Existents and entities

[DavidOdden]

Do you consider the question of what the fundamental characteristic of the concept entity is, to be epistemology or physics?

The question of the fundamental characteristics of entities is not physics, it is a philosophical question. It is a metaphysical question, unless asked from an epistemological perspective (as Paikoff is doing, I believe). That is, he is asking "how do we form the conce[t 'entity', which is so fundamental to epistemology"?

[Danneskjöld]

I don't know how they do things in your first language, but in English if you are creating a structured list which is intended to be a taxonomy then it should be complete and self-contained. Definitions and other information in prefatory text must appear in its place in the list as well. Splitting the information up into two different formats is just poor presentation.

Actually, I don't know it neither in English nor in German, most probably they will tell you the same. Honestly, so far I don't give a damn. So why should it be self-contained in its presentation?

How do you want to create a neat presentation of a complex structure, if you have to give every definition of the structures categories within the structure itself? It would be a poor presentation, if I had to show you in 30 pages what I did in 14 lines. How would you possibly figere out the created structure?

That is exactly what concepts are here for. So are the concepts I am using in the structure. They are defined, so I try to use them accordingly. As I said before, on the metaphysical and non-metaphysical part I need some further thoughts. But that does not change the rest of the structure.

So do not take it out of context.

The structure is intended to categorize ALL existents. Atoms and galaxies are existents. Therefore each of them must belong by definition to a category. And by definition atoms are different from galaxies. How would you describe the essence of the difference?

The point of this portion of the thread is to dispute your assertion of the metaphysical significance of the structure of matter. Everything known about matter belongs to the special science of physics. Even mentioning atoms plunges you deep into an advanced scientific context of knowledge. Atoms are metaphysical, but the knowledge of atoms is part of physics. META-physics omits all physics knowledge.

As shown above, atoms must be part of the structure. They must be, because we know they are existents. Of course we know it due to empirical investigations, i.e. physics. That is why they are non-primary existents.

As you see, so far we agree (unless you think atoms are primary existents). And whether metaphysics in general omits all physics knowledge or not is for the proposed structure irrelevant.

[Grames]

... if I had to show you in 30 pages what I did in 14 lines.

Ok, my turn to ask ????????????????

We were talking about one or two lines, your b₁ and b₁₁, where the hell did 30 pages come from?

The structure is intended to categorize ALL existents. Atoms and galaxies are existents. Therefore each of them must belong by definition to a category. And by definition atoms are different from galaxies. How would you describe the essence of the difference?

Within the field of metaphysics, judging how atoms and galaxies fit within an ontology, there is no difference in principle between atoms and galaxies. They are both entities in the extended sense, are both metaphysically given, and there is nothing more to be said which is relevant or even permissible.

[Plasmatic]

Ok, my turn to ask ????????????????

We were talking about one or two lines, your b₁ and b₁₁, where the hell did 30 pages come from?

Within the field of metaphysics, judging how atoms and galaxies fit within an ontology, there is no difference in principle between atoms and galaxies. They are both entities in the extended sense, are both metaphysically given, and there is nothing more to be said which is relevant or even permissible.

In other words the 'categories' of Metaphysics/ontology must ONLY consist of ubiquitously available content. No 'special' observations should be required or else your in the 'category' of the special sciences.

[Grames]

Plasmatic, instead of ubiquitously available I would say self-evident.

[Danneskjöld]

Ok, my turn to ask ????????????????

We were talking about one or two lines, your b₁ and b₁₁, where the hell did 30 pages come from?

No, we are not merely talking about this two lines, we are talking about this structure:

a) primary existents

a₁) living entities

a₁₁) human beings

a₁₂) non-human beings

a₂) non-living entities

a₂₂) metaphysically given entities

a₂₃) non-metaphysically given entities

non-primary existents

b₁) entities in a “extended sense”

b₁₁) lower-level entities

b₁₂) higher-level entities

b₂) non-entity existents

b₂₁) metaphysically given non-entities

b₂₂) non-metaphysically given non-entities

According to your statement, each category has to be defined directly in this structure. You have 14 complete and exact defintitions to give, so that there can be no doubt, that you can "sort" every existent in it. That means 14 long paragraphs.

Within the field of metaphysics, judging how atoms and galaxies fit within an ontology, there is no difference in principle between atoms and galaxies. They are both entities in the extended sense, are both metaphysically given, and there is nothing more to be said which is relevant or even permissible.

So do not consider this as "metaphysics" or "ontology". I do not and never have myself. Give it any name you wish, "The Categories of Existents" for example.

[edit: disable emoticons]

Edited August 15, 2009 by Danneskjöld

[Danneskjöld]

In other words the 'categories' of Metaphysics/ontology must ONLY consist of ubiquitously available content. No 'special' observations should be required or else your in the 'category' of the special sciences.

That sounds like you have to use some kind of knowledge to create categories of metaphysics, but blank out other knowledge.

[Plasmatic]

That sounds like you have to use some kind of knowledge to create categories of metaphysics, but blank out other knowledge.

What you have to use in the special sciences is knowledge not available at all times to everyone. The method of defining the observations of these 'special' contexts is the same.It is the provence of Philosophy to set out said method.

edit: As to your comment about 'blank out' see earlier comments on hierarchy.

Edited August 15, 2009 by Plasmatic

[Danneskjöld]

What you have to use in the special sciences is knowledge not available at all times to everyone. The method of defining the observations of these 'special' contexts is the same.It is the provence of Philosophy to set out said method.

edit: As to your comment about 'blank out' see earlier comments on hierarchy.

Need definitely to get a better understandig of metaphysics as a concept. But it is getting late, that has to wait.

[Grames]

No, we are not merely talking about this two lines, we are talking about this structure:

According to your statement, each category has to be defined directly in this structure. You have 14 complete and exact defintitions to give, so that there can be no doubt, that you can "sort" every existent in it. That means 14 long paragraphs.

You are being excessively literal-minded, but if that is how you want to play it go ahead it is your project.

If you restricted yourself to the metaphysical level, it would be impossible to write long paragraphs about any of those definitions. The degree of exactness required is only enough to distinguish one category from another, not to fully specify all of the contents. Within metaphysics the definitions are essentially ostensive anyway and any words used are merely pointers. It would not be necessary to define life or human to the satisfaction of a biologist.

So do not consider this as "metaphysics" or "ontology". I do not and never have myself. Give it any name you wish, "The Categories of Existents" for example.

Oh, so you just want to inventory the universe is that all? Here is a link to a helpful head start: a classification of the different kinds of apparel that exist. Might as well start alphabetically with the A's.

Not what you had in mind? Your challenge is to find some non-arbitrary threshold so you can justify omitting the 15,000 or so varieties of buttons that exist. A good threshold would have been the limit of metaphysics. Settling on an arbitrary threshold will just render your entire project arbitrary and useless.

edit: Upon reviewing your outline again I saw another problem. The distinction between the metaphysical and the man-made is actually an ethical issue, not a metaphysical one.

Edited August 16, 2009 by Grames

[Grames]

This is all that is metaphysically important about the "categories of existents".

An entity is a solid thing with a definite boundary within the human perceptual scale.

a) primary existents

a1) living entities - those entities engaging in self-sustaining and self-generated action.

a11) human beings - the rational animals

a12) non-human beings - all other animals and plants

a2) non-living entities

non-primary existents

b1) entities in an “extended sense”

b11) entities not self-evident or only self-evident to augmented perception

b12) collections and collective nouns with indefinite boundaries - fluids, flocks

b13) parts of entities or "extended sense" entities

b2) non-entity existents

b21) attributes

b22) actions

b23) relationships

Edited August 16, 2009 by Grames

[JeffS]

No, I don't think "something between" is really correct. Rather, I think what is more important is that when speaking of entities in the secondary sense, their perception logically relies on a prior well worked out understanding of entities in the primary sense. If you review the extract from Peikoff in the OP, you will see that he is focusing on those facts about entities that pertain to how we grasp the concept "entity". It does turn out that with molecules and quarks, these entities can be perceived but not directly without the use of man-made tools of perceptual enhancement. While "something between" does happen to be correct, I don't think that's the main point. It is, simply, that there are these three basic properties of entities which make "entity" a fundamental concept, which give rise to the concept: but you can't hold "definite boundary" or "direct perceivability" to be absolute requirements for entityhood.

Okay, I'm having a number of problems with this, and I'm not really sure why. Fundamentally, I question what we gain with Dr. Peikoff's distinction. Does it add something to our knowledge? Is it simply a way to explain concept formation? Why do we need to make a distinction between primary entities and other (secondary? tertiary? quaternary? - after all, he did write "The term [entity] may be used in several senses.") entities?

I'm not sure if your answer to this question is, "I think what is more important is that when speaking of entities in the secondary sense, their perception logically relies on a prior well worked out understanding of entities in the primary sense." It seems to be, but either I don't understand your point, or that just doesn't seem right to me. What are "entities in the secondary sense?"

An entity, in the primary sense, is a solid thing with a definite boundary—as against a fluid, such as air. In the literal sense, air is not an entity. There are contexts, such as when the wind moves as one mass, when you can call it that, by analogy, but in the primary sense, fluids are not entities.

Well, fluid and air do have boundaries - the planet. Perhaps this is negated by the fact that all the air and water on the planet would not be "perceptual in scale, in size," but what about a lake, or a pool, or a balloon? The water in a lake or pool has a definite boundary, and is perceptual in size. The air in a balloon has a definite boundary and is perceptual in size. I suppose these situations are covered when Dr. Peikoff writes, "There are contexts...." But when do we ever drop context? Nothing exists without context. As pertains to existent, I understood this to be its "mode." Mode is usually understood in everyday conversation, but when it's not, couldn't this whole issue of "primary vs. 'other'" be solved by simply making the existent's mode explicit?

An entity is perceptual in scale, in size. In other words it is a “this” which you can point to and grasp by human perception. In an extended sense you can call molecules—or the universe as a whole—“entities,” because they are self-sufficient things. But in the primary sense when we say that entities are what is given in sense perception, we mean solid things which we can directly perceive.

Why is this necessary? You argued this:

It's a safe bet that a giraffe is also not right now seeable by you with a naked eye. That's because of a changeable fact about the relationship between you and the giraffe. That is the same with Pluto: get on a spaceship and take a look out the port. Whereas, molecules and electrons cannot ever be directly perceived by man. Man has the potential to see any planet, and no microscopic structures. Whether or not the entity is actually seen is not the defining distinction.

From this, I infer Pluto would be a primary entity. It is directly perceivable by man because he can get on a spaceship, travel to Pluto, then look out the port. Prior to this, you wrote:

There has to be a fundamental epistemological underpinning to this discussion. Therefore the facts of human perception are relevant to understanding the two senses of "entity" -- it's not as though concepts are metaphysically given. Case in point, Santa Claus would be perceivable in this imaginary universe just in case a person could "see" the contents of another person's mind. That's not how humans are, nor can they directly perceive molecules. The problem with fantastic alterations of the nature of man is that it's hard to limit. How do we know that it's really "possible" to engineer a man who can perceive molecules, atoms, electrons and quarks, but not possible to perceive the universe? If you allow fantasy in one bunch of cases, why not extend it to every sort of case (including the universe). It seems to me that injecting fantasy is a bad idea for a philosophy that is, in fact, designed around the nature of man.

Well, it's not in the nature of Man to be in space. We can't travel to Pluto - unless we alter his nature by putting him in a spaceship. We can only perceive Pluto by creating something that will allow Man, whose nature does not allow him to travel closer to Pluto, to travel closer to Pluto. If we do, then Pluto is a primary entity. We can only perceive molecules by creating something that will allow Man, whose nature does not allow him to see the microscopic, to see the microscopic. If we do, molecules will still be entities only in the extended sense.

Edited August 16, 2009 by JeffS

[DavidOdden]

Fundamentally, I question what we gain with Dr. Peikoff's distinction.

It adds to our knowledge by explaining some essential facts about the relationship between man's means of gaining knowledge, and metaphysics. Every piece of man's knowledge must be grounded in what he perceives, and that includes the fundamental metaphysical distinction between "entity" and "existent". It should be obvious (in light of a few thousand years of confusion over the topic) that there is a real difference between "quality", "action" and "entity", and his distinctions help you to grasp the nature of entities as opposed to other existents. Perhaps you specifically don't need any such help; as far as I know, nothing fundamental to Objectivism hinges on distinguishing "entity in the primary sense" and "entity otherwise".

after all, he did write "The term [entity] may be used in several senses."

Denying that fact would be foolhardy; therefore, it's a fact that needs to be addressed, as he did.

What are "entities in the secondary sense?"

Simply, the complement of primary entities within the set of entities.

Well, fluid and air do have boundaries - the planet.

That's not a definite boundary in any sense that I know of. Where is the boundary between the air and space? Where is the boundary between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean? (You can give me the answer to the nearest foot, if that's more convenient). At the microscopic level of inspection, it's hard to find the boundary between two miscible gases or fluids.

The water in a lake or pool has a definite boundary, and is perceptual in size.

The statement that fluids don't have definite boundaries does not mean that an entity with definite boundaries cannot be primarily composed of a fluid.

But when do we ever drop context?

We don't. So fluids, alone, are never "primary entities", but you can always enclose a fluid. If you want to add context, you can, but changing context does not always result in an equally valid conclusion.

Well, it's not in the nature of Man to be in space.

I disagree entirely. We may require special environmental protection and propulsion, but space travel, and the ability to discover those conditions that enable it, are architypically man's nature.

We can't travel to Pluto - unless we alter his nature by putting him in a spaceship.

No, it is not man's nature to be a naked, uncivilized ape.

You probably want to attack this from the other end, namely the question of whether it's in man's nature to be able to visually perceive individual molecules or quarks. Recall that the question was whether man could ever directly perceive Pluto without e.g. a telescope. I suggest that no biological structure is possible that can directly perceive individual molecules, and certainly not quarks. [Let be add that I'm not claiming that we can't make a molecule that's big enough that we can directly see it; rather, we can't enhance vision so that it can, in general, resolve at the molecule-sized level].

[JeffS]

Denying that fact would be foolhardy; therefore, it's a fact that needs to be addressed, as he did..../Simply, the complement of primary entities within the set of entities.

To the first point: Then there must be other "senses" that entity can be discussed in. To the second, and the first point: Can you provide any examples of secondary, tertiary, or any other entities that would not be primary (besides molecules)?

That's not a definite boundary in any sense that I know of. Where is the boundary between the air and space?

Then the Earth is not a primary entity? Or would the primary entity "Earth" not include its atmosphere?

Where is the boundary between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean?

I can understand why "Pacific Ocean" and "Indian Ocean" are not primary entities - but I'm not arguing they are. (I would argue they are concepts, which exist.) I'm arguing water is an entity. It always has a context: it could be water in my hand, or water on the ground - but I can point to it, I can perceive it. Why would it not be an entity?

At the microscopic level of inspection, it's hard to find the boundary between two miscible gases or fluids.The statement that fluids don't have definite boundaries does not mean that an entity with definite boundaries cannot be primarily composed of a fluid.

I disagree. At the microscopic level it's very easy to find the boundary between two miscible gases or fluids. Things become more discreet the smaller we look. Unless you're arguing that gases pass easily between boundaries at a microscopic level - but if that is your argument, then a man couldn't be a primary entity because, at the microscopic level, gases are passing between the air around him and his skin. But we're not discussing things at a microscopic level, right? We're only discussing things, entities, which we perceive directly. Do I need to be able to distinguish where one entity ends and another begins at the microscopic level in order to identify it?

We don't. So fluids, alone, are never "primary entities", but you can always enclose a fluid. If you want to add context, you can, but changing context does not always result in an equally valid conclusion.

But then, nothing alone could ever be a primary entity. Nothing is ever "alone."

I disagree entirely. We may require special environmental protection and propulsion, but space travel, and the ability to discover those conditions that enable it, are architypically man's nature.No, it is not man's nature to be a naked, uncivilized ape.

It might be our nature to discover those conditions that enable space travel, but if it were our nature to be in space, we wouldn't need to discover what changes to our nature are necessary to be in space. I mean, we can discover ways to identify poison, and ways to counteract the effects of ingested poison, but you wouldn't argue it's Man's nature to ingest poison, would you?

You probably want to attack this from the other end, namely the question of whether it's in man's nature to be able to visually perceive individual molecules or quarks. Recall that the question was whether man could ever directly perceive Pluto without e.g. a telescope. I suggest that no biological structure is possible that can directly perceive individual molecules, and certainly not quarks. [Let be add that I'm not claiming that we can't make a molecule that's big enough that we can directly see it; rather, we can't enhance vision so that it can, in general, resolve at the molecule-sized level].

I suppose I just don't understand the necessity of categorizing things this way. I don't know what special quality "primary" bestows upon an entity. I don't understand what the requirement "directly perceive" entails, and what the constraints are upon it. It seems to me something can both be a primary entity and not-a-primary-entity depending upon who's perceiving it, which smacks of subjectivism besides being a blatant contradiction.

It is not in Man's nature to perceive Pluto, either directly or indirectly. He can not perceive it from where his nature finds him. He can utilize his nature (a rational mind) to create something which will allow him to perceive Pluto (both directly and indirectly), but unless he does that he will not perceive Pluto and has no ability to. In other words, unless he creates some tool(s) for perceiving Pluto, no biological structure is possible that can perceive Pluto, neither directly nor indirectly. And, at the end of the day, what would it really matter if Pluto were not a primary entity?

[Grames]

I suppose I just don't understand the necessity of categorizing things this way. I don't know what special quality "primary" bestows upon an entity. I don't understand what the requirement "directly perceive" entails, and what the constraints are upon it. It seems to me something can both be a primary entity and not-a-primary-entity depending upon who's perceiving it, which smacks of subjectivism besides being a blatant contradiction.

"Entity" needed to be defined. The genus is existents, differentia is the things with perceivable boundaries. This sets up the vocabulary necessary for further reasoning and the rest of philosophy, and it is accessible without any scientific background. The whole business with the 'extended sense' is how scientific knowledge of other kinds of entities is integrated into this scheme. The laws of identity and causality are explained in terms of entities. For the purpose of making it clear that identity and causality apply to things known only by inference they too are identified as entities, but in an extended sense that preserves the original distinction.

Existents are not toggling between being entities and not being entities, they are entities known because they are self-evident and entities known only by inference. Furthermore there isn't even any toggling: once a person knows an entity in the primary sense it is remembered as such and is never again an extended-sense entity to that person.

[JeffS]

Existents are not toggling between being entities and not being entities, they are entities known because they are self-evident and entities known only by inference. Furthermore there isn't even any toggling: once a person knows an entity in the primary sense it is remembered as such and is never again an extended-sense entity to that person.

Isn't this subjectivism though? An entity could be a primary entity to some, but an extended entity to others?

[DavidOdden]

I suppose I just don't understand the necessity of categorizing things this way.

As I explained, it is a fact of the different senses of the concept. While you may wish those senses did not exist, in fact they do, so if you ever intend to discuss the concept "entity" with others, you ought to be able to explain what one is -- especially if your purpose is to explain Objectivist metaphysics. If you don't do such things, you don't "need" to distinguish primary entities from other things.

Explain what an entity is.

[Grames]

Isn't this subjectivism though? An entity could be a primary entity to some, but an extended entity to others?

It is an example of contextual nature of all knowledge. Even entity, a concept at the very base of metaphysics, has only a contextual definition specifying a relationship between the existent and human perception of it.

[JeffS]

As I explained, it is a fact of the different senses of the concept. While you may wish those senses did not exist, in fact they do, so if you ever intend to discuss the concept "entity" with others, you ought to be able to explain what one is -- especially if your purpose is to explain Objectivist metaphysics. If you don't do such things, you don't "need" to distinguish primary entities from other things.

Explain what an entity is.

What are those other senses? Mr. Odden, I have no preference for their existence or not. I simply don't know what they are if they do exist.

Ontologically, an entity is a physical existent, as opposed to qualities, attributes, or actions of entities. I see no gain in calling an existent a primary existent, or a primary entity. I see no loss in not using these terms either. I do see a loss in using them, though: I see confusion. Why create concepts for which there is no use?

Pluto is an existent. It is a physical existent and an entity in reality. Molecules are existents. They are physical existents and entities in reality. What do I gain by asserting, and accepting, that Pluto is a primary entity, but molecules are not?

[JeffS]

It is an example of contextual nature of all knowledge. Even entity, a concept at the very base of metaphysics, has only a contextual definition specifying a relationship between the existent and human perception of it.

I can certainly understand and agree with that. If I can perceive it, it exists. However, I must specify the mode of that existent if I am to gain any knowledge of it. For example: molecules exist. They exist as physical entities at the atomic level of reality. As such, since atomically small is one of their attributes, I must use a microscope to learn about them. I lose none of the context by specifying molecules in this way (by specifying their mode), and I take nothing away from their entity nature - which classifying them as not-primary entities seems to do. Classifying them as not-primary entities seems to bestow special entity status upon some entities - as if those not-primary entities are somehow inferior existents.

[Grames]

Classifying them as not-primary entities seems to bestow special entity status upon some entities - as if those not-primary entities are somehow inferior existents.

The special status of the extended sense entities is epistemological, not metaphysical.

[JeffS]

The special status of the extended sense entities is epistemological, not metaphysical.

Okay, I think I get it now.

Is this a correct understanding:

To directly perceive something is to see it and/or touch it in its entirety and without altering Man's perceptual faculties (without giving him special perceptive powers beyond his natural perceptive abilities).

All entities are existents, but not all existents are entities. Some entities can be perceived directly - they can be seen and/or touched in their entirety without altering Man's perceptual faculties; these entities are referred to as "primary entities." Some entities require altering Man's perceptual faculties (e.g. to see the microscopic, to see the very far away, etc.), but in order to gain knowledge of these entities we must first understand the entities perceivable to the unaided senses. Classifying entities in this way helps us understand the way we form concepts.

[DavidOdden]

What are those other senses?

Here are some. First is a legal sense where it refers to actual people and "legal people", viz. corporations. In certain literary genres, it refers to kinds of non-human apparently animate matter (ghosts, monsters, etc. always with a supernatural connotation). As a sub-specialization in literature it will refer specifically to beings without corporeal form. I'm naming some of the non-philosophical senses. As Grames said, since we're talking about "senses", that means different meanings, which is an epistemological and linguistic problem.

I don't think I would fully agree with your characterization of direct perception. (I am ignoring Cartesian representationalism which is a kind of "indirect perception", which IMO is so wrong as to not be worth considering). First, the "in its entirety" requirement is too strong, because when you look at an apple and perceive it, you do not perceive the entirety of the apply. In fact, you could not (visually) perceive the entirely of any non-transparent object. You can rotate or split open the apple in order to see all of it, but it is not required that you see the entirety of the object in order to perceive it.

Second, drawing on the Peikoff example of the molecule where the perception is indirect, indirect perception (as it actually exists) can be analyzed in terms of two variants. First, "amplifiers" may be interposed between the perceiver and the object -- a lens or audio amplifier -- which shapes the physical signal in certain ways whereby the type of signal is the same but the form of the signal is modified (to make the object perceptible). Second, "translators" may be interposed -- e.g. a Geiger counter renders nuclear decays detectable auditorily and visually. People may differ in whether they include optically amplified visual signals are part of "indirect perception", but certainly a translating device like a TV or camera, or electron microscope would count as indirect perception. Now the point here is that Geiger counters, TVs, scanning microscopes and so on do not alter man's perceptual faculties. They may extend his actual perceptual abilities, but that is different from changing his perceptual faculty (which would require some kind of surgical or genetic intervention).

[Grames]

You got it.

Just to backtrack a bit, I thought the question of what sense the Earth is an entity is interesting. Pre-science, the earth is distinguished from the air above it and has a surface boundary, but not all of the boundary can be seen. The partial boundary is enough to establish the primary entity status of the Earth. It is misleading of me to use the proper noun Earth, the concept starts off just as 'the ground' or land. There is a long scientific road to go get from the idea of Earth as land to Earth as a planet.

[JeffS]

Here are some. First is a legal sense where it refers to actual people and "legal people", viz. corporations. In certain literary genres, it refers to kinds of non-human apparently animate matter (ghosts, monsters, etc. always with a supernatural connotation). As a sub-specialization in literature it will refer specifically to beings without corporeal form. I'm naming some of the non-philosophical senses. As Grames said, since we're talking about "senses", that means different meanings, which is an epistemological and linguistic problem.

I'm assuming by "it" you mean entity, so if I'm mistaken, please correct me. I think I'm wrong though, because that would make your response more appropriate to a question such as: "What are the different senses the word 'entity' can be used?" That was not my question, and I apologize if anything I wrote misled you.

My question is: "What are the different senses of an entity?"

Dr. Peikoff wrote:

"This term [entity] may be used in several senses. If you speak in the primary sense, “entity” has to be defined ostensively—that is to say, by pointing. I can, however, give you three descriptive characteristics essential to the primary, philosophic use of the term, according to Objectivism. This is not a definition, because I’d have to rely ultimately on pointing to make these points clear, but it will give you certain criteria for the application of the term in the primary sense…"

Which your use of the term above follows. In short, he's saying, "This word 'entity' has a couple different meanings, but it's primary use, it's philosophical use is things I would ultimately have to point to in order to make it clear to you." Peikoff is using "primary" to distinguish which definition, or sense, of the term "entity" he is using. Peikoff is saying, "There are entities, and there are non-entities (in the primary sense, the philosophical definition, of the term 'entity')."

But the OP is not using "primary" in this way. He is using "primary" (and "extended") to classify entities. He's arguing there are "primary" entities and "non-primary" entities. It's not clear from the Peikoff quote that Peikoff meant to imply there are "primary" entities and "non-primary" entities. (Rand uses the term "primary existent," but these are simply entities.)

You seem to agree with this interpretation of the Peikoff quote, so I'm trying to determine what the different senses of an entity are, or examples of non-primary entities.

I don't think I would fully agree with your characterization of direct perception. (I am ignoring Cartesian representationalism which is a kind of "indirect perception", which IMO is so wrong as to not be worth considering). First, the "in its entirety" requirement is too strong, because when you look at an apple and perceive it, you do not perceive the entirety of the apply. In fact, you could not (visually) perceive the entirely of any non-transparent object. You can rotate or split open the apple in order to see all of it, but it is not required that you see the entirety of the object in order to perceive it.

I agree. I was attempting to include the criteria that the entity be perceptual in size. I suppose "perceptual in size" works pretty well.

Now the point here is that Geiger counters, TVs, scanning microscopes and so on do not alter man's perceptual faculties. They may extend his actual perceptual abilities, but that is different from changing his perceptual faculty (which would require some kind of surgical or genetic intervention).

I agree.