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A _fundamental_ flaw in Rand's definition of Reason

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Neither of you address the issue here. (In general, do not take intros such as this as jabs in any way -- if your concern is reason, then interpret all I write/say in a benevolent context.)

I beg to differ. I've addressed your issue precisely.

You speak of the referents of a concept (which are objective and unchanging), versus its definition (which is contextual, wholly epistemological)? You mention that there is no thought, outside of a sensory context? Neither of these have any bearing on the case. There are things that exist inside the mind, that exist solely in the context of consciousness, and her definition -- of Reason -- limits the field of that faculty to only sensory data. But "nothing is outside the province of reason."

The referents are unchanging and objective? You mean the earth is flat, "property is theft", capitalism is exploitation, selfishness is evil, the speed of light is not limited, a whale is a fish? All knowledge is contextual.

There is NOTHING inside the mind that exists solely in the context of consciousness. Consciousness is identification of existence. Please, show me one thought, emotion, value, or desire, that you have that does not ultimately refer to an external reality (assuming you are not hallucinating). Descartes maintained that consciousness is aware without referents. On what basis do you claim that introspection is solely in the context of consciousness? How do you distinguish between your thought of "freedom" and "freedom"? I'd be curious to know.

For instance (on the adult level), when a man sees a woman walking down the street, the action of his consciousness is perception; when he notes that she is beautiful, the action of his consciousness is evaluation; when he experiences an inner state of pleasure and approval, of admiration, the action of his consciousness is emotion; when he stops to watch her and draws conclusions, from the evidence, about her character, age, social position, etc., the action of his consciousness is thought; when, later, he recalls the incident, the action of his consciousness is reminiscence; when he projects that her appearance would be improved if her hair were blond rather than brown, and her dress were blue rather than red, the action of his consciousness is imagination.

Again, you assert "her definition -- of Reason -- limits the field of that faculty to only sensory data." Yet you do not demonstrate that. If it is the faculty that integrates sensory data, then it clearly is above and beyond it differentia; it is part of its genus.

What is a valid definition of Reason? Try this: Reason is the faculty that integrates and identifies that which is (with the understood context that that which is, is grasped by objective means).

"Grasping" is an instance of integration, hence it is already covered under Rand's definition. Your definition amounts to "reason is the faculty that works by reason." And since "grasping" is an act of consciousness, I don't see how your definition solves your own statement of the problem. What does "objective" consist of? Does it not presuppose that one is already using reason? It is not valid to include it in the definition.

(In general, addressed in general: what is your first concern? Is it Reality, or her written philosophy? What do you think her first concern would be? Challenge every word she wrote, when it is called for, and know that she would love you the more for it. Pardon, unsure this parenthetical should be here. In any case -- hitting 'Add Reply'.)

This is misleading and presumptuous. (I might even consider it offensive since you seem to assume your state of knowledge is mine: that I need to challenge every word she wrote, as if I have not thought about the state of my own knowledge and its correspondence to reality.) YOUR question was related to Rand's definition. Am I supposed to ignore what she stated about the subject to address your question? If you think that I somehow argue her points without grasping the relationship to reality, i.e., that I don't think what she said is true, then there is no point in arguing here. This is a forum for discussing Objectivism, is it not? If you want to argue your ideas apart from Objectivism, then please so state your question and make sure the subject under which the discussion is to occur does not refer to Objectivism.

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Still, big deal - this is why you are "not an Objectivist"? What is an Objectivist, in your eyes? I heard Peikoff giving a great description, which is: agreeing with the fundamentals of her philosophy and living by them. (Just a side topic)
That was my first thought when I read the sub-topic. I can understand someone not calling themselves an Objectivist because he does not agree with the way Objectivism conceptualizes something fundamental. However, to agree with the conceptualization but say one is not an Objectivist because of some definition seems odd.

However, in this case, it highlights an underlying issue where the OP disagrees with (or does not understand) Objectivist epistemology: the fundamentals of the theory of concepts. I say it highlights it, not that it demonstrates it, because one only sees this when one reads OP's other topics. Organon1973 's earlier topic on induction shows where he is coming from. If people want to help the OP understand this topic, they really ought to read that previous topic first; otherwise, communication is happening in two different languages.

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Organon is a metaphysical dualist. There are the things out in the world and the things in the mind, and they are two radically different kinds of things not necessarily related. Matter and mind are two independent realms of equal importance, so naturally a definition of reason cast only in terms of what is sensed of matter is incomplete.

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Organon is a metaphysical dualist. There are the things out in the world and the things in the mind, and they are two radically different kinds of things not necessarily related. Matter and mind are two independent realms of equal importance, so naturally a definition of reason cast only in terms of what is sensed of matter is incomplete.

Good observations.

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Organon, would this be a correct statement of your conclusion of Rands definition: That "Her definition of reason excludes mental existents from the province of reason and its integrative nature because abstractions are not perceptual/sensual in their origin." ? I want to be clear on your position.

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they are two radically different kinds of things not necessarily related

This is what Im trying to get him to make clear. Im not sure he intends this from his end, but rather thinks Rand implies this by the definition, even though she says differently in other places. In other words simply pointing out an inconsistency.

Edited by Plasmatic
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This is what Im trying to get him to make clear. Im not sure he intends this from his end, but rather thinks Rand implies this by the definition, even though she says differently in other places. In other words simply pointing out an inconsistency.

As I mentioned previously, organon is substituting the definition for the concept and implying that only the definition is what the concept refers to. It is up to him to present a clear argument. You should not be trying to guess what he means. All that does is double the number of posts and does lead to clarity.

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It is up to him to present a clear argument. You should not be trying to guess what he means. All that does is double the number of posts and does lead to clarity.

Chief, I suggest you read more carefully. My statement:

Organon, would this be a correct statement of your conclusion of Rands definition: That "Her definition of reason excludes mental existents from the province of reason and its integrative nature because abstractions are not perceptual/sensual in their origin." ? I want to be clear on your position.

Leaves your comment above in direct contradiction to facts. If I was guessing I wouldn't ask for clarification.What I "should" be doing is pursuing my own interest in this topic. Your nonsense has added more waste to this thread than my request for clarity,but that is not my concern as you can post in whatever fashion you deem valuable to you. [within the rules of course,which is the concern of the moderators anyway].

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[quote name='organon1973' date='Dec 20 2009, 12:07 AM' post='240279

Note, in this context, she also restricts productive work to material manifestation -- something that exists in the world (see her re productivity) -- by which, a psychotherapist, engaged solely in therapeutic practice, does not qualify as productive.

I have never seen it interpreted the way you have chosen to. (btw, my wife is a psychotherapist)

It is easy enough to see that there is a material manifestation occurring from the work of a pschotherapist. The material manifestation is the people they are able to help become more productive and better adjusted.

Just as a coach has material manifestation in their athletes, students, etc.

Can you provide a direct quote from Ms.Rand that supports your interpretation?

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