Rand's argument against determinism

[ctrl y]

Rand's argument against determinism has always bothered me, and I think I've figured out why. Rand is correct that if determinism is true, then the determinist is forced to believe as he believes by blind forces. However, this is only the case if the determinist is correct about determinism. In other words, the argument can cast all of the determinist's beliefs into doubt, except for the one Rand targets in her argument.

Edited February 15, 2009 by ctrl y

[knast]

Rand's argument against determinism has always bothered me, and I think I've figured out why. Rand is correct that if determinism is true, then the determinist is forced to believe as he believes by blind forces. However, this is only the case if the determinist is correct about determinism. In other words, the argument can cast all of the determinist's beliefs into doubt, except for the one Rand targets in her argument.

You have unfortunately misunderstood the argument (which, by the way, is not Ayn Rand's originally).

To begin with, it would be a obvious case of self-exclusion to say that the determinist would have a good reason to say that determinism is objectively true, if it actually is true. That is not true. It would still be impossible for him to objectively know that determinism is true, _if_ it would be true.

In addition, since reality is one and knowledge of reality also is and must be one integrated whole, there is _no_ way he can, somehow, know that determinism is true, while he also knows that he has no reason to believe that anything is (objectively) true. Say he would answer: "Determinism is true because it meets my criteria of truth." How can he know that his criteria of truth is valid? He can't and according to determinism he just believes what he believes. Not because it corresponds to reality, and he knows it and can prove it, but because of forces beyond his control makes him believe it. Can he even know that the concept he uses are objective? No. For, more or less, the same reason. Etc.

The point here is that once he have no reason to objectively believe that he knows or can know the truth about _anything_ except, somehow, determinism, then there is no way he can even know the truth about determinism. "Knowledge", "truth", "proof", etc would all be stolen concepts in this context. It all amounts to this: "Now, we know thanks to the discoveries of modern science, that man's volitional mind is an illusion. After all, the universe is as modern science have proved ruled by natural laws. This must therefore include man's mind and therefore volition simply must be a myth. Now, of course, this implies that everything I believe, I just happen to believe because of the interaction of natural laws, not because of any observations or logical inferences, based on said observations, I've made. This means that I believe in the discoveries of modern science, because of forces beyond my control, which means that the entire base that led me to believe in determinism in the first base, is totally undermined." Thus, "determinism" and _any pretense_ at being justified in believing in determinism as a "true" or "proven" doctrine, is to commit the fallacy of the stolen concept.

Edited February 15, 2009 by knast

[Prospectivist_Objectivist]

You have unfortunately misunderstood the argument (which, by the way, is not Ayn Rand's originally).

To begin with, it would be a obvious case of self-exclusion to say that the determinist would have a good reason to say that determinism is objectively true, if it actually is true. That is not true. It would still be impossible for him to objectively know that determinism is true, _if_ it would be true.

In addition, since reality is one and knowledge of reality also is and must be one integrated whole, there is _no_ way he can, somehow, know that determinism is true, while he also knows that he has no reason to believe that anything is (objectively) true. Say he would answer: "Determinism is true because it meets my criteria of truth." How can he know that his criteria of truth is valid? He can't and according to determinism he just believes what he believes. Not because it corresponds to reality, and he knows it and can prove it, but because of forces beyond his control makes him believe it. Can he even know that the concept he uses are objective? No. For, more or less, the same reason. Etc.

The point here is that once he have no reason to objectively believe that he knows or can know the truth about _anything_ except, somehow, determinism, then there is no way he can even know the truth about determinism. "Knowledge", "truth", "proof", etc would all be stolen concepts in this context. It all amounts to this: "Now, we know thanks to the discoveries of modern science, that man's volitional mind is an illusion. After all, the universe is as modern science have proved ruled by natural laws. This must therefore include man's mind and therefore volition simply must be a myth. Now, of course, this implies that everything I believe, I just happen to believe because of the interaction of natural laws, not because of any observations or logical inferences, based on said observations, I've made. This means that I believe in the discoveries of modern science, because of forces beyond my control, which means that the entire base that led me to believe in determinism in the first base, is totally undermined." Thus, "determinism" and _any pretense_ at being justified in believing in determinism as a "true" or "proven" doctrine, is to commit the fallacy of the stolen concept.

I have been struggling with this argument against determinism for some time, and I'm not sure it actually holds. Input one way or another would be appreciated. (Also: if it wasn't Ayn Rand's argument originally, whose was it?)

All this argument shows is that we cannot definitively conclude "that man's volitional mind is an illusion... (etc)." But from the fact that we cannot definitively conclude that a proposition is true, it does not follow that the proposition must not be true. (For example: the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle shows that we cannot ever be certain of certain electron properties, but it does not follow that an electron cannot have a certain proposed set of properties.) That is, I see no contradiction in the following thought experiment: suppose a universe exists which is completely determined. Suppose that in this universe, an organism develops, makes observations, and draws the (invalid) conclusion that its universe must be determined and its volition is an illusion. The organism's lack of logical rigor implies that the conclusion is invalid, not that the conclusion is necessarily false. The point is that this hypothetical determined universe does not place its nature at the mercy of the organisms it determines.

Moving to a different objection: if modern science shows that everything in the universe is ruled by natural laws and that every effect has a cause, then how can we possibly get around determinism? That is, suppose I accept the argument I challenged above: man is volitional. Then man somehow exercises free will independent of pre-existing physical realities (otherwise, volition would be a myth); but since no physical system acts independently of the pre-existing physical realities, it follows that some aspect of volition is nonphysical. Even if we accept this conclusion for now, it seems like modern science is getting better and better at explaining the mind in purely physical (well, electrochemical) terms. Yet the conclusion that some aspect of volition is nonphysical implies that science will never ever fully explain cognition in purely physical terms. The truth of this remains to be seen, but this seems a very dangerous supposition given the historical inability of such claims to withstand scientific advances.

But following my own objection: suppose science one day does explain cognition in purely physical terms; it would therefore follow that volition is an illusion. But for the above reasons, we can't draw that conclusion definitively; but neither can we ignore scientific findings.

Is this just an unresolvable paradox?

(Productive) comments appreciated!

[whYNOT]

I don't get it. If a particle's properties, velocity and position can be determined, is a matter for the physicists to investigate.

But we are - aren't we ? - talking philosophy here. Man is not a particle. He is a self-generating, self- directing, self-determinist ------- or he is not.

This argument reminds me of those that the New Age [ and Old Age ] mystics use, i.e. gleefully pouncing on fresh scientific evidence, in Physics or Biology, to 'prove' that they were 'right' : See, there must be a Supreme Power, see there is a Fate. Of course they have conveniently taken things out of context, or made the same fallacy as above, that what goes for natural bodies, must also go for Man.

Surely, consciousness, free will, and choice, pre-suppose self- determinism?

'Determinism' - "Theory that human action is not free but determined by motives regarded as external forces acting on the will."

Or am I totally misunderstanding this?

[Prospectivist_Objectivist]

WhYNOT: Unfortunately, you have not addressed the content of the argument. The Heisenberg example serves only to illustrate that a proposition can be true without necessarily being provable; the real content of the argument is in the paradox. To refute my objections, you'll need to show that the paradox is not actually a paradox. It is not sufficient to re-assert the conclusion: "Surely, consciousness, free will, and choice, pre-suppose self- determinism." The point is that if the universe is determined, then volition is an illusion (and therefore so are free will and choice).

[DavidOdden]

The Heisenberg example serves only to illustrate that a proposition can be true without necessarily being provable; the real content of the argument is in the paradox.

Here is a staring-point question that you need to answer, from the Objectivist perspective: what is "truth"? This implies an answer to the related question "what is 'true'?". I am deliberately ignoring the question of whether there is a particular unknowability in the universe, because I'm not yet persuaded that you have the correct epistemology -- hence we have to get straight on the philosophy before attempting to address the science.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

The apparent paradox arises due to thinking about causality strictly in terms of Aristotle's Efficient Cause, whereby one thing acts on another, leading to the second body doing something. However, this is an incomplete understanding of causation. Aristotle actually had a four-fold conception of causality; and then later boiled it down to an entity acting according to its nature. During the Industrial Revolution, his Efficient Cause took root, while the rest of his understanding of causation was effectively dropped. So, if one starts off with a non-complete understanding of causation, then, yes, it will lead to apparent paradoxes.

The position of the Determinists also ignores a directly observable aspect of human consciousness, that a human being can indeed make choices. So, to claim that "the whole universe is deterministic" in the efficient cause sense, is simply wrong. I wouldn't even put it in terms of man being an exception, because we don't know if animals make choices or not; because sometimes they seem to, but that would be difficult to identify, since we don't experience their type of consciousness directly. In other words, the direct observation that humans do make choices and are self-directed overrides the determinist's approach to causation -- i.e. it is wrong.

[Prospectivist_Objectivist]

Here is a staring-point question that you need to answer, from the Objectivist perspective: what is "truth"? This implies an answer to the related question "what is 'true'?". I am deliberately ignoring the question of whether there is a particular unknowability in the universe, because I'm not yet persuaded that you have the correct epistemology -- hence we have to get straight on the philosophy before attempting to address the science.

In this case, "truth" is that which exists, and existence is primary. In some cases, we can discover truth through rational inquiry; and in other cases, such as the one illustrated here, we cannot discover truth (an electron has a certain set of properties, we just can't know them all).

Please carry on...

[Prospectivist_Objectivist]

The apparent paradox arises due to thinking about causality strictly in terms of Aristotle's Efficient Cause, whereby one thing acts on another, leading to the second body doing something. However, this is an incomplete understanding of causation. Aristotle actually had a four-fold conception of causality; and then later boiled it down to an entity acting according to its nature. During the Industrial Revolution, his Efficient Cause took root, while the rest of his understanding of causation was effectively dropped. So, if one starts off with a non-complete understanding of causation, then, yes, it will lead to apparent paradoxes.

The position of the Determinists also ignores a directly observable aspect of human consciousness, that a human being can indeed make choices. So, to claim that "the whole universe is deterministic" in the efficient cause sense, is simply wrong. I wouldn't even put it in terms of man being an exception, because we don't know if animals make choices or not; because sometimes they seem to, but that would be difficult to identify, since we don't experience their type of consciousness directly. In other words, the direct observation that humans do make choices and are self-directed overrides the determinist's approach to causation -- i.e. it is wrong.

As for the first objection: I'm thinking of causality less in Aristotilian terms than in terms of modern science, which has shown over and over again that physical systems consistently follow certain laws and that the activity of physical systems is always dependent on pre-existing physical realities.

As for the second objection: that a human being can indeed make choices is not a directly observable aspect of human consciousness. What is observable is that a man can think he is making choices, and he can think he actually had the ability to take an action different from the one he took. It does not immediately follow that man could have actually rejected his chosen action and taken another.

[whYNOT]

First off, there is no paradox, to my mind. The fact that some thinkers entertain that idea is for them to prove, not for me to disprove.

The Universe can be fully explained in terms of cause and effect, but it is self-evident that Man has options.

I can change my thoughts, - and my subsequent actions - at will.

Following that first thought will come another thought and action, then another, at each stage putting me in some place with an almost infinite number of choices at my disposal, leading to me, let's say, married to Charlize Theron, and living in Acapulco, exactly one year from now.

I cannot deny my physical being, and it's composition of molecules and cells all performing according to a Law of nature, and doubtlessly unpredictability and random chance play a huge role in life; but the question has to be answered : "Just who is steering my ship?"

Nature, to be commanded,must be obeyed, said Ayn Rand. Surely she also included the nature of Man in that commanding? To that end, volition is our only tool.

[Capitalism Forever]

Moving to a different objection: if modern science shows that everything in the universe is ruled by natural laws and that every effect has a cause, then how can we possibly get around determinism?

Modern (more precisely, post-modern) science has "shown" a lot of things that aren't so. In order to be valid, scientific reasoning has to be built on a correct metaphysical and epistemological foundation; if science reaches a conclusion that contradicts fundamental philosophical axioms, that is prima facie evidence of the invalidity of the science.

The problem with the statement "everything in the universe is ruled by natural laws" is that it reverses the relationship between metaphysics and epistemology, committing the fallacy known as the primacy of consciousness. A natural law is a general principle that describes many concrete facts of reality in one sentence (or one formula, or one set of equations, etc.); it is an epistemological construct, existing in men's minds as a product of their cognition, not as some intrinsic factor in outside reality telling objects how to behave. Each concrete object behaves the way it does because of its own nature, and laws are formulated by men based on the natures of concrete objects, not the other way around. Concrete existents are the primary ; laws are (or ought to be) derived from them. Thus, it is not "everything in the universe" that is "ruled by natural laws," but rather, it is natural laws that ought to be "ruled" by "everything in the universe."

[knast]

The argument that knowledge becomes impossible if materialistic determinism is true was raised against pre-Socratic materialists. The argument that knowledge, truth and proof become stolen concepts if determinism is true was, however, first raised by Ayn Rand.

Look, how do we reach knowledge? How do we, for instance, reach scientific knowledge? Well, for one thing, we have to apply the scientific method. But if we had no choice regarding our thinking, then what would be the use of recommending the scientific method?

If we are determined to always be right, then a method would be unnecessary. If we are determined to always be wrong, then a method would be impossible.

The fact is that we can reach truth and knowledge only by adhering to reality, and we can only adhere to reality if we follow a specific method (logic), and it's only possible and necessary to follow this suggested method (logic), if we are in control over our thinking.

Thus, volition is a precondition of knowledge and truth. Thus, you cannot use scientific knowledge as an argument against the very preconditions of knowledge and truth, namely volition.

The idea that free will must be an illusion because everything in reality is determined by physical laws is not true. In fact, it is a logical fallacy. To be specific it is a fallacy of composition. What you are saying is this: Because everything consists of atoms, and all the atoms are determined by physical laws, therefore everything, including human beings, must be determined by the laws of physics, and therefore free will cannot be possible. It must be an illusion.

But notice that by this reasoning you can just as well argue that it must be an illusion that you can see. After all, atoms cannot see, yet your eyes consist of atoms. And consciousness must also be impossible, because, again, the atoms do not possess any consciousness. Therefore, you must be unconscious. Etc.

Look at reality. You are conscious. You can observe that you possess volition just as you can observe that the grass is green. What else do you need? Are you going to argue that you do not see what you see? That you are not really conscious of your own mind and that you have control over your mind and your body? I.e., that you have free will? The laws of physics are real, and volition is real, but how does one combine them? That is not a philosophical question but a scientific question. The only thing we know for sure is that neither is an illusion and if we deny either, we end in contradictions.

Edited June 10, 2009 by knast

[Prospectivist_Objectivist]

The last few posts have not been terribly productive. WhYNOT either didn't read the paradox (see near the top) or misunderstood it. Capitalism Forever's correction is right but irrelevant, as it does not actually address the paradox. Knat's argument simply re-states the already-conceded fact that we cannot definitively conclude that determinism is true based on scientific knowledge; and Knat fails to argue the actual point, i.e. that determinism actually is impossible.

Still interested in thoughts.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Still interested in thoughts.

Actually, you've been answered in spades: There is no contradiction between causality and free will. An entity acts according to what it is; and we are what we are, and one of our abilities is to be self-directing. So, there is no paradox between "all of reality being deterministic" and man having free will; because determinism as an intellectual position on the nature of causality is wrong.

You had to decide to register on this website and to choose a user name and a password of your own free will. By the way, you know what an interesting experiment would be? To set up a website stating that you must pay $500 to enter. If determinism is true, then you would have no choice not to pay the $500 and enter the website

[Prospectivist_Objectivist]

Actually, you've been answered in spades: There is no contradiction between causality and free will. An entity acts according to what it is; and we are what we are, and one of our abilities is to be self-directing. So, there is no paradox between "all of reality being deterministic" and man having free will; because determinism as an intellectual position on the nature of causality is wrong.

You had to decide to register on this website and to choose a user name and a password of your own free will. By the way, you know what an interesting experiment would be? To set up a website stating that you must pay $500 to enter. If determinism is true, then you would have no choice not to pay the $500 and enter the website

On the contrary, my inquiry was precisely whether or not there is a contradiction between causality and free will, and this has yet to be demonstrated-- only asserted. As I noted above, free will is not self-evident, so its non-contradiction with causality is nontrivial. I look forward to someone demonstrating this non-contradiction. Since you seem confident on the point, would you please do the honors?

As for the website entry fee: your experiment would not demonstrate much. A determinist would respond that while I probably would not pay the entry fee, it would be because of physical conditions set long ago and I could not actually have done anything else.

Edited June 11, 2009 by Prospectivist_Objectivist

[DavidOdden]

As I noted above, free will is not self-evident, so its non-contradiction with causality is nontrivial.

Do you believe that you are fallible?

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

A determinist would respond that while I probably would not pay the entry fee, it would be because of physical conditions set long ago and I could not actually have done anything else.

Well, then not having any control over your prior conditions, there isn't anything you can do to change your mind or that we can do to change your mind. It was all set billions of years ago that you would be logging onto oo.net and to post your messages -- which, of course, means that we can ignore them like so much static on our TV sets. It's just a fact of nature, not changeable by anything we choose to do.

Thanks for letting us know that.

[Prospectivist_Objectivist]

Well, then not having any control over your prior conditions, there isn't anything you can do to change your mind or that we can do to change your mind. It was all set billions of years ago that you would be logging onto oo.net and to post your messages -- which, of course, means that we can ignore them like so much static on our TV sets. It's just a fact of nature, not changeable by anything we choose to do.

Thanks for letting us know that.

This is an observably false inference since people "change their minds" all the time. A determinist would remark that you could still convince me, even though the sequence of events which led to my being convinced and the illusion of choice I experience while changing my mind were determined.

The epistemology to which you (allegedly) subscribe dictates that higher-order knowledge may only be gained through reason. Is it really so much for me to ask that you defend your contention? I'm not sure how confident I would be in my own philosophical premises if I elected not to defend them when challenged, but it's naturally your decision (speaking in non-deterministic language).

I'm not just calling on Mr. Miovas. I encourage anyone here to consider what seems a rather legitimate challenge to both free will and determinism.

Do you believe that you are fallible?

Obviously. Please connect this to the question at hand.

[hunterrose]

If modern science shows that everything in the universe is ruled by natural laws and that every effect has a cause, then how can we possibly get around determinism?

fallacy of composition

Suppose science one day does explain cognition in purely physical terms; it...

You mean prove that every thought is reducible to specific environmental factors?? Can any type of lab experiment possibly prove that? If what you are supposing is in fact beyond the power of science, then there's no paradox.

IMO scientifically proving human determinism is just as impossible as scientifically proving human volition.

For what it's worth, I don't think Rand's statement - that a determinist ultimately believes his arguments for determinism aren't the result of careful independent thought, but rather the result of his environment - was her argument against determinism. That was only pointing out an interesting side thought, not her actual philosophical case against determinism.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

This is an observably false inference since people "change their minds" all the time.

Oh, I see, you want me to conjure up the illusion that I changed your mind.

I am not a magician, so I don't deal in illusions.

I observe that I make choices, and I choose not to ignore that; you observe that you make choices, but you choose to ignore that. So, what can I possibly do that would get you to realize that you are posting here of your own free will?

[nanite1018]

Alright, I'm going to take this one up again because I've read OPAR and ITOE and feel better prepared than I was before.

I see this as on one level an issue of definitions and connotations, the meaning of words make talking about the subject difficult ("choice" "decision" etc. cannot be used in the same way by a person arguing for determinism as they are by one arguing for volition, each misunderstands the other, or will bring up problems which aren't problems if you understood what the other is trying to say).

I could never have made any decision other than the one I ended up making in a given situation given all of the past events in my life (beliefs, actions, state of the world, etc.) as an absolute given. I may have felt that I had, but I never really did, when I think about it. All I do when making a decision is create a number of options (pick up glass, put down glass, read ITOE, read Critique of Pure Reason, etc.) and then go through a process of selection (comparing my desires at that moment, emotional state, etc.) eventually coming to a conclusion about which I will do. Before the selection process, I feel like I could do any of those things (because if I didn't think it possible that I might want to do it, I wouldn't have brought it up for consideration). I have the sense "I could do anything, no one can predict it, not even me, at least not accurately." In a way, I "could" do any of those things, because no one could know which I will actually end up doing. Then I go through whatever selection process (whether it be a vague guess based on emotional reaction or a long process of careful processing of my values, time, conditions, etc.). After I have selected a course of action and carried it out, I remember that feeling of "I can do anything" and say "I made a free choice." Well, no, not really. I just came up with some options and selected one by some process. That whole process was "determined" by my conditions (both physical and mental, including beliefs, habits, attitudes, and values) and couldn't have been any other way. This is why people feel they have freedom of choice, its the feeling one gets before someone has chosen, and it is a result of the sometimes unpredictable nature of our thoughts (that is simply because consciousness isn't primary, our brain is, and a "thought" isn't a conscious thought until it comes into contact with our ego, the "I" in our minds, the concept I have of me, that is, until it becomes conscious.

Either our mind is simply subatomic particles arranged in a certain way acting according to certain physical laws (whatever those may be, there must be some since there can only be a finite number of particles and they must have a definite nature which will determine their behavior in all situations) which has the ability to do certain things (create models of other objects, even a model of itself, compute information, etc.) or there is something nonphysical which is outside of the range of physics and thus outside science's domain (physics is the base of all science, because it is about the interactions of everything which makes up the universe at the most basic level) which creates consciousness. There is no middle ground. Magic or science, you can't have a "neither" option.

Just because your brain came up with a course of action to take doesn't mean it couldn't be incorrect or end up harming you, it simply means that you came to a conclusion. You aren't infallible (in the sense that you are not able to make a decision which would end up worse for you than another that you "might" have made), and so you still must apply reason as best you can because it has been found time and again to be the best way of optimizing your life, since it is based on the unalterable fact that existence exists and that A is A.

The idea of "self-generated, self-directed action" can still exist in a deterministic universe in the same sense it exists in a volitional universe (so long as it doesn't have any non corporeal souls or other supernatural gobbledygook). When you perform an action, who selected that course of action from some set of initial possible alternatives? You did. When you choose to not think of some important piece of information, who selected to do that instead of working out the implications? You did. When you choose to not focus, who selects to live in a world of fog instead of one of clarity? You did. Your brain went through a process of selection. Yes, that process arose from previous events in your life and the current conditions around you, but how could it not if you accept that humans are born tabula rasa? Your brain still went through the process. You are your brain and body, that physical system went through a process which resulted in a course of action, and so you chose that course of action. We can talk about decision-making in two ways, the physical/material/scientific or the psychological/philosophical but they are the same thing because they are reflections of a single reality. If they don't mean the same thing, if its impossible to translate between them then there is an error somewhere. I am my body, if my body did something, I did it, if I came up with some options and picked one, I chose it. That's the resolution, in my mind, between the so-called "mind-body problem" and the "determinism v. volition" issue.

[DavidOdden]

Obviously. Please connect this to the question at hand.

In contrast, a fire, rock or bacterium are infallible -- they do what they do automatically, and cannot fail to do what they do. This is also true of animals, because their consciousnesses are automatic. Being fallible implies being capable of making the wrong choice, which implies being capable of making choice. It is obvious -- self-evident -- that you are fallible, and therefore that you are capable of making choices. Being capable of making choices is just another way of saying that you have volition, or free will.

[Grames]

Either our mind is simply subatomic particles arranged in a certain way acting according to certain physical laws (whatever those may be, there must be some since there can only be a finite number of particles and they must have a definite nature which will determine their behavior in all situations) which has the ability to do certain things (create models of other objects, even a model of itself, compute information, etc.) or there is something nonphysical which is outside of the range of physics and thus outside science's domain (physics is the base of all science, because it is about the interactions of everything which makes up the universe at the most basic level) which creates consciousness. There is no middle ground. Magic or science, you can't have a "neither" option.

This premise that there exists a set of physical laws which are determinative of everything is a claim that physics is, or potentially is, a formally complete and consistent theory. This guy Gödel had something to say about formal systems that claimed completeness.

On The Physical Meaning of Volition by Ronald E. Merrill in the defunct journal Objectivity offers an argument based on Gödel's Incompleteness Proof that the laws of physics can never be complete, so the determinist argument from physics fails.

[Prospectivist_Objectivist]

fallacy of composition

You mean prove that every thought is reducible to specific environmental factors?? Can any type of lab experiment possibly prove that? If what you are supposing is in fact beyond the power of science, then there's no paradox.

IMO scientifically proving human determinism is just as impossible as scientifically proving human volition.

For what it's worth, I don't think Rand's statement - that a determinist ultimately believes his arguments for determinism aren't the result of careful independent thought, but rather the result of his environment - was her argument against determinism. That was only pointing out an interesting side thought, not her actual philosophical case against determinism.

Thank you for a relevant reply.

How is this the fallacy of composition? The argument is not that people behave the same way as atoms. The argument is that if everything in the mind is reducible to physical processes, and since we know all physical processes depend entirely on the initial conditions of a physical system, then the mind also must be such a physical system, so it must be determined by its initial conditions just like any physical system. If this is still fallacious, please explain how.

For the second part-- you're right, I'm making the supposition that science will eventually be good enough to show this. If science can't ever do that, the conclusions which follow are false. But the trend seems to be that each decade, science explains things where until recently were considered well out of humanity's reach. Consequently, this assumption may not be so far out.

[Prospectivist_Objectivist]

Oh, I see, you want me to conjure up the illusion that I changed your mind.

I am not a magician, so I don't deal in illusions.

I observe that I make choices, and I choose not to ignore that; you observe that you make choices, but you choose to ignore that. So, what can I possibly do that would get you to realize that you are posting here of your own free will?

You continue simply to assert this nontrivial conclusion. The only way free will could be axiomatically "self-evident" is if we could (and this is obviously impossible) play reality over again and witness people doing different things under the exact same initial conditions. Since we can't do that, free will is much more problematic, because we have no means of showing trivially that someone can do something other than they did.

A determinist would remark that you would not be conjuring up an illusion. You would be doing the only thing you could do, and so would I. "Illusion" is a euphemism for our mistaken perception that we have volition.

I encourage you to recognize the weaknesses of this philosophical premise and treat it more rigorously. All manner of philosophers attempt to mock those with whom they disagree, yet such an approach is ineffective without a complementary rigorous argument.