Primacy of existence

[phibetakappa]

What perception leads you to conclude that the universe exists independent of any consciousness?

All of them.

Edited October 6, 2009 by phibetakappa

[Plasmatic]

So when Descartes and the Maverick philosopher use the concept consciousness in their challenge to Rands use of it as an axiom they need to :

ask themselves the origin of the concept "consciousness"—since they meant something by that concept and they referred to something, their inner mental state.

Because they are stealing the concept consciousness:

Which Rand states :

AR: Read the chapter on axiomatic concepts. You don't need "intuition" here, you need to remember very clearly the fallacy of the "stolen concept." What do you mean by a "series of states of consciousness"? Anyone who offers that argument to you is guilty of the crudest form of concept-stealing. There is no such thing as a state of consciousness without the person experiencing it. What does one mean by "state of consciousness"? A state of a faculty possessed by an entity. Consciousness is not a primary object, it is not an independent existent, it's an attribute of a certain kind of existents.

You cannot project what you mean by a state of consciousness—neither by synonyms nor in any way—without referring to the person or the animal who possesses that consciousness: <ioe2_252> an entity of whom consciousness is a faculty. It is not possible to project it.

Now why isn't it possible? Because such a thing as a state of consciousness is obviously a derivative concept—derivative qua attribute. It's a primary, as far as the conceptual chain is concerned, but in regard to observation, you have no way of experiencing or observing a state of consciousness without the entity which experiences it. It's a concept that could not enter your mind or your language unless in the form of a faculty of a living entity. That's what that concept means. Therefore to ask, "Well, I know I have states, but how does it prove that I am?"—is a question that's not worth discussing.

Incidentally, I know a lady who once gave the proper answer to that kind of question, the kind of question you have been confronted with, so let me quote her with the appropriate answer. Some young college student said to her, "I don't know whether I exist," which is the same issue. She said, "You'd better find out, because I don't want to be caught talking to myself." And that's about the seriousness this question deserves.

The consciousness of self is implicit in [any grasp] of consciousness.

R: No. The notion of "self" is an axiomatic concept; it's implicit in the concept of "consciousness"; it can't be separated from it................

R: Wait a moment, let's start at the beginning. Descartes says that consciousness or the "I" is something innate, apart from any content. In other words, apart from perceiving anything, you have that idea of the "I" or of "I think"; you have those ideas before you think of anything or have anything to think about. That's the difference.

Now what I say is: before your conscious apparatus, the faculty of consciousness, is aware of something, it is not conscious, and certainly there is no "I." But when you become aware, implicit in your first sensation are certain axiomatic concepts. And they are what? That you exist, that the outside world exists, and that you are conscious. The baby could not conceptualize this, but it's implicit; without that implication he couldn't be aware of anything. Therefore it's not an "innate idea," it's a corollary of the fact of consciousness.

Prof. D: So when a consciousness becomes conscious of an object, that object will not be the self; but implicit in the consciousness of the object will be the idea of a self having it.

AR: That's right.

Prof. D: That is no different though, essentially, from Descartes.

AR: It has to be different, because if it were the same how would you go from that to the idea that you have to prove the existence of an outside world? If Descartes claimed that implicit in the first sensation from the outside are certain concepts such as "I" and "consciousness," he would be wedded to the primacy of the exterior world. He would say, "Well if the world doesn't exist, I can't be conscious." That isn't what he said. <ioe2_254>

Prof. D: The idea of an external world wasn't an innate idea, though, in Descartes.

AR: But are you suggesting in any way that we are here dealing with innate ideas?

Prof. D: Well, it looks that way.

AR: Well yes, if you drop the context.

Prof. E: There's an enormous confusion throughout the Rationalist tradition between two things: a concept which has introspective referents as against an innate idea. And these philosophers constantly go from one to the other.

AR: As interchangeable.

Prof. E: As interchangeable. As though if all you have to do is introspect to discover the referents of a concept, it follows that the idea of those referents is innate. Which is a complete non sequitur.

AR: But you see that's what I mean by the dropping of the context.

Prof. E: Descartes can say that we are aware of the self by the sheer act of being conscious and being implicitly aware of our consciousness; he calls that an innate idea, and proceeds to say that in the same way we have an innate idea of God. Because he switches from defining an "innate" idea as a conceptualized recognition of something in advance of experience to calling an "innate" idea any concept which is formed by a process of thought based upon introspective data.

AR: Exactly.

Prof. E: Let's look at the definition of "implicit." On page 6, it is applied to "existence," but the same thing would be applicable to "consciousness." A concept is implicit when one "grasps the constituents of the concept... the data which are later to be integrated by that concept."

Prof. D: But if my self is not one of the constituents of the content of consciousness, then "implicit" must have a different sense here from the sense it has in cases where the contents are present but not put together. Or do you want to say that I am put together out of contents of consciousness?

AR: No, you are the precondition of the concept of <ioe2_255> "consciousness." In every state of consciousness that you experience, part of it is the fact of the person who experiences. And in that sense you are implicit in every state of your consciousness.Prof. E: In other words the only fact of reality that you'd have to get in order subsequently to form the concept "self" or "I" would be your being conscious.

Prof. E: In other words the only fact of reality that you'd have to get in order subsequently to form the concept "self" or "I" would be your being conscious.

AR: That's right.

Prof. B: Is this correct? When you introspect, it's not that what you observe is a state of consciousness, so that when it comes time to form the concept of "self," there's nothing to form it from. When you introspect, what you experience each time is "me being conscious of something."

AR: Yes.

Prof. B: It's not that you experience consciousness and later on you discover a new component: self.

AR: Exactly.

Prof. B: Every awareness is: me experiencing something.

AR: Exactly. You know the best example I could give—perhaps this will help. If you brought a dog or a cat into this room, it would be aware of everything that we see here. It would also see the room, the objects, and the people. What it would never be able to grasp is, "I am conscious of this room," although that fact is inherent in its perception. The difference between its consciousness and a human consciousness is that looking at that room we are able to say, "It takes an act of consciousness to be aware of all this, and it's I, my consciousness, that's performing that act." That is, I am aware of this room, and I can project closing my eyes and my awareness stops—at least visually. Or I can project fainting or sleeping and not being aware at all. But an animal cannot do that. If he falls asleep, then that's one state; when he awakens, it's another. But he wouldn't be capable of identifying conceptually material which is present there in his consciousness: that it is he who is aware and at other times he is not aware.

The whole difference between a human type of consciousness and an animal is exactly this. The ability to be self-conscious <ioe2_256> and to identify the fact of one's own consciousness, one's "I." And then to apply introspection to the processes of one's own consciousness and check them.

So more specifically its that "you have to have the self-consciousness to identify explicitly certain elements in your knowledge which have been implicit up to then. It requires a sufficient amount of knowledge and a very significant degree of introspection"

The essential thing here is to understand that what is implicit in every perception is "subject and object" "Self" and ones own "inner mental state" and that which is external to it.

Edited October 6, 2009 by Plasmatic

[Plasmatic]

Its funny the answer to the question:

"What self evident perception makes you say that their are mind independent objects."

Is :

What do you mean by "self"!

[phibetakappa]

So more specifically its that "you have to have the self-consciousness to identify explicitly certain elements in your knowledge which have been implicit up to then. It requires a sufficient amount of knowledge and a very significant degree of introspection"

The essential thing here is to understand that what is implicit in every perception is "subject and object" "Self" and ones own "inner mental state" and that which is external to it.

I'm interested where you are going with this line of thought. I've read this passage too. It matches up very well with this text from the actual chapter on axiomatic concepts, where she describes how axiomatic concepts provide us the ability to differentiate the inner from the outer, i.e., allow us to differentiate the subject of cognition from the object of cognition.

"Axiomatic concepts are the constants of man's consciousness, the cognitive integrators that identify and thus protect its continuity. They identify explicitly the omission of psychological time measurements, which is implicit in all other concepts.

It must be remembered that conceptual awareness is the only type of awareness capable of integrating past, present and future. Sensations are merely an awareness of the present and cannot be retained beyond the immediate moment; percepts are retained and, through automatic memory, provide a certain rudimentary link to the past, but cannot project the future. It is only conceptual awareness that can grasp and hold the total of its experience—extrospectively, the continuity of existence; introspectively, the continuity of consciousness—and thus enable its possessor to project his course long-range. It is by means of axiomatic concepts that man grasps and holds this continuity, bringing it into his conscious awareness and knowledge. It is axiomatic concepts that identify the precondition of knowledge: the distinction between existence and consciousness, between reality and the awareness of reality, between the object and the subject of cognition. Axiomatic concepts are the foundation of objectivity."(ITOE, 56)

In particular, in the paragraph before these she states how this kind of "continuity" is achieved,

"The units of the concepts "existence" and "identity" are every entity, attribute, action, event or phenomenon (including consciousness) that exists, has ever existed or will ever exist. The units of the concept "consciousness" are every state or process of awareness that one experiences, has ever experienced or will ever experience (as well as similar units, a similar faculty, which one infers in other living entities). The measurements omitted from axiomatic concepts are all the measurements of all the existents they subsume; what is retained, metaphysically, is only a fundamental fact; what is retained, epistemologically, is only one category of measurement, omitting its particulars: time—i.e., the fundamental fact is retained independent of any particular moment of awareness."

This links up with the example provided about the lion:

QUOTE (Laissez-Faire @ Oct 1 2009, 10:36 AM)

I'm interested in how to respond to an argument of the sort: "If you're conscious of a lion, how do you know that the lion existed before you were conscious of it?" without begging the question.

The key word here is a concept of "time", i.e., the word "before"

The measurements omitted from axiomatic concepts are all the measurements of all the existents they subsume; what is retained, metaphysically, is only a fundamental fact; what is retained, epistemologically, is only one category of measurement, omitting its particulars: time—i.e., the fundamental fact is retained independent of any particular moment of awareness.

Edited October 6, 2009 by phibetakappa

[Plasmatic]

I'm interested where you are going with this line of thought. I've read this passage too. It matches up very well with this text from the actual chapter on axiomatic concepts, where she describes how this axiomatic concepts provide us the ability to differentiate the inner from the outer, i.e., allow us to differentiate the subject of cognition from the object of cognition.

Simply that all of Philosophy is related to man. In every context for mans self consciousness, is awareness of that distinction of what he is not. The axioms are independent of time measurements because they are allways there. They are the answer to the question of external or "objective" objects. Basically your last quote is a wonderful conclusion to sum this all up. Well done.

Edited October 6, 2009 by Plasmatic

[Plasmatic]

I must admit I did not consider the relevance of time and continuity as relates to the axioms in answer to the lion question. I really wasn't even considering it. Your integration here is excellent. Again I say well done.

[hunterrose]

Your question does not follow from what I wrote.

I wasn’t questioning your definition of the term axiom.

By primacy of existence Ayn Rand means that every [existent] exists independently of our consciousness

I had similarly thought of Primacy of Existence as meaning that existents are causally independent of any consciousness (i.e. that a consciousness cannot alter any existent’s causality.)

But Primacy of Existence was then stated as

"Existence" is not logically dependent on "consciousness". However, if a consciousness exists, then something exist -- "consciousness" is logically dependent on "existence".

Phibetakappa, I was questioning your implication that “The universe exists independent of any consciousness” is an axiom. If in the causally-independent sense, how is this perceptually self-evident? If in the logically-independent sense, how would this set up an epistemological order necessary for establishing the Objectivist epistemology?

[phibetakappa]

I must admit I did not consider the relevance of time and continuity as relates to the axioms in answer to the lion question. I really wasn't even considering it. Your integration here is excellent. Again I say well done.

Another interesting integration is if we tie back to the first chapter of the book (ITOE), and we find her use the word continuous, in a slightly different context:

The third stage consists of grasping relationships among these entities by grasping the

similarities and differences of their identities. This requires the transformation of the (implicit)

concept "entity" into the (implicit) concept "unit."

When a child observes that two objects (which he will later learn to designate as "tables")

resemble each other, but are different from four other objects ("chairs"), his mind is focusing on a

particular attribute of the objects (their shape), then isolating them according to their differences,

and integrating them as units into separate groups according to their similarities.

This is the key, the entrance to the conceptual level of man's consciousness. The ability to

regard entities as units is man's distinctive method of cognition, which other living species are

unable to follow.

A unit is an existent regarded as a separate member of a group of two or more similar

members. (Two stones are two units; so are two square feet of ground, if regarded as distinct parts

of a continuous stretch of ground.) Note that the concept "unit" involves an act of consciousness (a

selective focus, a certain way of regarding things), but that it is not an arbitrary creation

of consciousness: it is a method of identification or classification according to the attributes which

a consciousness observes in reality. This method permits any number of classifications and

cross-classifications: one may classify things according to their shape or color or weight or size or

atomic structure; but the criterion of classification is not invented, it is perceived in reality.

Thus the concept "unit" is a bridge between metaphysics and epistemology: units do not exist qua units,

what exists are things, but units are things viewed by a consciousness in certain existing

relationships.

With the grasp of the (implicit) concept "unit" man reaches the conceptual level of cognition,

which consists of two interrelated fields: Conceptual and the Mathematical. The process of

concept-formation is, in large part, a mathematical process." (ITOE, 6)

It is the omission of mental time measurements, which creates this "unit perspective" with regard to the "outer" and the "inner", the subject and the object. I.e., man using axiomatic concepts can then treat the "outer" as a unitary whole, and then following that, he can regard his inner states, his self, as a unitary whole.

Now, if your want an integration, tie the concept "time" to the "outer," i.e., as dependent on existence. Time, as we perceive it, is based on an the external relationships of objects moving outside of us. E.g., the earth as it moves around the sun, and all the movement affects on shadows, changing seasons, i.e., the time related uniformity of change around us. It is in becoming aware of time passing in external reality, that we are only able to get a "sense of time" in our own consciousness. (for further evidence of this, note examples when we loose track of time, and why?)

This highlights the dependence of consciousness on existence.

As it is the recognition of time as an implicit "category of measurement", from which we 'omit' any particular instance thereof; which becomes our means of forming the concept of a continuous, unified "inner" state of awareness, i.e., of a consciousness as such.

Another follow up and fruitfull integration is to review the nature of measurement as such, and its dependence on existence. Then when we fully understand that human consciousness, particularly its use of concepts, depends on measurement omission, we will have an even clearer understanding of the fundamental primacy of existence to consciousness, i.e., that man's particular form of conceptual consciousness completely depends on existence.

Edited October 6, 2009 by phibetakappa

[phibetakappa]

Phibetakappa, I was questioning your implication that “The universe exists independent of any consciousness” is an axiom. If in the causally-independent sense, how is this perceptually self-evident?

It was not my implication. It was Ayn Rand's. She states it explicitly, and I have provided the reference above.

[Plasmatic]

It's interesting that "existence" is an axiom which is absent psychological time measurement. We then see how "universe" just is or is eternal. The U being the sum of existence.

Edited October 6, 2009 by Plasmatic

[Plasmatic]

Directly or indirectly, every phenomenon of consciousness is derived from one's awareness of the external world. Some object, i.e., some content, is involved in every state of awareness. Extrospection is a process of cognition directed outward—a process of apprehending some existent(s) of the external world. Introspection is a process of cognition directed inward—a process of apprehending one's own psychological actions in regard to some existent(s) of the external world, such actions as thinking, feeling, reminiscing, etc. It is only in relation to the external world that the various actions of a consciousness can be experienced, grasped, defined or communicated. Awareness is awareness of something. A content-less state of consciousness is a contradiction in terms.

Two fundamental attributes are involved in every state, <ioe2_30> aspect or function of man's consciousness: content and action—the content of awareness, and the action of consciousness in regard to that content.

These two attributes are the fundamental Conceptual Common Denominator of all concepts pertaining to consciousness.

On the perceptual level of awareness, a child merely experiences and performs various psychological processes; his full conceptual development requires that he learn to conceptualize them (after he has reached a certain stage in his extrospective conceptual development).

To form concepts of consciousness, one must isolate the action from the content of a given state of consciousness, by a process of abstraction. Just as, extrospectively, man can abstract attributes from entities—so, introspectively, he can abstract the actions of his consciousness from its contents, and observe the differences among these various actions.For instance (on the adult level), when a man sees a woman walking down the street, the action of his consciousness is perception; when he notes that she is beautiful, the action of his consciousness is evaluation; when he experiences an inner state of pleasure and approval, of admiration, the action of his consciousness is emotion; when he stops to watch her and draws conclusions, from the evidence, about her character, age, social position, etc., the action of his consciousness is thought; when, later, he recalls the incident, the action of his consciousness is reminiscence; when he projects that her appearance would be improved if her hair were blond rather than brown, and her dress were blue rather than red, the action of his consciousness is imagination.

He can also observe the similarities among the actions of his consciousness on various occasions, by observing the fact that these same actions—in different sequences, combinations and degrees—are, have been or can be applicable to other objects: to a man, a dog, an automobile, or the entire street; to the reading of a book, the learning of a new skill, the choice of a job, or to any object within the scope of his awareness. <ioe2_31>

Such is the pattern of the process by which (in slower, gradual steps) man learns to form concepts of consciousness.In the realm of introspection, the concretes, the units which are integrated into a single concept, are the specific instances of a given psychological process. The measurable attributes of a psychological process are its object or content and its intensity.

The content is some aspect of the external world (or is derived from some aspect of the external world) and is measurable by the various methods of measurement applicable to the external world. The intensity of a psychological process is the automatically summed up result of many factors: of its scope, its clarity, its cognitive and motivational context, the degree of mental energy or effort required, etc.

Does this help you Hunter?

[hunterrose]

It was not my implication. It was Ayn Rand's. She states it explicitly, and I have provided the reference above.

You provided arguments from authority, but you have not said which perceptions show that existents are causally independent of any consciousness.

[My one year old son] has only this week learned he can put a finger in each ear and stop the "awareness" of the sounds coming in.

That’s what I'm looking for: a perception. But coming to the conclusion that all existents are causally-independent of all consciousnesses is not something you perceive, rather it’s an induction. Not an axiom.

Does this help you Hunter?

Somewhat, and I see that you’ve posted some other stuff today that I haven’t yet read. I’ll do that.

[Laissez-Faire]

That’s what I'm looking for: a perception. But coming to the conclusion that all existents are causally-independent of all consciousnesses is not something you perceive, rather it’s an induction. Not an axiom.

This is what I was thinking as well, an induction is not an axiom. I've always justified it on the basis of induction but if it's an axiom then I'd like a demonstration of it's status as an axiom (I realize that an axiom can't be proved but that's not what I'm asking for).

[phibetakappa]

You provided arguments from authority, but you have not said which perceptions show that existents are causally independent of any consciousness.

You keep rephrasing your question. Now you added "causally independent" to it. I did not provide an argument from authority. I provided you what Ayn Rand stated about HER philosophy.

Further, I never claimed that isolated, individual perceptions, without processing from our conceptual faculty lead to anything related to your bizarre question. You made that claim, then tried to put it in my mouth.

That’s what I'm looking for: a perception. But coming to the conclusion that all existents are causally-independent of all consciousnesses is not something you perceive, rather it’s an induction. Not an axiom.

You are amusing... you trying to write up a straw man about individual perceptions, try to put it in my mouth... and now you are saying.. you have come up with some brilliant conclusion about all existents this and all consciousnesses that... try calming down for a few minutes... and actually read...

"...rather induced..." how do you think axioms are formed? Axioms are sophisticated formulations. Children don't state axioms, adult, learned philosophers do; that should be a clue to you that axioms are way up the hierarchical chain of knowledge.

Further, if I were to take your request seriously for a moment... how am I going to write you a post, and provide you with a "perception?"

Edited October 7, 2009 by phibetakappa

[phibetakappa]

This is what I was thinking as well, an induction is not an axiom.

How do you think the O'ist primary axioms are formed?

[Plasmatic]

Hunter, do you realize that axioms are only implicit until later epistemic/conceptual development? We have supplied the quotes explaining this. All inductions would pressupose the axioms any way. Can you provide a single example of a perception that does not involve the subject, object,inner-self,external-not self implicit in it?

Edited October 7, 2009 by Plasmatic

[phibetakappa]

Does this help you Hunter?

LOL... that's the quote I provided in my very first post on the topic.

Post #3

Yeah, does that help you hunter?

I'm finished with this... we are going in circles...

All sarcasm aside... good job Plasmatic...

Edited October 7, 2009 by phibetakappa

[Plasmatic]

LOL... that's the quote I provided in my very first post on the topic.

Post #3

Yeah, does that help you hunter?

I'm finished with this... we are going in circles...

All sarcasm aside... good job Plasmatic...

[hunterrose]

how do you think axioms are formed? Axioms are sophisticated formulations. Children don't state axioms, adult, learned philosophers do.

I agree with what you’re saying about explicitly forming and stating axioms; my point is that you don’t need sophisticated formulations to implicitly grasp the perceptually self-evident.

Consciousness, like every other kind of entity, acts in a certain way and only in that way. In adult, philosophic terms, we refer to this fact as the "primacy of existence."[OPAR]

This Primacy of Existence is not an axiom – “every other kind of entity acts in a certain way and only in a certain way” is not something that is perceptually self-evident.

Do you realize that axioms are only implicit until later epistemic/conceptual development?

Sure.

Can you provide a single example of a perception that does not involve the subject, object,inner-self,external-not self implicit in it?

No, but is that necessary for implicit knowledge of an axiom?

[hunterrose]

Does this help you Hunter?

To be more accurate, the passage seems to have very little to do with Primacy of Existence or axioms. Internal vs. external may be of use in building up the idea of Primacy of Existence, but that only gives more credence to the idea that Primacy of Existence is not an axiom. What part of it do you find most relevant to the idea that Primacy of Existence is (implicitly) self-evident?

[Grames]

This Primacy of Existence is not an axiom – “every other kind of entity acts in a certain way and only in a certain way” is not something that is perceptually self-evident.

Yes, it is.

[Eiuol]

Yes, it is.

How so? I mean obviously "existence exists" is an axiom, but I don't see how that is exactly the same meaning as saying "there is a primacy of existence".

[Plasmatic]

How so? I mean obviously "existence exists" is an axiom, but I don't see how that is exactly the same meaning as saying "there is a primacy of existence".

So you can grasp a non-existent consciousness?This is not a problem for you?

[Eiuol]

I thought the "primacy of existence" was simply discovered through induction, making it not an axiom, that's all.

[Plasmatic]

I thought the "primacy of existence" was simply discovered through induction, making it not an axiom, that's all.

We induce from some perceieved instances that the axioms are involved in all perceptions.In the same way we induce from perception that consciousness is dependent on existence. All of this is implicit in every perception ubiquitously before we rise to the maturity of conceptual development and are able to make this explicit.