What does philosophy tell us about the universe?

[Falafel]

Ok, it is the definitions we are then disagreeing with. I agree with the dictionary's definition ...

... I am thinking about your definition "causually unrelated".

A list of numbers of the day-to-day temperature would be random to you, since those numbers are not causually related to your wishes. (Agree/Disagree?)

What then of a list of numbers {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14... etc}. ? They are listed here, and are not causually related to your wishes. You are calling those random numbers, since they are not causally related to your wishes?

-Falafel.

[y_feldblum]

"Causally unrelated" takes a "to". An ordered list of numbers may be causally unrelated to a whim, whether or no it is causally related to reality and hence displays specific pattern when observed in relation to such. Hence, since one person's definition of "x" is "y", and since every "y" requires a "z", that specific definition of "x" too requires a "z" - and Matt's definition of "random" takes a "to".

However, I would never use "random" as a relation, because it already has an objective non-relative definition and belongs in the realm of a thing's identity.

[AshRyan]

If you're claiming that "randomness" is not a relative term, but pertains to the identity of the entity, I must object. I haven't thought about this fully, but wouldn't that claim amount to saying that that entity was in some respect non-causal? That's impossible. All non-volitional objects are causally determined according to their natures--whatever they are and whatever actions they perform are metaphysically given, and therefore absolute. And all volitional actions are also caused, by the volitional agent who chose them. So I don't think that that is a valid use of the concept "random."

As I said, I haven't thought about it too much myself yet, but at this point I am definitely leaning toward Matt's definition (unless I can come up with or someone can offer a better one that does not violate the law of causality).

[Guest andrew]

I think one of the things that might be confusing here is this. Take the question, "is there a specific number of existents in the universe?" Well, first of all, we can't count existents, but only entities. So switch the question to entities. (I make a point of stating this, because it's a very different question, and some people have been equivocating.) One thing to notice is that this isn't a very interesting question, in a sense. The universe is not a sum of all entities; it's the sum of all existents. (In other words, it's a metaphysical issue, not an epistemological one.) So even treating it as a strict sum, counting the number of entities in the universe, if you could, wouldn't give you anything like a full understanding of the universe.

This may be a silly question to ask, and it may be irrelevant to the thread of discussion, and it's not even my own question... but if the universe is made up of a finite number of existents, and those existents are arranged in patterns that form physical reality, given that time is infinite surely sooner or later the pattern of existents must repeat itself (ie eventually I will be typing this message into a computer again, and eventually your eyes will be reading it)?

[y_feldblum]

Ash, If you're claiming that "randomness" is not a relative term, but pertains to the identity of the entity, wouldn't that claim amount to saying that that entity was in some respect non-causal?

My own definition for random is not deterministic, ie one cannot predict it with infinite precision simply by knowing a previous state of the entire universe to infinite precision and doing a lot of very complex calculations. A thing which is not deterministic still obeys identity and causality, however. I could take Matt's definition, with respect to the universe, only using determinism instead of causality in the definition.

Andrew, the universe can never repeat itself - a premise which comes from a number of physical laws -, but I will probably be banned if I go into any more detail.

[eetest01]

Here is the source of my confusion:

1. "Entities constitute the content of the world men perceive; there

is nothing else to observe." -Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand,

Chapter 1, Causality as a Corollary of Identity

2. The universe is the total of all that exists.

If entities are all there are to perceive, and we cannot perceive the

universe as a whole, then the universe is an abstraction. If it is an

abstraction, does it exist only as an abstraction, or only as an

entity, or both?

For instance, mammals exist (particular humans, particular bears,

particular elephants, etc.), but "mammal" exists as an abstraction

from entities that possess the qualities we define as mammalian.

"Mammal" is not an entity as is this particular bear or this

particular elephant, it is an abstraction from entities. The only

existence "mammal" has is as a concept, which is an element of

consciousness.

Since we can only know the universe from its entities, we must

abstract it in the same way we abstract "mammal". Does this mean the

universe has the same existence as "mammal", i.e. as an element of

consciousness?

If the universe is an abstraction what does it mean to say, "The

universe is finite."? Does that mean the attribute of being finite

applies to the entities that comprise the universe, or does it apply

to the universe itself?

None of this seems right. Where have I gone wrong?

Joe C

[aynfan]

The same as to say mammal is finite.

[Betsy]

If entities are all there are to perceive, and we cannot perceive the universe as a whole,

True.

then the universe is an abstraction. If it is an abstraction, does it exist only as an abstraction, or only as an entity, or both?

You seem to be using the word "abstraction" to mean something which doesn't really exist as contrasted to an entity which does. This is not how Objectivists use the term.

"Abstraction" is the mental process of isolating properties, characterics, and actions from entities. The quality "red" is abstracted from red objects.

The word "universe" means the sum of all things which exist and are real. Entities are all there is to perceive and they are real. Because they exist, they are part of the universe. Therefore, while we can't perceive the universe as a whole, we can certainly perceive parts of it.

[khaight]

Entities are all there is to perceive and they are real.  Because they exist, they are part of the universe.  Therefore, while we can't perceive the universe as a whole, we can certainly perceive parts of it.

Note in this connection that we can't perceive most entities in their entirety at any given moment. Right now I can only see the front of my computer monitor; I can't see the back. If I turn it around I will be able to see the back but not the front. This doesn't undermine the entity-ness of the monitor in any way. Similarly, our inability to perceive the entire universe at one time doesn't undermine its entity-ness either.

[stephen_speicher]

Note in this connection that we can't perceive most entities in their entirety at any given moment.  Right now I can only see the front of my computer monitor; I can't see the back.  If I turn it around I will be able to see the back but not the front.  This doesn't undermine the entity-ness of the monitor in any way.  Similarly, our inability to perceive the entire universe at one time doesn't undermine its entity-ness either.

The analogy to a monitor begs the question as to whether or not the universe can be considered as being an entity.

In Peikoff's The Philosophy of Objectivism lecture series, he gives some essential criteria for determining whether or not to label something an entity, in the primary sense of the term. An entity must be a self-sufficient form of existence -- a thing -- with a definite boundary, perceptual in scale, in size. By this criteria the universe would not be considered to be an entity because it cannot be bounded and is not perceptual in scale. Your monitor is bounded and is capable of being perceived, both front and back, just by walking around it and looking. But the universe is not bounded and one cannot step out of the universe to perceive it in any form.

However, as Peikoff also points out, in an extended sense, not the primary sense, we loosely refer to the universe as an entity because it is a self-sufficient thing.

[eetest01]

It's difficult to get into words the nature of my confusion. I suppose that's what I get for arguing with theists. My theist friend has a very complicated definition of the universe involving nature, supernature and man strattling the boundry.

In analyzing his argument I attempted to reduce his system back to the observations of reality that might lead to such an idea. Realizing that his argument was hopelessly rationalistic (deduction without reference to reality), I began to wonder how I might reduce my definition of the universe back to observations of reality.

Is the universe self-evident? Apparently not since I cannot point to it and say, "That."

So the universe must be discovered by a process of abstraction. It would have to involve an awareness of the concepts entity, existence, and non-existence. I would have to abstract existence as an aspect of all entities, ignoring their particular identities (remembering they must have some identity), and differentiating this from non-existence. Thus, I arrive at the concept "universe" - i.e. the sum of all that exists.

It somehow seems wrong to me that universe is a concept and not self-evident or axiomatic. It exists in the same sense as entities do - doesn't it? Wouldn't this make the universe a primary or axiomatic?

Does "universe" have two meanings, one in the epistemological realm and the other metaphysical?

Am I confused about the meaning of "entity?"

Instead of abstraction, perhaps the universe is discovered by a process of induction? What is the difference? How would the conclusion be validated?

"Universe" is much more complicated than I thought. Until now I assumed it as self-evident.

[MisterSwig]

If entities are all there are to perceive, and we cannot perceive the universe as a whole, then the universe is an abstraction. If it is an abstraction, does it exist only as an abstraction, or only as an entity, or both?

Joe C

"Universe" is a name. It is like any old name you might give to a collection or group of concretes. I have a lot of baseball cards in boxes. I call it my "baseball card collection." Los Angeles has a basketball team of individual players called the "Lakers."

Well, "universe" is the name we have given to the "existent collection"--the collection of all the things that exist.

"Universe" is not an abstraction. It is merely the name for everything that exists. If only Earth existed, then the universe would be called "Earth." If only you existed, then the universe would be called "Joe."

[stephen_speicher]

It somehow seems wrong to me that universe is a concept and not self-evident or axiomatic.

But concepts can also be "self-evident or axiomatic." These are not mutually exclusive terms.

Am I confused about the meaning of "entity?"

See my previous post for a discussion about this.

[stephen_speicher]

Well, "universe" is the name we have given to the "existent collection"--the collection of all the things that exist.

"Universe" is not an abstraction. It is merely the name for everything that exists.

Nonsense. Of course "universe" is a concept. Just like "society," a collection of human beings, is a concept. You are conflating a collective noun, "universe," with a proper name, such as "John."

[MisterSwig]

Nonsense. Of course "universe" is a concept. Just like "society," a collection of human beings, is a concept. You are conflating a collective noun, "universe," with a proper name, such as "John."

What process of abstraction does one go through to arrive at the concept of "universe"?

I'm not closed to the idea that "universe" is an abstraction, but I do not see how that is achieved, and I am very doubtful.

"Society" is a collective noun, yes. But it does not name a unique set of concretes. There can be more than one society.

"Universe", however, names a unique set--EVERYTHING. There can only be one "everything." That is why I characterized "universe" as a name. A name for "everything." A name for this world of existents. A name for this entire place, where everything exists.

Also, "society" is abstracted from the broader abstraction "group." But is there a broader abstraction from which "universe" could be abstracted? I don't see how that is possible, which is why I don't think "universe" is a conceptual abstraction.

It seems to me that "universe" is both a collective noun and a proper name. On one hand it designates the totality of existents, and on the other hand it designates this world, this place, this realm where everything is.

[stephen_speicher]

What process of abstraction does one go through to arrive at the concept of "universe"?

A very similar process of abstraction as that used to form the concept of 'existence.' 'Existence' is different from 'universe' in that it is an axiomatic concept and it is perceived directly, but it is still grasped conceptually -- an act of abstraction. The units of the concept of 'existence' are "every entity, attribute, action, event or phenomenon (including consciousness) that exists, has ever existed or will ever exist." (ITOE, p. 56) In concept formation one isolates the units by a process of abstraction and then integrates them into a single mental entity. This is true also for 'universe' as a collective noun.

Note in ITOE Miss Rand remarks that "Because the concept 'existence,' at least the way I use it, is in a certain way close to the concept 'universe'—all that which exists.

[eetest01]

Stephen:

Would you argee that 'universe' is a corollary of the existence axiom, like causality is a corollary of identity?

'Universe' follows from the existence axiom once one realizes that multiple entities exist. The universe is a self-evident implication of existence and entity.

What are the units represented by the concept 'universe'? Since there can only be one unit in this case, how is 'universe' different from a proper noun, which is not a concept?

[stephen_speicher]

Would you argee that 'universe' is a corollary of the existence axiom, like causality is a corollary of identity?

No.

What are the units represented by the concept 'universe'?

As I quoted in my previous post: "every entity, attribute, action, event or phenomenon (including consciousness) that exists, has ever existed or will ever exist."

Since there can only be one unit in this case, how is 'universe' different from a proper noun, which is not a concept?

I suppose you could denote the universe as it exists right at this moment -- all the particulars that exist right now -- and call that Bob if you like, and then that would be a proper name. But the concept universe is not so denoted.

[stephen_speicher]

As I quoted in my previous post: "every entity, attribute, action, event or phenomenon (including consciousness) that exists, has ever existed or will ever exist."

This is not quite right. I will have to think about this some more.

[eetest01]

I've had some time to reflect on this issue.

A basic level concept is a mental integration of observed existence. I perceive this leafy thing growing out of the ground with this particular shape, and I notice another similar one, and another. I also note their difference from other things that grow from the ground that are not similar in shape. I mentally integrate the similar objects, ignoring their measurements, and come up with the concept I name 'tree'.

This process is a combination of consciousness and reality, thus its product, a concept, is. If concepts were the result of consciousness alone, then they would be subjective. If concepts had there own metaphysical existence (tree-ness exists in the tree alone) apart from consciousness, then we have intrinsicism. A concept must be a combination of reality and consciousness.

The universe cannot be observed as a whole, so it is not a base level concept - one based on perceptions of entities. If it is not derived from direct observation it must be an abstaction from abstractions.

Which abstractions? Since we define 'universe' as the sum of all existence, then 'existence' must be one of the subordinate concepts. It's no great leap for a mind to consider all existents as related by the fact of their existence, therefore, 'universe' is a self-evident implication of the existence axiom - it is a corollary.

I think my confusion has been in trying to reduce 'universe' directly to perception - to units. The universe is singlular, it has no units to integrate into a concept.

stephen_speicher said, "I suppose you could denote the universe as it exists right at this moment -- all the particulars that exist right now..."

If you mean that every 'now' is a separate instance of the universe, then I disagree. The universe is not subject to time.

Joe C.

[khaight]

The analogy to a monitor begs the question as to whether or not the universe can be considered as being an entity.

In Peikoff's The Philosophy of Objectivism lecture series, he gives some essential criteria for determining whether or not to label something an entity, in the primary sense of the term. An entity must be a self-sufficient form of existence -- a thing -- with a definite boundary, perceptual in scale, in size. By this criteria the universe would not be considered to be an entity because it cannot be bounded and is not perceptual in scale.

Ok, Stephen, you got me. I was imprecise. Let me try again.

The original poster seemed to be concerned that our inability to perceive the universe in its entirety somehow undercut its concreteness. My point is that most (if not all) concretes cannot be perceived by humans in their entirety. We can't see the back sides of opaque objects. We can't see many wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation reflected from things. And so on.

This fact doesn't undermine the concreteness of the universe (or anything else). Just as the fact that I can't perceive the opposite side of my monitor doesn't mean I can't perceive the monitor, the fact that I can't perceive the entire universe doesn't mean I can't perceive the universe. Requiring that we be able to perceive everything about a concrete before we can be considered to perceive it at all is just an application of an omniscient standard of knowledge to the issue of perception.