to the facts to back up his assertions, but he seems resistive to this approach. I wouldn't say he is blatantly irrational, he's just caught up in his rationalistic meanderings in his own mind. I think he is rather set in his ways and may not have the capability of checking his premises on that deep of a level.

Let me put it this way: Aristotle was the most rational philosopher of his day, but he couldn't convince Plato of changing his approach; consequently, Aristotle left The Academy and formed his own school, The Lyceum. Eventually, when there are enough Objectivists out there, private schools dedicated to the Objectivist approach will arise; but until, then one has to assess the possibility of changing professional minds on a case by case basis.

Sometimes outright rationalist show up on oo.net and I try to convince them to go to the facts, but I suspect they think that is soiling their minds. In other words, a primacy of consciousness approach is implicit in the rationalist way of thinking -- that logic is superior to facts. Once one reaches that state of mind, there may be no turning back.

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I agree with this assessment, but realize that if you have contradictions in your line of thinking, then you are not thinking rationally or logically. The definition is the one Miss Rand gave, and it includes induction and deduction.

I know what Rand's definition is, I want to know Why it is the definition of Logic?

I would actually have to look up what Aristotle said or look up what Dr.Peikoff said in his course on logic. I don't remember technically if an obvious contradiction to reality, like pigs flying, is a violation of a syllogism or not. In other words, when Aristotle developed the syllogism in the abstract, did he develop it only from true premises leading to true conclusions (given the context), or did he state that the form alone is sufficient, so long as direct necessity is implied. So, you've got me on that one. Aristotle came from a Platonic background, so he may have focused on the form, but I think he might also have said that one must actually understand the form and necessity (which would come from the law of identity).

From my understanding, Aristotle's work on logic revolved around deduction, and his inductive work is much smaller in scope. He defines a deduction in the following manner: A deduction is speech (logos) in which, certain things having been supposed, something different from those supposed results of necessity because of their being so. (Prior Analytics I.2, 24b18-20) There is no qualification of "truth" or "identification"; on the other hand, he starts with suppositions, which can be anything, i.e. All pigs can fly.

And it makes a difference if one is talking about the tradition and development of logic from Aristotle on. Frankly, I don't trust rationalistic definitions, and saying it is logic because of the form alone would be rationalistic.

I fail to see how this follows. If you had written "saying it is true because of the form alone would be rationalistic", then I would agree. I'm stuck on understanding why "logical" necessitates "true".

1) It falls within the realm of logic if one is going to be rationalistic about the issue; but it does not fall within the realm of logic in the rational sense of non-contradiction.

2) Same as #1: Rationalistically it is logical; rationally it is not.

3) Depending on how Aristotle developed the idea of the syllogism, it might be a syllogism.

4) Rationalistically, the argument is deductively valid; rationally speaking it is not; there is no logical conclusion that can follow from a contradiction.

5) Given what Bill said (and I'm not willing to take his word at it), since the first premise is false, then the argument is not sound.

This is really weird. The seperation of "rationally" and "rationalistically", so that the argument is not logical with respect to one, and is logical in respect to the other, makes no sense. Either it is, or it is not. Words must have a precise meaning, right? It's either a statement that falls within the realm of logic or not, it's either logical or not, etc.

3. According to Aristotle, it would be a syllogism.

4. I feel like your answer is circling around the question. In the first place: deduction, in and of itself, is rationalistic. Secondly, if the argument is a deduction (you granted this), and deduction is a part of logic, then we've come back to the first question: Does the statement fall within the realm of logic? Now we have to answer yes. The argument I presented, regardless of how ridiculous it is, is a deduction, is it not?

Edited by adrock3215
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