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Moral Obligation To Help

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By realizing it doesn't prohibit acting to save someone.

That is true, but it does not oblige a person to assist anyone either. If there is no obligation to assist then assisting is purely a matter of preference or choice. Like choosing which flavor of ice cream to have tonight. Except where a contractual obligation to assist is in place, assisting another person is purely optional. Neither choice is immoral or unethical. Where there is a contract in place to render assistance under specified conditions, failure to do so, is a breach of contract which is unethical.

Bob Kolker

Edited by Robert J. Kolker
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That is true, but it does not oblige a person to assist anyone either. If there is no obligation to assist then assisting is purely a matter of preference or choice. Like choosing which flavor of ice cream to have tonight. Except where a contractual obligation to assist is in place, assisting another person is purely optional. Neither choice is immoral or unethical.

That's not Ayn Rand's view of morality, only yours. This is the "Questions about Objectivism" section of the forum.

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That's not Ayn Rand's view of morality, only yours. This is the "Questions about Objectivism" section of the forum.

O.K. When is one obliged to help (in the sense of duty) outside of a contract? When is it immoral not to help? I simply do not see such an instance. If one has no contractual obligation to help, then one can simply choose not to help. On the other hand if there is a substantial interest or consequential benefit in helping out, then it makes good sense to pursue one's interest or benefit. But even when it makes good sense to try to get a benefit, it is not immoral to not get the benefit, provided no harm comes of not pursuing the benefit.

In general, there is no substantial interest in helping strangers who have no connection to one's life or situation. Saving the world is, by and large, a futile effort.

Bob Kolker

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O.K. When is one obliged to help (in the sense of duty) outside of a contract? When is it immoral not to help? I simply do not see such an instance. If one has no contractual obligation to help, then one can simply choose not to help. On the other hand if there is a substantial interest or consequential benefit in helping out, then it makes good sense to pursue one's interest or benefit. But even when it makes good sense to try to get a benefit, it is not immoral to not get the benefit, provided no harm comes of not pursuing the benefit.

I don't wish to engage in a debate about any of this. I just want to point out the inherent lie in answering a question about Objectivism, with your own contradictory viewpoint. I know you are aware of it being contrary to Objectivism, because you said so less than an hour ago in the other thread (here).

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Yes, and premise #1 is trying to overlook the idea that we cannot compare values like that: across two different people. It tries to set up a notion where I get (say) 1 unit of value from the $1 I'm going to spend on some gum, while someone in Africa will get 1000 units of value if I give him the money for a meal. It's trying to compare that which cannot be compared.

Singer thinks he can. He is a utilitarian and so takes value outside the context of a particular valuer. He is attempting to assume the "view from nowhere" when he makes these kinds of arguments (which of course he cannot do). So to him all units of value are equivalent and can be mathematically parsed in such a way. This type of thinking is why utilitarianism continues to exist.

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1. There is no such thing as a zero cost action. Every action has a cost in energy and time spent. There is also the matter of opportunity cost which is highly contextual. Time spent in one action, deprives one of the time and opportunity to do another action, at that time. This could be (in a context) a significant cost.

Yes, of course, and oftentimes in a real-world situation with context, the costs outweigh the value gained. In this situation, the obligation deriving from integrity goes the other way; it is immoral to extend help and forgo something of greater value. However, in assuming zero cost I simply responded to an unrealistically-formed question, and I think the logic of the answer has significance for real world situations. In real world situations, if you take the full context into account and still feel that helping a stranger is the most objectively valuable action you can take at present, you are obligated to take that action by integrity to your values.

2. How do you reconcile you position with the Striker's Oath in -Atlas Shrugged-?

Because the obligation to help derives from an egoistic ethics. It is fidelity to your own egoistic hierarchy of values that drives the obligation I am talking about. The well being of strangers carries a non-zero value to me, and it therefore fits somewhere within my hierarchy. In some situations, I will judge that promoting that value (the well-being of a stranger) will be the best course I can take to further my overall value structure, and in those situations I am obligated to help.

Your actions are not taken "for the sake of" the person you are trying to help, in the sense that your moral code is not built around their well-being. You're still ultimately acting for your own sake. However, other people factor into your own value structure to varying degrees; loved ones factor in very heavily, friends less so, and strangers still less so. Acting for your own sake requires mutually beneficial relationships with each of these groups of people.

In a sense, I am saying that you would never be obligated to help a stranger when helping him is not a mutually beneficial action. When you judge that extending help will be the most beneficial action possible for yourself at that moment, you are obligated to take it.

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That is true, but it does not oblige a person to assist anyone either. If there is no obligation to assist then assisting is purely a matter of preference or choice. Like choosing which flavor of ice cream to have tonight. Except where a contractual obligation to assist is in place, assisting another person is purely optional. Neither choice is immoral or unethical. Where there is a contract in place to render assistance under specified conditions, failure to do so, is a breach of contract which is unethical.

Is it immoral for me to follow my father into a career in medicine, simply because it is expected of me, when what I would really love to do is become an economics professor? Objectivism would say that yes, taking this action is immoral. Why? Because I'm sacrificing something of great value to me and getting little in return. Assuming I have chosen to live, I have a moral obligation to pursue my own happiness; that is to say, sacrificing myself and my happiness is immoral.

When I say that I have a moral obligation to take that career as an economist, what I am trying to convey is that morality dictates that we pursue properly-formed selfish values. These dictates of morality are what I refer to as moral obligations. Morality dictates that we look for rational values in all that we do.

To look back at the situation of helping strangers, morality still dictates that we look for rational values in others. When we find them, we should pursue them to an extent that is consistent with our hierarchy of values overall. It would be irrational to ignore all value except that to be gained by helping strangers, but it would also be irrational to neglect helping strangers entirely when they hold a true rational value to us. Forgoing the value to be gained from helping strangers is immoral in the same way as forgoing the value to be gained by pursuing the career that I like. My moral obligation to do both of them, given a favorable context, derives from my commitment to selfish values.

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In general, there is no substantial interest in helping strangers who have no connection to one's life or situation. Saving the world is, by and large, a futile effort.

True. It is true that helping strangers who have no conceivable connection to oneself is not beneficial. However, assuming that all strangers are in this relationship to one's life is entirely unrealistic.

The most obvious value to be gained by helping strangers is their potential relationship to you as value-producers in the future. I can't tell you how many current friends of mine became friends of mine beginning with a kind gesture extended to them when they were a stranger to me. Effort expended to help strangers can turn into friendships, relationships, beneficial business contacts and partnerships, etc.

In many situations, the likelihood of this is very small. For example, there is little likelihood of this sort of benefit accruing from me sending money to starving children in India or some such thing. This type of potential benefit obviously favors helping those in your own university, community, company, etc over more distant strangers.

However, there is another kind of benefit available from helping strangers, and that is the psychic benefit from encouraging the pursuit of objective values by others. You may gain some rational satisfaction from contributing to a cause which teaches the uneducated valuable skills and puts them in a position to support themselves. Even if you never anticipate that your life will be made better by someone who went through the program, you value self-sufficiency and value production, and you gain some happiness from seeing others accomplish that. This type of benefit is possible even with very distant strangers; however, it is only possible with certain types of activities. Simply giving money to the poor indiscriminately is not likely to do anything but encourage their dependence on charity; this type of giving does not benefit me because I am not encouraging any rational values. However, if charitable giving is structured in a way which promotes self-sufficiency and rational values, I may legitimately gain satisfaction by giving to it.

Obviously, this satisfaction doesn't go very far. An acontextual orgy of giving to others, even if done in a way which actually promotes self-sufficiency, is likely to end with the giver being impoverished and unable to pursue other values that he/she has neglected. However, if effort to help strangers is expended in the right way, and if it does not endanger his or her other rational values, it can be beneficial to and proper for the giver. This is why I would characterize charity as a marginal issue in ethics; it is likely to hold a low place in one's value structure, far below pursuing a career or helping out loved ones and friends.

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It is in the nature of man to be a contractual animal.

Since one cannot be contractual in loneliness, a contractual animal needs the existence of other contractual animals to keep being a contractual animal.

(Meaning, a man needs other men to keep living qua man).

That's why almost all people value human beings more than a vanilla ice cream. We feel that people are more important to our own flourishing, and that's why we would prefer to invest five minutes saving a life than eating vanilla ice cream.

Having a partner is so important for my long term goals, that even skipping a whole meal to get or keep a partner is generally a good investment. It is not that human beings have an intrinsec value. No. It is just that rational people happen to like, in principle, other people, unless dissapointed, unless they are given a good reason to dislike them.

So, to me saving the life of a stranger is related to rationality: to acting according to my nature.

Correspondingly, not saving the life of a stranger when there is no objective danger to myself and my higher values, is irrational and hence immoral.

Edited by Hotu Matua
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The most obvious value to be gained by helping strangers is their potential relationship to you as value-producers in the future. I can't tell you how many current friends of mine became friends of mine beginning with a kind gesture extended to them when they were a stranger to me. Effort expended to help strangers can turn into friendships, relationships, beneficial business contacts and partnerships, etc.

<snip>

However, there is another kind of benefit available from helping strangers, and that is the psychic benefit from encouraging the pursuit of objective values by others. You may gain some rational satisfaction from contributing to a cause which teaches the uneducated valuable skills and puts them in a position to support themselves. Even if you never anticipate that your life will be made better by someone who went through the program, you value self-sufficiency and value production, and you gain some happiness from seeing others accomplish that. This type of benefit is possible even with very distant strangers; however, it is only possible with certain types of activities. Simply giving money to the poor indiscriminately is not likely to do anything but encourage their dependence on charity; this type of giving does not benefit me because I am not encouraging any rational values. However, if charitable giving is structured in a way which promotes self-sufficiency and rational values, I may legitimately gain satisfaction by giving to it.

Good stuff, I agree with this fully. Dante, your posts usually make me think "I should have said that". :)

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I don't wish to engage in a debate about any of this. I just want to point out the inherent lie in answering a question about Objectivism, with your own contradictory viewpoint. I know you are aware of it being contrary to Objectivism, because you said so less than an hour ago in the other thread (here).

I am not contrary to Objectivism in the entirety. I differ on one point concerning whether purely optional choices are a matter of moral import. Sometimes they are, sometimes they are not. I fully sympathize with the economic and political thrust of big Oh Objectivism. I am pro-Capitalism down to my toenails. I stopped working for governments back in 1968; that is 42 years ago. How long have you been it? I also detest altruism in all its forms. I consider it a disease as much as a philosophical error. I have seen more of the New Deal and Fair Deal than most of you folks here who were not even born until after FDR died.

I have made a sincere and studied effort to become as hard headed and hard-hearted as I can possibly be. I stopped shedding tears for the suffering of stupid mankind decades ago. I have done a good job of purging myself of compassion and pity. I have worked on this for over forty years so I am harder than most of you here.

I do not live for the sake of others nor do I expect or require that they live for mine. I reached that conclusion without a bit of help from Ayn Rand. I came across Ayn Rand when I was nearly 25 years old, so I did not have a teen-age infatuation with Rand. I found Atlas Shrugged to be an interesting alternate time-line novel and rather plausible. I note with a kind of amusement that some of the worst of Rand's predictions are now coming true. What was it that Francisco said? Brother you asked for it. Yup. They asked for it, now they are getting it.

So, while I am not a member of the Club, neither am I an enemy of the Club.

Bob Kolker

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I differ on one point concerning whether purely optional choices are a matter of moral import. Sometimes they are, sometimes they are not.

What is the the controlling source of Ayn Rand information (speech, writing, etc) where she defines this in terms of a "purely optional choice"?

I understand the the concept in terms of say, ice cream, where a person can determine what they want/feel like at that moment if they focus... But what about things like which number to choose if you're playing roulette? Would Rand say the choice of black or red is a moral choice?

(this is a "for fun" game where no money is at stake... for the sake of simplicity)

Edited by freestyle
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So, to me saving the life of a stranger is related to rationality: to acting according to my nature.

Correspondingly, not saving the life of a stranger when there is no objective danger to myself and my higher values, is irrational and hence immoral.

What if there is a more pressing need of your time and attention than saving the life of the stranger? What if you were on your way to catch a train to go to a job interview that could be very important to your well being. If you save the stranger, you miss the train, you miss the interview and probably miss the chance of getting that job. Which is more important? The life of the stranger or the job interview (in this hypothetical scenario)?

All choices and judgments have a cost. One must weigh the cost versus the benefit.

So in deciding whether to try to save the stranger, I would first ask: what do I get if I save the stranger and what do I lose if I don't save the stranger. I run a cost/benefit analysis as quickly as I can. Or at least I should run a cost/benefit analysis.

Bob Kolker

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So in deciding whether to try to save the stranger, I would first ask: what do I get if I save the stranger and what do I lose if I don't save the stranger. I run a cost/benefit analysis as quickly as I can. Or at least I should run a cost/benefit analysis.

Have you ever tried doing it? What exactly did you measure?

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Bob:

If by cost/benefit analysis you mean what risk such an act entails for your life or the life of the ones you love, I agree with you.

But once you have established that your life runs negligible or no risk, what other sort of cost/benefit analysis could you possibly make?

Such an analysis would require information not only related to what you know you will lose (e.g. your job interview) but about the stranger and the consequences of saving his life. Is he a millionaire who will pay you back with a big check, or an Islamic terrorist that will interpret your act as an act of Alah that kept him alive to fulfill His will to blow up some bus?

Without information of both risks and benefits, how can you run a risk analysis?

That's why I would say: In those situations, trust your nature.

Evolution has done a great job in you.

It has given you a mind able to perform logical thinking, but it has also given you neurohormonal mechanisms to make you do the BEST possible thing, in terms of survival, when there is no time or information for a logical thinking.

You can decide in advance that, in situations where rationality will have no time or input to work, you will trust your nature.

And many times it will guide you to an adventageous position. As a tool of survival, mind trumps guts by far, but guts trump chance . Following your guts is better than flipping a coin. I would even go further: whereas mind trumps guts by far in medium and long term goals, guts trump mind in immediate term goals, when decisions on life and death have to be made in few seconds. Indeed, trying to apply logical thinking such situations would work against you.

I believe that it is in our nature to save strangers when doing that does not represent an ostensible risk. Maybe evolution made individuals who save strangers more able to be saved by others when they are the strangers. This behaviour is seen in other primates. Sympathy generally pays off.

Edited by Hotu Matua
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Responding to a previous post by themadkat, I don't think it is fair to call Singer a Utilitarian. Utilitarians believe in maximizing pleasure overall. Singer is more of an egalitarian, he does not really care how bad things are - just that everyone experiences them equally. He advocates redistribution of wealth to the point at which the giver is just as poor as the receiver. Utilitarians (as nutty as I believe they are) at least shoot for the "good" (maximizing hedons or pleasure units or something similar). Singer wants to diminish "the bad" he does not really care about "the good."

I have been reading OPAR again and I am at least confident enough to contradict the statement made by aequalsa that "You are not required to act in any way for another persons interest." Leonard Peikoff states that "a man must certainly act to help a person in trouble whom he loves, even to the point of risking his own life in case of danger" (Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand 238).

Also, while obviously not addressing the exact circumstances of my impossible scenario, Peikoff claims that ". . . if no sacrifice is involved on the helper's part . . . [e]xtending help to others in such a context is an act of generosity, not an obligation" (Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand 239). Peikoff is addressing emergency circumstances, but I think that the same moral status of the action (a generosity, not an obligation) could be applied to non-emergency circumstances.

Oh, and if my quotations from OPAR are in any way against forum policy, please know that I understand and will remove them (or understand that they will be removed). I attempted to cite the information correctly.

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Responding to a previous post by themadkat, I don't think it is fair to call Singer a Utilitarian. Utilitarians believe in maximizing pleasure overall. Singer is more of an egalitarian, he does not really care how bad things are - just that everyone experiences them equally. He advocates redistribution of wealth to the point at which the giver is just as poor as the receiver. Utilitarians (as nutty as I believe they are) at least shoot for the "good" (maximizing hedons or pleasure units or something similar). Singer wants to diminish "the bad" he does not really care about "the good."

Singer is a self-described utilitarian. There are many stripes and not all of them are trying to maximize good. In fact, not all of them seek to maximize. Mostly what the consequentialist philosophies have in common is a teleological view of the good, intrinsic value or worth (without reference to a valuer).

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  • 2 weeks later...

I believe that the main issue in your original question is the amount of value you place is a person you would be helping.. i do not really think there are many rational reasons for helping complete strangers, however if you believed that you had a value to gain from helping someone then it would not be a moral duty, but merely another self interest for you to pursue. therefore if it in your self interests to assist a stranger then do it, if not, then you have no moral obligation.

In respect to the singer question the main issue with that is in the first premise. the idea of "comparable significance" assumes that everyone has an obligation to sacrifice everything of lesser value for everything of greater value without even establishing a standard of value, which implicitly is obviously the Kantian standard of value which is "whatever is valuable to others" and in this way the argument makes the case that everyone must sacrifice everything to everyone else and is very obviously unacceptable.. i made this argument to my philosophy prof. recently (i'm also doing Singer right now) and it definitely made her stop and think for a minute and eventually she just sort of gave me an answer which skirted around most of my argument.

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i do not really think there are many rational reasons for helping complete strangers, however if you believed that you had a value to gain from helping someone then it would not be a moral duty, but merely another self interest for you to pursue. therefore if it in your self interests to assist a stranger then do it, if not, then you have no moral obligation.

One of the selfish gains in helping a complete stranger is to build tacit agreements of mutual help that can be favourable to me when I go into need.

It is like a sort of "behavioural insurance".

For example, it may be in my rational self interest to apply a Heimlich maneuver to an stranger undergoing asphyxia due to a chunk of food stuck in his throat.

Why? Because by practicing this, I am setting a standard, an example that can be easily followed by others: a tacit agreement that would read: "If I happen to come into the same situation of asphyxia, please help me, even if I am a complete stranger to you".

4473882563_042b7b094a_o.jpg

This is an example of a kind of help that

1) does not give the stranger something that he could have gained or done by himself

2) does not last beyond the period of time strictly necessary for the stranger to get back to a position where he can help himself

3) does not reward any known vice nor punishes any known virtue, so it is neutral from the point of view of justice

Edited by Hotu Matua
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One of the selfish gains in helping a complete stranger is to build tacit agreements of mutual help that can be favourable to me when I go into need.

It is like a sort of "behavioural insurance".

For example, it may be in my rational self interest to apply a Heimlich maneuver to any stranger underoging asphyxia becasue a chunk of food is stuck in their throat.

Why? Becasue by practicing this, I am setting a standard, an example that can be easily followed by others: a tacit agreement that would read: "If I happen to come into the same situation of asphyxia, please help me, even if I am a complete stranger to you".

i agree with this entirely, and in this case that makes sense. however once again i would argue that you have no moral obligation to apply the heimlich, it is merely in your best interests. however, as most objectivists believe that to refuse to act on your own best interests is a failure of morality i can see why you would make this argument.. however it is possible for the same person to have two interests which conflict with one another, and in that case he must choose which is more important. for instance, i may be able to help someone without significant cost to myself, however, if that action, while not costing me anything, would interfere with one of my other goals, then i have committed no moral breach. now if you will make the argument that any time you have a conflicting goal then you are incurring a cost and the hypothetical states that there must be no cost, or negligent cost to you i will respond by stating that there will be almost no cases in which you will not have the option of helping someone conflict with one of your goals/interests.

Also there is the issue of gain to onesself to be analyzed in this argument. while it is almost impossible for a case to arise where you incur no loss at all, it is also very likely that in any situation in which you help someone you will incur some sort of gain. even if this gain is merely emotional it is still important to raise the possibility that if you incur an insignificant loss by helping someone but a significant emotional gain, then it would be a good idea to perform the action

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Yeah, I see your point.

And the hot issue is whether it should be considered immoral and illegal to choose not to perform this Heimlich in a complete stranger, when you know how to perform this maneuver.

About three years ago, I was walking through the aisles of the office building where I used to work.

The offices were almost empty. It was lunch time and everyone was on the cantine.

I happened to pass by a meeting room whose door was half-opened. The room looked empty, but I could hear some weird noise behind the door. I was about to choose not to pay attention to it, but I had a strong feeling: I coudl recognize that sound: it was someone gasping.

I opened the door fully. Behind the door I saw one of our administrative asssistants gasping desperately. She had been eating the buiscuits and snacks that were left on a table after the meeting, and now she was about to fall in a state of asphyxia. I applied the Heimlich and she coughed up a peanut. She was evidently grateful with me. She coudl have gone through complete asphyxia and died there, as there was no body around.

Now let me change a bit this real-life scenario into alternative scenarios

  1. Suppose that instead of our admistrative assistant she had been a complete stranger.
  2. Suppose that instead of our administrative assistant I find, oddly enough, a Catholic priest who I knew has been raping children for years, and now is just there, gasping, in front of me.

Should it be considered immoral not to help her in the alternative scenario #1? Should it be considered illegal?

Should it be considered immoral not to help him in the alternative scenario #2? Should it be considered illegal?

Edited by Hotu Matua
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Yeah, I see your point.

And the hot issue is whether it should be considered immoral and illegal to choose not to perform this Heimlich in a complete stranger, when you know how to perform this maneuver.

About three years ago, I was walking through the aisles of the office building where I used to work.

The offices were almost empty. It was lunch time and everyone was on the cantine.

I happened to pass by a meeting room whose door was half-opened. The room looked empty, but I could hear some weird noise behind the door. I was about to choose not to pay attention to it, but I had a strong feeling: I coudl recognize that sound: it was someone gasping.

I opened the door fully. Behind the door I saw one of our administrative asssistants gasping desperately. She had been eating the buiscuits and snacks that were left on a table after the meeting, and now she was about to fall in a state of asphyxia. I applied the Heimlich and she coughed up a peanut. She was evidently grateful with me. She coudl have gone through complete asphyxia and died there, as there was no body around.

Now let me change a bit this real-life scenario into alternative scenarios

  1. Suppose that instead of our admistrative assistant she had been a complete stranger.
  2. Suppose that instead of our administrative assistant I find, oddly enough, a Catholic priest who I knew has been raping children for years, and now is just there, gasping, in front of me.

Should it be considered immoral not to help her in the alternative scenario #1? Should it be considered illegal?

Should it be considered immoral not to help him in the alternative scenario #2? Should it be considered illegal?

The main issue here is how much value you place in the person who you would be saving. if you like your administrative assistant then it is moral to save them and immoral to allow them to die. if you dont value the catholic priest, and indeed if you find them contemptable, then it would be immoral to save them and moral to let them die.

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The main issue here is how much value you place in the person who you would be saving. if you like your administrative assistant then it is moral to save them and immoral to allow them to die. if you dont value the catholic priest, and indeed if you find them contemptable, then it would be immoral to save them and moral to let them die.
That's true to the extent that your values are rational. A purely emotional "I don't value X therefore I can reject X" does not render an objectively immoral decision moral.
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That's true to the extent that your values are rational. A purely emotional "I don't value X therefore I can reject X" does not render an objectively immoral decision moral.

Correct, sorry i should have included that stipulation in my statement.

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it is possible for the same person to have two interests which conflict with one another, and in that case he must choose which is more important. for instance, i may be able to help someone without significant cost to myself, however, if that action, while not costing me anything, would interfere with one of my other goals, then i have committed no moral breach.

I don't know about that. If you're saying that any time there is a foregone opportunity in me making a choice then it can no longer be morally evaluated, I would disagree. If I choose not to save someone I care about who is choking because I would have to forego some small thing, that would still be immoral.

I agree that in such a situation, he must choose which is more important. However, once he figures out which is more valuable to him, he must pursue that value or commit a moral breach. The opposite argument, that whenever there are both costs and benefits you can't blame the actor for choosing either course, quickly breaks down into the conclusion that almost no choices can be morally evaluated, because there are always costs to each course.

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