Is objectivism consequentialist?

[Invictus2017]

On Wednesday September 23, 2009 at 1:40 AM, aequalsa said:

After the primary choice to live rationally,

The primary choice is to live period.  Objectivism demonstrates that, having made that choice, one should live rationally.  That is, being rational is pro-survival.

 

I'm reminded of a scene from Star Trek.  Spock et al are in a shuttlecraft that's in a decaying orbit and about to burn up.  They have some fuel, but not enough to do more than delay the inevitable. They can't call for help due to massive interference.  Spock reaches over and flips a switch that dumps the rest of their fuel, which burns up, causing a massive flare.  Those on the Enterprise spot it and beam them out of there in the nick of time.  Later, McCoy twits Spock for being irrational.

A naive interpretation of Objectivism might agree with McCoy.  After all, the odds that the Enterprise was nearby were really small.  Wouldn't saving the fuel for a few more moments of life be more rational?  But Spock did make the rational choice -- choosing against  a few moments where he might definitely live, but impotently and with the certain knowledge of impending death, for the possibility, however remote, of a long and well lived life.

On Wednesday September 23, 2009 at 1:40 AM, aequalsa said:

The premise seems to be that humans choose life or death and if they choose life then a consequential proof easily follows. The problem I am running into is that it is not a dichotomic choice to live or die. It is a choice to live a "rational, flourishing life." People can an in fact usually do choose something far less then that and a whole range of things in between. So in the sense of the basic question, it still seems fundamentally consequentialist. Man ought to behave in a certain way if he chooses to live this particular sort of rational productive life.

Objectivism's point is that the root choice is a simple binary choice: live, or let nature take its course.  The rest of the Objectivist ethics is premised on the fact that one has made that choice.  It is, however, important to keep in mind that the ethics is not a recipe for living.  It is a set of principles that acquire life (so to speak) only when applied to an individual's existence.

What this means in real life is that I don't sit down one day and say, "I've decided to live" and then become an Objectivist.  Rather, I decide for whatever reason that I want to be "good", and Objectivism tells me what the good is and how I can be good according to that conception.  Along the way, I discover that the foundation of being good is to choose to live.  And not live in a purely biological sense, but as a human being.

This latter is not, strictly speaking, a part of that primary choice.  Rather, I start with bare physical survival and, going down the logic chain, discover that bare physical survival doesn't work without taking into account my own nature.  In particular, it means taking into account my physical and mental capacities, including the emotional ones.

This is necessary because that primary choice provides a logical grounding for Objectivism, but not a practical one.  Nothing in "I choose to live" tells me how to balance the requirements of short and long term survival.  But the logic chain tells me that, to promote my own survival, I must, among other things, learn to love -- not life itself -- but life as as a human being. (Rand's "man qua man".)

Survival, for me, then becomes not mere physical survival, but survival as a human being.  If I act for mere survival, I undercut that love of life, and likely actually work against my own survival.

I doubt that the writer of that Star Trek episode was an Objectivist, but I do think that he understood that Spock's choice was fundamentally an emotional choice.  So they had McCoy twit Spock for his emotionalism.  And that Spock was also right in replying that, under the circumstances, that emotional choice was the logical thing to do.

 

From an Objectivist perspective, Spock's choice was between ten minutes of mere physical survival and the possibility of an extended life worth living --- and to the person who loves life, that's a no-brainer.  The choice, while ultimately grounded in emotion, was nevertheless a rational choice.

There is no question that a person may imperfectly translate the binary choice to live into his actual life, meaning that, in some situations, his actions are pro-survival and, in others, not.  But that doesn't affect whether he accepts, as a rational principle, that survival is his ultimate goal.

 

As for the flourishing debate, I think that the proponents of flourishing as something distinct from survival need to consider that Star Trek episode.  In particular, why Spock's action was moral from an Objectivist perspective.  Yes, flourishing is important -- because it contributes to survival.  And because it does, it can be given a definite meaning -- by considering how it contributes to survival.

[Craig24]

11 hours ago, Grames said:

To review the definition of consequentialism given at wikipedia:

Consequentialism is the class of normative ethical theories holding that the consequences of one's conduct are the ultimate basis for any judgment about the rightness or wrongness of that conduct. Thus, from a consequentialist standpoint, a morally right act (or omission from acting) is one that will produce a good outcome, or consequence. In an extreme form, the idea of consequentialism is commonly encapsulated in the saying, "the end justifies the means",^[1] meaning that if a goal is morally important enough, any method of achieving it is acceptable.

Note that the definition gives absolutely no guidance on what code of values is used to determine what the meaning of "good" is.  This is an empty doctrine, as value-free and meaningless as the Golden Rule of "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you".  A blood thirsty conqueror can abide by the Golden Rule as long as he sincerely relishes combat and regards dying in battle as noble.  A blood thirsty conqueror can also be a consequentialist using his own victory as his standard of the good. 

Yes, you can bolt the Objectivist standard of value - your own life - onto consequentialism.  You can also do that with the Golden Rule.  However, Objectivism does not reduce to consequentialism because you omit a core feature of the philosophy by omitting its theory of the good.

I must have been reading your mind when I read the wikipedia entry quoted.  I was thinking to myself "How do you know what the good is?"

[2046]

11 minutes ago, Craig24 said:

I must have been reading your mind when I read the wikipedia entry quoted.  I was thinking to myself "How do you know what the good is?"

Indeed, however to be fair, it's not as if C theories such as utilitarianism, hedonism, psychological egoism, etc. don't have an answer to this. The point of the term C was to classify broadly between the relationships of moral terms in various normative theories. Each one of those theories may have its own meta-normative grounding for its theory, but here we are just isolating one aspect. 

[Invictus2017]

On Tuesday October 03, 2017 at 10:37 AM, DonAthos said:

I believe that all choices have to be moral.

I'd go further:  Any choice is necessarily moral.  Somewhere in a chooser is better/worse that motivates his choices.  Without the ability to decide that one alternative is better than another,  there is no "choice", only action.  The morality may be very primitive, as in "pleasure/good", "pain/bad", and it may be wholly unconsidered, but it must be there.

[2046]

8 hours ago, gio said:

I'm sorry, I haven't read all the answers, but I'll bring mine, if it can be useful. It might fit with what has already been said.

Everyone who is interested in Objectivism observes that this philosophy rejects many false dichotomy:

• Body vs. Mind
• Reason vs. Emotions
• The moral vs. The practical
• Free will vs. causality
• Rationalism vs. Empiricism
• Theory vs. Practice

Etc.

In my opinion, Consequentialism vs. Deontology is simply one of those false dichotomies, which has the same roots as "The moral vs. The practical".

I think this is a quite reasonable interpretation. Rand seemed to strive at transcending the problematic dichotomies of modern philosophy, and many times appealed to the classical Greeks, or something like them with a modern twist, in doing so. I think one of Rand's and virtue theorists goals to solve the consequentialism vs deontology dualism and it's great to see such appeals firmly grounded in the nature of life and value.

[Invictus2017]

On Tuesday October 03, 2017 at 10:37 AM, DonAthos said:

I would rather live a slightly shorter life, but filled with greater pleasure, than a slightly longer life devoid of it. I consider that to be an intensely moral choice. Your approach to ethics, where morality only concerns whether an individual survives or not, is arbitrarily limited

I agree that this would be a moral choice.  However, I disagree that individual survival would not support it.  As human beings, feelings are our motivation and reward for action and, as such, gratifying them can be pro-survival.  (Not always, of course.)

In the example at hand, gaining enjoyment through eating ice cream, the analysis is simple:  Pampering myself, so long as it doesn't have clearly determined negative consequences, makes my experience of living more positive and thereby improves my ability to handle my life. It is therefore pro-survival and I should do it when it doesn't conflict with other more pro-survival actions.

[Easy Truth]

13 hours ago, Grames said:

Yes, you can bolt the Objectivist standard of value - your own life - onto consequentialism.  You can also do that with the Golden Rule.  However, Objectivism does not reduce to consequentialism because you omit a core feature of the philosophy by omitting its theory of the good.

We all agree that it can't be reduced to any traditional versions of consequentialist philosophies. (utilitarianism, pragmatism, etc.)
But Objectivist Ethics can be developed from the ground up based on and in terms of anticipated "consequences" based on causality.
The consequence of life vs. death is at the center of the ethics.
In that sense the argument that it is Consequentialist is valid. At a minimum, it is "primarily" Consequentialist.

Even the Objectivist theory of good and virtues are based on the anticipated consequence of life or death, existence or nonexistence.
 

[Invictus2017]

22 hours ago, DonAthos said:

I cannot describe the "badness" of pain and suffering because it is pain and suffering that allow for a conception of "bad" in the first place; "bad" without pain and suffering is meaningless and arbitrary. My definition of "good" is equally rooted in human experience -- specifically my experience.

Happiness is not good because it lets us live longer; happiness is good because that's what happiness is.

I agree with the last sentence, but I think you're conflating different definitions of good.  Happiness is experienced as good because that is part of its identity; happiness is good in exactly the same way that water is wet.

 

But happiness is also good, in the moral sense, because it promotes survival.

Mother nature did this on "purpose", so that early humans, with their poorly trained rational faculties, would have a ready guide to pro-survival action.  So the fact that happiness is both kinds of good is no accident.  With a bit more knowledge under our belts, we can make note of he relationship and thereby make it a virtue to seek happiness, and take advantage of what evolution has gifted us with.

I believe that it is possible to have a conception of good and bad that is not rooted in pleasure/pain.  Some intelligent species on another planet may arrive at their morality in a different way.  But for humans, because pleasure and pain are tied to our survival, our morality must take them into account.  That is not the same thing as saying that the moral good is that which is felt as good, or even that for a thing to be morally good it must be felt as good.
 

[Invictus2017]

 

23 hours ago, DonAthos said:

This is why I believe that someone who holds longevity as the standard of value is apt to live a long life filled with fewer pleasures and less happiness than otherwise possible.

It's worth noting that longevity is not the Objectivist standard of value.

Life is a process, one in which an organism's actions (ideally) all contribute to its continuing existence.  This process, being goal directed, serves as both as end and means to its continued existence.  A volitional being has the choice to make its actions contribute --or not -- to its continuing existence.

The point of ethics is to make those actions contribute.  However, nothing in the Objectivist ethics speaks to the duration of the process.   To the contrary, Rand focused on the nature of the process, not its duration.  One action is not more moral than another because it makes you live longer, it is because it supports the life appropriate to the sort of being you are.

(I note that I am as guilty as any of the sloppiness that leads to this confusion.)

 

Edited October 4, 2017 by Invictus2017
minor copyediting

[2046]

7 minutes ago, Invictus2017 said:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

It's worth noting that longevity is not the Objectivist standard of value.

 

Life is a process, one in which an organism's actions (ideally) all contributed to its continuing existence.  This process, being goal directed, serves as both as end and means to its continued existence.  A volitional being has the choice to make its actions contribute --or not -- to its continuing existence.

The point of ethics is to make those actions contribute.  However, nothing in the Objectivist ethics speaks to the duration of the process.   To the contrary, Rand focused on the nature of the process, not its duration.  One action is not more moral than another because it makes you live longer, it is because it supports the life appropriate to the sort of being you are.

(I note that I am as guilty as any of the sloppiness that leads to this confusion.)
 

But this points to a problem for the "survivalists." If mere duration and non-deadness isn't preferable to supporting a specific kind of life that will take qualitative form in what particular kind of being you are (certainly the most plausible interpretation of "survival qua man"), then life here is explicated not merely in terms of survival but in the enjoyment proper to a human being. Rand often says that the ultimate end is survival proper to a human being or happiness, and neither of these can be reduced to mere non-deadness. To survive qua human being in the manner Rand is regarding here must be lead a virtuous life in which one has realized ones human capacities, and eudaimonists point out that this is not mere survival.

A survivalist might reply, and it definitely seems like they want to say, that they want to start out with something that looks like survival and then end up with flourishing, but then that takes some bit of argumentation to get there. Even if it's that survival needs are the source of getting us to care about values, it doesn't follow that survival would be the ultimate end.

[Easy Truth]

39 minutes ago, 2046 said:

But this points to a problem for the "survivalists." If mere duration and non-deadness isn't preferable to supporting a specific kind of life that will take qualitative form in what particular kind of being you are (certainly the most plausible interpretation of "survival qua man"), then life here is explicated not merely in terms of survival but in the enjoyment proper to a human being. Rand often says that the ultimate end is survival proper to a human being or happiness, and neither of these can be reduced to mere non-deadness. To survive qua human being in the manner Rand is regarding here must be lead a virtuous life in which one has realized ones human capacities, and eudaimonists point out that this is not mere survival.

A survivalist might reply, and it definitely seems like they want to say, that they want to start out with something that looks like survival and then end up with flourishing, but then that takes some bit of argumentation to get there. Even if it's that survival needs are the source of getting us to care about values, it doesn't follow that survival would be the ultimate end.

2

"The maintenance of life and the pursuit of happiness are not two separate
issues. To hold one’s own life as one’s ultimate value, and one’s own
happiness as one’s highest purpose are two aspects of the same achievement.
Existentially, the activity of pursuing rational goals is the activity of
maintaining one’s life; psychologically, its result, reward and concomitant is
an emotional state of happiness. It is by experiencing happiness that one
lives one’s life, in any hour, year or the whole of it. And when one
experiences the kind of pure happiness that is an end in itself—the kind that
makes one think: “This is worth living for”—what one is greeting and
affirming in emotional terms is the metaphysical fact that life is an end in
itself.
But the relationship of cause to effect cannot be reversed. It is only by
accepting “man’s life” as one’s primary and by pursuing the rational values
it requires that one can achieve happiness—not by taking “happiness” as
some undefined, irreducible primary and then attempting to live by its guidance.
" Virtue of Selfisheness (p.25)

I assume happiness is equivalent to flourishing.

[Invictus2017]

15 minutes ago, 2046 said:

To survive qua human being in the manner Rand is regarding here must be lead a virtuous life in which one has realized ones human capacities, and eudaimonists point out that this is not mere survival.

And in this they are correct.  Rand's point isn't that morality consists of acting for survival, it is that the possibility of surviving or not  makes morality possible and necessary.  But mere surviving isn't, in her conception, the sum of moral action.

The survivalists are correct in that all actions must be directed at survival.  However, life is a process, carried out in an uncertain world.  The consideration of survival alone won't work in the face of that uncertainty, if for no other reason than human beings are not omniscient.  Rather, to best carry on that process -- to best survive -- it is necessary to cultivate those things that allow one to cope with uncertainty.

Furthermore, emotions are an inescapable part of being alive. A person can, however, choose whether those emotions motivate and reward survival action.  The person concerned with survival will, necessarily, concern himself with emotional health.  That dish of ice cream might, conceivably, take some small amount of time from one's life (but, in the face of life's uncertainty -- and in consideration of the fact that statistics do not apply to individuals -- this is really not a meaningful consideration), but the habit of giving one's self minor pleasures will certainly have a survival benefit.

 

Similar arguments can be made concerning the "spiritual" and social values that are, apparently, unconnected to survival.

The bottom line is that survival alone does not provide a proper guide to living.  Rather, it is survival plus a consideration of the nature of the process that is human life that does.  This is Rand's "life proper to a human being" and it is also the "flourishing" that people talk about.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  
 

[Invictus2017]

9 minutes ago, Easy Truth said:

I assume happiness is equivalent to flourishing.

Rather, happiness is the result of flourishing.  Or, put another way:  If you want to survive best, you must be happy.  If you want the best chance at happiness, flourish.  From that, and human nature, it is possible to define "flourishing".

 

(It should go without saying that "flourishing" doesn't mean doing specific things.  A particular person might flourish doing things that another might find utterly intolerable.  As always, specific conclusions require consideration of the specifics of a particular life.)
 

[DonAthos]

1 hour ago, Invictus2017 said:

I'd go further:  Any choice is necessarily moral.

After your first post in this thread, I was hoping that you would also choose to respond to one of my own. I hope that, even in disagreement, we can maintain the spirit of discussion that I suspect we can. (Sometimes I feel like I'm searching for something so rare as to be practically nonexistent; yet I continue to search.)

1 hour ago, Invictus2017 said:

Somewhere in a chooser is better/worse that motivates his choices.  Without the ability to decide that one alternative is better than another,  there is no "choice", only action.  The morality may be very primitive, as in "pleasure/good", "pain/bad", and it may be wholly unconsidered, but it must be there.

Wholly agreed.

1 hour ago, Invictus2017 said:

I agree that this would be a moral choice.  However, I disagree that individual survival would not support it.  As human beings, feelings are our motivation and reward for action and, as such, gratifying them can be pro-survival.  (Not always, of course.)

In the example at hand, gaining enjoyment through eating ice cream, the analysis is simple:  Pampering myself, so long as it doesn't have clearly determined negative consequences, makes my experience of living more positive and thereby improves my ability to handle my life. It is therefore pro-survival and I should do it when it doesn't conflict with other more pro-survival actions.

StrictlyLogical's first response was along these same lines, and I don't disagree that there are survival advantages in "pampering oneself," in improving the ability to handle life, or providing spiritual/emotional "fuel." But I disagree that these survival advantages are the solitary consideration, or even the primary one. My subsequent reply to StrictlyLogical was to stipulate (for the purpose of my hypothetical) that when the survival advantages of pampering are accounted for, a lifetime of eating ice cream in moderation still results in a slightly shorter lifespan -- by a day -- accounting to the other negative health effects of eating ice cream.

What would be the moral choice, given that?

His response was that, in such a situation, the moral choice would be to forego ice cream; I presume that this is because he would judge the one extra day of living to be worth more than all of the enjoyment of ice cream that one may experience in a lifetime, eating it in moderation. I think that decision is consonant with what he's expressed about his understanding of "life as the standard of value," which I describe as "longevity," but it conflicts starkly with my own; I would choose a lifetime of eating ice cream... and one fewer days of life, because that would be worth more to me than a lifetime without ice cream, and one more day (of an existence without ice cream).

Though my example is, obviously, highly contrived (we cannot know, and probably never will, with such specificity what the consequences of such actions will be) I don't think it's useless for that. It reflects real world behaviors and decision-making that I've observed over many years -- both within and outside of the Objectivist community -- and I'm certain that you're familiar with them, too. I've known people who not only do not eat ice cream, but never eat dessert, as a matter of policy, or do not eat red meat, or do not eat meat at all, so focused are they on (what I have described as) longevity. They take seriously, as I suppose we must, what scientists and nutritionists have had to say about the long term consequences of such behaviors, including eating ice cream or red meat or what have you, and they have determined that those behaviors are not worth the expected consequences or risks.

Well, I'm aware of the long term consequences of those behaviors, and I understand that my lifespan may be limited as a result; I probably could secure a longer life -- though a more joyless one -- by replacing the bulk of my diet with celery and brown rice and so forth, and I do not believe that I can support the notion that the psychological joys of eating steak and ice cream will actually let me live longer than some harsh, abstemious diet. I accept that a more health-focused diet would promote a longer life, just as the experts proclaim that it would. But that is not how I wish to live my life.

57 minutes ago, Invictus2017 said:

I agree with the last sentence, but I think you're conflating different definitions of good.  Happiness is experienced as good because that is part of its identity; happiness is good in exactly the same way that water is wet.

But happiness is also good, in the moral sense, because it promotes survival.

I understand, but in the service of explaining (or attempting to explain) my meaning, I am focused on the nature of happiness as good -- as you say, in the same way that water is wet -- and not because it adheres to an Objectivist's understanding that happiness is good because it promotes survival.

When philosophy "began," and ethics became a discipline, because people were interested in "the good life" and discovering how they may attain it, they identified happiness as good, and perhaps the chief good. They were thousands of years from Objectivism, and mistaken in perhaps all sorts of ways with respect to philosophy and science, but I think they were yet right in that identification. For good reasons.

I still look at ethics as the pursuit of the good life. (Or the better life; or the best.) And if I have a choice between a slightly longer life without ice cream, or a slightly shorter one with it, I know which one looks better to me.

57 minutes ago, Invictus2017 said:

Mother nature did this on "purpose", so that early humans, with their poorly trained rational faculties, would have a ready guide to pro-survival action.  So the fact that happiness is both kinds of good is no accident.  With a bit more knowledge under our belts, we can make note of he relationship and thereby make it a virtue to seek happiness, and take advantage of what evolution has gifted us with.

I agree with you about the role of "mother nature," or evolution, with respect to both pleasure/pain and our capacity for emotional analogues; but I have grown uneasy over the years with drawing too much on evolution or "nature," in that sense, for the purpose of ethical argument (such as that homosexuality is wrong because it is contra human nature, or "design," or so forth).

57 minutes ago, Invictus2017 said:

I believe that it is possible to have a conception of good and bad that is not rooted in pleasure/pain.  Some intelligent species on another planet may arrive at their morality in a different way.

This is as may be, but I don't know what that could be. And if we could imagine plausible sounding alternatives, I suspect that they would remain fundamentally and inescapably alien to me. I suspect it would be hard for me to empathize with a morality not based in our natural, human systems. (Just as it is hard for me to empathize with "moralities" based upon obedience to God, etc.)

57 minutes ago, Invictus2017 said:

But for humans, because pleasure and pain are tied to our survival, our morality must take them into account.  That is not the same thing as saying that the moral good is that which is felt as good, or even that for a thing to be morally good it must be felt as good.

My participation in these sorts of discussions goes back a while in the forum. If you have a lot of time and are feeling sufficiently masochistic, you might find this thread interesting (which, itself, refers back to earlier threads -- it is a bottomless rabbit hole).

Suffice it to say, briefly, that we are fully agreed that "the moral good is that which is felt as good" and "for a thing to be morally good it must be felt as good" are incorrect; that is not at all my intended meaning or belief.

5 minutes ago, Invictus2017 said:

It's worth noting that longevity is not the Objectivist standard of value.

I agree. But sometimes I believe that Objectivists discuss "life" (as the standard of value) or "survival," when really what they're talking about is longevity.

Or, even if I am wrong about what the Objectivist standard of value is, or how it has been employed (by Rand or others), I know that longevity is not sufficient for me as a standard of value (and neither is survival).

5 minutes ago, Invictus2017 said:

Life is a process, one in which an organism's actions (ideally) all contributed to its continuing existence.  This process, being goal directed, serves as both as end and means to its continued existence.  A volitional being has the choice to make its actions contribute --or not -- to its continuing existence.

Agreed.

5 minutes ago, Invictus2017 said:

The point of ethics is to make those actions contribute.

This is possibly where I diverge. It is not alone to my "continuing existence" that I mean to direct my actions, but also the nature of my experience of my existence.

5 minutes ago, Invictus2017 said:

 However, nothing in the Objectivist ethics speaks to the duration of the process.   To the contrary, Rand focused on the nature of the process, not its duration.  One action is not more moral than another because it makes you live longer, it is because it supports the life appropriate to the sort of being you are.

"Appropriateness," like "human nature," leaves me feeling uneasy. If we say that, of my nature, I may only achieve happiness in some certain way (or within a delimited range of ways) -- if this is what we mean by "appropriate" -- then I agree. And it remains for me to discover the ways in which a being like myself can attain happiness (and longevity, which, in most contexts, is a good).

But if I were to seek happiness in ways which we decide are not "appropriate" for me, because in terms of evolutionary history, or etc., we decide that such is not "natural," then I cannot agree that "appropriateness" is an appropriate consideration.

The problem with inappropriate or unnatural means of pursuing happiness -- when appropriate and natural are employed in what I consider to be the correct sense -- is that: they will not work. They will not allow a man to achieve happiness. But ethics are still the pursuit of happiness, or the good life, and whatever works to achieve that is appropriate to man.

[Invictus2017]

17 minutes ago, DonAthos said:

I don't disagree that there are survival advantages in "pampering oneself," in improving the ability to handle life, or providing spiritual/emotional "fuel." But I disagree that these survival advantages are the solitary consideration, or even the primary one. My subsequent reply to StrictlyLogical was to stipulate (for the purpose of my hypothetical) that when the survival advantages of pampering are accounted for, a lifetime of eating ice cream in moderation still results in a slightly shorter lifespan -- by a day -- accounting to the other negative health effects of eating ice cream.

What would be the moral choice, given that?

As I pointed out elsewhere, longevity is simply not the standard.  So, even absolute knowledge that a particular action would shorten your life does not suffice to make it immoral.  (Never mind that such knowledge cannot exist.)  Ultimately, it is whether that ice cream supports the process that is your life that determines whether it is moral.  That, in turn and when considered as an example of a species of moral question, is one of the things that would go into "flourishing".

25 minutes ago, DonAthos said:

I would choose a lifetime of eating ice cream... and one fewer days of life, because that would be worth more to me than a lifetime without ice cream, and one more day (of an existence without ice cream).

I happen to agree, but is your "worth more" an ungrounded emotional evaluation or can you justify it.  If so, how?

 

30 minutes ago, DonAthos said:

They take seriously, as I suppose we must, what scientists and nutritionists have had to say about the long term consequences of such behaviors, including eating ice cream or red meat or what have you, and they have determined that those behaviors are not worth the expected consequences or risks.

I, for one, do not take such pronouncements seriously.  History is littered with "expert" pronouncements that have far more to do with politics and political correctness than with science.  E.g., those concerning salt and fat.

I'll take the life-affirming sense of contentment after eating a good steak dinner over any alleged negative effects on my health.  If, somehow, I was persuaded that they effects were real, I'd seek out some equally gratifying but less risky form of pampering.  So, we're basically in agreement about the conclusion, but not about its justification.

36 minutes ago, DonAthos said:

I understand, but in the service of explaining (or attempting to explain) my meaning, I am focused on the nature of happiness as good -- as you say, in the same way that water is wet -- and not because it adheres to an Objectivist's understanding that happiness is good because it promotes survival.

Well, my view is not that happiness promotes survival (although it does), but that it is part of the process that is survival, and that this is what makes it moral.

40 minutes ago, DonAthos said:

I have grown uneasy over the years with drawing too much on evolution or "nature," in that sense, for the purpose of ethical argument (such as that homosexuality is wrong because it is contra human nature, or "design," or so forth).

I agree. In fact, as I made my illustration, I gave some thought as to whether I had a better way to make the point.  In any case, I definitely do not accept the notion that because it was good enough for our ancestors, that's how we should live today.  Nevertheless, any ethical argument does need to take into account human nature.  But actual human nature, not a rationalization.

 

47 minutes ago, DonAthos said:

This is possibly where I diverge. It is not alone to my "continuing existence" that I mean to direct my actions, but also the nature of my experience of my existence.

The nature of your experience is part of your continuing existence.

In the process that is your life, you experience emotions, etc., that contribute (or not) to an existence that is appropriate to what you are, and in doing so contribute (or not) to your life.  Among the goals of morality is to make your experience of life actually contribute to an appropriate existence.  This, in my view, is why your ice cream is moral, because the pleasure you get from it, in the broad sense, is appropriate to your life.  This would remain true even if there were minor deleterious effects from eating the ice cream.

56 minutes ago, DonAthos said:

"Appropriateness," like "human nature," leaves me feeling uneasy.

With good reason, considering how these terms have been abused.  But they're necessary terms.  What is essential is to derive their meaning by a rational process rather than by appeals to history...or feelings.

58 minutes ago, DonAthos said:

If we say that, of my nature, I may only achieve happiness in some certain way (or within a delimited range of ways) -- if this is what we mean by "appropriate" -- then I agree. And it remains for me to discover the ways in which a being like myself can attain happiness (and longevity, which, in most contexts, is a good).

Agreed.

 

59 minutes ago, DonAthos said:

The problem with inappropriate or unnatural means of pursuing happiness -- when appropriate and natural are employed in what I consider to be the correct sense -- is that: they will not work. They will not allow a man to achieve happiness.

Also agreed.  And happiness is both part of and a sign of a successful life, one appropriate to a human being, and one that is most conducive to survival. These are not different standards.

(And with that, I've run out of time for now.  Otherwise, I might add a bit more.)

 
 

[Grames]

6 hours ago, Easy Truth said:

We all agree that it can't be reduced to any traditional versions of consequentialist philosophies. (utilitarianism, pragmatism, etc.)
But Objectivist Ethics can be developed from the ground up based on and in terms of anticipated "consequences" based on causality.
The consequence of life vs. death is at the center of the ethics.
In that sense the argument that it is Consequentialist is valid. At a minimum, it is "primarily" Consequentialist.

Even the Objectivist theory of good and virtues are based on the anticipated consequence of life or death, existence or nonexistence.
 

Every theory of good and of the virtues is trivially consequentialist as long as there is any calculating at all.  Even so-called deontological ethics are concerned with the consequence of the eternal damnation of your immortal soul as a consequence of poor life choices.

All I really have to say here is to emphasize nonessential and unhelpful nature of the category and concept of consequentialist types of ethics.  What does Objectivism have in common with other consequentialist philosophies, or those philosophies with each other?  Does this noted similarity go anywhere?  In other words, does this integration pass the test of Rand's Razor?

[DonAthos]

6 hours ago, Invictus2017 said:

...even absolute knowledge that a particular action would shorten your life does not suffice to make it immoral.  (Never mind that such knowledge cannot exist.)  Ultimately, it is whether that ice cream supports the process that is your life that determines whether it is moral.  That, in turn and when considered as an example of a species of moral question, is one of the things that would go into "flourishing".

Forgive me, but I'm having a hard time understanding the thrust here. Knowing that actions shorten our lives do not suffice to make those actions immoral, but presumably an action that does not support (or works against) "the process that is my life" is immoral --? I find this language a bit confusing, and given my understanding (what is perhaps limited or errant) of those who see life (as the standard of value) as "survival," I don't see how we could support a process which would result in actions which shorten one's life.

Perhaps in the face of uncertainty, this is unavoidable, just as a system of justice will sometimes produce miscarriages of justice as an unfortunate byproduct. But we would never say that some particular injustice is a proper outcome of a just system; given absolute knowledge (as you allow for this hypothetical), a just system would amend itself to prevent a particular injustice. That's the very point of a justice system, and the standard against which all of its processes may be evaluated: delivering just results.

And if "Objectivism is about survival, not flourishing," as you've said, then I would assume that a person with absolute knowledge that a particular action would shorten his life would not perform that action -- because it appears to me to work against survival (again: even if a survival-oriented process may, at times, produce anti-survival outcomes as an unfortunate but necessary byproduct).

Unless I misunderstand "survival"? As David Kelley has it (also quoted in the thread I'd linked in my last post), "Although Ayn Rand made it clear that she meant her morality to ensure a rich, fully human life, it is the bare fundamental alternative of survival versus death that stands at the root of all values.

Several admirers of Rand’s approach to ethics have debated the sense in which survival can serve the most basic criterion of ethics. Here we have argued that survival is the literal alternative of life versus death, existence versus nonexistence."

If survival "is the literal alternative of life versus death, existence versus nonexistence," then it seems to me a hard argument to make that an action which will knowingly cause one to die more quickly is moral, given a survival ethics.

6 hours ago, Invictus2017 said:

I happen to agree, but is your "worth more" an ungrounded emotional evaluation or can you justify it.  If so, how?

I can justify it to my own satisfaction, according to the pleasures of eating ice cream, and the value I find in those experiences (not in terms of their relationship to survival, but in themselves). I'm not entirely certain about "ungrounded emotional evaluations," but I do factor emotions -- as a fact of reality, and an important one with respect to quality of life -- into my decision making.

I'm less certain of how a survival ethos would justify such a thing... but then, I'm also confused as to whether you would make the attempt, because although here you say that you "happen to agree" with my conclusion, later on you indicate that if actions like eating ice cream had negative effects on your health, you would seek out a "less risky form of pampering." But dying one day sooner is, I would argue, a "negative effect on one's health," if minor.

So I do not feel confident that I know how you would answer this question. (Though I know how StrictlyLogical answers it, and that I answer it in a different way, so I think that provides a good contrast -- in terms of results -- between what I advocate and what I argue against.)

6 hours ago, Invictus2017 said:

I, for one, do not take such pronouncements seriously.  History is littered with "expert" pronouncements that have far more to do with politics and political correctness than with science.  E.g., those concerning salt and fat.

I agree with you that "experts" are often wrong, but I don't feel qualified to make assessments of particular statements which require medical or scientific expertise (especially given that my education and vocation are in other areas). Perhaps everything my doctor tells me is false; but he is the one with the medical degree, so I'm generally inclined to follow his advice.

Regardless, we may proceed as though it is true that red meat and ice cream, and etc., are not particularly healthy, for the sake of discussion. If that's not the case in reality -- if ice cream is health food and brown rice is junk -- so be it. I trust that you may well know more about this area than I.

6 hours ago, Invictus2017 said:

I'll take the life-affirming sense of contentment after eating a good steak dinner over any alleged negative effects on my health.  If, somehow, I was persuaded that they effects were real, I'd seek out some equally gratifying but less risky form of pampering.

Both you and StrictlyLogical raised the idea of alternatives which are equally gratifying/pleasurable, but without any of the attendant negative health risks of ice cream and steak. But it seems to me that if there were alternatives to ice cream and steak that were equally gratifying, without the potential for negative outcome (depending on how we stand on the science), that we would already prefer those alternatives.

I've eaten frozen yogurt and various "meat substitutes," and in my experience, nothing in the world compares to ice cream and steak. But if you or StrictlyLogical do have a lead on the alternative which is simply better (in price, in taste, in health benefits, etc.) -- please do let me know, so that I can invest early.

[StrictlyLogical]

9 hours ago, DonAthos said:

But if you or StrictlyLogical do have a lead on the alternative which is simply better (in price, in taste, in health benefits, etc.) -- please do let me know, so that I can invest early.

There are literally a humanly uncountable number of alternatives. Assuming eating a steak and ice cream at a restaurant cost $50, takes up 1.5 hours total, you could replace the time and effort doing any number of things (even over your lifetime): 

a  eat a bowl of wheaties, skip out ($24 dollars worth of gas, and 30 minutes away) to your favorite lake and spend 30 minutes rowing in your canoe,

b  have a power bar and go finish attaching the new door to your garden shed, doing some gardening, or cutting wood, or building a deck or a path through your property, making a home *your* home.

c  make yourself a coffee and skip out to the deck when the light is just right to get in another hour of your plein air oil painting of the lake you live nearby

d have a hot chocolate and take an hour and a half to study some more for your financial analyst accreditation course so that you can one day live in a house with a lake nearby.

 

[DonAthos]

37 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:

There are literally a humanly uncountable number of alternatives. Assuming eating a steak and ice cream at a restaurant cost $50, takes up 1.5 hours total, you could replace the time and effort doing any number of things (even over your lifetime): 

a  eat a bowl of wheaties, skip out ($24 dollars worth of gas, and 30 minutes away) to your favorite lake and spend 30 minutes rowing in your canoe,

b  have a power bar and go finish attaching the new door to your garden shed, doing some gardening, or cutting wood, or building a deck or a path through your property, making a home *your* home.

c  make yourself a coffee and skip out to the deck when the light is just right to get in another hour of your plein air oil painting of the lake you live nearby

d have a hot chocolate and take an hour and a half to study some more for your financial analyst accreditation course so that you can one day live in a house with a lake nearby.

This may be playing a little fast and loose with the initial challenge, but truly, I don't see that steak or ice cream would ever be part of the diet of a survival ethicist; I suspect that some form of vegetarianism (or perhaps pescetarianism) would be the likeliest diet, given current nutrition science (to say nothing of price, and etc.).

How many activities, I wonder, would fall to the "pampering" that studying for one's financial analyst accreditation course provide?

[StrictlyLogical]

46 minutes ago, DonAthos said:

How many activities, I wonder, would fall to the "pampering" that studying for one's financial analyst accreditation course provide?

Ha.  That depends on whether one *sees* the (no doubt lively and entertaining) textbook, or the lake house.

The pampered life... how's that for a new standard of morality?  My inner "millennial" is cracking out the metaphorical slippers and jammies. 

[DonAthos]

1 minute ago, StrictlyLogical said:

Ha.  That depends on whether one *sees* the (no doubt lively and entertaining) textbook, or the lake house.

Among people I know, I don't think there is a person who takes greater pleasure in textbooks than I do. One of the books I'm currently reading ("for fun"), actually, is a survey of how foreign high school textbooks cover US history. Not to make this too personal, but it's not that I'm insensitive to the potential for joy in "labor," whether learning or exercise or building one's deck or working towards one's future; but it's also that I am alive to the visceral pleasures of eating a well-cooked steak -- and it is not the same thing as reading a textbook.

1 minute ago, StrictlyLogical said:

The pampered life... how's that for a new standard of morality?  My inner "millennial" is cracking out the metaphorical slippers and jammies. 

"Pampering" wasn't my word; I believe it was Invictus2017 who introduced it (I suspect to avoid the word "pleasure"). My interest is not in a "pampered" life, but in a life filled with pleasure and happiness. And yes, I think that a life filled with pleasure and happiness is a fine standard of morality -- I would describe it, in fact, as "the good life"; I think that a life filled with the pleasures of ice cream and so forth is far preferable to a life without those pleasures.

And if we mean to work hard, and to produce -- as I also mean to do -- then isn't it for the sake of the pleasures (physical, emotional, spiritual) that we may consequently reap?

[Invictus2017]

5 minutes ago, DonAthos said:

"Pampering" wasn't my word; I believe it was Invictus2017 who introduced it (I suspect to avoid the word "pleasure").

Yes, it was mine. I understood eating ice cream as an example of a minor action intended to improve the felt quality of one's life.  There are many things that would qualify, and not all of them involve pleasure  Things that relieve pain, save time, etc., would also qualify.  Consider NSAID's; they relieve pain, but can have nasty and occasionally lethal side effects.  When taken to relieve minor pain, you get the same ethical problem as with eating ice cream, but pleasure isn't part of the equation.

[StrictlyLogical]

24 minutes ago, DonAthos said:

And if we mean to work hard, and to produce -- as I also mean to do -- then isn't it for the sake of the pleasures (physical, emotional, spiritual) that we may consequently reap?

Of course we both choose pleasures. 

We differ on the details of how we see that choice in relation to the choice to live, its relationship to an objective morality.  A consequence also is that the resulting specifics we arrive at may also differ.

I really did not mean to interrupt your discourse with Invictus2017, only to make clear that my previous answer about a replacement for ice cream which gives similar or greater pleasure was meant in the broadest sense, not that one can find a replacement like ice cream or even a replacement for that specific kind of pleasure (visceral pleasures as you put it) but that you can find completely different things which might in fact provide the same or more pleasure of a completely different kind.

Edited October 5, 2017 by StrictlyLogical

[DonAthos]

2 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:

I really did not mean to interrupt your discourse with Invictus2017...

So we're clear, you are always welcome to "interrupt"; though I never receive it as an interruption.

[DonAthos]

11 minutes ago, Invictus2017 said:

I understood eating ice cream as an example of a minor action intended to improve the felt quality of one's life.

What I'm about to comment on is utterly, utterly minor -- to the point that it might seem insulting. I hope that you will not take it that way, even if you find it trivial or misguided.

But I find it interesting that you refer to the "felt quality" of one's life, as opposed to (what I would say is) the quality of one's life. In that I find pleasure in food, in sex, in art, in work, etc., these are not simply what I "feel" to be the quality of my life -- but they are part and parcel to the actual quality of my life. It is the totality of such experiences which in fact comprise one's life.

And yes, taking medication to deal with pain (though the medication may sometimes involve risk or side-effect) is absolutely the same sort of thing -- and again, it isn't that one may have a true quality of life 'A', but a diminished "felt quality" of life 'B' (accounting to the pain one is experiencing); that pain does in fact work to diminish one's actual quality of life, which is precisely why it may be moral to take a pain reliever (in reason, in context, accounting for risk and side-effect): not to "pamper," but to improve one's quality of life.

8 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:

Of course we both choose pleasures. 

We differ on the details of how we see that choice in relation to the choice to live, its relationship to an objective morality.  A consequence also is that the resulting specifics we arrive at may also differ.

Truly. If I understand it right, you see these pleasures as taking their value from their relationship to one's survival, or as I have it, longevity. I see them as having value in themselves, albeit not as a hedonist would, but closer to what you'd once described as the "maximization of the area under the curve." I note that you have subsequently disavowed that, and I wanted to "like" your post, but it's a bit of a clumsy instrument; I regret the direction that your thoughts have taken, in that I disagree, but I respect your forthrightness. It is much to your credit.