The Fallacy of Composition

[Grames]

Determinism still allows that people reduce all their knowledge to the perceptual level, so your first paragraph seems to simply be addressing the question of what is required for certainty, rather than any problem inherent in determinism as a position.

What I described as objective certainty is true certainty because it is certainty about what exists. Determinism is only capable of generating unavoidable conclusions (subjective certainty) due to deterministically being unable to find existing evidence to the contrary.

From Dr. Peikoff's uncertainty lecture in The Art of Thinking: "Errors are avoidable only by knowing and applying epistemology. No error is inevitable after that, but errors are still possible. If error was inevitable even to a methodologically conscious adult then determinism would be true."

I don't think volitional and determinist epistemologies are symmetric on the principle of excluding the arbitrary. Volition assumes a reliable means to check for error; if no error is found that is because there is no error. I'm not convinced that assumption is available in determinism. I'll have to come back to this when I sort it out.

So that leaves your explanation for why determinism is wrong at simply "It doesn't fit with what we see introspectively, and so by placing one form of perceptual evidence (the sciences) against introspection you are invoking perceptual indeterminism which does not allow for real knowledge." Okay, I think I can deal with this without much trouble. The trouble is simply what I have described the whole time in the above: My perception that I may have done otherwise is not actually what I perceive. I perceive that any of the courses I am considering are "possible" (since I am considering all of them as a course I might want to take), and then select one of them. I then say "well I could have done otherwise", but that simply involves me recalling the lack of knowledge I had prior to my decision, not an actual characteristic of reality.

Actually I should have written 'self-contradictory' to highlight the issue. All other perception mechanisms function in the manner of transducers: something exists, then a corresponding perception exists. This 'deterministic perception' model is common to the deterministic and volitional theories we have been discussing. But in determinism one thing is different: our perception of the power of choice is the result of something that does not exist. This special treatment of this one perception is special pleading, and it is indeterministic and actually acausal to suggest nothing ('lack of knowledge') can cause something (ironically exactly the same fault you claim to see in volition), and can cause it consistently (what, a permanent illusion?). That the caused perception is the opposite of what actually happens is not how any other perception works.

Why is all of this misperceiving necessary? Nature is pretty good at paring down form to function over generations of evolution, of what survival value is this permanent built-in lie we tell ourselves? We can't handle the truth? Apparently the many people advocating the determinist position can handle the truth just fine, so that makes no sense either. The whole Rube Goldberg construct should be excised with Occam's Razor.

Also, I find the way you described the perception of volition as about the past to be strange. The power to choose and the perception of that power is in the present, not the past or the future. There can be memories of any kind of perception including this one, but perception happens in real-time.

Essentially, I am explaining why we introspectively feel we have choice in much the same way science explains why we see colors, how touch works, the workings of our sense of smell, why some thing are registered as pleasant while others painful, etc.

No, the perception of choice is not treated like other perceptions in the determinist scheme, and contradicts the principle of determinism as applied to all other modes of perception.

[Marc K.]

I am only going to say one or two things about your last post to me since I think you and Grames have changed to a much more rational course of inquiry.

I am going to take the follow as a concession:

Your preference is what made you do it, but it was made up of the interactions of the particles in your brain, which (if certain interpretations of quantum mechanics are correct) could have turned out differently and so you may have had a different preference.

It can be read several different ways, all of which, thankfully signal an end to our foray into rationalism. If we edit your sentence a little by removing parenthetical remarks we get: "Your preference is what made you do it, which could have turned out differently..." which is the way I read it. I'm sure you would object and say instead that what you meant was: "the interactions of the particles could have turned out differently" but that contradicts your whole premise from the start. Namely, that given certain starting conditions, everything is determined, everything had to be the way it is. But surely if you are going to allow that the interactions of particles could have turned out differently, then you no longer could have an objection to some other existent acting the same way.

Its not like a sign flashes and says "hey, this isn't real, its just your eyes telling you that your going crazy." You have to figure out that your senses are fooling you.

Actually that is exactly what is happening, but you do have to figure it out using your mind, just like everything else. But again your senses aren't fooling you. The extent to which "you are being fooled" (which I think is a dubious description), is the same extent to which you are fooled by a pencil in water. The rest of your body has ways to signal of impending danger and your brain needs the same when it is under attack. Its flashes a scary danger sign, something you've never seen before: the unreal.

If that is the case than sense-perception is still perfectly valid.

That's what I wanted to hear. And if you sense that you have free will, then that is a valid perception.

Now, onto better things, the discussion of Objectivism. I'm glad that Grames has steered the conversation in a much more rational direction, I'll let him take it for a while and may reenter after judging your responses since I am still uncertain of your purpose here: whether you are dedicated to the truth or whether you are determined to defend your position regardless of the truth.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

When it comes to determinism and knowledge, the thing is that if you do not have volition then you didn't have anything to do with your own knowledge -- it's just something that happened to you, like a computer being programmed. A computer doesn't have knowledge, it's just a machine that has certain inputs, runs certain processes due to those inputs, and then outputs a determined result. Human conceptual consciousness does not work that way; in a sense we can say that is the way the senses work and how emotions work -- certain inputs result in certain outputs automatically (if we take awareness of colors and such as an output). However, sensory evidence and emotions are not knowledge, at least not in the human sense. In order to have knowledge, a man must direct his own mind volitionally to focus on the facts in an integrated and non-contradictory manner (logic) -- this processing of information does not happen automatically; you must put forth the self-effort to come to a proper conclusion using the proper method. Without the method of logic, it is just inputs and outputs based upon whatever programming you happened to have, the programming that you didn't have anything to do with, but rather got programmed by your society, your teachers, your parents, or whatever you happened to have encountered in life.

The human mind does not automatically remain focused on the facts of reality in a logical manner; logic as in a non-contradictory identification of the facts of reality as given by observation. This is something you must do by means of your own directing of your own mind. If you don't do that, then you are not much more than a robot going by a programming; and you have defaulted on what it means to be human -- of being a rational man. Inputs leading to outputs is not rationality; your computer is not rational no matter how accurate its output is. Rationality requires you to take the reigns of your own mind and to direct yourself to be logical. And contradicting the facts of reality of the nature of your own mind is not being logical. That is, determinism, insofar as it denies the self-evidence of volition, is not a rational position.

[nanite1018]

I don't think volitional and determinist epistemologies are symmetric on the principle of excluding the arbitrary. Volition assumes a reliable means to check for error; if no error is found that is because there is no error. I'm not convinced that assumption is available in determinism. I'll have to come back to this when I sort it out.

Well I'll give you my view of how I think about it. What you require of volitional entities, namely that they check out everything in their minds against reality, make sure that their predictions match reality (as a way of finding contradictions), etc. are all possible to a determinist entity, in principle. Sure, they may make an error, but if they are applying the correct method (just as in volitional entities), they will, by the nature of reality, have to come across the problem. That doesn't mean they have to correct the error, after all evasion is always an option, as is simple oversight, but the evidence is there so long as the entity looks for it.

So, if a deterministic entity cannot find any evidence to the contrary, and has applied the correct method (basically the same as a volitonal one), then there is no error in its context. It seems odd to me that Objectivists will claim that "if you do everything properly, i.e. follow the method we set out, then if you don't find an error there isn't one", but then will say "just because you are determined, following precisely the same method and finding no error means simply that you can't find one." The method seems to be the key, and obviously if you apply it right then there is no error (or at least, any claim of the possibility of error can be dismissed in the same way as one deals with any skeptics in Objectivism, as arbitrary).

But in determinism one thing is different: our perception of the power of choice is the result of something that does not exist. This special treatment of this one perception is special pleading, and it is indeterministic and actually acausal to suggest nothing ('lack of knowledge') can cause something (ironically exactly the same fault you claim to see in volition)...

Because by the nature of any conceivable system, anything at all, it will not be able to accurately predict what it is about to do (before it actually makes a decision). Therefore it is obvious that we would not be able to predict what we'll do, and that any and all options we think up will seem possible to us (because they literally are, as far as our own knowledge of the workings of our mind can say at that point). Also, we are determined by the workings of our brains, but our brains are us, and so we are still the ones making decisions and deciding what we do. So the feeling that "I decided to...." is totally valid, as was our perception that any of the possibilities we dreamed up were available options at the time (since we could never under any circumstances know the future state of our minds with perfect accuracy). So I don't think that I am denying almost any of what introspection tells us, I am denying an assumption we then make based on it, namely, that given exactly the same conditions we would have been able to do something different. That isn't what we sense, we sense that as far as we can tell we could do any of our options, that doesn't mean that is absolutely true in the strictest sense.

Nature is pretty good at paring down form to function over generations of evolution, of what survival value is this permanent built-in lie we tell ourselves?

Because our introspective observations are a component of our nature as a physical system (and as a conscious entity, as a sub-set of that), as described above.

No, the perception of choice is not treated like other perceptions in the determinist scheme, and contradicts the principle of determinism as applied to all other modes of perception.

It is an explanation why we introspect what we do. Similarly science explains why we see the visible spectrum, why we have the four major flavors we do, why we are sensitive to certain smells, we our sense of hot and cold can be fooled by placing warm and cool rods near to each other on your skin, etc. It is an explanation for why we see what we do, why we sense what we do, and I think it is perfectly in line with how science, and determinism (I don't think it really applies, but okay), addresses the senses.

[nanite1018]

Without the method of logic, it is just inputs and outputs based upon whatever programming you happened to have, the programming that you didn't have anything to do with, but rather got programmed by your society, your teachers, your parents, or whatever you happened to have encountered in life.

If I am tabula rasa at birth, then the "I" I have, all my experiences that made me me, from birth, are the result of whatever programming I got by my society, teachers, parents, etc. That doesn't make the "I" any less meaningful, and as far as I can tell it does not make logic or knowledge impossible.

The human mind does not automatically remain focused on the facts of reality in a logical manner; logic as in a non-contradictory identification of the facts of reality as given by observation. This is something you must do by means of your own directing of your own mind. If you don't do that, then you are not much more than a robot going by a programming; and you have defaulted on what it means to be human -- of being a rational man. Inputs leading to outputs is not rationality; your computer is not rational no matter how accurate its output is. Rationality requires you to take the reigns of your own mind and to direct yourself to be logical. And contradicting the facts of reality of the nature of your own mind is not being logical. That is, determinism, insofar as it denies the self-evidence of volition, is not a rational position.

I know that the mind does not remain on the facts of reality, and I know that logic requires non-contradictory identification. The point is not that I must "take the reigns of my own mind" but simply follow the only logical method for gaining any sort of knowledge about reality, and that is discovered by basing it on the axioms of existence and the nature of man's senses and mind. I don't see why volition is necessary, in the strict sense that at any given time I can actually do any of the things I consider doing. They don't seem related, what matters is which path I take, not whether I had a choice.

[hunterrose]

What you require of volitional entities, namely that they check out everything in their minds against reality, make sure that their predictions match reality, etc. are all possible to a determinist entity, in principle. Sure, they may make an error, but if they are applying the correct method, they will, by the nature of reality, have to come across the problem.

How would a deterministic person tell whether X is objectively correct or whether X is objectively incorrect, but she is determined to believe X was correct?

The issue isn't that she can't be guaranteed that she's correctly distinguishing one from the other. That, as I believe you have stated, woud apply to volitional beings as well.

The issue is that

1. If the universe's initial state is "wrong" (i.e. is an initial state that determines that she will distinguish X incorrectly), it is impossible for her to distinguish X correctly; if the universe's initial state is "misleading" (i.e. is an initial state that determines that she won't find out that she is distinguishing X incorrectly), it is impossible for her to find out that she was distinguishing X incorrectly.
   
2. it is impossible to know whether the universe's initial state is "wrong" or "misleading" in terms of X.
   

Do these impossibilities exist for a volitional person?

Edited July 13, 2009 by hunterrose

[nanite1018]

[*]If the universe's initial state is "wrong" (i.e. is an initial state that determines that she will distinguish X incorrectly), it is impossible for her to distinguish X correctly; if the universe's initial state is "misleading" (i.e. is an initial state that determines that she won't find out that she is distinguishing X incorrectly), it is impossible for her to find out that she was distinguishing X incorrectly.

[*]it is impossible to know whether the universe's initial state is "wrong" or "misleading" in terms of X.

Do these impossibilities exist for a volitional person?

Yes, actually. If I make an error, at that exact moment in time it is impossible for me to know that I made one (since obviously, at that point I believe I was correct). It is only at some later time, for example when I am double-checking my reasoning, that I might find it. THere is no guarantee that a volitional being would find their mistake.

Determinism isn't about categorical "fates", such as what you described above. Just because a person makes an error now does not in any way mean that they must continue with that error for the rest of their lives.

By the way, how would a volitional being find out if they were correct or if they had made a mistake? They would apply a particular method, reason, and after they had checked their conclusions a number of times, and made sure everything fit together nicely, they would have no reason to believe that they had made an error. The only way for them to find one at that point is if they ran into a contradiction at some later date. If you have no reason to believe that you are incorrect then any claim of error (without actually pointing one out) is arbitrary and can be dismissed.

Your argument about whether a deterministic person could distinguish between herself being correct or if she was making an error is the same as the one a skeptic makes for a volitional being, "Man can make mistakes, so you might be wrong, even if there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that you are." That is an arbitrary claim and can be rejected. Until someone actually finds an error in the deterministic person's thinking (whether themselves or someone else) then any claim of error is at best arbitrary skepticism.

[Eiuol]

Yes, actually. If I make an error, at that exact moment in time it is impossible for me to know that I made one (since obviously, at that point I believe I was correct). It is only at some later time, for example when I am double-checking my reasoning, that I might find it. THere is no guarantee that a volitional being would find their mistake.

I would agree that even non-volitional entities can double-check their "reasoning", much like a computer. But I know that when I double-check my reasoning, I am aware that I am doing it. I am not sure how I can validate that -you- have free-will, other than I know that I am human and I know you are. I cannot sense what you sense, I cannot feel what you feel. I can't feel your pain if you have a headache. How would I be able to tell you if some other alien life-form possesses free-will, I do not know. If one is aware that they are making a choice, then that does not sound deterministic at all. If humans make decisions deterministically, how exactly do you explain that you are not simply aware, but aware that you are consciously making a choice?

Edited July 13, 2009 by Eiuol

[nanite1018]

I would agree that even non-volitional entities can double-check their "reasoning", much like a computer. But I know that when I double-check my reasoning, I am aware that I am doing it. I am not sure how I can validate that -you- have free-will, other than I know that I am human and I know you are. I cannot sense what you sense, I cannot feel what you feel. I can't feel your pain if you have a headache. How would I be able to tell you if some other alien life-form possesses free-will, I do not know. If one is aware that they are making a choice, then that does not sound deterministic at all. If humans make decisions deterministically, how exactly do you explain that you are not simply aware, but aware that you are consciously making a choice?

I am aware that I am making a choice from a number of options. I explain that as a natural result of the way my brain must operate, in order to find the most optimal solution to any given problem (since our conceptual/reasoning faculties are not perfect or "automatic" in the sense that an animals instincts are) we must brainstorm a few options that seem on the surface like a good idea and select from among them. I am conscious of the fact that it is possible that any of those options are open to me, should I pick that one (obviously since otherwise it wouldn't even be on the table). My selection process however seems like it must be a result of how my brain works, a deterministic (or perhaps semi-random), result of everything I know, my conditions, the world around me, etc. When I make a decision about something, I know that given everything I am it couldn't have been a different way, because I chose it. My identity is all my knowledge, beliefs, experiences, my emotions, my "gut-feelings", my thoughts, my reasoning, and my body itself and when faced with a decision given all that I came to a conclusion which is an expression of who I am.

Many people seem to have a problem with determinism because they feel as if determinism means they aren't actually making a choice, or are somehow not in control of themselves. That is silly. My view is that "I" make a choice, and my choice is a direct result of everything I am. I make choices based on what I am which in turn affects in numerous ways what and who I am. Isn't that self-determination and self-control?

[hunterrose]

Your argument about whether a deterministic person could distinguish between herself being correct or if she was making an error is the same as the one a skeptic makes for a volitional being, "Man can make mistakes, so you might be wrong, even if there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that you are." That is an arbitrary claim and can be rejected.

Those are arbitrary claims, I suppose, but that isn't my argument. But I will note that in one case there may be something you that you don't know but could have and will be able to know and in another case there is something you couldn't have known and may never be able to know.

Taking one who makes an error in judgement:

If she is volitional, that she may be wrong because she doesn't know something is arbitrary and should be rejected as you say.

My argument, that the universe's initial state is such that, if she is deterministic, it either

1. was impossible for this person to have not made the error or
   
2. will be impossible for this person to ever rectify her error,
   

is not arbitrary. Surely you acknowledge these facts?

I'm not saying determinism is erroneous because of the above, but it does impact the idea of knowledge (and dependent subjects) in a deterministic world, take it for what you will.

[Grames]

Because by the nature of any conceivable system, anything at all, it will not be able to accurately predict what it is about to do (before it actually makes a decision). Therefore it is obvious that we would not be able to predict what we'll do, and that any and all options we think up will seem possible to us (because they literally are, as far as our own knowledge of the workings of our mind can say at that point).

To summarize your position as I understand it:

We can't and don't perceive the future, or even predict it, resulting in a perception of multiple possibilities. The perception of possibility is not the reality. We only ever select one alternative from among several, proving only one alternative was possible all along.

There is an assumption here that if we could perceive the future it would be only one future, the deterministically pre-determined future. This assumes the premise.

The standard of knowledge you are applying here is perception of the future; we could only know determinism was false if we could perceive the future and it was multiple possibilities. It is true we can't and don't perceive the future, and that applies even to the bits of reality around us that are fully deterministic, the static and dynamic mechanics of structures and machines. But the future cannot be perceived because it does not exist, not because of a mathematical impossibility. Because we cannot perceive the non-existent, you reject the perception that we do have, the perception of volition.

Could we ever prove determinism was true or false? We could never prove it was false because we can't perceive the future. We can never prove it was true because we can't perceive the future. Statements about the past prove nothing, the past does not exist and is not a causal agent.

I would say something about a non-falsifiable theory being nonsense, but I have not read my Popper. Instead, I will dimiss it as arbitrary in the technical sense of unable to be proven true or false. Now I can stop trying to prove you wrong.