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Broken units, broken men

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I have not clearly understood the concept of broken units within a concept.

Specifically I am having problems figuring out how the concept of "broken units" apply to the problem of reconizing human rights to people who, because of a physical condition, like a severe neurological disorder, are uncapable of abstract thinking.

My question is whether rights are for men as units, or for the concept of "men".

If rights are for men as a concept, then it is applied to all men, regardless of the particular units (individuals) who for some reason do not match the concept of an animal with abstract thinking capabilities.

But if rights are for individuals, for the units, then I have a problem with recognizing rights in people without this capability.

I can't deal with a broken table the way I deal with a normal table. Even if the broken table is still a broken unit of the "table" concept, I wouldn't use it as a table and place a heavy object on it.

Same with animals. A horse which cannot walk is still a horse, but I can't treat it like a horse: I can't ride it. A a cow that does not secrete milk is still a cow, but I can't milk it or sell it or even treat it as I would treat a normal cow. For example, I may decide not to invest any money in veterinary care.

Then, in human species, what kind of treatment do severily mentally disabled people deserve /are they entitled to? What is the rationale for it?

If they have a right to life, for example, on what grounds do they have such a right? On the grounds of being broken units of a "man" concept? Do we acknolwedge rights to a concept of man or to individual men?

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I have not clearly understood the concept of broken units within a concept.

Specifically I am having problems figuring out how the concept of "broken units" apply to the problem of reconizing human rights to people who, because of a physical condition, like a severe neurological disorder, are uncapable of abstract thinking.

My question is whether rights are for men as units, or for the concept of "men".

If rights are for men as a concept, then it is applied to all men, regardless of the particular units (individuals) who for some reason do not match the concept of an animal with abstract thinking capabilities.

But if rights are for individuals, for the units, then I have a problem with recognizing rights in people without this capability.

I can't deal with a broken table the way I deal with a normal table. Even if the broken table is still a broken unit of the "table" concept, I wouldn't use it as a table and place a heavy object on it.

Same with animals. A horse which cannot walk is still a horse, but I can't treat it like a horse: I can't ride it. A a cow that does not secrete milk is still a cow, but I can't milk it or sell it or even treat it as I would treat a normal cow. For example, I may decide not to invest any money in veterinary care.

Then, in human species, what kind of treatment do severily mentally disabled people deserve /are they entitled to? What is the rationale for it?

If they have a right to life, for example, on what grounds do they have such a right? On the grounds of being broken units of a "man" concept? Do we acknolwedge rights to a concept of man or to individual men?

If you followed the thread on "Broken Units" then you'd realize that it is an invalid approach to conceptualization. Borderline cases is sufficient to apply the concepts to.

Now, rights are not for any concept or units. Rights are moral principles that apply to individuals, the only entities that exist in physical reality, in a social context. Individuals do not "match" concepts of animals. A broken table is not a broken unit of the concept table. It is a broken table. Entities are observed to be similar to other entities, or they are not similar. They are regarded as units because of their similarity, which, in turn, allows us to form the concept. This is what allows us to use the similarity of entities, the unit, as an instance of the concept. If they are similar in some respects but not others, they may be borderline cases, not broken units. Units cannot be broken; entities can be broken.

Now, to answer the question about "severely mentally disable people" one only need ask, "in what way are they similar to other entities to which the concept of rights applies, and in what way are they different from other entities to which the concept of rights does not apply?" The answer should be fairly clear and not that difficult to grasp.

Edited by A is A
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In LFC, rights are an attribute of men (the concept). The reason for that is man's rational faculty. If a "broken unit" has no rational faculty, that unit has no rights in LFC. So, for instance, if a family has a baby which is born without a brain, in LFC they would be allowed to end its life, instead of sitting around for it to die by itself.

Personally, I don't see a problem with simply excluding existents which have some characteristics in common, but not the essential characteristic, from the category defined by that characteristic. (Meaning a brainless baby is simply not a man, instead of a broken unit of 'man'. It's a 'brainless baby'.) But I am not very confident about it, and curious what the reason for not doing that would be.

P.S. Yes, I am familiar with Rand's Epistemological Razor, but I don't see how differentiating between 'brainless baby' and 'man' is any less necessary than differentiating between fetus and man, for instance.

Edited by Jake_Ellison
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Personally, I don't see a problem with simply excluding existents which have some characteristics in common, but not the essential characteristic, from the category defined by that characteristic. (Meaning a brainless baby is simply not a man, instead of a broken unit of 'man'. It's a 'brainless baby'.) But I am not very confident about it, and curious what the reason for not doing that would be.

That sounds like the right track, more or less. I would add further that essential characteristics are probably the way in which such decisions must be made. So a person who loses a hand would be incapable of some particular human capabilities but a person who was severely brain damaged might lose most, or even all, of the capabilities a human requires for existence. In such cases, rights are usually limited based on the capacities and requirements of their particular disabilities. Rights of property and liberty are very often removed or withheld such as with children(brainless or otherwise) and in some severe cases so is the right to life, such as when humans are removed from life support. With a living will, the rights of the rational person who used to exist is being respected when their mindless body lies inert, not unlike how the property rights of a no longer living individual are respected with a traditional will.

So, I would agree, Hotu, that we cannot deal with a broken unit in the same way as a functioning unit and we, in point of fact, do not. How we deal with them, in particular, is contingent on what in particular they are lacking. A table is no different really. If it is missing a foot, we might stuff a folded napkin beneath it for balance and carry on as if there is nothing wrong or we might relegate a working table for use only with light items if it lacks sufficient structural integrity, or we might give it to Goodwill or throw it out. Just depends. Kontext is King.

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In LFC, rights are an attribute of men (the concept). The reason for that is man's rational faculty. If a "broken unit" has no rational faculty, that unit has no rights in LFC. So, for instance, if a family has a baby which is born without a brain, in LFC they would be allowed to end its life, instead of sitting around for it to die by itself.

Personally, I don't see a problem with simply excluding existents which have some characteristics in common, but not the essential characteristic, from the category defined by that characteristic. (Meaning a brainless baby is simply not a man, instead of a broken unit of 'man'. It's a 'brainless baby'.) But I am not very confident about it, and curious what the reason for not doing that would be.

P.S. Yes, I am familiar with Rand's Epistemological Razor, but I don't see how differentiating between 'brainless baby' and 'man' is any less necessary than differentiating between fetus and man, for instance.

The fact that you are calling it a 'brainless baby' means that you regard it as a qualified instance of 'baby'. I'm not sure what you mean if you are to regard a baby as not a man, unless you are talking about babies that are not human.

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In LFC, rights are an attribute of men (the concept). The reason for that is man's rational faculty. If a "broken unit" has no rational faculty, that unit has no rights in LFC. So, for instance, if a family has a baby which is born without a brain, in LFC they would be allowed to end its life, instead of sitting around for it to die by itself.

I agree with your premise but come to the opposite conclusion.

Rights are an attribute of man (the concept). This is why rights are universally attributed to all men (and women, and children, and babies, and mad men). Regular babies and brainless babies are both broken units of the concept man for lacking a rational faculty, but because they are both units of 'man' they both have rights. There is no basis to extend rights to one and not the other. (If anyone thinks babies have rights because they are potentially rational, that is wrong. A potential is not an actual, which is why abortion is valid.)

I do not believe anyone should be able to end the lives of even brainless babies without meeting some kind of objective legal hurdle, something functionally equivalent to what a living will does but it would have to be in the generic form of a law. Next of kin should be able to make these decisions for brain dead adults or infants, but if they and the doctors involved don't want to be charged with murder they should document how their case meets an objective legal standard.

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The fact that you are calling it a 'brainless baby' means that you regard it as a qualified instance of 'baby'.

No, it doesn't.

If anyone thinks babies have rights because they are potentially rational, that is wrong. A potential is not an actual, which is why abortion is valid.

Why do men have rights then? (I'll just skip past the "Why do babies have rights? Because they're men." part)

Edited by Jake_Ellison
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My question is whether rights are for men as units, or for the concept of "men".
I'm not exactly sure what you mean by this question. Concepts are mental constructs, they don't have anything in the concrete sense. A car has wheels, but the concept of a car does not. Men have a rational faculty, the concept of man does not.

Never go searching for truth in a concept. Instead, look to reality and then form your concepts as needed. When you deal with a three-legged table, you deal with that particular table. Even if you happen to ask yourself: "Is this really a table?" that is not the primary question that tells you how to deal with it. Rather, you see that it is different from a typical table (call it a "broken unit" or call it a "borderline case", or whatever, but the important fact is that it is not a normal table, in ways that are important to your purposes). For your own purposes, you need to learn about its attributes and its nature. If you cannot place a heavy object on it, then you cannot. Only secondarily do you ask yourself if you would still classify it as a table or not. You might search all the dictionaries in the world and not discover whether that table will hold the object you want to place upon it.

Similarly, one does not explore the concept of man across dictionaries lexicons to find out if a retarded human being should be given rights. It is a mistake to approach it via the following steps:

1) Is this retarded human being a man?

2) If yes, then he has rights; if no, then he does not

That approach is a fine way to sum things up after the facts have been discovered and the principles derived, i.e. to summarize the position, or to explain it to others. It is also a passable way to start understanding someone else's ideas and concepts. However, it is the wrong way to seek the facts and principles from reality. Dr. Peikoff terms this type of approach "rationalism": we are conceptual beings, so we obviously use our concepts to think things out; however, we run the danger of letting concepts become primary. In many ways, concepts have to take on a life of their own in our minds -- that's just how our brains work. Yet, this runs the danger of them taking on a life divorced from reality. Particularly in non-standard cases like this, one has to trace back to the reality embodied in the units, and form the right concepts and principles from there, rather than the other way around.

So, I suggest that you simply ignore the whole issue of broken units and/or borderline cases if you are really trying to answer the question of whether retarded human beings have rights.

Edited by softwareNerd
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Thank you all for your comments.

This is a troubling issue to me.

Ayn Rand states "The right to life means the right to engage in self-sustaining and self-generated action--which means: the freedom to take all the actions required by the nature of a rational being for the support, the furtherance, the fulfillment and the enjoyment of his own life" ["Man's Rights" VOS 124; pb 93]

If Henry is an individual who, because of severe neurological damage, cannot engage in actions to promote his flourishing, how can he have rigthts?

Taking softwareNerd's advice, if I go not to the concept but to reality, to the existent, to the Henry who is lying in bed, dependant on others, enslaved to a perceptual thinking, never to be able to make abstractions, what do I see?

I see someone who will never live qua man because by his nature (his physical reality), he cannot live qua man. In what sense is he different from an animal pet, like a dog for example? In his DNA sequence? In his external shape?

I understand that we may hold profound feelings of affection to this being. This being will represent a value for his relatives. That's why they will take care of him.

But same can be said about the family dog. The dog triggers strong feelings of affection and represents a value. That's why people take care on their dogs. Sometimes they invest a lot in the dog, and they certainly cry a lot when the dog is gone forever.

This being called Henry represents, by his biological nature, a strong memorial to humanity. It triggers a lot of feelings, memories, reflections. We would feel horrified to see someone damaging this being. In some sense, and let me use a mystical word here, his body is "sacred", ALMOST as sacred as the body of an actual rational person. "Almost", but not quite...

I read some time ago in some book about the "Ethics of Horror". The argument, irrational but powerful at the same time, went in this direction:

Do not underestimate your sense of horror. If something horrifies you, it is evil.

Certainly, this argument does not hold water. Abortion horrifies some people, but not others. The same can be said about euthanasia, homosexuality, altruism, atheism, etc.

But seeing Margaret kick and hit a dog with a bat while the dog barks and moans and weeps is horrifying for all rational men at all times, I guess.

And even more horrifying would be seing an adult hurting a severy mentally disasbled person, let alone a baby.

I think we may find reasonable to think that people who torture an animal or a baby or a severe mentally disabled people are a THREAT to us. By torturing them, they are objectively capable of torturing us.

Maybe it is like the drunk driver racing on the highway, who has not killed anyone yet, but is considered an objective threat so that the use of force against him is seen as retailatory, more than initial.

Maybe it is in my own self-interest to live in a community without people who torture or kill sentinent beings in the pursuit of short-term, irrational goals.

Anti-life behaviour (defined as the irrational pursuit of destruction of living beings) can be seen as an objective threat, on the same grounds that anti-social behaviour.

What I am coming from now is that maybe, while denying these severly mentally damaged human beings RIGHTS, we could still enforce some form protection for them based on objective law.

What do you think?

Edited by Hotu Matua
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In what sense is he different from an animal pet, like a dog for example? In his DNA sequence? In his external shape?

Yes. Also, the functions of the parts of his body differ from those of other animals. In cases of the mentally handicapped, the function of such a person's brain remains similar, though his brain is failing to perform its function. As Grames pointed out in the other thread, this problem is unique to biological contexts; there's no such thing as a broken electron. The problem also highlights what happens when causal contexts clash. When we speak of healthy adults, we say they are essentially rational because rationality explains more about what they do than anything else unique to them. But rationality is itself caused by a man's physiology and genetics. In normal everyday contexts, "rationality" does the job. But contexts change; in some contexts rationality best serves the function of an essence, in other contexts it is another fact about men (say genetics and historical origin (being formed from the sperm and egg of humans)). Remember, Objectivism is not Aristotle; Objectivism doesn't believe in real essences.

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I have not clearly understood the concept of broken units within a concept.

Specifically I am having problems figuring out how the concept of "broken units" apply to the problem of reconizing human rights to people who, because of a physical condition, like a severe neurological disorder, are uncapable of abstract thinking.

My question is whether rights are for men as units, or for the concept of "men".

If rights are for men as a concept, then it is applied to all men, regardless of the particular units (individuals) who for some reason do not match the concept of an animal with abstract thinking capabilities.

But if rights are for individuals, for the units, then I have a problem with recognizing rights in people without this capability.

I can't deal with a broken table the way I deal with a normal table. Even if the broken table is still a broken unit of the "table" concept, I wouldn't use it as a table and place a heavy object on it.

Same with animals. A horse which cannot walk is still a horse, but I can't treat it like a horse: I can't ride it. A a cow that does not secrete milk is still a cow, but I can't milk it or sell it or even treat it as I would treat a normal cow. For example, I may decide not to invest any money in veterinary care.

Then, in human species, what kind of treatment do severily mentally disabled people deserve /are they entitled to? What is the rationale for it?

If they have a right to life, for example, on what grounds do they have such a right? On the grounds of being broken units of a "man" concept? Do we acknolwedge rights to a concept of man or to individual men?

Okay is this for the individual given at birth with considered 'broken units' or the individual who somehow became a 'broken unit' afterwards?

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Okay is this for the individual given at birth with considered 'broken units' or the individual who somehow became a 'broken unit' afterwards?

It does not matter. If you disagree please explain how it ever possibly could matter, preferably by using an example.

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Thank you all for your comments.

This is a troubling issue to me.

Ayn Rand states "The right to life means the right to engage in self-sustaining and self-generated action--which means: the freedom to take all the actions required by the nature of a rational being for the support, the furtherance, the fulfillment and the enjoyment of his own life" ["Man's Rights" VOS 124; pb 93]

If Henry is an individual who, because of severe neurological damage, cannot engage in actions to promote his flourishing, how can he have rigthts?

Taking softwareNerd's advice, if I go not to the concept but to reality, to the existent, to the Henry who is lying in bed, dependant on others, enslaved to a perceptual thinking, never to be able to make abstractions, what do I see?

Don't confuse a principle (Rand's quote) with a concrete. You might as well ask, "did George Washington have rights? How could he have rights? When I look at him, all I see is a corpse. When I go from the concept to reality, to the George who is lying in a grave, what do I see? Someone who cannot promote his flourishing." The principle is timeless, the fact that an individual who has rights is now incapacitated does not mean he legally loses his rights (in the present or the past or into the future). It does mean that he cannot exercise some of his rights. But it certainly does not mean that you can now steal his money or burn his house down. Many of his rights become delegated to those who have legal jurisdiction, such as family members or a court attorney. The exercise of rights can certainly be legally delegated to others, such as the power of attorney, maintaining sustenance, do-not-resuscitate issues, organ donation, etc.

I see someone who will never live qua man because by his nature (his physical reality), he cannot live qua man. In what sense is he different from an animal pet, like a dog for example? In his DNA sequence? In his external shape?

See my comment above. Surely you would not imply that a man undergoing an operation and who is now unconscious be treated by a veterinarian? Or that you can go steal his clothes in his hospital room because he cannot now engage in self-sustaining action? After all, if he is kept unconscious, he will never live as man qua man. How is he different from a dog?

I understand that we may hold profound feelings of affection to this being. This being will represent a value for his relatives. That's why they will take care of him.

But same can be said about the family dog. The dog triggers strong feelings of affection and represents a value. That's why people take care on their dogs. Sometimes they invest a lot in the dog, and they certainly cry a lot when the dog is gone forever.

This being called Henry represents, by his biological nature, a strong memorial to humanity. It triggers a lot of feelings, memories, reflections. We would feel horrified to see someone damaging this being. In some sense, and let me use a mystical word here, his body is "sacred", ALMOST as sacred as the body of an actual rational person. "Almost", but not quite...

--------------

One's feeling about the person doesn't establish rights, after all, I'm sure there are those who feel quite differently than Henry's family.

Having rights and exercising rights are two different issues.

Edited by A is A
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If Henry is an individual who, because of severe neurological damage, cannot engage in actions to promote his flourishing, how can he have rigthts?... ... if I go not to the concept but to reality, to the existent, to the Henry who is lying in bed, dependant on others, enslaved to a perceptual thinking, never to be able to make abstractions, what do I see?
After reading the opening post I was not sure if you were trying to explore the notion of "broken unit", using retarded humans as an example, or if you were primarily trying to answer the question about retarded humans. I see that it is the latter.

Your latest post makes the issue very clear: of course retarded humans -- particularly as badly off as your example depicts -- cannot have all the rights of a normal human being.

First, A is A's two counter examples do not work; nevertheless, his examples are the right type of focus on reality that one needs to derive the proper principle (rather than trying to figure out "is this a 'man'? ").. If we're comparing against a person who was once alive, then we are respecting the rights that flow from that life. So, that's a different example, and does not help. If we're talking about a person who is sleeping, or under anesthesia, or in a coma from which they may emerge, we are once again dealing with a very different situation. The example you're presenting is of someone who never was and -- in the view of contemporary science -- never will be able to live like a regular human being.

You're right that emotions cannot be used as an argument (i.e. your point about not using "horror"), nor can any feeling of empathy for a being that is so much like us (your "sacredness" example). I'd quibble with the terms, but your main point is right: emotions cannot stand in for argument.

You say the question is troubling to you. Why though? Is it not a rather peripheral, and relatively unimportant question? Maybe you don't mean troubling in the sense of being important, but only in the sense that it is a puzzler that you would like to reconcile. If so, fair enough, but -- just in case -- I'd caution you against trying to use freak cases as a way to explore a philosophy. For the sake of argument, suppose Objectivism were to say: normal, non-retarded men have rights and we have no stand on the retarded. What of it? Would this be an important issue?

Anyhow, back to the central issue...

Clearly, retarded people cannot have all the rights of regular folk, signing contracts, etc. I'm pretty sure you agree with this. So, the question becomes: should they at least have some rights: like the right against physical violence.

I don't remember Rand addressing it formally. So, it is safe to say that Objectivism does not have a clearly enunciated position on this. However, she was asked about it in a Q&A, and she gave a brief answer. (Q&A answers cannot be given the same weight as published work or a planned speech. So, take this with that caveat.) She said that they are like perpetual children. She offered two reasons for allowing them some limited rights: one, that they might improve; second, as "a courtesy extended to them for being human". [see "Ayn Rand Answers", Ch-1, page 4] So, no, they could not have full human rights.

I'm wary of the reasoning you put forward to make the case for some rights. It is an extremely tempting argument, because it gets to the desired end and is able to justify it by reference to the rights of folks like us, for whom rights are not open to debate. However, I think it takes one down a slippery slope to judging someone on the basis of a link that is nebulous. The drunk driver is actually a different example. His is a case of someone taking an action that could actually endanger people (even if luck saw nobody hurt). The animal-hurter did not take any action that could endanger people. So, one is trying to look into his mind and extrapolate his future behavior. In this case, I don't think the extrapolation is justified.

In addition to all of the above, I am personally wary of the law deeming a person insane. I know it has to be done, to protect the insane. As long as the procedures are tight, I'm fine with it being done to protect the insane. If it is also done to declare the insane void of protection, I think that's one less guard against corrupt abuse. (There is a link to my own rights in this argument.)

I don't expect any of this would have convinced you that the retarded must have rights. In other words, I want to make it clear I regard these arguments to be rather weak. If you can come up with a really good argument for such protection, that'll be great. Meanwhile, the law already seems pretty good on this score. If anything, it might go too much in the other direction.

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First, A is A's two counter examples do not work; nevertheless, his examples are the right type of focus on reality that one needs to derive the proper principle (rather than trying to figure out "is this a 'man'? ")..

There is no figuring out to be done, broken men are men. Being anti-conceptual is not going to enable the derivation of any principle whatever. Staying concrete bound is definitely the wrong type of focus on reality.

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There is no figuring out to be done, broken men are men. Being anti-conceptual is not going to enable the derivation of any principle whatever. Staying concrete bound is definitely the wrong type of focus on reality.
My point is that that was the wrong question to be asking. Of course, I agree with the first part of what you say, as I said in the relevant thread. Perhaps the OP read some of that thread and thought the issue of whether retarded humans have rights can be resolved by understanding the issue of broken-units and/or borderline cases. That is putting the cart before the horse, if he is trying to re-validate from reality. He ought not to have been asking about the concept of man, as if that was a primary from which we should start. Happily, his recent post makes his question, and the issues, absolutely clear. The second part of what you say is wrong. Your accusation of this being a concrete-bound approach is false. Edited by softwareNerd
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My point is that that was the wrong question to be asking.
No, it is exactly the right question he should ask.

What I am coming from now is that maybe, while denying these severly mentally damaged human beings RIGHTS, we could still enforce some form protection for them based on objective law.

Hotu Matua wants to protect severely mentally damaged human beings but he thinks they do not have rights so naturally this is a problem. But they DO have rights, so the question of justifiably protecting them is easy. The only thing which is not easy, for him and a few others here, is recognizing a human being. Applying the concept man to a specific unit is the essence of the problem here, so asking about the concept of man is exactly the right question to ask. What he did not understand about the broken units idea was that broken units are still inside the concept. Broken men are still men. Once it is established that we are dealing with a man, the political principles that apply to all men apply to this one as well. This is what it means to think in principle.

Why is applying a first level concept so hard for some people? One likely explanation is thinking in the style of the 'primacy of definition' instead of 'primacy of existence'. 'Primacy of definition' is the rationalist's way of engaging in 'primacy of consciousness'. It is a corruption of thought and should be put aside whenever one becomes aware of it.

Children, the deranged and the incapacitated all have rights, but they cannot exercise them rationally or at all. The political solution to this political problem is the concept of a guardian, someone who exercise rights on behalf of someone else. This is possible to the extent that the safety and welfare of the protected is objectively ascertainable. (A guardian may not vote on behalf of his charge, but can consent to medical procedures.) Any action which is objectively not furthering the safety and welfare of the charge is an initiation of force and comes under the scope of the law.

Dead men are not a type of broken men. A dead man has no rights at all, his last will and testament is executed to protect the rights of his survivors and inheritors. (edit: This line is not in response to your post softwarenerd, but I wanted to state it somewhere.)

And what terrible advice this is:

Never go searching for truth in a concept.
It is not possible to find truth without a concept. The possibility of truth and falsehood does not even exist until after concepts have been formed and applied. If you wanted to caution against rationalism, you bungled it. You should said something along the lines of 'look to the referents, not the definition'. (Another edit: Ok, you did say that but your example of the table which is about a fact does not port easily over to a normative principle. One might rationalistically conclude that a table will support an object but it does not, a contradiction. If one concludes rights apply to all men, and so I should respects this man's rights, what could be the contradictory fact?) Edited by Grames
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Clearly, retarded people cannot have all the rights of regular folk, signing contracts, etc. I'm pretty sure you agree with this. So, the question becomes: should they at least have some rights: like the right against physical violence.

I don't remember Rand addressing it formally. So, it is safe to say that Objectivism does not have a clearly enunciated position on this. However, she was asked about it in a Q&A, and she gave a brief answer. (Q&A answers cannot be given the same weight as published work or a planned speech. So, take this with that caveat.) She said that they are like perpetual children. She offered two reasons for allowing them some limited rights: one, that they might improve; second, as "a courtesy extended to them for being human". [see "Ayn Rand Answers", Ch-1, page 4] So, no, they could not have full human rights.

This line of thought troubles me. Syntax like: "should they at least have some rights...," or, "... allowing them some limited rights... a courtesy extended to them for being human..." imply rights are conferred rather than following from the nature of rights bearing entities. Since I'm positive you mean the latter, and not the former, I'm confused.

Why would a retarded person not have the right to sign a contract? As you pointed out so clearly in your penultimate post, we need to start at the reality of the situation at hand. If I deem a particular retarded person capable of fulfilling a contract, why should I not sign one with him? Why would the government step in to prevent him from signing the contract? Assuming the government did not allow the retarded person to sign the contract, and he subsequently violated the contract, shouldn't the government step in to protect my rights? Likewise, if I breached the contract, shouldn't the government step in to protect the retarded person's rights?

In addition to all of the above, I am personally wary of the law deeming a person insane. I know it has to be done, to protect the insane. As long as the procedures are tight, I'm fine with it being done to protect the insane. If it is also done to declare the insane void of protection, I think that's one less guard against corrupt abuse. (There is a link to my own rights in this argument.)

Again, this seems to me to be the beginning of an argument that some have rights different from others dependent upon what "we" choose to confer upon them. What special qualities of the insane require protections not afforded to the sane? If a particular individual is not rational, does he deserve extra protection? Does he deserve special consideration from the government?

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This line of thought troubles me. Syntax like: "should they at least have some rights...," or, "... allowing them some limited rights... a courtesy extended to them for being human..." imply rights are conferred rather than following from the nature of rights bearing entities. Since I'm positive you mean the latter, and not the former, I'm confused.
I see this distinction being made often, but do not understand what it means. Rights are man-made institution that recognize the nature of man and the requirements of living in a society. If you prefer using the term "recognizing some rights", I'm fine with that.

Why would a retarded person not have the right to sign a contract? As you pointed out so clearly in your penultimate post, we need to start at the reality of the situation at hand. If I deem a particular retarded person capable of fulfilling a contract, why should I not sign one with him?
If he can truly understand what he is agreeing to, and agree to it in the sense a normal human being can, then I would question how we're calling such a person retarded. Imagine that you told your chicken: "you can eat this bowl of grain if you agree that I may slaughter you tomorrow". Would you call this an agreement? If not, why not? If the retarded person has the chicken's ability to understand to understand you, how can he agree in any meaningful sense of the word?

A detail I did not explore in my previous post, is that retarded people are not all equally incapable. There is a gradation of what they can understand and -- correspondingly -- in what rights the law ought to recognize. There are a whole lot of details like that which one could explore. The OP mentions "severe neurological damage" and "severely retarded", so I stuck to that type. Later, we can always work backwards from the the more "obvious" cases to see if there are some further relevant divisions in reality.

Likewise, if I breached the contract, shouldn't the government step in to protect the retarded person's rights?
There can be no contract with someone who has no ability to understand what he is agreeing to. Any contract would have to be with the person or entity who is acting as a guardian.

What special qualities of the insane require protections not afforded to the sane?
The quality is his insanity. Have you ever dealt with a severely insane person? If so, I cannot understand how you could say that such a person has the ability to look out for himself.

If a particular individual is not rational, does he deserve extra protection? Does he deserve special consideration from the government?
No.

Since your points are addressed narrowly, I'm not sure of your broader position. Are you questioning the very idea of insanity? I know there was a thread about that a while ago. I'm not sure if you're implying that there is no such thing as a person who is truly insane -- we're not talking neuroses here, but hallucinating, hearing voices, thinking that his stools are actually his food, and so on. Maybe that's what you're questioning: the validity of insanity as a notion. Or. maybe you're saying some have no ability to look after themselves, but that it is too bad for them; that law should take no cognizance of it. Imagine, for instance, that a person has some type of serious brain disease and starts to hallucinate and imagine all sorts of crazy things. Someone tells him that if he signs over his fortune to him, or some such thing, and he does it in his insanity. Now, are you saying that there is no way to say if such a person is insane or merely stupid (after all people do the same when they join some religious cults)? Or, are you saying that insanity is different from stupidity, but not in the eyes of the law?

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You say the question is troubling to you. Why though? Is it not a rather peripheral, and relatively unimportant question? Maybe you don't mean troubling in the sense of being important, but only in the sense that it is a puzzler that you would like to reconcile. If so, fair enough, but -- just in case -- I'd caution you against trying to use freak cases as a way to explore a philosophy. For the sake of argument, suppose Objectivism were to say: normal, non-retarded men have rights and we have no stand on the retarded. What of it? Would this be an important issue?

Well, it is troubling to me beacuse I am doing a Master in Bioethics and in the future as a bioethicist, these "freak cases" will be the cases I will be presented to on a daily basis by intellectual adversaries to try to prove that abortion and euthanasia are immoral and crimes.

Basically, many of them believe that the concept of man must be extended to all individuals with a human DNA sequence. Therefore, all individuals with a human DNA sequence are entitled rights, notwithstanding their current or future ability to excercise those rights.

Certainly this view has its own problems, but the argument seems to have its own internal consistency. To me, a beggineer in Objectivism, it looms a formidable giant to fight.

Under this line or argumentation, by placing the border of person vs. non-person at the DNA sequence and at the biological conception of "entity" or "individual", they feel pretty "safe" because we include in the same basket fertilized eggs, embryos, fetuses, babies, children, adults, mentally disabled people, people under anesthesia, etc. All of them are men, all of them have rights. No exceptions, you see? Very clearcut.

Anyhow, back to the central issue...

Clearly, retarded people cannot have all the rights of regular folk, signing contracts, etc. I'm pretty sure you agree with this. So, the question becomes: should they at least have some rights: like the right against physical violence.

I don't remember Rand addressing it formally. So, it is safe to say that Objectivism does not have a clearly enunciated position on this. However, she was asked about it in a Q&A, and she gave a brief answer. (Q&A answers cannot be given the same weight as published work or a planned speech. So, take this with that caveat.) She said that they are like perpetual children. She offered two reasons for allowing them some limited rights: one, that they might improve; second, as "a courtesy extended to them for being human". [see "Ayn Rand Answers", Ch-1, page 4] So, no, they could not have full human rights.

We know why we should be moral: to promote our lives, to flourish.

But why should we be courteous? Is a person who chooses not to be courteous to those severly mentally impaired people immoral? Should he be punished?

Now, the response of Ayn Rand is very insightful in that it recognizes that these people unable to display the essential characteristic of men (volitional, abstract thinking) are still human. She says "for being human".

This makes me thing that a there is a value linking "being human" (from a biological stand) to our own flourishing.

It is good, I think, to be live in a world where human life is respected, or valued.

Biological human life cannot be the highest value. Life qua man is the highest value. But human life still has a value for all rational men. How much in a hierarchy of values? Well, it depends.

The value of a fertilized egg for a woman whose pursuit of happiness will be objectively affected if she lets the egg develop is one thing.

The value of a body of a husband who lived a bountiful life and now is severly damaged because of a neurological condition, is another very different thing.

And the value of a person who is sleeping, and able to continue his life if you just shake her a bit and awake her, is a completely different thing.

I woud approach the issue this way:

  1. A human being is a biologically distinct individual with a human DNA sequence, independently of their current or future ability for abstract thinking.
  2. Human beings are not property, as they do not meet the criteria of a concept of property.
  3. Some human beings become volitional thinking creatures and recognize their own lives as their standard of value. Some of them do not. Those who develop volitional thinking are subject of rights, so that they can deal with other volitional thinkers. Those who do not develop this feature, or lose it permantenly, are not subject of rights.
  4. We generally value human beings, independently of whether they have rights or not. The value we give them depends of a hierarchy of values and a particular context.
  5. A moral hierarchy of values and a valueing process must be objective, rational. It cannot be the result of whim or blind hedonistic short term goals.
  6. The State cannot enforce a person to value another human being. The State can only enforce a person to respect the rights of other human being, when that human being is a subject of rights.
  7. At the same time, the State cannot not stop person A from performing actions to promote B's life, except B itself, if no other person is being affected in his right. In other words, no one can stand between the agent who values and the person valued, since persons are not property... unless the rights of a third party are jeopardized.
  8. In those very rare circumstances in which nobody valued a human being enough to sustain his life, including the human being himself, there would be no immorality in letting this human being die or actively ending his life.

From these premises, we could argue that

Killing "Henry" is immoral if there are people out there who value him enough to keep him alive. Certainly, active euthanasia is another concept that should be treated differently. Because under objective circumstances (e.g. intractable pain and suffering with no hopes for improvement as part of a disease, and demostrated by at least two independent professionals) euthanasia can be indeed a way to show we value this human being.. It is not only immoral, it is punishable by the State, as the person who is killing Henry is interfering with other people who value him taking actions to protect his life.

People who care about Henry can take care of him through associations, or a deparment within the State.

The revolutionary idea here is that we would would be expanding the proper function of the government. It would be not only to enforce the protection of rights, but the protection of special entities that cannot be, because of its objective nature, neither private property nor subject of rights, and which however are almost universally valued. This would still be compatible with Objectivism.

Moving forward, we could as well think in other entities that could qualify of values not subject to property rights: certain rare ancient pieces of art whose original ownership cannot be objectively attested (Who owns the Parthenon?), the air of the atmosphere, the water of the sea (not the seabed, but the liquid element itself), certain rare species of wild plants or animals in which no human work "ingredient" has been added, etc.

What do you think?

Edited by Hotu Matua
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I see this distinction being made often, but do not understand what it means. Rights are man-made institution that recognize the nature of man and the requirements of living in a society. If you prefer using the term "recognizing some rights", I'm fine with that.

I think "recognizing some rights" would be better. So then the question is: What rights of the retarded/insane/irrational/etc. should we recognize? But that seems to beg the question: What objective principle allows us to make that determination? Where do we get the right to determine which rights of these individuals we can ignore?

A detail I did not explore in my previous post, is that retarded people are not all equally incapable. There is a gradation of what they can understand and -- correspondingly -- in what rights the law ought to recognize. There are a whole lot of details like that which one could explore.

That was my point. How do we define "retarded/insane?" I think it's fairly safe to assume the spectrum is very wide. Legally, that would mean something like, "If you get a 0% on this aptitude test, then the government will recognize these rights, but not these rights. If you score a 10% on this aptitude test, then the government will recognize these rights, but not these rights... etc." But then, that doesn't mesh with your answer that irrational individuals don't deserve extra protection. If an irrational person doesn't deserve extra protection, then presumably a rational person doesn't deserve extra protection. If a rational person doesn't deserve extra protecton, then what rights of the rational individual would the government recognize that it would not recognize in the irrational person? If the person is severely retarded, do they warrant extra protection from the government? If so, and if the government's only job is to protect rights, then what extra rights does the severely retarded person have that warrants that extra protection?

The quality is his insanity. Have you ever dealt with a severely insane person? If so, I cannot understand how you could say that such a person has the ability to look out for himself.

I haven't ever dealt with a severely insane person, but I'm also not arguing that such a person has the ability to look out for himself. I'm questioning whether you're arguing government has some special obligation to these people. Whether the government recognizes special rights for them, or whether the government does not recognize certain rights for them that it would recognize in others. If insanity imparts or abriges certain rights, then what else imparts or abriges certain rights? Can being a different color than most people impart or abrige certain rights? If not, what makes the two different?

Or. maybe you're saying some have no ability to look after themselves, but that it is too bad for them; that law should take no cognizance of it. Imagine, for instance, that a person has some type of serious brain disease and starts to hallucinate and imagine all sorts of crazy things. Someone tells him that if he signs over his fortune to him, or some such thing, and he does it in his insanity. Now, are you saying that there is no way to say if such a person is insane or merely stupid (after all people do the same when they join some religious cults)? Or, are you saying that insanity is different from stupidity, but not in the eyes of the law?

Certainly, insanity exists - and it has a very wide spectrum, which further confounds the issue. I'm questioning what principle directs the law to take special cognizance of someone's insanity. In other words, can the law state: If you're insane, you have different rights, and are entitled to different protections than a sane person. Suppose an insane person kills my family - does he get special consideration because he's insane? Suppose the insane person has no family, or friends, who is his guardian? Must the state then step in as his guardian so as to protect his rights? What if no one in society wants to deal with this insane person, do rights still apply if living in society becomes an impossibility?

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Well, it is troubling to me beacuse I am doing a Master in Bioethics and in the future as a bioethicist, these "freak cases" will be the cases I will be presented to on a daily basis by intellectual adversaries to try to prove that abortion and euthanasia are immoral and crimes.
Thanks for explaining. It helps understand where you're coming from. (Though retarded people are not as rare as "lifeboat examples", forums often see newbies who seem overly focussed on the exceptions. That was the reason for my question.)

I ... approach the issue this way:
If I summarize your position in my own words, it would be thus: severely retarded people are not property, but someone may adopt them, and the state should respect that assumed guardianship and not allow third-parties to interfere. Is that a fair summary?

I would not extend the argument to the Parthenon and so on. Those things are fully capable of being property. So, the law only needs to figure out guidelines of when it will recognize the right to such property. I don't think the law should say: "this person will be allowed to own it, because the law sympathizes with their plans about how they will use and manage it". This brings the law excessively into deciding on an intellectual issue that ought to be left to private individuals.

In contrast, I like notion of the law expressing a preference between a person who wants to use his guardianship to help the retarded person live to the maximum of his ability, versus another who wishes to beat them up, or some such irrational thing. However, I cannot claim that I can make a compelling underlying argument, and that's the million dollar question.

The best to you.

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