Ayn Rand's Immortal Indestructible Robot

[tommyedison]

By that reasoning suicide bombing is moral because the suicide bomber values killing other people more than he values his own life. Just because a rational being (ie capable of using reason not necessarily actually rational all the time) does not value its own life, that makes it OK for it to violate my rights?

Morality is a set of values to promote one's life. Suicide bombing does not promote life. Therefore it is immoral.

[Godless Capitalist]

source, I dealt with that earlier.

This is a fallacous analogy based on a failure to grasp the concept 'suicide bomber'.

Also, how do you do you go from an example that concludes X is amoral to an example that concludes Y is moral - and then conclude that they are analogous in the first place?  Amoral and moral are opposites.  As such, they cannot be considered analogous at all.

Sorry; I should have thought that through more carefully. What I meant that was suicide bombing would be amoral, since the suicide bomber does not value his own life. Or do you mean that ethics still applies because the suicide bomber is acting irrationally?

[RadCap]

Sorry; I should have thought that through more carefully. What I meant that was suicide bombing would be amoral, since the suicide bomber does not value his own life. Or do you mean that ethics still applies because the suicide bomber is acting irrationally?

Check your premises.

If you jump on a grenade in order to protect something you value greatly (your wife, your children, your president, etc), does that mean you do not value your own life? Does it mean you have acted 'amorally'?

Remember - in the example of the robot, it can neither gain nor lose any values. Is that the case of a 'suicide bomber' or someone who throws themselves on a grenade?

As I indicated, I think the reason you make the error that you do is attributable to a conceptual misunderstanding when it comes to the term 'suicide bomber'. I believe the word 'suicide' in the term is confusing your understanding of the nature of the act of such a person. Try this exercise in order to see exactly why your analogy is flawed:

Identify the nature of suicide. Identify the nature of 'suicide bombers' (aka kamakazis, splodedopes, etc). Then identify the DIFFERENCE between them.

--

As to your request for a path trackback from a recreational activity to the fact that you are mortal (ie back to the ultimate choice of live or death), that has already been done with your own example. However, you left out some questions which would have made the connection much more clear to you otherwise:

"Q. Why do you like it?

A. I feel in control and on top of the world."

In control of what - your LIFE perhaps? Your ability to survive and thrive in the reality around you (which is what makes you feel "on top of the world"? An indestructable robot has no control over his life - by the very fact that he CANNOT lose it. Nothing he does or fails to do will change the fact that he exists and will continue to exist. You have that power. It does not. Every action you take has an effect upon your continued survival. Every action you make involves a risk. And with kayaking, that risk is fairly immediate. You risk limb. You risk life. And your ability to survive that risk is an affirmation of your ability to survive reality itself. It is a reinforcement of the efficacy of your mind - the efficacy that it has to grasp reality correctly, which in turn allows you to act and survive.

So WHY do you feel on top of the world? Why do you get an emotional rush of enjoyment? Could it be because you are taking a risk of your life and safety - and have succeeded?

"Q. Why do you want to feel in control and on top of the world?

A. It's better than feeling helpless."

In control of what? Helpless against what? If you cannot lose your existence, then what are you controlling and why would you feel helpless if you could not control it?

As I indicate in the previous answer, I believe you proceeding from certain premises in making these claims. But, by not identifying those premises, you more easily contradict them (because the contradiction is not explicit, though is implicit in the statements).

"Q. What's so bad about feeling helpless?

A. If there was nothing I could accomplish in life, I'd feel miserable"

What do you "accomplish" except an understanding of reality? And what end does that understanding serve? Your ability to exist and thrive in that reality. If you couldnt succeed at that, you would indeed feel miserable. But again, the immortal and indestructable robot cannot lose its life nor act to keep it. As such, it has nothing to motivate it to action at all. Why should it raise its arm? Why should it open its eyes? Why should it sense ANYTHING about reality at all, since NOTHING in reality can affect it at all?

Life REQUIRES action. If something cannot lose its life, then there is absolutely NO impetus to action whatsoever.

And of course there is Betsy's question - which you have ignored and thus refused to answer - about the fact that you keep talking about emotions - about an elaborate pain/pleasure mechanism - but you never address its PURPOSE. You never state WHY you have it. You simply take it as a given and proceed from there. That is the same mistake of collectivists - they proceed from the fact that men produce, and proceed from there. They are not interested in why men produce.

You need to really check all these premises you are implicitly (and explicitly) accepting. And to do so will require that you engage in some DETAILED introspection, as opposed to the more superficial version you provided with your Q/A post.

[source]

source, I dealt with that earlier.

Sory. I don't get to log in often and when I do I don't usually have time to read through all the threads. I just reply to those that interest me.

As for the Q&A thing that's being discussed here, I think that a robot is incapable of answering the "why" unless you program it to do so. This is an inevitable consequence of the fact that robots only do what you can and do tell them to do.

The only one who can answer the "why" is the programmer. And even then the answer will be - because that's how it's programmed. If a robot kills someone it isn't conscious of it. It can be called either an accident or programmer's misuse of a robot, in which case a programmer should be blamed for murder - not a robot.

The only way you can get an answer from a robot is to look at its programming. A robot is a tool, just like any other. It is automated and complex, but a tool nonetheless. Tools are not ends in themselves, but only the means to the ends of men. Therefore, a robot cannot be treated as a person and be expected to know the answers. So one of the proper answers to "Why do you kayak?" for a robot who was programmed to give any responses at all is: "There were no search results." Or maybe something like this:

Tip: Have a question? Ask the researchers at Google Answers.

SK FAQ Section 2: Learning to Sea Kayak

... How are your braces? Navigation. Can you navigate in a kayak if you can't see

your destination? Do you own a compass? Hand held or deck mount? ...

[Godless Capitalist]

RadCap, thanks for the great answer! I think that clears up everything for me except maybe for this:

If you jump on a grenade in order to protect something you value greatly (your wife, your children, your president, etc), does that mean you do not value your own life?  Does it mean you have acted 'amorally'?

You still value your life, yes, but you apparently value something else more highly. According to the Objectivist ethics, wouldn't that be immoral?

[tommyedison]

You still value your life, yes, but you apparently value something else more highly. According to the Objectivist ethics, wouldn't that be immoral?

To quote John Galt:

"And because I value my life so much that I will not accept a substitute for it"

Life without values is meaningless. To a husband, his wife is a supreme value. He would rather die than live a life without that value.

[RadCap]

To quote John Galt:

"And because I value my life so much that I will not accept a substitute for it"

Life without values is meaningless. To a husband, his wife is a supreme value. He would rather die than live a life without that value.

Tommy is correct here. Your life is your STANDARD of values. It is the standard by which you determine your heirarchy of values. And there may be some values you are simply not willing to live without.

Take, for instance, an extreme example - the film "Whose Life Is It Anyway?". In it, a brilliant sculptor becomes a parapalegic. He lives a tortured existence because he can neither produce nor love anymore. His life is not a value to him without these things any longer. And so he seeks to end his life.

As is made clear in the film, there are many values which he still has. But the ones that are most important to him - the one's that make his life WORTH living - are gone forever.

The same can be true of a wife or husband. They can be of such a high value - of such an irreplacable value - that one would not want to live without that value. That is why one would throw one's self on a grenade - because one is faced with two value choices:

- loss of irreplacable value and with it, one's desire to exist (leading to the loss of that existence)

- preservation of an irreplacable value, even though one loses one's existence

In the first example, one loses BOTH of one's values. In the second, one is able to achieve at least ONE of one's value.

When faced with such a choice, which do you think is preferable?

[DavidV]

I don’t think that’s a complete explanation. Unlike the sculptor, there are few things in life for most people that would really make life not worth living. Yet they may still choose to decide to give their lives to save someone. For example, a parent might choose to die to save a child, but he would go on living a relatively normal life without that child. It therefore follows that there are some values worth dying to save, because life without the very act of attempting to save them would not be worthwhile – but a life without that value and no chance to attempt to save it would be. How can this be explained?

Examples: a soldier who jumps on grenade to save his buddies, or a parent who pushes a child out of a truck’s way as he runs in front of it, or a spy would commits suicide so as not to reveal secrets to the enemy.

I have an alternative explanation for this kind of action: there are some commitments we can make, that require us to give up our lives if a certain situation arises. By agreeing to the commitment, we agree to give up our lives if the need arises. Such commitments do not necessarily have to involve any other parties – for example, I have committed myself to living in a free society. That commitment includes the possibility that I will willingly die to protect that freedom – even if my life would still be worthwhile without it. More commonly, parents commit themselves to protecting their children’s lives if the need arises, soldiers commit to protecting their country with their lives, and doctors commit to exposing themselves to disease to save a patient. (At least, one would hope so.)

[RadCap]

I don’t think that’s a complete explanation.

I am not clear exactly what part of my explanation you consider to be 'incomplete'.

Unlike the sculptor, there are few things in life for most people that would really make life not worth living.

As I said, the sculptor example was provided because it is an extreme case. As such, it serves as a crystal clear example of the principle which needed to be explained. But that does not mean less extreme cases do not proceed from that same principle. Thus I must disagree with the assertion you make in the above quote. I would suggest, so long as they are using reason when making their choices, the very fact that some men DO choose to give up their life in order to protect something they value indicates they have decided they CANNOT live without that value.

Now you claim to offer an "alternative explanation" for such behavior. You say:

a man may choose death in order to save his buddies

a man may choose death in order to save his child

a man may choose death in order to save his country

And you claim that such choices are made, not because a man considers these to be values without which he cannot live, but are instead the result ofr some "commitment" he has made.

In other words, you are saying a man chooses death because he has agreed to choose death. But that is not, as you suggest, an EXPLANATION of why he chooses death in these instances. It is merely a restatement of the fact that he does choose death when faced with the choice of living without any of these values. As such, you haven't answered the question which was asked, because you haven't provided an actual alternative at all.

[Inspector]

I really would like to see your train of thought.

I haven't been watching the forum much, so I haven't been around to give you your answer. Happily, though, RadCap gave it to you for me. Very good answer, RadCap, that's exactly what I was getting at.

It's comforting to see that there are so many rational people around, and that we reach the same answers.

[DavidV]

In other words, you are saying a man chooses death because he has agreed to choose death.

That’s not what I said –the sculptor case is not equivalent to the examples I provided. In the sculptor case, living without the value of mobility is not worthwhile for him. In the examples I give however, life without the values I mention IS worthwhile.

The case of the sculptor is very rare, since there are very few situations that would in fact make life not worth living. The examples I provide differ, because the loss of the values does NOT in fact make life not worth living. That does not mean that such choices are not rational, but that the explanation you provide is incomplete, even though it is essentially right. Specifically, the value worth dying for is not the immediate value at stake (fellow soldiers, a child, secret intelligence) but a certain type of contract made with oneself. To put it in your terms, the thing “not worth living for” is not the immediate value at stake, but the deviation from principled action in regard to that value.

[RadCap]

You claim the quote you cite is not accurate. Then you turn around and prove that it IS accurate. You SPECIFICALLY claim that a man chooses death because he makes a contract with himself to do so (ie he chooses death because he has made a contract to choose death). Please explain how this is DIFFERENT from my original characterization of your argument that a man chooses death because he has agreed to choose death.

If you cannot demonstrate a difference between these two statements, then my entire set of objections remain - and still need to be addressed. I will repeat them here:

"In other words, you are saying a man chooses death because he has agreed to choose death. But that is not, as you suggest, an EXPLANATION of why he chooses death in these instances. It is merely a restatement of the fact that he does choose death when faced with the choice of living without any of these values. As such, you haven't answered the question which was asked, because you haven't provided an actual alternative at all."

Thus contrary to your claim here, I DO grasp the assertion you are trying to claim as fact. I DO understand that you believe the actions of the sculptor and the wife-saver are supposedly derived from SEPARATE premises. MY point is that you have NOT PROVIDED a separate premise. You have provided nothing but a CIRCULAR statement: a man chooses death because he chooses death. Obviously, as I indicate in my repeated passage, this doesn't actually EXPLAIN anything. Which means, so far, NO alternative explanation for a man's value choice in these instances has been provided.

I therefore respectfully suggest that it is YOU who did not understand MY argument here - NOT the other way around, as you claim.

[RadCap]

To put it simply, we KNOW man CHOOSES death in X situations.  This was NEVER in question.  The question is WHY does he CHOOSE death, and is that CHOICE moral?  By claiming a man chooses death BECAUSE he chooses death, you are asserting that there is NO reason man chooses the one value over the other. 

Your assertion in a nutshell:

KNOWN____________Man chooses. 

KNOWN____________What does man choose?

KNOWN____________Death.

UNKNOWN__________WHY does man choose death?

ASSERTION_________Because made has made an agreement/contract.

ASSERTION_________What agreement has man made?

REPEAT KNOWN_____To choose.

REPEAT KNOWN_____What does man choose?

REPEAT KNOWN_____Death.

REPEAT UNKNOWN___WHY does man choose death?

REPEAT ASSERTION__ad infinitum

Thus you have not answered the question.  Instead, you have made an infinite loop.  And circular reasoning is erroneous.  It is a logical fallacy. That is what I TRIED to point out in the post you are now contesting.

[DavidV]

You claim the quote you cite is not accurate.  Then you turn around and prove that it IS accurate. You SPECIFICALLY claim that a man chooses death because he makes a contract with himself to do so (ie he chooses death because he has made a contract to choose death).  Please explain how this is DIFFERENT from my original characterization of your argument that a man chooses death because he has agreed to choose death.

That’s NOT what I argued, or at least that’s not the argument I intended to make. What I said what that a man may choose to follow certain principles, which entail the POSSIBILITY of a scenario in which he may have to choose death. The REASON why he would choose death in such a situation is that violating the principles he has decided to follow is a worse alternative that death. My point is that it is not the specific value at stake in that scenario that is worth dying for, but the principles one has agreed to follow.

To put it within the context of an example, one does not choose to die in battle to kill a few more enemy soldiers, but for the freedom one has pledged to preserve.

[RadCap]

Sigh - my argument still remains (and remains the same).

Consider the NEW example you provide. This "alternative explanation" you offer is not an EXPLANATION at all. It does NOT explain WHY he makes the choice. It just identifies that he DOES make a choice. And, as I have said a couple times already, the fact THAT he makes a choice is NOT under dispute. If you read back through thread, it is a GIVEN. The question of WHY he makes that choice - why he chooses death - and if that choice is MORAL, is what we are trying to explain here.

You do NOT do that.

You do NOT offer an explanation of WHY a man chooses to die to protect his value (freedom) instead of choosing to live potentially without that value. ALL you have said is that he does CHOOSE (agree, contract - and now pledge) to do so.

WE KNOW THAT.

We KNOW he 'pledges' to die if necessary to save a value. We KNOW he makes a 'contract' with himself to do so. We KNOW he 'agrees' to choose one action rather than another. The question is WHY he makes that choice - WHY he makes the contract with himself - WHY he pledges to die if necessary.

You have FAILED to answer that question.

I don't know how to make this any clearer.

[Capitalism Forever]

In other words, we know that "violating the principles he has decided to follow is a worse alternative than death," but we want to know why it is worse than death. Death is a pretty bad thing, after all.

[DavidV]

We KNOW he 'pledges' to die if necessary to save a value.  We KNOW he makes a 'contract' with himself to do so.  We KNOW he 'agrees' to choose one action rather than another.  The question is WHY he makes that choice -  WHY he makes the contract with himself - WHY he pledges to die if necessary.

But this is beyond the scope of the point I am trying to make. I never disagreed with your explanation that some values are not living without. I only pointed out that in most cases, the value at stake is not the immediate one, but rather adherence to some principle or virtue in regard to the value being threatened.

[RadCap]

IF I understand you correctly, you seem to be suggesting that your argument all along has simply been: the immediate value one dies for may not be the value which one has actually given up one's life for. To support this assertion, your last example posits a scenario where a man dies to achieve the value of killing some of the enemy, but what he is 'really' doing is dying for the more fundamental value/virtue/principle freedom.

IF that is indeed your argument, then you get no disagreement. But your original complaint is that my premise is somehow incomplete. I specifically stated:

"Your life is your STANDARD of values. It is the standard by which you determine your heirarchy of values. And there may be some values you are simply not willing to live without."

Please explain how this premise does NOT include the argument you claim to have been making all along. My so-called 'incomplete' premise does not identify WHAT value one is not willing to live without. It simply claims that such values can exist and that one considers one's life not worth living IF the value cannot be achieved. I do not see how your 'additional explanation' changes this premise in the slightest.

Note that in my statements I say you claim this has been your argument all along. I state it this way because I do not see how this can have been your claim all along. For instance, in the post where you challenged my premise for the very first time, you provided some examples of your supposed 'additional explanations':

"a soldier who jumps on grenade to save his buddies"

"a parent who pushes a child out of a truck’s way as he runs in front of it"

Please tell me what more fundamental value/virtue/principle is supposedly being accepted in each of the cases you provide.

Instead of the value of the lives of his buddies, what more fundamelntal value/virtue/principle is being accepted? Instead of the value of the life of his child, what more fundamental value/virtue/principle is being accepted?

As it stands, no matter which direction you claim to have been going with your argument, I do not see the sense in them.

--

Oh - and in spite of all this, Happy Birthday.

[DavidV]

Instead of the value of the lives of his buddies, what more fundamental value/virtue/principle is being accepted?  Instead of the value of the life of his child, what more fundamental value/virtue/principle is being accepted?

These examples are what prompted my original response. There is not a single value being upheld here, but it is clear to me that the fellow soldiers or a child are not it, since life without these things would still be worthwhile. In the first case, one might say that the code of military ethics, honor, and courage are at stake, and in the second, the commitment to one’s children - which entails many values that would be hard to explain but should be obvious nevertheless.

Oh - and in spite of all this, Happy Birthday.

Thanks :-)

[RadCap]

Im sorry, but I believe you are begging the question here. By what standard do you claim that a man's life would still be "worthwhile" if he lost the values of his buddies, or his child, or his wife, etc.? You are ASSUMING exactly that which is under debate. You are ASSUMING that a man's life IS worth living EXCEPT for the loss of VERY rare extreme values (specifically his ABILITY to value). I have to disagree completely. Just because one is still CAPABLE of valuing does not mean one considers one's life worth living WITHOUT a SPECIFIC value.

Now, it may be true, according to YOUR heirarchy of values, that your life would INDEED be "worth" living without your wife, without your child, without your buddies, as you claim. But by what right - by what principle - by what standard - do you claim that heirarchy to be universal to all men? And that IS your position here - a position I believe to be erroneous.

A man may believe his life would NOT be worth living if he could not have the value of his wife (child, buddies etc). And a man may believe his life WOULD be worth living if he could not have the value of his wife (child, buddies, etc). EITHER position IS valid - because the degree to which one holds that value may be higher or lower in one's heirarchy OF values. But you are claiming the former is an INVALID position - that one CANNOT properly hold that position. Again, I have to disagree completely.

You are asserting that life without X values (one's buddies, one's child, or one's wife, etc) IS definitely "worth" living. And you are further asserting that, while the absense of any of these specific concrete values still leaves life worth living - the absense of Y values (code of military ethics, or some other abstract principle) may or may not leave life worth living, depending upon your heirarchy of values. By what logic do you claim this to be the case. I see no evidence of this - in reality or your arguments.

It appears you are trying to suggest that ANY concrete value is something a man can live without, but the abstract principle which that concrete embodies is something he cannot live without. Your argument appears to be that NO SPECIFIC CONCRETE is worth one's life - that the concretes are ultimately interchangable. And thus, if you die for your wife, your child, your buddies, it is NOT them you are ACTUALLY dying for. You are only dying for the IDEA of them. You don't die for your wife, you die for 'love'. You don't die for your 'child', you die for 'family'. You don't die for your buddies, you die for 'friendship'.

I have to disagree STRONGLY for a final time here. I believe you have set up here a FALSE dichotomy.

[hunterrose]

Sorry to resurrect an old topic, but this is exactly one of the questions I had. I was going to create a topic, but I luckily saw this one.

If a question of mine has already been answered, my bad. I'll try to only ask questions that I still have after reading the topic's posts.

*revivifies immortal*

Okay, using our "immortal," whose noteworthy attribute here is that he doesn't face the alternative of death.

Here's one thing IMO. These immortal cases can be separated into (1) those that have values at the onset of the example (e.g. Superman,) and (2) those that don't have values at the onset of the example.

An immortal being that doesn't have values at the onset of the example has no way or reason to choose one action over another, or no action at all. Everything would have the same result.

But Rand's example didn't refer to just (2) immortals. That'd be circular logic: Immortals don't have values -> immortals can't have values -> immortals don't have values -> immortals can't have values ad infinitum. That is, if we assume immortals can't have values at the onset, then the example is nothing more than a self-fulfilling prophecy. ( I should say that I believe that to be an assumption, as I've not seen an argument that shows that immortals don't ever have values. For my part, take our kryptonite-less Superman. Saving Lois Lane, or Metropolis would/could still be a value, right?) I believe Rand's argument applies to cases in which the immortal has prior values, otherwise her example would translate to some immortals can't have values.

Let's say our immortal has value of hoarding red objects. We needn't ask why he has that particular value, or how he obtained it, anymore than we'd ask why an enfant how or why an enfant has the value of life. The point here would be the immortal has a value at the onset of our consideration.

I'm taking some latitude here. As Rand applied her immortal example to the entire class of immortals (not just ones without onset values) my assumption would be that her example applied to immortals with values at the onset. As these immortals do have values at the onset of our example I think Rand's argument would be interpreted as the immortal will eventually not have values anymore.

So my question would be, why would this immortal, having values at the onset of the example, lose the capacity to have values? In this case the immortal's primary (i.e. only) value would be hoarding red objects. I agree the immortal wouldn't have a higher value requiring him to hoard, but that doesn't say why he'd lose the capacity to value his hoarding, either instantly, or eventually.

Comments?

[mrocktor]

Let's say our immortal has value of hoarding red objects. We needn't ask why he has that particular value, or how he obtained it, anymore than we'd ask why an enfant how or why an enfant has the value of life. The point here would be the immortal has a value at the onset of our consideration.

Of course we need to ask why he has that particular value. Why does he need red objects? What possible value can he derive from having red objects? He can't die if he does not collect red objects, whatever "feelings" he has over red objects are irrelevant. If you are immortal, what difference is there between pleasure and pain? Both are sensations, but they have no more meaning.

Basically you assumed exactly what we are trying to discuss.

mrocktor

[DavidOdden]

Of course we need to ask why he has that particular value. Why does he need red objects? What possible value can he derive from having red objects? He can't die if he does not collect red objects, whatever "feelings" he has over red objects are irrelevant. If you are immortal, what difference is there between pleasure and pain? Both are sensations, but they have no more meaning.

Tara Smith makes a similar argument in Viable Values, and I have to admit that I don't follow the entire structure of the argument. If anyone can fill in the gaps, that would be much appreciated. As far as physical existence is concerned, it's clear that -- since by assumption, the robot is immortal and indestructable -- his actions cannot lead to death, so there is no basic life or death choice for the robot. She then explains how pain arises as a defense mechanism against life-threatening actions (such as stepping on a rusty nail). The missing step, which she did not take (at least as far as I read it), would be to argue that an immortal being could not evolve that could feel pain, since pain would be evolutionarily pointless. Since she doesn't make that argument, I assume that is not the argument, and therefore I don't understand what the argument really is. If you are willing to postulate imaginary beings such as immortal, indestructable robots in the first place, then I don't understand why you can't posit that such a being has an analog of a nervous system that gives rise to feelings of pain or pleasure, like that found in humans and animals. Pain is a fact that involves certain impingements on the nervous system. The presupposition that a being cannot feel pain just in case he is immortal does not strike me as well argued.

[dougclayton]

The missing step, which she did not take (at least as far as I read it), would be to argue that an immortal being could not evolve that could feel pain, since pain would be evolutionarily pointless.

I don't have an entire answer for your question (namely, if we can postulate arbitrary situations, why can't we postulate that our immortal robot feels pleasure and pain?), but I did want to point out that absent the alternative of life or death, an entity could not have evolved at all, since it is the differential survival rate that results in evolution. She may not have made that argument, but it's nonetheless true.

[mrocktor]

The missing step, which she did not take (at least as far as I read it), would be to argue that an immortal being could not evolve that could feel pain, since pain would be evolutionarily pointless.

(...)

The presupposition that a being cannot feel pain just in case he is immortal does not strike me as well argued.

I don't have an entire answer for your question (namely, if we can postulate arbitrary situations, why can't we postulate that our immortal robot feels pleasure and pain?), but I did want to point out that absent the alternative of life or death, an entity could not have evolved at all, since it is the differential survival rate that results in evolution. She may not have made that argument, but it's nonetheless true.

Both of you miss the point. Assume for the moment that you are immortal and indestructible. You have a pleasure/pain mechanism and how it evolved is not really relevant. Now, from the moment you are granted immortality and indestructibility, what keeps you from stepping on rusty nails - just to know what it feels like? Why not cut off your arm just to know what *that* feels like, if it will grow back?

The point is not that pleasure and pain cannot be felt, rather that they are meaningless and interchangeable from the moment that they *have no consequence*.

mrocktor