Critique of the Objectivist Ethics

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

I say the Mandala represents only an informational asymmetry setting limits on the kind of moral action that's possible.

Objectivist ethics isn't just asymmetrical with regard to oneself in relation to others, it is necessarily focused on values appropriate to man's life and one's own individual life. It is man-centered and individual-centered. I have to decide what is best for me to do in my own long-term interest, and I don't have to take into account what that will do to others in the sense of them not wanting me to be that way or not wanting me to earn a living the way I want to earn a living. This is not implying any sort of cruelty to others -- such as necessarily acting to hurt their feelings or anything like that -- but rather that it is my own life and my own energy I must utilize for my own well-being. I should take others into account only on the trader principle.

As an example, in The Fountainhead, Howard Roark came up with a whole new way of designing buildings that could have put his competitors out of work; likewise, in Atlas Shrugged, Hank Rearden came up with a whole new metal that could have put his competitors out of work. In both cases, the did something moral -- i.e. they were rationally creative -- and the whole point of Objectivism is that they are moral men for doing so, regardless of what it does to others in the same industry.

The morality that Guru is trying to support would deny both men from pursuing their interest if it harmed others. Perhaps he is being too vague in his presentation, but I am definitely against the "symmetry" he is trying to present. An individual man ought to live his own life and not take others into account, except insofar as they are of value to him.

[gurugeorge]

And there have been many, many writers, thinkers, and pseudo-thinkers who have wanted to water down the Objectivist ethics to be more other-oriented. Ethics is a science, it is the science of living your life rationally -- by understanding existence and man's place in it. Having such a focus on other people is too close to second-handedness, when one ought to be living one's life in relation to reality as a primary.

I don't think we can avoid an intellectual position just because it's "uncomfortably close" to something we decry. Let the chips fall where they may (which is indeed what you said yourself ). "Uncomfortably close" is not identical!

[Plasmatic]

2) Plain, literal meaning of "Altruism" = concern with others' interests;

I have question I think will illuminate the problem here. George is there any reason to be concerned with others, other than a personal value to oneself in said other? The question is why should one be concerned for anothers interest? If the answer is anything other than the "other" is a value to oneself,then it is a sacrifice to be done only as some immoral duty,and your distinction is invalid.

Edited July 20, 2009 by Plasmatic

[estheticidea]

I agree with everything you are saying here, except: "how valuing another person is selfish". It plainly isn't (just) selfish, it is plainly a delight in the other. I don't delight in the other's delight just because it delights me (although of course it does), I delight in the other's delight because I delight in the other's delight, plain and simple. I am happy for him, happy that he is happy. The delight is other-directed (altruistic, in the plain sense of the word, not the sacrifice-infested sense).

I have been at the receiving end of this, and trust me: you don't want to be in that position. It is repulsive. If your delight becomes the object of somebody else's delight, you want it to be that somebody's authentic delight (i.e. based on authentic values), not a BORROWED one.

[estheticidea]

It's like this: to the rational intellect, there can be no privileged "centre" to the Universe. If there is to be benevolence, that benevolence can only be impartial - a desire to see all happy, fulfilled, etc.

I believe this a very pure statement of the Kantian view of what reason is.

There HAS to be a privileged center to the Universe--I privilege my OWN center. What matters is not the consequences of my benevolence TO OTHERS (that's a manipulative mindset)--what matters is, the consequence of my benevolence to ME. It makes ME happier.

[bluey]

(1) Plain, literal meaning of "Egoism" = concern with one's own interests;

(2) Plain, literal meaning of "Altruism" = concern with others' interests;

(3) Twisted, sacrifice-infested definition of "Egoism" = sacrifice of others to self in pursuit of one's own interests;

(4) Twisted, sacrifice-infested definition of "Altruism" = sacrifice of self to others in pursuit of their interests.

First of all, if your definitions (1) and (2) don't include a moral imperative, then we don't have any issue here. The reason why we have an issue is precisely because you want to advocate not just an impersonal "concern" for others, just a general preference for being nice rather than being nasty, but because you want to make it a moral imperative that we do have concern for others.

The reason why you are wrong that (1) and (2) are complimentary and innocent as moral principles, is that (2) is, in fact, in reality, as proven through history and demonstrated daily by actual events, impossible as a moral standard without the end result/demand of sacrificing one man to another. The only way to espouse a morality of altruism and not end up with sacrifice, is to clandestinely ignore your supposed moral principles and act like an egoist. Egoism does not lead to this inevitability, for the simple fact that it is never in one's rational, long-term interest to initiate force against another individual.

If all you are saying is that most people have no desire to hurt other people, and even have a desire to help them out whenever it makes sense to do so, then that is correct - but that concept already has a name, and it is "benevolence". It is not a moral issue and it is not altruism. You can try to wave your magic wand and call it altruism, but then you're not actually accomplishing anything, and you're most definitely not doing the same thing that Rand did with the term "egoism", as you still seem to think. Again I repeat, if you are still under the impression that this is what you are doing, then it is you who does not understand the Objectivist position.

If each individual is morally bound to be other-directed in his actions - even if it's just some of the time, even if everyone knows it's an impossible "ideal" - then you have a system of self-sacrifice.

It's not a problem with the given definition of altruism - it's a problem with that very stance, that other-directedness is a moral issue, no matter what name you give to it. So continually asserting that "your" definition of altruism doesn't involve sacrifice isn't going to cut it - altruism, in the sense of a moral imperative to other-directedness, always and inevitably implies sacrifice.

It's like this: to the rational intellect, there can be no privileged "centre" to the Universe. If there is to be benevolence, that benevolence can only be impartial - a desire to see all happy, fulfilled, etc.

Why in the world would that be the case?? Are you saying that you can't have a desire to see your son or daughter, as particular individuals, be well-fed and happy, but that you can only have a general desire to see everyone in the world well-fed and happy? I mean, that's just plain false. To the rational intellect, that individual himself is, in practice, the center of the universe, so to speak, because he himself is the locale of all his experiences, all his intellect, all his desires and all his actions. The rational intellect doesn't resemble an omniscient, disembodied mind and there's no reason why that should be an ideal. I know that is what the Rationalist philosophical tradition would say, but it's simply not true.

[Jake_Ellison]

I am talking about folk intuitions about what's right and wrong. They manifest themselves in (and sometimes as) hunches, in/as a "still small voice", in/as, emotive responses of revulsion or attraction, as thougtful, or articulate, but sometimes even off-the-cuff responses when they are asked "what's moral?"; faint tugs of conscience, homespun wisdom, things like that. People have these hunches, act on them, and tell the story of what happened to them when they acted that way. Or, people observe how others act, have moral hunches about the rightness or wrongness of those actions, and observe the consequences as those actions play out their effects in the world - and, again, talk about it with each other (especially women, who by virtue of their close contact with children, and this mutual sharing of moral intutions - which, at its worst, can descend into what is called "gossip"! - are the main moral guardians of society). Eventually, certain semi-consistent clusters of such ideas become common sense (relative to a given culture).

"Intuitions" is also a floating abstraction, until proven to exist as something connected to reality, other than thoughts, memories or emotions. There is no widespread agreement that intuitions are real, the way there is about thoughts, memories and emotions being real. I know I have thoughts, memories, and emotions, and I also know that my brain has the ability to solve complex problems on a semi-conscious or sub-conscious level. However, I never had a single occurrence of what people commonly call "intuitions" (and since you have not defined it I assume you mean it exactly that way), nor have I seen anyone prove that they are able to solve a problem using intuition. Since morality is a very complex "problem", it should be easy enough to prove that intuition can solve a much simpler problem first, rather than allege that it solves the very complex problem of morality, without proof.

A hunch, of course, comes from knowledge you have memorized, but aren't processing on a conscious level. At least for me, and for other people I know, who have the ability to solve complex problems really fast, or while doing other things. I have hunches all the time, but I am always able to reproduce the solution that "came to me" through a hunch, consciously. It just takes longer, that's why subconscious problem-solving is so important. That is what people with hunches about morality are doing: they are accessing their knowledge of morality (the one they know, because they have been thought: altruism), subconsciously. But that does not mean the knowledge in their memory is inherent: it has been learned, after birth, from the teachings of others.

"still small voice": Nope, I don't hear any voices, never have. (But I like the fact that you're being concrete here. That was very easy for me to understand and reject.)

--emotive responses of revulsion or attraction, as thoughtful, or articulate, but sometimes even off-the-cuff responses when they are asked "what's moral?": Emotions are very real, they are a reaction to events, in accordance with values we hold, by being taught and accepting them. There is no evidence that values are inherent, but there is overwhelming evidence that altruism is not an emotion, and that the emotional reaction in accordance with altruism is not inherent: I am an excellent example of that evidence, because I react emotionally in accordance with rational morality. So I would have the exact opposite reaction to say a rich person being robbed, or an inept thief being arrested, than a pure altruist.

faint tugs of conscience: Guilt is an emotion - a reaction to having done something opposite to your value-system. A conscience is, I believe, just an unnecessary name for our mind - it evaluates actions, and ....(insert mechanisms I'm not familiar with enough to explain)... "creates" emotions. When you use the word conscience, it implies that it contains the values, and it is all an inherent mechanism. I disagree, I believe human psychology is far too complicated, and the word conscience is far too simplistic, to be relevant to psychology.

homespun wisdom is exactly that: spun in the home, and in the cultural environment. Not inherent to humans, but picked up after birth.

Eventually, certain semi-consistent clusters of such ideas become common sense (relative to a given culture). -- they sure are. This is in contradiction with your claim that morality (at least the part you are describing here) can be inherent: relative to culture means not inherent to the species.

My conclusion (and to some extent it is a "hunch", I'll admit, it would take me a long time to read the authors you mentioned): since this massive (and I believe rationalistic: meaning it set out to prove altruism is inherently good, and then came across intuition and hunches and whatnot) philosophy you are describing is based on what I know to be false premises, I don't see the point in pursuing it any further.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

"Intuitions" is also a floating abstraction, until proven to exist as something connected to reality, other than thoughts, memories or emotions.

I think that is part of the problem, but also given what Guru was saying in another thread he is against perception from the human perspective -- seeing with our eyes, hearing with our ears, etc. -- as if we have no direct connection to existence or to ourselves; which is the Kantian influence on modern thought. In fact, as best I can determine from reading Kant's works, and intuition is an attempt to reconcile the human mode of being aware of existence with what is really out there, and we are forever trapped in only having intuitions about existence and no real knowledge of it -- either by perceiving it or by trying to understand it. So, I see his problem in this thread as being deeper than just being against egoism (understood correctly) but of rejecting the human mode of understanding existence -- via the sense and reason. In other words, I do see altruism, even the way he presents it, as being anti-man, the individual who can understand existence and act according to his knowledge of it.

[JeffS]

In objective reality, since knowledge isn't intrinsic, since the world doesn't somehow magically reach into our craniums to make our estimates of what's objectively the case valid,

...the "bootleg" or "common sense" definitions, sustained by our innate sense of morality inherited from our small-band, hunter-gatherer ancestry.

Juxtaposed and still missed. Remarkable.

[gurugeorge]

I have question I think will illuminate the problem here. George is there any reason to be concerned with others, other than a personal value to oneself in said other? The question is why should one be concerned for anothers interest? If the answer is anything other than the "other" is a value to oneself,then it is a sacrifice to be done only as some immoral duty,and your distinction is invalid.

The reason to be concerned with others is the same reason as to be concerned with yourself - i.e. that you ought first of all to be concerned with all.

[gurugeorge]

Juxtaposed and still missed. Remarkable.

"Intrinsic" does not mean the same as "innate".

[gurugeorge]

I believe this a very pure statement of the Kantian view of what reason is.

There HAS to be a privileged center to the Universe

Why?

--I privilege my OWN center. What matters is not the consequences of my benevolence TO OTHERS (that's a manipulative mindset)--what matters is, the consequence of my benevolence to ME. It makes ME happier.

In a sense, you cannot help but privilege your own centre, since you know more about what would make that centre happy. You are in a privileged position re. knowledge, therefore you are in fact in a privileged position wrt who the beneficiary of most of your actual concrete, detailed activity must be and is going to be. That's already set, there's nothing you can do about it, even if you tried. YOU DON'T EVEN HAVE A CHOICE HERE. (Note: that part of the "double-bind" nature of sacrificial altruism is the fact that man is "psychologically egoistic", that's why the sacrificial rule is so tortuous, why man is considered a "sinner", and all the rest of that tosh.)

But does this mean you have to wish only that your centre be happy - i.e. does it mean that you also have to not-have-a-care about whether other centres are happy?

(Note: not "consequences of benevolence", btw, "consequences of actions". It's not like you're already posing as some Benevolent Big Cheese, in which case it would be manipulative, as you say. Remember, we are in a position where everything we do will have some effect. If we are on our own, largely, that effect is confined to us. When we are in the company of others, then there is also an effect on others, and we must have some care what that effect will be (how that care manifests, in practical terms, at the end of the day, is that our actions conform to abstract rules, rules of property, honesty, etc. - individualistic, liberal rules).)

[Jake_Ellison]

I think that is part of the problem, but also given what Guru was saying in another thread he is against perception from the human perspective -- seeing with our eyes, hearing with our ears, etc. -- as if we have no direct connection to existence or to ourselves; which is the Kantian influence on modern thought.

Instincts are a directing force, for animals, and that is not a rejection of perception. You could, conceivably, claim that humans have "intuition" that makes them react in a certain ("altruistic") way emotionally, and not reject perception. I think attempts I've seen to back that up were rationalizations, which ignore things we know about both altruism and human nature, but they don't really reject existence and identity. Gurugeorge isn't making any assertions that are mysticism, at least not in the post I've read.

The reason to be concerned with others is the same reason as to be concerned with yourself - i.e. that you ought first of all to be concerned with all.

Is that a "begging the question" , or do you mean that morality is the primary, and reason follows from it?

Objectivism holds the opposite of your statement: morality [that which ought to be] is the consequence of what is. Morality ought to be, because it is rational, and rational men just are. Existence is the primary, not that which ought to be.

You, on the other hand, are, above, stating that morality exists, as a primary (either as a concrete or a floating abstraction), and then we exist as (somewhat) rational men only as a consequence. I can see how some might think that's a rejection of perception (of ourselves and the world) as our only means of studying reality.

P.S. I've read this on your "Livejournal", George. You are, in this paragraph, grossly misrepresenting Ayn Rand, and then proceed to argue with a strawman:

Killing the guy for a dollar would be causing a disvalue. One would have to add to the Objectivist ethic that causing a disvalue to others is wrong. That's the other-regarding side of morality. Rand is right that half of ethics is about those actions relative to oneself and one's own life. But how should one behave with regard to others? There are others in the world, after all. The answer is - one should get out of their way, let them be, not force disvalues on them.

Ayn Rand never said ethics is about actions relative to oneself, she said ethics is about one's own rational self interest. You are misrepresenting her in the above quote, and then you are offering a slightly more vague orm of her actual ethics as a solution to Rand's "mistake". All you had to do was look in the freely available Ayn Rand Lexicon, to find this description of Ayn Rand's ethics:

The Objectivist ethics proudly advocates and upholds rational selfishness—which means: the values required for man’s survival qua man—which means: the values required for human survival—not the values produced by the desires, the emotions, the “aspirations,” the feelings, the whims or the needs of irrational brutes, who have never outgrown the primordial practice of human sacrifices, have never discovered an industrial society and can conceive of no self-interest but that of grabbing the loot of the moment.

The Objectivist ethics holds that human good does not require human sacrifices and cannot be achieved by the sacrifice of anyone to anyone. It holds that the rational interests of men do not clash—that there is no conflict of interests among men who do not desire the unearned, who do not make sacrifices nor accept them, who deal with one another as traders, giving value for value.

Or, you could've read up on her politics, where, she defines individual rights clearly and objectively, and states that the initiation of force shold be banned from human interaction, and it is never in one's rational self interestto initiate force against another.

Edited July 20, 2009 by Jake_Ellison

[Plasmatic]

you ought first of all to be concerned with all

Aside from Jakes points this is also impossible not to mention arbitrary. How could one even derive this ought from observation? What in reality could possibly lead one to this conclusion? How does one induce this from reality?

Edited July 20, 2009 by Plasmatic

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Instincts are a directing force, for animals, and that is not a rejection of perception. You could, conceivably, claim that humans have "intuition" that makes them react in a certain ("altruistic") way emotionally, and not reject perception. I think attempts I've seen to back that up were rationalizations, which ignore things we know about both altruism and human nature, but they don't really reject existence and identity. Gurugeorge isn't making any assertions that are mysticism, at least not in the post I've read.

Instincts might be a direct force for animals, but I don't think it is clearly defined. Animals tend to have more hardwiring than man, for one thing they don't seem to have free will when it comes to their own consciousness -- maybe with regard to what they perceive on some level, but I am not aware of an animal being aware of his own mind and being able to guide it in the pursuit of living its own life.

If by "intuition" Guru meant something other than what Kant was off-handedly referring to in an obtuse way, then he would have to state what that is and his evidence for it, which I haven't seen him do. In some cases, intuition means having a kind of subconscious or automatic knowledge based upon past experience; but the way he is using it implies man is hard wired to have a concern for everyone or of others. I do think, when one comes right down to it, this is a type of mysticism, because it says that man has some sort of hardwired moral system that hasn't been demonstrated.

I think it can be said that most young children are open to strangers, but that is not the same thing as a hard wired morality. Children are very receptive to being friendly with everyone until the get burned by trusting strangers. Learning that some people are evil and need to be avoided or subdued is something that I think has to be learned. Otherwise, it is just natural curiosity that is driving them, not a code of morality. And just because a young person may be able to figure something out doesn't make it implied intuitional knowledge, because kids are very observant and pick up on things very quickly -- from their adults and other children.

So, it is not mysticism in the sense of bowing to a higher power, but rather a type of mysticism not based upon observation. As in where do these intuitions come from? Kant said they came from the Noumenal self, that other self we can never be directly aware of, just as we cannot be directly aware of existence. Objectivism rejects this notion outright.

[JeffS]

"Intrinsic" does not mean the same as "innate".

"Intrinsic: innate, inherent, inseparable from the thing itself, essential."

Or is this another term you're "redefining?" What do you believe, George? Do you believe we have some inherited knowledge, or do you believe knowledge comes to us magically?

[gurugeorge]

First of all, if your definitions (1) and (2) don't include a moral imperative, then we don't have any issue here. The reason why we have an issue is precisely because you want to advocate not just an impersonal "concern" for others, just a general preference for being nice rather than being nasty, but because you want to make it a moral imperative that we do have concern for others.

You are right, I've been a bit unclear on this. I think only (1) and (2) are genuine moral imperatives, (3) and (4) pose as moral imperatives but are actually merely commands that have come from sundry self-appointed authorities throughout history.

(1) and (2) are moral imperatives, the two together forming a whole - one must care for oneself and one must care for others, one must ensure as much as one reasonably can that one's actions' effects are beneficial to oneself and beneficial to others. (Again, "as much as one reasonably can" gives the condition, and the only genuine connection between "is" and "ought", the only way "is" shapes "ought", based on informational assymetry.)

The reason why you are wrong that (1) and (2) are complimentary and innocent as moral principles, is that (2) is, in fact, in reality, as proven through history and demonstrated daily by actual events, impossible as a moral standard without the end result/demand of sacrificing one man to another. The only way to espouse a morality of altruism and not end up with sacrifice, is to clandestinely ignore your supposed moral principles and act like an egoist. Egoism does not lead to this inevitability, for the simple fact that it is never in one's rational, long-term interest to initiate force against another individual.

Please give me an example of how it is impossible to have a concern for others without ending up sacrificing to them (doesn't need to be specific, I just want to see the logic).

Why must other-concern inevitably "go bad"?

If each individual is morally bound to be other-directed in his actions - even if it's just some of the time, even if everyone knows it's an impossible "ideal" - then you have a system of self-sacrifice. It's not a problem with the given definition of altruism - it's a problem with that very stance, that other-directedness is a moral issue, no matter what name you give to it. So continually asserting that "your" definition of altruism doesn't involve sacrifice isn't going to cut it - altruism, in the sense of a moral imperative to other-directedness, always and inevitably implies sacrifice.

Pretend I'm from Missouri

Seriously, you're asserting this, but I'm not seeing any attempt at even a plausibility argument.

Again, why must other-concern inevitably "go bad"?

Why in the world would that be the case?? Are you saying that you can't have a desire to see your son or daughter, as particular individuals, be well-fed and happy, but that you can only have a general desire to see everyone in the world well-fed and happy? I mean, that's just plain false. To the rational intellect, that individual himself is, in practice, the center of the universe, so to speak, because he himself is the locale of all his experiences, all his intellect, all his desires and all his actions. The rational intellect doesn't resemble an omniscient, disembodied mind and there's no reason why that should be an ideal. I know that is what the Rationalist philosophical tradition would say, but it's simply not true.

Of course you can, and indeed ought to, not just have a desire to see, but actually see that your son or daughter as particular individuals are well-fed and happy - that's implicit in the idea that you should wish to see everyone well-fed and happy, and that you should ensure your actions are as beneficial as you can make them! (Of course, in their cases, you will likely have a strong innate drive to do so, which makes it much easier - it's not like you have to remind yourself; same as you don't have to remind yourself in your own case, and nor do you have to remind yourself in the case of the rest of your family and your friends, of whom you likely have between 20-30 )

[gurugeorge]

"Intuitions" is also a floating abstraction, until proven to exist as something connected to reality, other than thoughts, memories or emotions. There is no widespread agreement that intuitions are real, the way there is about thoughts, memories and emotions being real. I know I have thoughts, memories, and emotions, and I also know that my brain has the ability to solve complex problems on a semi-conscious or sub-conscious level.

Yes, this is intuition. But think about it: since there is no thought going on (relative to the subject matter at that time), clearly the faculty is there to "think", and even "think" conceptually (i.e. the filing cabinet is still being utilised in some sense), without the presence of consciousness. The sub-conscious machinery "throws up" answers from time to time, on problems you have been working on, right? This is within everyone's experience. Well, I think if you will check the literature, you will find most "sub-conscious thought" is mediated by the specialised "gadgets" that are strapped together to make up the brain. They are mechanisms with innate "knowledge" of the world built into them (their calculations happen to conform, to a certain fragmentary extent, to the way the world objectively is, because that's how they evolved).

Similar comments apply to the other examples. Yes, there is feedback from conscious thought down to the basement level (you consciously puzzle over something, let it settle, and at some point the answer pops up), but there is also feedback from the subconscious level to conscious thought, and in fact the latter kind of feedback forms a fragmentary (true so far as it goes, but incomplete, because merely evolved in a somewhat haphazard way) "apriori" skeleton of thought. Conscious thought couldn't even have got started without these little portions of assured objective (but hightly abstract) fact that we have inbuilt.

(Yes, this is merely assertion in this context - to look at the evidence and arguments pro and con, you have to look at the sorts of books I've referenced. Until you do that, we aren't on the same page, literally.)

Eventually, certain semi-consistent clusters of such ideas become common sense (relative to a given culture). -- they sure are. This is in contradiction with your claim that morality (at least the part you are describing here) can be inherent: relative to culture means not inherent to the species.

Hmm, how to put it briefly and concisely ... If a set of rules is propagated in one culture, and another set of rules is propagated in another culture, and they have an abstract similarity, and if it can be shown that that abstract similarity is mediated by brain gadgets that are either dedicated to that task, or dedicated to a task with a similar logical structure (in terms of sheer form, sheer rule-governed-symbol-shunting), then I think you have a good candidate for innate moral knowledge.

To take a very broad example: it's likely that there's an innate imperative to be "nice" to conspecifics (of course the trait varies with a bell-curve distribution). But how that pans out depends on how the culture defines (its equivalent of) "conspecific". For example, people in a primitive tribe might treat their fellow "humans" nicely, but think the tribe over the hill are mere animals, worthy only of slaughter and extraction of utility.

[gurugeorge]

... given what Guru was saying in another thread he is against perception from the human perspective -- seeing with our eyes, hearing with our ears, etc. -- as if we have no direct connection to existence or to ourselves ...

That's fightin' talk Thomas - cite, please.

[gurugeorge]

Is that a "begging the question" , or do you mean that morality is the primary, and reason follows from it?

Objectivism holds the opposite of your statement: morality [that which ought to be] is the consequence of what is. Morality ought to be, because it is rational, and rational men just are. Existence is the primary, not that which ought to be.

You, on the other hand, are, above, stating that morality exists, as a primary (either as a concrete or a floating abstraction), and then we exist as (somewhat) rational men only as a consequence. I can see how some might think that's a rejection of perception (of ourselves and the world) as our only means of studying reality.

No, existence is primary in this philosophy too. All things exist; the Universe exists. This is observed: by whom is it observed? By a mind, housed in a body, housed in the Universe. The mind "belongs to" the body, and gets its start in the body, but it is also "belongs to" the Universe, and has no theoretical limits wrt what it can take in, what it can understand of existence, i.e. of itself. (Metaphysically, when one's individual mind is cognizing the Universe, that is the Universe cognizing the Universe, through one of its members. This is so close to us, and so monstrous, and for many so frightening, that we don't normally see it. We "blank out" our divinity, as it were. Please note, I am not talking here about some mystical sense of "Mind" (with a capital "M"). The mind I am speaking of here is the ordinary human mind mediated by physical brain-events: it is that ordinary mind that is also, metaphysically and implicitly, cosmic in import.)

A normal, healthy mind automatically outputs care and concern - it is a caring and concerning machine, it does things about things. The mind's output of care and concern is sometimes (and to an extent naturally) devoted to the survival of the body, to reproduction, and to its own perpetuation through time (and to sundry other things that may or may not be corollaries of these, e.g. to creation and production, to the perpetuation of certain ideas); but the mind can also take on the ever-loftier, and more complete points of view that are metaphysically implicit in it, whereupon its output of care and concern perforce spreads out through the whole (including, obviously, still the body and mind - nothing changes at that level, least of all does a "black hole" unworthy of care and concern suddenly appear at the centre as one's viewpoint becomes loftier). The process of seeing and caring about the context, of the context, of the context, of the context, is the "ladder"-like (or "dialectical", though that word is a minefield) progress of philosophy. The context of all contexts is that one is oneself Universe, one is made of its substance, one is thoroughly embedded in it; this is just plain, scientific fact. (Compare: a leaf is a leaf, but it is also tree, it is connected through and through with the rest of the tree. A wave is a wave, but it is also ocean, or deeper, water.)

(One might be worried that it's "spreading itself thin"? In actual fact, the loftier one's vision, the more energy one has.)

You are, in this paragraph, grossly misrepresenting Ayn Rand, and then proceed to argue with a strawman:

I don't think so - the example is about a hypothetical choice in specific circumstances, that means for the person in that position, Rand recommends that he have regard to his self-interest only. It's true that in the abstract Objectivist morality is about man-qua-man, but what's good for man-qua-man is not what a given individual is supposed to be pursuing in any given set of concrete circumstances - s/he is supposed to be pursuing what's good for him or her.

Or is s/he? Well, that's part of the debate about whether Rand is consistent, I suppose.

[gurugeorge]

Aside from Jakes points this is also impossible not to mention arbitrary. How could one even derive this ought from observation? What in reality could possibly lead one to this conclusion? How does one induce this from reality?

Please see the above post in response to Jake.

[gurugeorge]

So, it is not mysticism in the sense of bowing to a higher power, but rather a type of mysticism not based upon observation.

This position is not "based on" observation (I am not a foundationalist), but it is certaintly shaped by observation: please see above post to Jake.

[Jake_Ellison]

Conscious thought couldn't even have got started without these little portions of assured objective (but hightly abstract) fact that we have inbuilt.

Inbuilt by whom? You haven't mentioned the mind that created these abstracts. In nature, there are no abstracts, only concretes, abstract facts have to be created by a conceptual consciousness capable of abstract thought. Abstracts, unlike concretes, aren't real: they are large ammounts of concretes we group together, based on fundamentally similar attributes, to help us better understand the concrete world.

Unless you wish to dispute the above, I'll continue with this question which assumes we agree on the above:

Yes, the question is the same: I need several concrete examples of these little portions of assured objective and true facts (about reality, therefor concrete; or if you intend to name the abstract consciousness that created the abstractions, then please also name evidence of this creator, and describe the specific abstractions, plus give a few concretes of the abstractions you describe).

And I shouldn't need to read a book to understand how one might come upon knowledge of those specific facts within the human subconscious. All I need is a link to an experiment which proved these specific facts (to be listed) are there in newborns, (or they are there in adults but they couldn't have been learned -though I can't imagine how that could've been proven, since ther aren't that many adults living in total isolation from knowledge-that we know can be learned).

Edited July 21, 2009 by Jake_Ellison

[gurugeorge]

"Intrinsic: innate, inherent, inseparable from the thing itself, essential."

Or is this another term you're "redefining?" What do you believe, George? Do you believe we have some inherited knowledge, or do you believe knowledge comes to us magically?

*sigh* Those two passages are in different contexts - "innate" in reference to biology, "intrinsic" in reference to philosophy. Something that is intrinsic isn't necessarily innate, the terms have different (although somewhat related) meanings in different contexts, intrinsic is the broader term, although "innate" is sometimes used as a synonym for "instrinsic".

We have some innate knowledge, but it is abstract (i.e. it is realised as a patchwork of apriori elements in thought). (But to check this out, you will have to check out the sorts of books I've referenced. Please do not give me babies again: remember, baby cognition is not a sufficient guide to adult cognition, and innate tendencies can lie dormant until triggered by environmental factors or learning.)

[Jake_Ellison]

The context of all contexts is that one is oneself Universe, one is made of its substance, one is thoroughly embedded in it; this is just plain, scientific fact. (Compare: a leaf is a leaf, but it is also tree, it is connected through and through with the rest of the tree. A wave is a wave, but it is also ocean, or deeper, water.)

All mystics claim that their myths are scientific fact, including the Catholic Church and Creationists. We have scientific proof that a leaf is physically connected to a tree, and we know exactly how and why. The comparison to human thought is invalid.

We have no evidence that a conscious mind is connected to the "Universe", except through the body, which is part of the Universe, on a physical level. The notion that there is another kind of connection, on a level that is "through inbuilt abstract facts about the World", is impossible for the reason I mentioned in the previous post: it requires the Universe to be capable of abstract thought. Short of supposed alien life, men are the only "things" capable of abstract thought. In other words, your philosophy requires God. God is a mystical concept.