Edwin Posted October 17, 2009 Report Share Posted October 17, 2009 We know that “Value” is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. We also know that, A plant must feed itself in order to live; the sunlight, the water, the chemicals it needs are the values its nature has set it to pursue; its life is the standard of value directing its actions. But WE can build genetically engineered organisms which are not primarily directed toward staying alive, instead to produce a chemical in excess and die. WE can also build robots which are programmed primarily to keep working by seeking light energy. Yet we consider these genetically engineered organisms alive while they act to gain and keep life. We also consider that robot not alive although it acts to gain and keep its continued working. Doesn't this mean that the proposed idea of value is artificial and ill-defined? Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
DavidOdden Posted October 17, 2009 Report Share Posted October 17, 2009 Doesn't this mean that the proposed idea of value is artificial and ill-defined?Why would it? Just because we might be able to create a thing with an artificial value does not mean that the concept "value" is artificial. In what way is it ill-defined? Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Edwin Posted October 17, 2009 Author Report Share Posted October 17, 2009 Allow me to quote the above argument's original author who tried debate with me by trying to show me that value as defined by objectivism cannot always work: You believe that bacteria, protists and algae are “alive.” And therefore that the concept of “value” applies to them as they try to maintain this “life.” However, for these organisms they are effectively equivalent to chemical computers with a known instruction set (the DNA) acting in response to environmental stimuli (illumination, local nutrient concentrations, etc.) That is, they are equivalent to a “simple” computer performing a “simple” task set as a feedback loop. In this case that task set happens to be the attempt to preserve and continue the “living” existence of the organism. However, that is irrelevant in terms of the informational structure is involved. Informationally, feedback loops are much the same; and there is little particular difference if you were to create a bacterium that was engineered to live for some preset amount of time, produce some valuable chemical and then die and release that chemical for harvesting. Similarly, one can build a solar powered robot that is designed to avoid things which will endanger its existence. So we can build “organisms” which have feedback loops which are not primarily directed toward “staying alive” and we can build robots which are programmed primarily to “stay alive.” And so we may see that your proposed idea of “value” is artificial and ill-defined. I think what he is saying is since we can engineer organisms to act so as to produce a valuable chemical, then die and release that chemical for harvesting means that the objectivist definition of value is not correct. Similarly he says, since we can engineer non-living robots to act in way that keeps them moving by seeking energy sources, life is not a standard f value. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Jake_Ellison Posted October 17, 2009 Report Share Posted October 17, 2009 (edited) The definition of value does not rest on the absence or presence of robots, it rests on the definition of life. Robots aren't life, substituting them for life makes for a fallacious argument. Sure, if you decide to call robots trees, then the whole thing falls apart, just as if you decide to call trees cars, the whole concept of fruit will fall apart. That's why we don't do that. Edited October 17, 2009 by Jake_Ellison Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
RationalBiker Posted October 17, 2009 Report Share Posted October 17, 2009 I think what he is saying is since we can engineer organisms to act so as to produce a valuable chemical, then die and release that chemical for harvesting means that the objectivist definition of value is not correct. Similarly he says, since we can engineer non-living robots to act in way that keeps them moving by seeking energy sources, life is not a standard f value. The problem with his argument is that Ayn Rand did not write a philosophy for robots or plants. She wrote a philosophy for rational beings, humans, which is assumed when one discusses philosophical matters. Robots, plants and animals do not need philosophy. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Edwin Posted October 17, 2009 Author Report Share Posted October 17, 2009 Thanks for the quick replies. I gave this reply to my friend who made the argument: Allow me to quote from Galt’s speech again: Entities such as you described which are not self-sustaining (like the chemical producing bacterium that is designed to die in your example) or not self-generated (like the solar powered robot) cannot be considered as the type of Life which makes Value possible. Also remember that, Just because we might be able to create a thing with an artificial value does not mean that the concept “value” is artificial. More quotes in context: from Page 12. “The Virtue Of Selfishness”. So to conclude, concept of “value” is neither artificial nor ill-defined. I hope this counter-argument is OK. Is there anything that I should add? Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
brian0918 Posted October 17, 2009 Report Share Posted October 17, 2009 (edited) Related questions: Certainly early in the development of life, there were countless mutations that resulted in an organism aimed at destroying itself rather than surviving. They acted only to their destruction, and so the mutation did not last long (natural selection in action). But were those organisms alive? Did they have goal-directed action? Did they have values? Edited October 17, 2009 by brian0918 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Uriah Posted October 17, 2009 Report Share Posted October 17, 2009 (edited) Even if those organisms might be considered as living entities they are not able to make valuation of their own, which means they might have "values" in a sense of goal-directed action but they have no ability to make a choice. Objectivist value is related mostly to a value with an objectivist moral standard, but just because we can define good and bad does not mean that other people can do the same. There is no contradiction, there is only misunderstood semantics. Edited October 17, 2009 by Uriah Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
JMeganSnow Posted October 17, 2009 Report Share Posted October 17, 2009 By the way, you don't need to talk about man-made creatures in order to find things that produce then self-destruct--this is what yeast does. It eats sugar and produces alcohol. Put it in enough sugar, and it keeps making alcohol until it poisons itself to death. The issue isn't that the yeast's actions aren't directed toward the sustainability of the yeast's life, it's that the nature of its goal-directed activities are non-volitional. In proper circumstances, metabolizing sugar is GOOD for the yeast--it keeps it alive and enables it to grow and produce more yeast. The "problem" with this definition of value and goal-direction, then is that you simply have to remember that it applies in a specific context. The primary advantage man has over animals and plants is the fact that we have the ability to at least attempt to rearrange our context until it is possible for us to survive even when our context would normally NOT be conducive to human life. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Grames Posted October 19, 2009 Report Share Posted October 19, 2009 (edited) The problem with his argument is that Ayn Rand did not write a philosophy for robots or plants. She wrote a philosophy for rational beings, humans, which is assumed when one discusses philosophical matters. Robots, plants and animals do not need philosophy. This is not true. Rand's theory of values was specifically meant to encompass "values for weeds" (her own phrase). See Dr. Salmieri's lecture on "Ayn Rand's Conception of Valuing" linked below. Plants don't need philosophy but they do have values. Any objective theory of values must be compatible with and integrate this phenomenon to be considered valid. Edited October 19, 2009 by Grames Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
brian0918 Posted October 19, 2009 Report Share Posted October 19, 2009 This is not true. Rand's theory of values was specifically meant to encompass "values for weeds" (her own phrase). See Dr. Salmieri's lecture on "Ayn Rand's Conception of Valuing" linked below. Plants don't need philosophy but they do have values. Any objective theory of values must be compatible with and integrate this phenomenon to be considered valid. Then how do you handle creatures such as I've described: Certainly early in the development of life, there were countless mutations that resulted in an organism aimed at destroying itself rather than surviving. They acted only to their destruction, and so the mutation did not last long (that's how natural selection stumbled upon what worked for survival). But were those organisms alive? Did they have goal-directed action? Did they have values? Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Grames Posted October 19, 2009 Report Share Posted October 19, 2009 I hope this counter-argument is OK. Is there anything that I should add? You didn't distinguish the metaphysically given from the man-made. An unmodified organism is an end in itself. A modified organism is a means to values held by man, who fulfills the role of final valuer in addition to what the organism does. In the proper context (a specially provide nutrient tank) a genetically modified microorganism does still engage in self-generated and self-sustaining action or it would not grow, it would be both not alive and useless. He seems to be asserting genetically modified organisms are not really alive according to the self-generated self-sustaining action definition. This is rationalism, equating the concept of life to just the words of the definition and not the actual referents which are living. No matter the source of the genes, a microorganism is alive as long as it acts as living things do. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Grames Posted October 19, 2009 Report Share Posted October 19, 2009 Then how do you handle creatures such as I've described: 'Aimed' attributes intentionality where it cannot exist. Mutations simply have identities and consequences. Those organisms were alive until they died. They had goal-directed action which was inadequate to be self-sustaining. They had values which had poor 'fitness' for their environmental context. Just as ethics should not be derived from emergency situations, concepts such as life should not be formed from malformed, doomed creatures. The concept of life is formed from successful living creatures and then extended to special examples and borderline cases such as mutants and viruses. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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