Virtue Ethics

[phibetakappa]

I think we're getting stuck on how we're defining our terms, specifically ethics.

I haven't seen you define any terms. All I've done is observed that you use terms in wishy-washy floating ways, apparently not intending them to actually have firm meanings, i.e., to actually have real referents.

I understand that when people who like to hold floating abstractions, feel "stuck" when they actually have to define their terms, because they don't know how to do it. They want to be able to "jigger" words together into sentences, which hang together enough to sound as if they are saying something, i.e., they want to appear to be having a rational argument, without the responsibility of actually producing one, and to that end they like to take over general terms like, philosophy, ethics, values, virtues and use them as a front for their own hodge-podge brand of philosophic agnosticism.

What term do we use to identify the altruist (or other ethical systems') codes for how man should live?

This question "begs the question" assuming what we are talking about are already "ethics", i.e., it already assumes we are stilling in front of a bunch of "ethical systems" which have been identified. Identified and/or recognized as ethical systems how? How are you identifying them as ethical systems?

Let's stop talking in generalities without content. As I asked above: take Kant's so-called ethics and demonstrate how it qualifies as a science of ethics.

If you want to use a starting definition use Ayn Rand's provided in VOS on page 13.

What is morality, or ethics? It is a code of values to guide man’s choices and actions—the choices and actions that determine the purpose and the course of his life. Ethics, as a science, deals with discovering and defining such a code.

(Note: If you do not like this as a starting point that ask what facts of reality give rise to the need of the concept of ethics, reduce the concept and then induce your own definition of ethics.)

What is the "code of values" in Kant's "ethics"?

What is a value to Kant? I.e., what does Kant prescribe man acts to gain and/or keep? Why? and How?

Edited November 1, 2009 by phibetakappa

[phibetakappa]

Please explain how Kant's ethics has a "code of values"? What values? His ethics is called de-ontological for a reason, i.e., that it is supposedly morality without ontology, i.e., without reality. What objective values are there that have no relation to reality?

CORRECTION:

After as much research as I could stand, I have resigned myself to the conclusion that the term "deontological" did not arise from using its apparent root "ontology" and prefixing it with "de-" to signify a morality with out "empirical" reality. (Which is Kant's own stated purpose in "The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals" see below).

However, given Kant's own statements regarding how he saw "pure philosophy" in relation to his conception of morality, I still believe my statement of the essence of Kant's "ethics" is better characterized as "de-ontological" i.e., ethics without reality, than it is characterized as an ethics of "duty."

But alas . . .

I've done an extensive etymological search for the origin of the term deontology, and its initial intended usage. The earliest usages I can find so far (see below for an 1834 usage by Jeremy Benthem) states it comes from the Greek "that which is binding".

This is the same origin we can find at dictionary.com.

Origin:

1820–30; < Gk deont- that which is binding (s. of déon, neut. prp. of deîn to bind), equiv. to de- bind + -ont- prp. suffix + -o- + -logy

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/deontology

(Note: the date matches very closely to the actual 1834 Benthem reference I found below).

Also, I found this reference for the term, so I search for the book.

It is sometimes described as "duty" or "obligation" or "rule" based ethics, because rules "bind you to your duty" [3] The term 'deontological' was first used in this way in 1930, in C. D. Broad's book, Five Types of Ethical Theory. (http://wapedia.mobi/en/Deontological_ethics)

However, this is not the first use of the term. Using Google books, so far, I've been able to find this term used prior to 1834. In particular there is a book entitled "Deontology or The Science of Morality: Duty and self-interest, virtue and felicity, prudence and benevolence by none other than Jeremy Benthem of Utilitarianism. Found here: "Deontology of The Science of Morality:"

Note: Jeremy Benthem lived from 1748 to 1832, while Kant was a contemporary of Benthem, living from 1724 to 1804. This seems to suggest that the term probably existed in popular "ethical" usage prior and was probably known to Kant himself. He does use the term several times in works such as "The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics"

In my defense

However, given Kant's epistemology, taking the words root of "ontology" (the study of being qua being) and prefixing it with "de-" made more sense to me, especially given how he describes his "ethics" in "The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals"where he begins laying down the so-called "basis" for his "categorical imperative." It is supposed to provide guidance "purely" without any reference to "empirical" information to corrupt it. In other words, he wanted a set of "pure" imperative statements 'a priori', cut off from concrete facts of reality.

In the first few paragraphs he states,

"We may call all philosophy empirical, so far as it is based on grounds of experience: on the other band, that which delivers its doctrines from a priori principles alone we may call pure philosophy."

Later, when he makes his purpose clearer he states:

"Now it is only a pure philosophy that we can look for the moral law in its purity and genuineness (and, in a practical matter, this is of the utmost consequence): we must, therefore, begin with pure philosophy (metaphysic), and without it there cannot be any moral philosophy at all. That which mingles these pure principles with the empirical does not deserve the name of philosophy (for what distinguishes philosophy from common rational knowledge is that it treats in separate sciences what the latter only comprehends confusedly); much less does it deserve that of moral philosophy, since by this confusion it even spoils the purity of morals themselves, and counteracts its own end."

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy" summarizes the point this way:

"Throughout his moral works, Kant returns time and again to the question of the method moral philosophy should employ when pursuing these aims. A basic theme of these discussions is that the fundamental philosophical issues must be addressed a priori, that is, without drawing on observations of human beings and their behavior. Once we “seek out and establish” the fundamental principle of morality a priori, then we may consult facts drawn from experience in order to determine how best to apply this principle to human beings and generate particular conclusions about how we ought to act." (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/)

Edited November 1, 2009 by phibetakappa

[Grames]

Let's stop talking in generalities without content. As I asked above: take Kant's so-called ethics and demonstrate how it qualifies as a science of ethics.

The actions that men take are objective facts. The reasons they state for taking certain actions are on record, the consequences are a matter of history. There are normative values and de facto values. The various false ethical theories still have de facto values, and it is on the basis of their causal relationship to the values they actually achieve that they are classified as ethical theories.

[phibetakappa]

The actions that men take are objective facts.

OK. When men take various actions, they really do take those actions. It's hard to disagree with you there.

However, I'm not sure what argument has this premise as a precondition. Also, I do not know of an argument that claims that the actions people take don't really happen and/or are not objective facts. So, I'm not sure why this is being stated.

The reasons they state for taking certain actions are on record, . . .

There have been some people who have acted in certain ways, and have then explained themselves, and sometimes those reasons are written into history, providing a record of their explanations?

. . . the consequences are a matter of history.

The consequences of people's actions in the past could be a matter of history, if they have been evaluated as significant enough to include in any given historians history. If this is what you were intending to say?

There are normative values and de facto values.

There are normative values? Are there non-normative values?

What are "de facto" values? I assume you are not contrasting "de facto" here with "de jure," because that does not really clarify what you are saying.

If we use a loose definition for value such as the "object of man's action," you are asserting there are "de facto" objects of man's actions? As opposed to what?

I really don't understand what you are trying to claim here, and the contrast seems a little dubious between "normative" values and "de facto" values?

Are you trying to say there are cultural norms which direct some peoples behavior? I.e., something like the idea of "cultural mores"?

If you are then what is a "de facto" value in that context?

The various false ethical theories still have de facto values, . . .

What makes a false ethical theory as opposed to a true ethical theory?

By what standard is any given "theory" included into the class "ethical" as opposed to non-ethical?

Further, I still don't understand what object is supposed to be distinguished by the concept of "def facto" value. Please define this term.

. . . and it is on the basis of their causal relationship to the values they actually achieve that they are classified as ethical theories.

It is on the basis of [false ethical theories] causal relationship to the values they actually achieve that they are classified as ethical theories.

How does this work? Could you please provide some examples?

* * *

I asked for no more floating abstractions, no more generalities without content, no more assertions without examples, and you have given us a bunch more assertions without examples, generalities without content etc.

Can you or anyone demonstrate how Kant's so-called "ethical theory" qualifies as an "ethical" theory? Can anyone here do it? Anyone?

I have been stating some of the so-called "ethical theories" which are given in the history of philosophy do not qualify as ethics at all. E.g., Kant's "theory" is one such example. What I have stated is that I do not believe that what we are told is an "ethical theory" of Kant does not qualify as an ethics, under any valid definition of ethics.

(Note: I chose Kant's theory because it is so bizarre, well known, and short in length. Also, I do not believe it is really an ethical system using any valid definition of ethics.)

Therefore, what "philosophers" have seemingly done is to steal a valid concept of "ethics" and turn it into a meaningless, elastic, floating term so they can cram some of these "theories" like Kant's in to ethics.

Amusingly, so far, some of the people here have been arguing that we keep it that way, and never question what it is we place under the concept of ethics.

"Ethics" is apparently what prominent philosophers and authors say it is, and/or whatever has been called "ethics" in the past.

Can you or anyone demonstrate how Kant's so-called "ethical theory" qualifies as an "ethical" theory? What attributes does Kant's so-called ethical theory have that qualifies it as an "ethics"?

Does Kant state why man needs ethics at all? Does Kant define value? Does Kant have a standard of value? Does Kant provide a "code" of values? Are these necessary conditions for a given "theory" to qualify as an ethics?

Kant proposes a mechanism (the categorical imperative") which he claims is supposed to be used to guide man's choices and actions.

Is this enough? Is an ethics any proposal which asserts a method to guide men's choices and actions?

Edited November 2, 2009 by phibetakappa

[Plasmatic]

Phi, forgive the seeming aside,but if your inclined,would you say this is commensurate to your point on ethics. Some say Metaphysics is useless in physics because questions such as "Why is there something rather than nothing" cannot be proved. They then lump all MP questions in this category. I say those type of questions are simply invalid and therefore are not even a part of Metaphysics as such. Is this similar to your position on ethics?

[Grames]

What makes a false ethical theory as opposed to a true ethical theory?

By what standard is any given "theory" included into the class "ethical" as opposed to non-ethical?

Further, I still don't understand what object is supposed to be distinguished by the concept of "def facto" value. Please define this term.

It is on the basis of [false ethical theories] causal relationship to the values they actually achieve that they are classified as ethical theories.

How does this work? Could you please provide some examples?

* * *

Can you or anyone demonstrate how Kant's so-called "ethical theory" qualifies as an "ethical" theory? Can anyone here do it? Anyone?

I have been stating some of the so-called "ethical theories" which are given in the history of philosophy do not qualify as ethics at all. E.g., Kant's "theory" is one such example. What I have stated is that I do not believe that what we are told is an "ethical theory" of Kant does not qualify as an ethics, under any valid definition of ethics.

Distinguishing between a true and a false theory of ethics requires a prior standard of truth. I'll use objectivity. A false theory of ethics is not reducible to reality or contradicts other knowledge.

The subject matter of ethics is man in action. Do not make the mistake of equating a concept with its definition.

Because men are fallible and not omniscient they can be wrong. Their thoughts and actions may contradict each other or the objective requirements of human life. The theory-practice dichotomy is true when the theory is false. Therefore, there can be false ethical theories that purport to provide guidance to achieve the good but only in fact achieve disaster.

Ex: Hedonism, the theory that bodily sensations of pleasure and pain and their accompanying emotions are valid guides to action. A meth addict's actions to get his drugs and use them are acts of valuing.

Ex: Altruism, the theory that only an action which is selfless can be good. Peter Keating's acts of conformity and obedience are acts of valuing.

Your attempt to narrow the field of ethics to only a single true theory is the mistake of equating a concept with its definition.

The subject matter of physics is the external material world. Contradictions do not exist in reality, therefore false theories that contradict reality can be barred from the field. Alchemy and astrology are not examples of false science, they are not science. Contradictions can exist in the minds of men, therefore false theories cannot be barred from the fields of philosophy so long as there are men who subscribe to those false theories and act on them. Philosophy is identifying what is true and also identifying what is false, because there is no 'existence test' to delimit the field as in physics.

[phibetakappa]

Phi, forgive the seeming aside,but if your inclined,would you say this is commensurate to your point on ethics. Some say Metaphysics is useless in physics because questions such as "Why is there something rather than nothing" cannot be proved. They then lump all MP questions in this category. I say those type of questions are simply invalid and therefore are not even a part of Metaphysics as such. Is this similar to your position on ethics?

LOL. You're still thinking about that last primacy of existence topic.

I'm not sure about your question. In a sense they are the same issue.

The issue doesn’t have to be as abstract as metaphysics or philosophy in general. It could be about the proper classification of anything: of apples and oranges, cars and trucks, alchemy and science.

Are concepts as such objective or not? Are definitions objective or not? See ITOE, Chapter 4.

Further, the issue is are we mentally active, or are we mentally passive? Do we constantly revisit, our conclusions and revise them when necessary, as new information becomes available or do we freeze our abstractions at some arbitrary point in time? (See what Ayn Rand describes about "versions" of the concept "man" in ITOE, Chapter 4.)

There's a great passage in the "Objectivist Ethics," which is often quoted where Ayn Rand makes this point. I've highlighted the clause of particular relevance:

“The process of concept-formation does not consist merely of grasping a few simple abstractions, such as "chair," "table," "hot," "cold," and of learning to speak. It consists of a method of using one's consciousness, best designated by the term "conceptualizing." It is not a passive state of registering random impressions. It is an actively sustained process of identifying one's impressions in conceptual terms, of integrating every event and every observation into a conceptual context, of grasping relationships, differences, similarities in one's perceptual material and of abstracting them into new concepts, of drawing inferences, of making deductions, of reaching conclusions, of asking new questions and discovering new answers and expanding one's knowledge into an ever-growing sum. The faculty that directs this process, the faculty that works by means of concepts, is: reason. The process is thinking.” (VOS, 21)

Edited November 2, 2009 by phibetakappa

[phibetakappa]

Do not make the mistake of equating a concept with its definition.

I would not and am not. I understand the issue of concepts being "open ended," i.e., that they stand for not just of a given objects essential characteristics, but all a given object's characteristics.

I don't think this is in question here.

[phibetakappa]

Your attempt to narrow the field of ethics to only a single true theory is the mistake of equating a concept with its definition.

No I am not. This is the third time someone has made this assertion and it is false.

I am not equating a concept with its definition. I understand that fallacy.

[phibetakappa]

Alchemy and astrology are not examples of false science, they are not science.

I hope this statement is not in answer to something I said. I never made the claim that alchemy was a "false science."

(I am not sure what a "false" science would be.)

I know it is not a science. That was my point. It is the same point I am making with regard to Kant's so-called ethics.

Kant's "ethics" is not an ethics.

It is OK to treat it as if it is a kind of ethics for academic and polemical reasons, but it is not part of the science of ethics. I.e., treating Kant's "ethics" as if it properly belongs in a valid concept of ethics has a limited value, e.g., as a good source for comparing the use of valid concepts in relation to the use of invalid concepts.

* * *

Again, this is your second interjecting post, and again you have only muddled things.

More importantly, you have avoided responding to the major points and questions I asked you.

Why does Kant's so-called "ethics" qualify as a unit of the concept "ethics"? And how do you know?

[Grames]

Why does Kant's so-called "ethics" qualify as a unit of the concept "ethics"? And how do you know?

The subject matter of ethics is man in action. All actions of all men, and all of their justifications and rationalizations come within the scope of ethics. The definition of a proper ethics is not equal to ethics as a field, because not all actions are proper actions. Even having a standard of 'proper' action begs the question of ethics. Kant's ethics is an ethics.

How do I know? Ethics must be universal to be principled or to count as knowledge. All actions and all ethical theories have to be integrated, even if most of those integrations are merely recognizing errors.

[phibetakappa]

The subject matter of ethics is man in action. All actions of all men, and all of their justifications and rationalizations come within the scope of ethics.

Thanks for the response.

[phibetakappa]

The subject matter of ethics is man in action. All actions of all men, and all of their justifications and rationalizations come within the scope of ethics.

The subject matter "man in action" covers just about every scholastic subject: philosophy as such, epistemology, politics, nature of man, history, economics, business, applied engineering, anthropology, psychology, construction and all vocational arts.

It's hard to find a subject that is not included in your description.

If you are going to accuse me of trying to make the subject of ethics "too narrow," I think you've managed to make it far, far too broad.

[Grames]

As I said, ethics must be universal to be principled or to count as knowledge. There is no corner of human activity beyond good and evil.

I'll double down and say the same thing about epistemology.

Given this definition: "Epistemology is a science devoted to the discovery of the proper methods of acquiring and validating knowledge", nevertheless all methods of acquiring knowledge by all men are the subject matter of epistemology. The claim that a mystic revelation is knowledge is an epistemological claim, and its refutation is an act of applied epistemology. Epistemology sets the means and standards of knowledge in every field, just as ethics sets the means and standards of value in every field.

Ethics judges epistemological doctrines as value or disvalue. Epistemology judges ethical doctrines as true or false. Philosophy applies everywhere there is choice and action, which includes: history, economics, business, applied engineering, anthropology, psychology, construction and all vocational arts. "Philosophy studies the fundamental nature of existence, of man, and of man’s relationship to existence" and it subsumes all of those other fields because it deals in true fundamentals common to all fields.

[phibetakappa]

There is no corner of human activity beyond good and evil.

. . .

Ethics judges epistemological doctrines as value or disvalue.

We have not been talking about what is and is not within the realm of being judged and/or evaluated by any given ethics.

We have been talking about what *is* and is not a included in the concept ethics, i.e., what are the proper units subsumed under the concept "ethics."

I just stated that your description includes ALL subjects involving man and man's actions. If what you stated was true, all the subjects I named would be subdivisions of ethics, but they are not.

Your description does not in anyway tell us what ethics *is* and how it can be differentiated from its closest relative. It includes nearly everything and excludes next to nothing. To quote Ayn Rand,

"And if something can be anything, it is actually nothing" (Art of Non-Fiction, 34)

Again, any man made object and any action of man can and should be evaluated, and thus is in the realm of being "ethics" in the sense that it can be "evaluated" by a given standard of values defined by a valid ethical system.

Being able to evaluate a given object, presupposes an ethics and/or a standard of value.

But the fact that nearly everything can be judged/evaluated by a given valid ethics, does not make everything a form of ethics.

Philosophy applies everywhere there is choice and action, which includes: history, economics, business, applied engineering, anthropology, psychology, construction and all vocational arts.

Again we have not been talking about were a given subject applies, but how to differentiate what does and does not qualify as a given kind of object.

[philosophy] subsumes all of those other fields because it deals in true fundamentals common to all fields.

subsumes means "to take up into a more inclusive classification." dictionary.com.

E.g., the class "animal" subsumes rabbits, snakes, birds, fish, men, etc., i.e., all these objects are a certain kind of animal. (while the class excludes objects such as rocks, dirty, trees, plants shrubs etc)

the class furniture subsumes tables, chairs, lamps, beds, bookcases etc, i.e.e., all these objects are a certain kind of furniture. (while the class excludes objects such as clothes, appliances, drapery, toilets etc. )

the class philosophy does not subsume: history, economics, business, applied engineering, anthropology, psychology, construction and all vocational arts, i.e., all these objects are not a certain kind of philosophy.

History is not a certain kind of philosophy. Psychology is not a certain kind of philosophy. Economics is not a certain kind of philosophy. etc. etc.

All those fields I named are not distinctive forms and/or kinds of philosophy. If we were defining any of those fields we would not say their genus is philosophy.

There is a difference in saying a.) men are guided fundamentally by philosophy, and b.) that all fields are a kind of philosophy.

Or in your case that all these fields are a kind of ethics, given that you stated ethics is the subject of all men and all mens actions.

The question is what are the proper units of the concept ethics, i.e., what cognitive purpose does it serve, what does it integrate into the concept, and what does it differentiate, i.e., what does not qualify as a member of the concept?

Just because Kant is a man, and he wrote and/or spoke about something (writing and/or speaking being actions), does not make what he wrote and/or spoke about a certain kind of ethics.

Nor does the fact that Kant's work can be evaluated by any given ethical code make his works a certain kind of ethics.

Edited November 4, 2009 by phibetakappa

[Grames]

We have not been talking about what is and is not within the realm of being judged and/or evaluated by any given ethics.

We have been talking about what *is* and is not a included in the concept ethics, i.e., what are the proper units subsumed under the concept "ethics."

Your previous post about ethics being too broad was an explicit attempt to find some actions not covered by ethics, to establish the principle that ethics is not universally about action. You need to attack the universality of ethics because only then could you move on to the next stage of your argument, that some ethical systems are not ethics because they are concerned with actions that are not ethical. Why wait until then to cut down your argument with the charge of begging the question (for a second time) when it is so much more reality-oriented to insist that the subject matter of ethics is all actions of all men?

Furthermore, you are attempting to establish a false dichotomy between the kinds of actions ethics is derived from and the kinds of actions ethics is applied to. As there is no such basis to divide actions in ethical and non-ethical, or before-ethics and after-ethics, this line of argument is a dead end.

I have skipped a step. Ethics is about principles for acting, but the principles themselves are abstracted from actual actions and the thoughts that caused them. For ethical principles to be universal (to be principles at all) all actions are integrated into ethics.

I just stated that your description includes ALL subjects involving man and man's actions. If what you stated was true, all the subjects I named would be subdivisions of ethics, but they are not.

Ah, but they are all the raw materials out of which ethical systems are built.

An abstraction is a form of human classification by which man integrates the evidence provided by his senses. Man rises above the perceptual level by integrating his percepts into concepts, his concepts into principles, his principles into sciences, and all of his sciences into a philosophy.

All of his sciences.

(So there. My quote is better than your than your quote. )

subsumes means "to take up into a more inclusive classification." dictionary.com.

E.g., the class "animal" subsumes rabbits, snakes, birds, fish, men, etc., i.e., all these objects are a certain kind of animal. (while the class excludes objects such as rocks, dirty, trees, plants shrubs etc)

the class furniture subsumes tables, chairs, lamps, beds, bookcases etc, i.e.e., all these objects are a certain kind of furniture. (while the class excludes objects such as clothes, appliances, drapery, toilets etc. )

the class philosophy does not subsume: history, economics, business, applied engineering, anthropology, psychology, construction and all vocational arts, i.e., all these objects are not a certain kind of philosophy.

History is not a certain kind of philosophy. Psychology is not a certain kind of philosophy. Economics is not a certain kind of philosophy. etc. etc.

All those fields I named are not distinctive forms and/or kinds of philosophy. If we were defining any of those fields we would not say their genus is philosophy.

There is a difference in saying a.) men are guided fundamentally by philosophy, and b.) that all fields are a kind of philosophy.

Or in your case that all these fields are a kind of ethics, given that you stated ethics is the subject of all men and all mens actions.

"Philosophy studies the fundamental nature of existence, of man, and of man’s relationship to existence" and it subsumes all of those other fields because it deals in true fundamentals common to all fields. Existence, the methods and means to knowledge, the methods and means of values are all fundamentals. There are different sets of fundamentals philosophers have claimed to discover, and those sets are all called philosophies and their various parts are all systems of metaphysics, epistemology and of ethics. The genus of special fields of study is knowledge, and epistemology studies knowledge in the abstract to discover valid means of knowing and inferring. The genus of all of the fields they study is metaphysics. The genus of all actions of historians, businessmen, engineers, etc... is ethics.

The question is what are the proper units of the concept ethics, i.e., what cognitive purpose does it serve, what does it integrate into the concept, and what does it differentiate, i.e., what does not qualify as a member of the concept?

Just because Kant is a man, and he wrote and/or spoke about something (writing and/or speaking being actions), does not make what he wrote and/or spoke about a certain kind of ethics.

Nor does the fact that Kant's work can be evaluated by any given ethical code make his works a certain kind of ethics.

Kant claimed to discover fundamentals that applied to thought and action. He was a philosopher with a metaphysics, an epistemology and an ethics.

The referents of ethics are normative principles about how man should act.

The cognitive purpose of ethics is to integrate into a noncontradictory whole a set of principles about how man should act.

Ethics integrates all actions of all men into principles for action.

Ethics omits actions of the inanimate, or of plants and animals, and non-conscious aspects of man's behavior.

[Dante]

Thanks to all those who replied and weighed in. I had already encountered Tara Smith's brief exploration of virtue ethics in the Intro to ARNE, which was in fact what prompted my question in the first place. She states that it permits a modicum of self-interest into the realm of morality, yet cannot usually be classified as egoism, but does not go into much more detail. I'm looking into book overviews of the subject, but have not yet found a cheap one, nor one which discusses Objectivism.

To weigh in on the discussion that's been going on through most of the thread...

I'm not prepared to reject "virtue ethics" as a bogus classification for the reason that "all ethics requires virtue," for the same reason that I don't object to the classification of "supply-side" economics simply because all economics talks about supply. Virtue ethics is a name, not a description.

(According to my limited understanding) virtue ethics means much more than just ethics which *includes* discussion about virtue. I agree that all ethics, in some way, must discuss virtue. Virtue ethics, however, is the *particular* name for a *particular* attempt to escape the consequential-deontological dichotomy in ethics. I see this as possibly relevant to Objectivism because O'ism represents such a third option. Tara Smith in particular, in Moral Rights and Political Freedoms, presents her "teleological" conception of rights as the solution to a false alternative between consequential and deontological rights. I was thus wondering if anyone had access to a succinct comparison of the similarities, differences, and relations between virtue ethics and Objectivism (although I appreciate the sources provided so far).

/attempt to re-rail thread.

[phibetakappa]

You need to attack the universality of ethics because only then could you move on to the next stage of your argument, that some ethical systems are not ethics because they are concerned with actions that are not ethical.

Given this statement I'm sure you do not understand my argument. I never made the claim that some actions are not ethical. That is not what I'm arguing.

Furthermore, the phrase "universality of ethics" is a term you asserted, and that you are now baselessly asserting as a necessary condition for some argument of your own, unrelated to what I've been saying.

[phibetakappa]

I'm not prepared to reject "virtue ethics" as a bogus classification for the reason that "all ethics requires virtue," for the same reason that I don't object to the classification of "supply-side" economics simply because all economics talks about supply. Virtue ethics is a name, not a description

Nice argument. So you won't dismiss "virtue ethics" as bogus because you want to retain a bogus classification in economics.

Yes, you have managed to put the thread back on the rail to nowhere. Enjoy.

[phibetakappa]

Your previous post about ethics being too broad was an explicit attempt to find some actions not covered by ethics, to establish the principle that ethics is

. . . blah blah blah . . .

Ethics omits actions of the inanimate, or of plants and animals, and non-conscious aspects of man's behavior.

Grames the non-sense you are rambling about has very little if any relationship to O'ism as I've studied it for the last 20 years. You seem to pick O'ist ideas a random then weave them into something else.

You'd be wise to read ITOE a few times, then actually do the work to understand Objectivism first hand.

You seem to post here a great deal, I hope you are not trying to pass yourself off as an expert of O'ism, because you are not.

For everyone else,

Caveat emptor

Regards,

[Grames]

[ex_banana-eater]

Nice argument. So you won't dismiss "virtue ethics" as bogus because you want to retain a bogus classification in economics.

Are supply side economics an economic theory? If not, what kind of theory are they?