Existents and entities

[Danneskjöld]

I think your b₁₁ and b₁₂ should be combined into one line for entities out of the range of unassisted human perception.

The structure or complexity you refer to here is physical not metaphysical. Scientific statements do not belong in an ontology or the whole thing is a stolen concept.

b₁₁ and b₁₂ are combined in one line: b₁) entities in an extended sense.... Crux is to specify these entities further, so what distinction do you propose?

By the way, check Ayn Rands defintion of metaphysical (Ayn Rand lexicon):

I use the word “metaphysical” to mean: that which pertains to reality, to the nature of things, to existence.

It pertains to reality, that atoms are part of primary entites and that primary entities are part of other entities. That IS metaphysical.

[Eiuol]

It is because a microscope is required. Philosophical terms must have a pre-scientific context or they risk being fallacious on grounds of the stolen-concept.

Would this make anything that can only be seen with tools an entity only in the an extended sense? Is Pluto not an entity since it cannot be seen with the naked eye? Clearly an orbit cannot be directly perceived, nor is there anything to suggest an orbit will ever be perceivable directly. But I know that Pluto can be seen with the naked eye if I were a few hundred miles away in a spaceship. This is why I am confused about why requiring a tool to perceive something directly means that the something cannot be an entity.

Edited August 14, 2009 by Eiuol

[Grames]

b₁₁ and b₁₂ are combined in one line: b₁) entities in an extended sense.... Crux is to specify these entities further, so what distinction do you propose?

Entities beyond the range of unassisted perception and collective nouns (winds, fluids, flocks, armies)

It pertains to reality, that atoms are part of primary entites and that primary entities are part of other entities. That IS metaphysical.

This is not the definition and your understanding of the context of 'pertains to reality' is far too broad and vague. Photosynthesis pertains to reality, the economics of medicine pertain to reality, neither is metaphysical nor is the atomic theory of matter.

Metaphysics, in the Objectivist viewpoint, is a highly delimited subject. In essence, it identifies only the fact of existence (along with the corollaries of this fact). The subject does not study particular existents or undertake to guide men in the achievement of a goal.

And see Metaphysics in the Lexicon.

[Plasmatic]

The topic is more oblique to the discussion than I remembered...

Now you can see why Objectivism rejects the primary secondary quality distinction.It is not true that extension is really out there intrinsically and color and the rest are really just subjective effects on us. All of the qualities we perceive are facts of independent reality as perceived by human consciousness.There is no grounds whatever to divide the properties we perceive up into the extension connected ones versus the color sounds textures exetera. There is no warrant for proclaiming two kinds of sensory properties.Those which belong to the object versus those which are created by consciousness.The actual facts are, there are objects in independent reality which have various attributes in themselves.Human being have the faculty of consciousness and perceive those objects by certain means, and thus in certain forms.Forms inexorably dictated and determined by the nature of the objects in themselves.Part of which includes the nature of mans sensory apparatus.Now the only valid distinction you can make is between the primary causes in reality the "energy puffs" in my construct, and the derivative manifestations of those puffs.All of their expressions, effects, results.You can distinguish between cause and effect in this way. But that is not the distinction between primary and secondary qualities as the traditional philosophers make it.......if the phrase primary quality means, quality intrinsic in reality, in other words quality which is a real fact as against a subjective product of consciousness, then as we have seen all the qualities we perceive are facts, all are real all are primary.

Edited August 14, 2009 by Plasmatic

[Grames]

Would this make anything that can only be seen with tools an entity only in the an extended sense? Is Pluto not an entity since it cannot be seen with the naked eye? Clearly an orbit cannot be directly perceived, nor is there anything to suggest an orbit will ever be perceivable directly. But I know that Pluto can be seen with the naked eye if I were a few hundred miles away in a spaceship. This is why I am confused about why requiring a tool to perceive something directly means that the something cannot be an entity.

In the metaphysical sense only, Pluto is an entity in the extended sense since it cannot be seen with the naked eye. In the context of astronomy this is trivial. There is no sense in which it could be stated that 'Pluto is not an entity'.

Knowledge is contextual, even the judgement of whether something is an extended-sense entity or not is contextual as you have explained. Pluto does not change as you approach it in a spaceship, but your relationship with it does. Pluto crosses a line from being invisible to self-evident, from a scientific inference to a direct percept and first-level concept.

[DavidOdden]

Is Pluto not an entity since it cannot be seen with the naked eye?

It's a safe bet that a giraffe is also not right now seeable by you with a naked eye. That's because of a changeable fact about the relationship between you and the giraffe. That is the same with Pluto: get on a spaceship and take a look out the port. Whereas, molecules and electrons cannot ever be directly perceived by man. Man has the potential to see any planet, and no microscopic structures. Whether or not the entity is actually seen is not the defining distinction.

[Danneskjöld]

Would this make anything that can only be seen with tools an entity only in the an extended sense? Is Pluto not an entity since it cannot be seen with the naked eye? Clearly an orbit cannot be directly perceived, nor is there anything to suggest an orbit will ever be perceivable directly. But I know that Pluto can be seen with the naked eye if I were a few hundred miles away in a spaceship. This is why I am confused about why requiring a tool to perceive something directly means that the something cannot be an entity.

Same pattern, same answer.

If I were a few hundred miles away in a spaceship, then Pluto could be seen with the naked eye. If and to the extent this is the case, then you could call it a primary entity.

[edited for spelling]

Edited August 14, 2009 by Danneskjöld

[Danneskjöld]

The topic is more oblique to the discussion than I remembered...

QUOTE

Now you can see why Objectivism rejects the primary secondary quality distinction.It is not true that extension is really out there intrinsically and color and the rest are really just subjective effects on us. All of the qualities we perceive are facts of independent reality as perceived by human consciousness.There is no grounds whatever to divide the properties we perceive up into the extension connected ones versus the color sounds textures exetera. There is no warrant for proclaiming two kinds of sensory properties.Those which belong to the object versus those which are created by consciousness.The actual facts are, there are objects in independent reality which have various attributes in themselves.Human being have the faculty of consciousness and perceive those objects by certain means, and thus in certain forms.Forms inexorably dictated and determined by the nature of the objects in themselves.Part of which includes the nature of mans sensory apparatus.Now the only valid distinction you can make is between the primary causes in reality the "energy puffs" in my construct, and the derivative manifestations of those puffs.All of their expressions, effects, results.You can distinguish between cause and effect in this way. But that is not the distinction between primary and secondary qualities as the traditional philosophers make it.......if the phrase primary quality means, quality intrinsic in reality, in other words quality which is a real fact as against a subjective product of consciousness, then as we have seen all the qualities we perceive are facts, all are real all are primary.

[emphasis added]

Our discussion is about a primary/secondary entity distincion, not a primary/secondary quality distinction. So this quote does not say whether or not a primary/secondary entity distincion is useful/correct/compatible with Objectivists Philosophy.

[Danneskjöld]

Entities beyond the range of unassisted perception and collective nouns (winds, fluids, flocks, armies)

So instead of

b₁) entities in a “extended sense”

b₁₁) lower-level entities

b₁₂) higher-level entities

you would put it this way:

b₁) entities in a “extended sense”

b₁₁) entities beyond the range of unassisted perception

b₁₂) collective nouns (winds, fluids, flocks, armies)

To object this distinction:

b₁) entities in a “extended sense” is by definition the same as b₁₁) entities beyond the range of unassisted perception. A thing cannot be a sub-category of itself.

So there you have only one sub-category b₁₂) collective nouns (winds, fluids, flocks, armies). Only one sub-category is a contradiction in itself, as there is only one category.

Leaving this aside, my question would then be a differentiation of your b₁₁) entities beyond the range of unassisted perception (which is by definition the same question as posed before).

This is not the definition and your understanding of the context of 'pertains to reality' is far too broad and vague. Photosynthesis pertains to reality, the economics of medicine pertain to reality, neither is metaphysical nor is the atomic theory of matter.

And see Metaphysics in the Lexicon.

I am talking of pertaining to reality in respect to entities (as we are discussion the differentiation of entities). Neither photosynthesis nor the economics of medicine are entities. So that (if?) they are not metaphysical does not imply, that atoms are not metaphysical.

I will have to check definitions, before getting to a definit answer. But so far I do not see why atoms are not a metaphysically given fact.

[Plasmatic]

Our discussion is about a primary/secondary entity distincion, not a primary/secondary quality distinction. So this quote does not say whether or not a primary/secondary entity distincion is useful/correct/compatible with Objectivists Philosophy.

Ergo my comment on obliqueness. However it still touches on the perception part of our discussion.

[Danneskjöld]

Ergo my comment on obliqueness. However it still touches on the perception part of our discussion.

Hm, the translations of oblique by the online-dictionary I use (http://dict.leo.org) does not make sense when I translate your sentence into german. Can you give another word (or explain) what oblique in your statement means?

[edit: and yes, this touches on the perception part of our discussion, i.e. it must be considered when discussing (categorizing) qualities, which are situated somewhere in the non-entity category.]

Edited August 14, 2009 by Danneskjöld

[JeffS]

There has to be a fundamental epistemological underpinning to this discussion. Therefore the facts of human perception are relevant to understanding the two senses of "entity" -- it's not as though concepts are metaphysically given. Case in point, Santa Claus would be perceivable in this imaginary universe just in case a person could "see" the contents of another person's mind. That's not how humans are, nor can they directly perceive molecules. The problem with fantastic alterations of the nature of man is that it's hard to limit. How do we know that it's really "possible" to engineer a man who can perceive molecules, atoms, electrons and quarks, but not possible to perceive the universe? If you allow fantasy in one bunch of cases, why not extend it to every sort of case (including the universe). It seems to me that injecting fantasy is a bad idea for a philosophy that is, in fact, designed around the nature of man.

So this really boils down to whether or not something is coming between Man and his perception, right? If I put something between me (and my perceptive faculties) and the thing I'm trying to perceive, then I'm not perceiving it directly?

[Danneskjöld]

So this really boils down to whether or not something is coming between Man and his perception, right? If I put something between me (and my perceptive faculties) and the thing I'm trying to perceive, then I'm not perceiving it directly?

If you think of saying that there are humans which do need glasses to perceive things clearly, skip it. They do perceive directly something, i.e. the primary entity.

[Grames]

you would put it this way:

b₁) entities in a “extended sense”

b₁₁) entities beyond the range of unassisted perception

b₁₂) collective nouns (winds, fluids, flocks, armies)

To object this distinction:

b₁) entities in a “extended sense” is by definition the same as b₁₁) entities beyond the range of unassisted perception.

How so? In your structured list the meaning of entities in a “extended sense” has not yet been given so b₁₁ duplicates nothing.

I am talking of pertaining to reality in respect to entities (as we are discussion the differentiation of entities). Neither photosynthesis nor the economics of medicine are entities. So that (if?) they are not metaphysical does not imply, that atoms are not metaphysical.

I will have to check definitions, before getting to a definit answer. But so far I do not see why atoms are not a metaphysically given fact.

Perhaps it is a language problem. Atoms are undeniably a metaphysically given fact. All facts not man-made are metaphysically given, this doesn't make them all the subject matter of metaphysics.

Metaphysics is a noun, metaphysical is an adjective. The definition of the adjective metaphysical you gave above is not at all equivalent to the definition of the noun metaphysics. To be specific, in the distinction between the metaphysical and the man-made what is important is the origin or cause of a certain fact. No man caused matter to be arranged in atoms, that arises inevitably from the nature of reality and is therefore metaphysical in its cause, while remaining a fact requiring a scientific knowledge of physics to prove.

edit: grammar

Edited August 14, 2009 by Grames

[JeffS]

If you think of saying that there are humans which do need glasses to perceive things clearly, skip it. They do perceive directly something, i.e. the primary entity.

Since you have such a solid handle on assumptions, I'll just let you finish off our discussion.

[Plasmatic]

Can you give another word (or explain) what oblique in your statement means?

Sure, I simply meant not exactly parallel to the discussions topic.

[DavidOdden]

So this really boils down to whether or not something is coming between Man and his perception, right? If I put something between me (and my perceptive faculties) and the thing I'm trying to perceive, then I'm not perceiving it directly?

No, I don't think "something between" is really correct. Rather, I think what is more important is that when speaking of entities in the secondary sense, their perception logically relies on a prior well worked out understanding of entities in the primary sense. If you review the extract from Peikoff in the OP, you will see that he is focusing on those facts about entities that pertain to how we grasp the concept "entity". It does turn out that with molecules and quarks, these entities can be perceived but not directly without the use of man-made tools of perceptual enhancement. While "something between" does happen to be correct, I don't think that's the main point. It is, simply, that there are these three basic properties of entities which make "entity" a fundamental concept, which give rise to the concept: but you can't hold "definite boundary" or "direct perceivability" to be absolute requirements for entityhood.

[Plasmatic]

but you can't hold "definite boundary

Im curious David. In your understanding why not? I know in the lecture I quoted from Peikoff he says we would have to be omniscient to know, but... What say you?

[Danneskjöld]

Since you have such a solid handle on assumptions, I'll just let you finish off our discussion.

Was it or was it not the kind of your next argument you wanted to use?

[Danneskjöld]

How so? In your structured list the meaning of entities in a “extended sense” has not yet been given so b₁₁ duplicates nothing.

???????????????

Read the very first post. And all following posts that led me to the proposed structure. DO NOT TAKE SOMETHING OUT OF CONTEXT.

[Danneskjöld]

Edit: So the metaphysical hierarchy is there anyway, why not introduce it in the categorical system?

The structure or complexity you refer to here is physical not metaphysical. Scientific statements do not belong in an ontology or the whole thing is a stolen concept.

Perhaps it is a language problem. Atoms are undeniably a metaphysically given fact. All facts not man-made are metaphysically given, this doesn't make them all the subject matter of metaphysics.

Metaphysics is a noun, metaphysical is an adjective. The definition of the adjective metaphysical you gave above is not at all equivalent to the definition of the noun metaphysics. To be specific, in the distinction between the metaphysical and the man-made what is important is the origin or cause of a certain fact. No man caused matter to be arranged in atoms, that arises inevitably from the nature of reality and is therefore metaphysical in its cause, while remaining a fact requiring a scientific knowledge of physics to prove.

edit: grammar

I do not see where your heading to or what your point is. Atoms are metaphysical. I try to differentiate them from the integrated concepts of existents. I do not try to prove anything regarding to physics, i.e. regarding to HOW these metaphysical entities behave or are.

It seems, that you are talking about something being primary or not.

[Danneskjöld]

Sure, I simply meant not exactly parallel to the discussions topic.

Thanks. I do agree then. :-)

[Grames]

???????????????

Read the very first post. And all following posts that led me to the proposed structure. DO NOT TAKE SOMETHING OUT OF CONTEXT.

I don't know how they do things in your first language, but in English if you are creating a structured list which is intended to be a taxonomy then it should be complete and self-contained. Definitions and other information in prefatory text must appear in its place in the list as well. Splitting the information up into two different formats is just poor presentation.

I do not see where your heading to or what your point is. Atoms are metaphysical. I try to differentiate them from the integrated concepts of existents. I do not try to prove anything regarding to physics, i.e. regarding to HOW these metaphysical entities behave or are.

It seems, that you are talking about something being primary or not.

The point of this portion of the thread is to dispute your assertion of the metaphysical significance of the structure of matter. Everything known about matter belongs to the special science of physics. Even mentioning atoms plunges you deep into an advanced scientific context of knowledge. Atoms are metaphysical, but the knowledge of atoms is part of physics. META-physics omits all physics knowledge.

[DavidOdden]

Im curious David. In your understanding why not? I know in the lecture I quoted from Peikoff he says we would have to be omniscient to know, but...

It's simply that the atmosphere, for example, has no definite boundary, but it is an entity. Developmentally, we will notice numerous facts about the specifics subsumed by a concept, because they are the most perceptually outstanding (see for example Rand's chronology of the development of 'man' in a child).

I'm not getting the part about omniscience and a quote from Peikoff; perhaps you can elucidate.

[Plasmatic]

It's simply that the atmosphere, for example, has no definite boundary, but it is an entity. Developmentally, we will notice numerous facts about the specifics subsumed by a concept, because they are the most perceptually outstanding (see for example Rand's chronology of the development of 'man' in a child).

I'm not getting the part about omniscience and a quote from Peikoff; perhaps you can elucidate.

Before I go on. If you would,...Do you consider the question of what the fundamental characteristic of the concept entity is, to be epistemology or physics? It sounds silly to ask but Id appreciate your response. Ive spent quite a bit of time researching/pondering this topic, and still am working on it.