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Argument for the existence of God

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Honestly Id rather debate what we are discussing then correct their particular type of problems.

Taking physicist who dabble poorly in philosophy seriously. Not realizing the foundational nature of philosophy. Not realizing what the sounds coming form their mouths [which pretend to be words] would actually mean in reality ontologically. Taking Poppers poop seriously [particularly without actually reading his garbage]

And I would argue that the irrationality of such physicists is the result of not explicitly holding to my view of Logic- thus when they think they perceive a square circle, the fact that Logic demands such a thing is impossible is of no import to them. In fact, they seem to be titillated that they have (they think) proved the laws of logic wrong. They are guilty (implicitly) of the Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy. They (and all who think like them) are on the Synthetic side making war against the Analytic- whether they realize it or not.

Jacob your whole epistemic position rests on the analytic-synthetic dichotomy. Therefore Ill first ask if youve read Peikoffs writings on the ASD?

I have not read it, but I think I understand the issue well enough to say that I do not hold to a dichotomy, but I do make a distinction between the two; there's a difference. A distinction simply means that they are different. A dichotomy means that they are opposed/irreconcilable/at war with each other. While I believe some people can turn them against each other in their own heads (thus creating a dichotomy) I do not hold that they are actually irreconcilable. The question is, in what way are they "reconciled"? If they are both to be affirmed and they are not to be set against each other, then they must be in some sort of hierarchical order. One must be "inside of" the other (if you wish to picture them as circles on a white board), or one must be foundational to the other (if you wish to picture them as a house).

I hold that the synthetic is inside of the analytic IN REALITY and therefore the analytic should be used as a SYSTEMATIC foundation in epistemology.

Objectivists seem to be asserting that the analytic is inside of the synthetic IN EXPERIENCE (and I agree), but they seem unable to make the explicit distinction between an experiential/chronological foundation and a explantory/systematic foundation. Thus the disagreement.

I want to point out that I think Rand and Peikoff usually treat the analytic as systematically foundational- and therefore agree with me in this case. The problem is that when they do this, they don't explicitly make the distinction between a systematic foundation and a chronological one. So there's a lot of confusion.

I think Objectivists in general DO agree with treating logic/analytics like this implicitly, they just have no explicit categories for it and are thus freaked out when I talk about it explicitly.

I have just read some excerpts on this issue in the Lexicon (since I don't have Peikoff's book) and I plan to make a post just replying to the things said in those excerpts... because I think Objectivists could find a lot more common ground in my position than they realize.

See many recent posts of mine for elaboration on the distinction between the experiential/chronological and the explanatory/systematic..and for examples demonstrating how and in what ways logic is sufficient apart from perception. With the exception of Dante, I don't think anyone else on here is really understanding what I'm saying. They seem to think I am coming from some super-rationalist position and making war against perception.

On what basis did you derive this distinction between CS and Epistemology? Where did you derive your position on what you call epistemology?

On the basis that the order in which we experience things is not the order of reality. I've given many examples in recent posts.

I perceived my male-ness before I perceived my Y chromosome. But, the Y chromosome is foundational to my male-ness, not the other way around.

We perceive biology before chemistry and usually chemistry before physics. But physics is foundational to chemistry which is foundational to biology.

See? I am using "foundational" here in systematic/explanatory terms- speaking of the order of things in reality. This is how I suggest we talk about Epistemology.

Cognitive Science uses "foundational" in chronological/experiential terms- speaking of the order of things in our perception and formulation of them. It would emphasize that we would have no categories for "male-ness" if we started with the Y chromosome. No Scientist would disagree, but very few Scientists would consider this relevant to the fact that maleness is dependent upon a Y chromosome- regardless of the fact that we experience them in the opposite order.

How did these rules "get established" Jacob? How did the "rules and standards of knowledge,certainty, reality, etc".. get here? And the most important question of epistemology: What is knowledge? Why is it relevent? And most importantly for your position, to WHOM?

It depends on what you mean by the question. If you mean "how did we come to conceptualize and formulate these rules/standards?" the answer is going to begin with perception- which is you emphasis. I agree with this. And I call this cognitive science/development. This is a question regarding the discovery of a rule in reality and the consequent formulation of expressing this rule in human language.

But, If the question is "where did the rules (not our linguistic formulations, but the things in reality which they are referring to) come from?" The answer is that they have always and will always and must always simply be- even if no human had ever discovered them or formed linguistic rules representing them.

I do not accept the question "of relevance to WHOM?" in regard to reality, but rather the question "of relevance to WHAT?" and the answer is "to itself"- to reality being what reality is. If it were not the case, reality would be much different- and therefore all questions of "relevance to WHOM?" are inside of the relevance of reality being this way and not some other way.

Let me share an anecdote which I think will be helpful:

I heard of a detective on a TV show (perhaps Sherlocke??) saying something to the effect of "I care very little if the earth revolves around the sun or if the sun revolves around the earth. It makes no difference to me and my line of work".

If he means his understanding of this issue makes no difference, then he is right.

But be careful! If we only talk like this, we treat truth as some pragmatic Kantian tool to help us get along on our little project- whatever it may be.

The fact is that in reality - whether he understands it or not, the fact that the earth revolves around the sun (rather the the converse) makes all the difference in the world to him and his line of work- for surely if it were the opposite, his chemical composition would be much different to say the least.

Question:

Where do the standards come from if not from experience? So establishing the "rules and standards of reality" is accomplished without a "grasp of reality" by a subject? How is one to contact these "objective rules" without starting with the content of perception? "The rules are here.How did they get here......." Blank out?

See above.

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To jump in here on the naturalism topic...

I am happy to discuss this topic with YOU, since you seem to understand the ways in which I am using Logic as foundational. The current debate on epistemological foundation was a result of discussions concerning this syllogism. Since we are in agreement on the epistemological issue (or so it seems), I'm glad you brought this up.

I believe you are imputing something extra into your definition of "physical matter” and “physical cause and effect," which Objectivists would argue does not necessarily follow. Speaking for myself, I do hold that only physical entities exist. However, I think you are making an added implicit assumption that physical matter can only act and interact through deterministic processes (I am using the term “deterministic” here to include quantum events which occur with a known probability distribution set by the natures of the entities involved. I mean to contrast “deterministic” with “volitional.”). When you jump from "only physical matter exists" to "physical cause and effect is the only explanation of events," you seem to be simply stating something obvious, but we see from a later step that you mean something more specific by “physical cause and effect.” When, in step 5, you say that the limitation to only physical cause and effect precludes volitional truth-seeking by a person (correct me if I misunderstand you), you are saying that by “physical cause and effect” you really mean completely deterministic processes. You seem to be assuming that simply because some physical entity is limited to its physical form, it cannot have volition, on that basis. If so, this is an unwarranted empirical assumption about the nature of all physical entities.

Yes, it is correct that I am saying "if only physical cause and effect, therefore no volition" or to put it another way "If Naturalism, therefore Determinism". Yes, I am assuming that if a physical entity is limited to its physical form (and is limited to the results of physical cause and effect), that it cannot have volition on that basis. You say this is an unwarranted empirical assumption...what do you mean?

Your argument is actually quite similar to the argument in OPAR against determinism. Both you and Objectivists agree that there must exist some volitional process that is not completely deterministic, but rather has powers of self-determination. Otherwise, objective knowledge would not be possible, and the claims of determinists would be contradictory. Objectivists would house this volition within the human brain, and would explain it entirely through natural causes. After all, the simple statement “Existence exists” does not make any particular claims about the properties of the entities which exist; in particular, it does not make the claim that everything that exists is deterministic. Also, we experience free will on a first hand basis from introspection. Thus the conclusion, humans have the power to choose.

Now, your argument aims to locate the source of this “something extra” outside of physical entities, but it is only your empirical assumption about how physical entities interact (deterministically) that necessitates this shift.

My assumption that physical entities limited to physical cause and effect only interact deterministically is not so much empirical as it is realizing that given the definitions of those words, it simply must be the case. Volitional (non-deterministic) interaction requires some sort of freedom from the interlocked physical cause and effect system. Such freedom has no basis (is impossible) in a purely physical cause and effect world.

The Objectivist position seems to reject Determinism because it negates reason, then ASSUME Naturalism, then observe volition and conclude that Naturalism and Volition are not at odds.

I reject Determinism because it negates reason, and I reject Naturalism because it negates Volition (which negates reason).

I am saying "If Naturalism, then Determinism". You seem to be saying "But I hold to Naturalism and I observe reason, therefore Naturalism doesn't lead to Determinism".

My response is simply that you are being inconsistent. One can hold to two mutually exclusive positions in their own head, but this does not make the positions not mutually exclusive in reality. The fact that we empirically observe volition only proves my case- that Naturalism is false.

If the activity in one's brain is no different (in relation to physical cause and effect) than the activity in one's stomach, then there is no basis to consider the outcome of the first as different in significance from the outcome of the second.

Remember, I do not hold to that "IF". Naturalism does- and therefore the conclusion of Naturalism is Determinism.

Without this assumption, introducing the concept of a God to explain volition is a needless addition. You are positing an entity which, by its nature, has the power of choice. We agree that such an entity must exist, but we have first-hand evidence that man has volition, and no independent evidence of a higher power. Thus, the creation of a God to explain volition, once your empirical assumption is removed, is an arbitrary addition; there is no need for one. Man has the power of choice, by virtue of his nature.

I am not (yet) introducing the concept of a God in this argument. I am introducing the concept of Supernature (the idea that more than physical entities exists). I agree that we have first hand evidence that man has volition. I am saying that this fact proves that there must be more than the physical world of physical cause and effect. I am saying that in some way, man's volition and reason must be super-natural events and that therefore in some way man's "mind" is super-natural. I am not claiming to know all the ways in which this super-natural event harmonizes with physical events. I am only claiming that it must be so.

Objections that "we experience reason. Reason is accurate. That's good enough" simply ASSUME Naturalism and ignore the logical inconsistency of such a position.

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I have just finished reading Peikoff's ASD. I have much to say on the topic and I might even have to just go paragraph by paragraph commenting on what he says, but for now I would recommend that the Objectivists on here go back and read it themselves.

I would suggest that in many cases, the Objectivists have been guilty of the side of the dichotomy which is skeptical of logical/analytic certainty- saying that...

"if the proposition represents knowledge which is certain, then it does not represent knowledge of reality. In other words: if a proposition cannot be wrong, it cannot be right"

(bottom of p.118 in ITOE under "Conclusion").

Peikoff has here hit the nail on the head in describing many in this forum concerning this discussion.

This is all I have time to post on the issue right now, but more will be forthcoming (eventually).

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My assumption that physical entities limited to physical cause and effect only interact deterministically is not so much empirical as it is realizing that given the definitions of those words, it simply must be the case.

And yet it is not.

Perhaps I am not sophisticated enough to understand your use of the Logic (sic), but I can find no flaw in my logic, as based on what I or other reliable individuals can reproducibly experience and communicate.

Experience has to be the basis; without grist, the mill cannot produce, no matter how pristine, proper, and principled its function.

Experience shows unequivocally that there are physical events which are not predictable from their precursors; and the nature of these experiments makes it highly unlikely that the physical principles which constrain the outcomes to a finite set are necessitated by the presence of a volitional experimenter; i.e., it appears that the physics is natural and given, not man-made.

In fact, in order to have uncertainty sufficient to allow volition requires that the uncertainty be at the root of the system; if the root is deterministic, then so is all concrete experience, including all our communications; and including all the nuclear and chemical compoundings; and all the genetics; and etc -- all the experiences that any individual consciousness can have are accompanied by a concrete material change in the entropy of the individual and their surroundings. If these changes are all deterministic, then the individual has no basis to validate volition as anything more than a figment of our arrogant imagination.

A deterministic given world would be inconsistent with volition, not to mention change itself.

Time is the ambient uncertainty in the present, which is necessary to spacing of entities that allows them to move and change relative to one another.

Without time, the essential PHYSICAL uncertainty, which is clearly not a figment of our imaginations, there could not be volition.

Whatever your Logic is, if it ignores the fact of uncertainty as a generative principle, then it cannot lead to volition except by fiat.

- ico

Edited by icosahedron
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And yet it is not.

Perhaps I am not sophisticated enough to understand your use of the Logic (sic), but I can find no flaw in my logic, as based on what I or other reliable individuals can reproducibly experience and communicate.

Experience has to be the basis; without grist, the mill cannot produce, no matter how pristine, proper, and principled its function.

Experience shows unequivocally that there are physical events which are not predictable from their precursors; and the nature of these experiments makes it highly unlikely that the physical principles which constrain the outcomes to a finite set are necessitated by the presence of a volitional experimenter; i.e., it appears that the physics is natural and given, not man-made.

In fact, in order to have uncertainty sufficient to allow volition requires that the uncertainty be at the root of the system; if the root is deterministic, then so is all concrete experience, including all our communications; and including all the nuclear and chemical compoundings; and all the genetics; and etc -- all the experiences that any individual consciousness can have are accompanied by a concrete material change in the entropy of the individual and their surroundings. If these changes are all deterministic, then the individual has no basis to validate volition as anything more than a figment of our arrogant imagination.

A deterministic given world would be inconsistent with volition, not to mention change itself.

Time is the ambient uncertainty in the present, which is necessary to spacing of entities that allows them to move and change relative to one another.

Without time, the essential PHYSICAL uncertainty, which is clearly not a figment of our imaginations, there could not be volition.

Whatever your Logic is, if it ignores the fact of uncertainty as a generative principle, then it cannot lead to volition except by fiat.

- ico

Did you read the entire post? Everything you just said in condemning determinism, I agree with.

I am saying Naturalism = Determinism. I reject Determinism & Naturalism because they go hand in hand.

You seem to think that I am arguing for Determinism. I'm not. I'm arguing that Naturalism logically necessitates Determinism and therefore Naturalism should be rejected for the same reasons that Determinism is rejected.

You seem to be saying "but I believe in Naturalism and I still have volition" which only proves that it is possible to be and act inconsistently with one's own beliefs.

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I don't have time to write EVERYTHING there is to write in response to Peikoff's ASD- however, I noticed that the the issue has been brought up in another thread on the topic of the ASD alone so I would encourage everyone to check that conversation out (I might or might not be adding to it). For now let me give a brief overview of my position on it:

I hold that there is a distinction (NOT a dichotomy) between the analytic and the synthetic and that they are not at odds (unless we try to pit them against each other). If they are to both be upheld, and if they are not at odds, they must have some sort of hierarchical relation. One must be "inside of" the other/ "foundational to" the other. I hold that the analytic is foundational to the synthetic because the synthetic is contingent upon the analytic for explanation while the analytic can be self-explanatory apart from the synthetic.

Allow me to introduce a quote from my teacher:

"A proposition can be valid (analytically) without being sound (synthetically), but a proposition cannot be sound without being valid."

In this statement, "valid" means "analytically non-contradictory" and "sound" means "true about the world".

So all synthetic statements which are true about the world are inside of the category of valid/non-contradictory/analytic statements. But not all analytic statements are synthetic.

***Notice: this does NOT say that if a proposition is valid, it is automatically true about the world. This would mean that any non-contradictory concept (like "unicorns existing") was true about the world. I think this is what many are afraid of when they reject the analytic as foundational- but I am trying to stress that it is an unwarranted fear. Analytically valid does not automatically mean "sound" or true about reality. I am not saying that. Please don't think I am saying that. Please don't be distracted by the fact that you think I am saying that because I am not saying that.

I am saying that synthetic propositions necessarily use analytics (logic) and that purely analytical statements do not depend on the synthetic.

The first objection you will have is "then what is the point of making such a distinction!? If the 'purely analytic' is not necessarily true without the synthetic, then why consider the analytic as apart from the synthetic?"

If that's your objection, then you're tracking with me. If that's not your objection, I lost you somewhere...please let me know where.

The answer is that while not necessarily all purely analytical propositions are true about the world, the purely analytic CAN give you truth about the world. Exhibit A:

"A is A".

This statement is purely analytic without a hint of the synthetic and it is absolutely true about the world. To deny this- to try and make the Law of Identity a "tool" inside of the synthetic (as Peikoff seems to attempt to do) is to imply that contradictions are possible; that A could be ~A; that we just haven't happened upon any such instances yet. This would undercut ALL human knowledge (analytic or synthetic).

Far from being "abstract" and "having nothing to do with reality", this type of analytic proposition or "truth" has everything to do with every thing in reality- it is inescapable and it's "relevance" bares down on ALL propositions whatsoever (analytic or synthetic) such that any synthetic proposition which violates this analytic truth that "A is A" is automatically and necessarily false beyond any reasonable doubt whatsoever.

This is why the Analytic is foundational to the Synthetic. Not because we experience the analytic first (we don't. I know that). But, because any true synthetic proposition is foundationally analytic/logical. If any synthetic proposition or idea violates the Laws of Logic (Analytics) it MUST be rejected immediately and without any hesitation whatsoever.

This is the way (and the ONLY way) in which the Purely Analytic can give us true statements about the world- in cases of contradiction and in cases of necessarily either or scenarios where one side is a contradiction.

Examples:

"Square Circles" by pure analytic analysis is self-contradictory and therefore we know with absolute certainty without any synthetic work needed that "no square circles exist" which is the same as saying "no contradictions exist" which is the same as saying "A is A". To get out your graph paper and go on a synthetic safari for square circles is ultimately to wage war against "A is A"- and trust me, you don't want to do that.

"There is no truth" is another proposition which is false by pure analytic analysis. However, it is also a necessarily either / or scenario and therefore the opposite is absolutely and certainly true by pure analytic analysis: "There is absolute truth". This does not tell us what specifically is absolutely true, but it does tell us that absolute truth can be known- and with certainty.

In these two corollary ways, the purely analytic can give us truth about the real world apart from the synthetic. It cannot give us ALL truth about the real world apart from the synthetic, but it does give us the "biggest" and most "foundational" truths upon which all synthetic truths are contingent.

This is my position. I am convinced that Rand held this position implicitly/functionally in her writings (and this is why she was so brilliant), but that in the explicit formulation of this issue, she and/or Peikoff have undercut/evaded/ignored/missed/whatever this important relationship between the analytic and synthetic- a relationship which if left to and lost on the functional level of Objectivism, will SWIFTLY bring Objectivism to its end.

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Let me add that I bring all of that up as relevant to the conversation at hand because many/most Objectivists on here have been either implicitly or explicitly attempting to deny the validity of those types of analytic/logical propositions. I think MUCH of it is caused by misunderstandings based on Peikoff's ASD- since Peikoff seems to function in this way (in accord w/ my position) while explicitly denying the foundation for functioning this way. However, I think another great deal of it is caused by an attempt to evade the power of the arguments I have made against foundational pieces the world view of many Objectivists: Naturalism and The Principle of Falsifiability.

1)Naturalism is the idea that "only physical nature exists"

2)The Principle of Falsifiability is that "only propositions which are 'falsifiable'/testable/'scientific' are true about the world"

These two assumptions are common pillars in most Atheistic worldviews- I call them "assumptions" because they lack any credibility, are rarely- if ever- analyzed or explicitly thought of by the Atheist, and they are self-contradictory and therefore necessarily false.

1) I have argued that Naturalism is self-contradictory and therefore necessarily false (which implies that Supernature- whatever it may be- necessarily exists). I have done this by showing that Naturalism automatically is equivalent with Determinism and therefore necessarily negates the ability to reason objectively. And since the proposition "Only physical nature exists" is dependent upon the ability to reason objectively (just like all propositions) it therefore affirms and denies the ability to reason objectively at the same time and in the same relationship.

2)I have argued that the Principle of Falsifiability is self-contradictory and therefore not a sufficient principle upon which to base the validity of all propositions. I have done this by showing that the assertion that "only testable propositions can be true about the world" is not, itself a testable proposition and therefore violates it's own standard for truth.

These two assumptions have been shown to be nothing more than highly adored square circles. To ignore this fact in order to save one's Atheism is to negate (in your own mind) the Laws of Logic and to "evict yourself from reality" as Rand would put it.

I hope that there are some Objectivists who are more devoted to Truth and Reason than they are to their Atheism.

If you find that my reasoning (especially for the two assumptions above) is faulty, please point it out.

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Yes, it is correct that I am saying "if only physical cause and effect, therefore no volition" or to put it another way "If Naturalism, therefore Determinism". Yes, I am assuming that if a physical entity is limited to its physical form (and is limited to the results of physical cause and effect), that it cannot have volition on that basis. You say this is an unwarranted empirical assumption...what do you mean?

...

My assumption that physical entities limited to physical cause and effect only interact deterministically is not so much empirical as it is realizing that given the definitions of those words, it simply must be the case. Volitional (non-deterministic) interaction requires some sort of freedom from the interlocked physical cause and effect system. Such freedom has no basis (is impossible) in a purely physical cause and effect world.

I disagree that you can come to this conclusion simply by reasoning from the starting point that only physical entities (limited to physical cause and effect) exist. There is nothing logically contradictory about a physical entity acting in a non-deterministic fashion of its own accord. The statement that all physical entities, if limited to their physical natures, only act deterministically is an induction based on examining the physical entities that we find around us in the world. It is true that the vast majority of entities act in this way, and it gives us a strong reason to doubt a counterexample to this inductive principle, but it is certainly possible that the context of this principle cannot be extended to include human beings.

This is what I mean when I say that your argument rests on an empirical assumption. The Objectivist statement of causality, which is more general than the conceptions of causality which lead people to determinism, can be stated as, "Entities act in accordance with their natures." Now, in the case of the vast majority of entities around us, at least on the macroscopic level, this means that the actions of entities are entirely determined by previous chains of physical cause and effect. That is their nature: deterministic. However, to jump from this inductive observation to the statement that, "No physical entity, if restricted to its physical nature, can behave in a way that is not necessitated by prior states of the world," makes the implicit claim that a physical nature is inherently tied to a deterministic process. This jump is not logically necessitated, but made by extending an inductively formed principle over all physical entities, including man.

I am not (yet) introducing the concept of a God in this argument. I am introducing the concept of Supernature (the idea that more than physical entities exists). I agree that we have first hand evidence that man has volition. I am saying that this fact proves that there must be more than the physical world of physical cause and effect. I am saying that in some way, man's volition and reason must be super-natural events and that therefore in some way man's "mind" is super-natural. I am not claiming to know all the ways in which this super-natural event harmonizes with physical events. I am only claiming that it must be so.

The fact that man has volition does prove something, or at least prompt it. Indeed, there must be something more going on in the mind of man than a deterministic process. But again, to assume that this does not operate through natural means is to make an assumption that "natural" is just another word for "deterministic." It is to make an assumption about the nature of all entities, an assumption which is not contained in the law of causality itself (which simply states that, whatever the nature of an identity is, it cannot defy that nature).

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I disagree that you can come to this conclusion simply by reasoning from the starting point that only physical entities (limited to physical cause and effect) exist. There is nothing logically contradictory about a physical entity acting in a non-deterministic fashion of its own accord.

There is if the entity is ONLY physical. For an entity to act "non-deterministically of its own accord", it must be free from the influence of all other physical cause and effect phenomena upon it in relation to the way in which it acts. If an entity is purely physical it must "act" in absolute accordance with the influence of other physical entities and it's natural physical effect from such causes. Only if an entity is beyond physical (in addition to being physical), can it possibly be said to have any level of freedom from the influence of the interlocked cause and effect chain of the physical universe.

The statement that all physical entities, if limited to their physical natures, only act deterministically is an induction based on examining the physical entities that we find around us in the world. It is true that the vast majority of entities act in this way, and it gives us a strong reason to doubt a counterexample to this inductive principle, but it is certainly possible that the context of this principle cannot be extended to include human beings.

This is what I mean when I say that your argument rests on an empirical assumption. The Objectivist statement of causality, which is more general than the conceptions of causality which lead people to determinism, can be stated as, "Entities act in accordance with their natures." Now, in the case of the vast majority of entities around us, at least on the macroscopic level, this means that the actions of entities are entirely determined by previous chains of physical cause and effect. That is their nature: deterministic. However, to jump from this inductive observation to the statement that, "No physical entity, if restricted to its physical nature, can behave in a way that is not necessitated by prior states of the world," makes the implicit claim that a physical nature is inherently tied to a deterministic process. This jump is not logically necessitated, but made by extending an inductively formed principle over all physical entities, including man.

I bring up inductive examples only as examples- not as the ultimate proof. The ultimate proof is the simple fact that freedom from the influence of physical cause and effect is necessary for any amount of volition or reason or "acting non-deterministically". And such freedom necessitates more than physical nature.

The fact that man has volition does prove something, or at least prompt it. Indeed, there must be something more going on in the mind of man than a deterministic process. But again, to assume that this does not operate through natural means is to make an assumption that "natural" is just another word for "deterministic." It is to make an assumption about the nature of all entities, an assumption which is not contained in the law of causality itself (which simply states that, whatever the nature of an identity is, it cannot defy that nature).

Yes, and because Man has volition and the ability to reason, "the nature" of man must be such that it is capable of being free from the rest of the interlocked physical cause and effect phenomena in physical nature...which means that "the nature of Man" must be "Supernatural" in the sense of being above and beyond physical nature.

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There is if the entity is ONLY physical. For an entity to act "non-deterministically of its own accord", it must be free from the influence of all other physical cause and effect phenomena upon it in relation to the way in which it acts.

This is not the case. I have volition, but it is limited in scope to, fundamentally, directing my awareness. I am obviously subject to all other physical phenomena which are acting upon me (if I am hit on the head, I will lose that consciousness temporarily), but volition as a part of my nature simply states that I am able to direct the focus of my own awareness. This is not a break from causality, because causality must be construed as wider than simple deterministic, billiard-ball interactions in order to capture that aspect of my nature.

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This is not the case. I have volition, but it is limited in scope to, fundamentally, directing my awareness. I am obviously subject to all other physical phenomena which are acting upon me (if I am hit on the head, I will lose that consciousness temporarily), but volition as a part of my nature simply states that I am able to direct the focus of my own awareness. This is not a break from causality, because causality must be construed as wider than simple deterministic, billiard-ball interactions in order to capture that aspect of my nature.

I agree that volition is limited in scope- that's why I qualified my statement by saying that Man must be free from the influence of outside physical causes in respect to the action we're talking about. The activity of Man's Mind must be "independent" or "free" from the influence of all other physical causes in order for it to be considered valid. If it is not independent from physical cause and effect, then it is no different in significance than the activity in Man's stomach. [by "significance" I mean "corresponding to reality"].

The insistence that "causality must be construed as wider than simple deterministic, billiard-ball interactions in order to capture that aspect of my nature" simply assumes that this aspect of your nature is purely physical without any grounds.

Yes, things act according to their natures. But, unless something is independent of the physical realm in some way, it's nature alone is not sufficient for explaining it's action. An entity's nature must be considered vital to cause and effect- but so must the entities acting upon it (along with their natures). A purely physical entity can not act unless it is acted upon- and it's action will be determined by its nature, the nature of the action, and the nature of that which acted upon it.

Only if the nature of an entity is more than physical, can it be said to have independence sufficient enough to explain it's action apart from the (deterministic) action of other entities upon it.

If our minds are only physical then the activity in them is only the result of physical entities (whether cells, molecules, atoms, etc..) bumping into each other in deterministic ways.

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Only if the nature of an entity is more than physical, can it be said to have independence sufficient enough to explain it's action apart from the (deterministic) action of other entities upon it.

So, you are contesting what Leonard Peikoff wrote in OPAR, that "[t]here is no basis for the suggestion that consciousness is separable from matter, let alone opposed to it, no hint of immortality, no kinship to any alleged transcendent realm."

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Jacob:

I hope to respond again soon somewhat at length to this discussion, but for now I have a resource that I think you might find pertinent to this discussion. The article is On The Physical Meaning of Volition, in the journal Objectivity. That link does load an entire issue of the journal, so it may take a second to load the article, but from my quick scanning of it, it attempts to address exactly this question. The author attempts to explore possible positive theories of volition grounded in science, and I believe he specifically addresses something very close to your argument against volition in physical entities, starting on page 72. You seem to have a lot of time to devote to this discussion, so enjoy.

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So, you are contesting what Leonard Peikoff wrote in OPAR, that "[t]here is no basis for the suggestion that consciousness is separable from matter, let alone opposed to it, no hint of immortality, no kinship to any alleged transcendent realm."

Could you give me the reference for that so I can read it in the context and see if I contest it or not (and to see on what grounds I would contest it if I do)?

Thanks.

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Could you give me the reference for that so I can read it in the context and see if I contest it or not (and to see on what grounds I would contest it if I do)?

Thanks.

Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, Pg. 30 starts the section on Idealism and Materialism as the Rejection of Basic Axioms, leading up to pg. 34 which was quoted.

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You seem to be saying "but I believe in Naturalism and I still have volition" which only proves that it is possible to be and act inconsistently with one's own beliefs.

You seem to be imagining me saying or implying this, repeatedly. I have not. I don't even define "Naturalism", it is not a relevant concept to me AT ALL.

There is the given, and the man-made. Once something is man-made, it becomes part of the given, but since the man-made did not have to be, it is also a matter of choice.

The given; and the chosen.

Intrinsicists take the given as all, ignoring volition. Subjectivists take the chosen as all, ignoring external facts. Neither position can be practiced consistently without leading to death of the individual in the short term.

Determinists are a flavor of Intrinsicists; sounds like Naturalists in your definition are the same. But it is not this distinction that matters; these are just shades of grey.

Objectivism rejects both intrinsicist and subjectivist, in any form.

And, the notion of God is subjective at root, an invention of the imagination that acts as a bag holder of fantasies.

- ico

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Jacob:

I hope to respond again soon somewhat at length to this discussion, but for now I have a resource that I think you might find pertinent to this discussion. The article is On The Physical Meaning of Volition, in the journal Objectivity. That link does load an entire issue of the journal, so it may take a second to load the article, but from my quick scanning of it, it attempts to address exactly this question. The author attempts to explore possible positive theories of volition grounded in science, and I believe he specifically addresses something very close to your argument against volition in physical entities, starting on page 72. You seem to have a lot of time to devote to this discussion, so enjoy.

I read the entire article. I'm no physicist, but I think I was able to track with what the auther meant. However, if you think I'm off, please let me know.

To begin with, I think his opening paragraph emphasizing the importance of deeper philosophical questions on this issue is one of the best and most helpful paragraphs in the entire thing. I'm not familiar with the particular ways in which Ayers and Rand "truncated Aristotle's 4 causes in order to avoid undesirable conclusions"- but THIS seems like the most worthy area of study on this issue. I, personally, have no "undesired conclusions". If I find that Atheism is true, very well. I want truth- not whim. So, I am eager to search out all philosophical territory- even where other are afraid to go because of undesired conclusions. The only conclusion I do not desire to come to is the invalidity of logic because such a conclusion is 1)Impossible and 2)Absurd.

It seems (correct me if I am wrong) that he is defining Deterministic as "able to be predicted- either in practice or in principle". I'm assuming you agree with this definition??

I take issue with it. I care very little (on the philosophical level) if something is able to be predicted- what matters more is if it is inevitably caused by factors of physical causation. This is what I mean by Deterministic: that something is inevitably caused to be the way it is- even if the cause(s) are not able to be identified and the effects are not able to be predicted.

His apparent definition for deterministic confuses an evidence of determinism (predictability) with the thing itself. If something is predictable, it is certainly deterministic. But it does not follow that if something is not predictable, it is therefore not deterministic. Even if there is no way for us to know why a particular particle (whether electron/photon/etc..) acts the way it does and even if we are not able to predict the way it will act, this does not mean that it lacks a sufficient cause for acting such a way and that it was not inevitably going to act that way at that particular moment in response to those particular causes.

Remember your Subject-Object distinction. I mean no offense, but I am baffled by how much Subjective "slippage" there seems to be on the part of Objectivists. (I say "seems" because I hope that I am simply misunderstanding what is being said....I'm attempting to give the benefit of the doubt).

I have no idea what Schrödinger's Cat is attempting to prove or illustrate other than implicit Subjectivism. Sure, we do not know whether the cat is alive or dead until we open the box- But our knowledge (or lack thereof) has no bearing at all on the reality inside the box! If the cat is dead, it is dead. If alive, it's alive. Until the box is opened it is sufficient and accurate to say "we do not know and we cannot know"- but it is an assault on Objectivity to say that "because we do not know, it is therefore alive and dead" or that "our discovering of it is what makes it alive or dead". Again, I may have misunderstood it- but this seems to be what it was saying.

He brought up "self-causation" at one point and I'm not sure what he meant. Taken strictly, it is absurd. A thing cannot cause itself- because it would need to "be" and "not be" at the same time and in the same relationship. Perhaps what he meant by "self-causation" is more along the lines of being "independent" from physical causation (which is my view of volition)- this would not be illogical/absurd, but it would beg the question leading to my position (or so it seems).

In summary, the incapability of identifying sufficient causes is not proof that sufficient causes are not at play. The incapability of predicting outcomes is not proof that the outcomes are not inevitable given the combined nature of all (known and unknown) causal influences involved. This all seems to focus on potential evidences of non-deterministic activity, but none of it gives sufficient grounds for explaining how such activity is possible without more than physical nature at play in the system. It all ASSUMES that physical nature is all there is without ever giving any grounds for such an assumption, and then proceeds to grope for evidence of non-deterministic activity within this assumed paradigm.

Edited by Jacob86
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From Dictionary.com:

de·ter·min·ism

–noun

1. the doctrine that all facts and events exemplify natural laws.

2. the doctrine that all events, including human choices and decisions, have sufficient causes.

fa·tal·ism

–noun

1. the acceptance of all things and events as inevitable; submission to fate: Her fatalism helped her to face death with stoic calm.

2. Philosophy . the doctrine that all events are subject to fate or inevitable predetermination.

Determinism is more general than fatalism, as it only asserts causes, but not lock-step, reversible, path-independent evolution in time. According to THESE definitions, I think many mistake fatalism as the only model for determinism; true, pre-determined implies determined, but things can be determined without being pre-determined.

Determinism is, effectively, a restatement of the Identity Axiom: as in, it is appropriate to be specific in determining the identities of the objects one considers -- or else risk logics based on quicksand.

- ico

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Determinism is more general than fatalism, as it only asserts causes, but not lock-step, reversible, path-independent evolution in time. According to THESE definitions, I think many mistake fatalism as the only model for determinism; true, pre-determined implies determined, but things can be determined without being pre-determined.

Not the best definitions for a philosophical discussion, that's for sure. Those are starting points at best, given that there are so many ideas out there relating to volition and determinism. What you're saying there is not the Objectivist position, which is fine, but I think it should be mentioned.

Edited by Eiuol
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I think that, as per Locke, most of the disagreements here are a matter of semantics among rational beings with shaded attachment of meaning to words (as usual with time lags, uncertainty, and their consequences).

The Given is that which is consistent with sensual awareness (evolutionary acquisition of patterns of sensations, leading to perceptions): each frame of sensual awareness consists of all the available sensations at that moment, plus summary references back to all prior sensations.

The Man-made is predicated on sensual awareness of the substrate, because Existence exists, and Consciousness is awareness of that fact via direct, self-evident experience of Existence via integration into the sensual pattern memory bank as an evolving perceptual framework, via the methods of logic, which express the function identified by "A is A".

But Man is not tantamount to the predicate on which he subsists. This is self-evident to any rational observer, because Man can change the substrate intentionally, in the direction of his desires.

So there is more to Man than sensual awareness, more than a bunch of jiggling chemicals. This shows up in concepts above the level of perception (translation of sensual data into percepts, the fundamental "boot-strapping" process by which we obtain our first, implicit concepts at the perceptual basis level). These concepts relate groups of special-case experiences by their differences and similarities, just like higher order concepts. But, concepts are to percepts like object class types are to object instances, so once formed, are not bound to temporal evolution, can be abstracted and reused in the future. This is how principles evolve in one's mind.

Man needs two holistically integrated functions: connection to reality (sensual awareness exercised), and the ability to relate sensual experiences into concepts, recursively. That is, action and thought, body and mind, working cooperatively, one harvesting sensual feedback, the other choosing subsequent action based on cognition of the relationships among this and prior sensual experiences.

It is an inseparable whole. A Tao, if you like ... you can't separate mind from body without losing meaning.

This is a general statement, and would apply to God. If God exists, God has a body that is contained within Existence; but God created Existence; so God created itself? That violates any rational scheduling algorithm. Game over.

- ico

The Man-made is not inevitable in any case, it did not have to be produced; the producer could have chosen not to produce it.

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Not the best definitions for a philosophical discussion, that's for sure. Those are starting points at best, given that there are so many ideas out there relating to volition and determinism. What you're saying there is not the Objectivist position, which is fine, but I think it should be mentioned.

Yet we must agree on some definitions, and there are two ideas here, by whatever names: lock-step execution of a predetermined path of execution, versus a causal mechanism that is not predetermined and allows choice of path.

Lock-step evolution contradicts the facts of experience. The causal mechanism is not at odds with volition, or we could not exist.

My mind, via concepts, gives me handles on historical and potential experiences (based on past proclivities and my integration of them), and allows me to treat them as if they had occurred for the purposes of predicting what will happen next and attempting to control my environment. This is a very definite, determined process at every step, yet is, overall, not wholly predictable in its outcomes, in terms of the consequent state of the mind and how one will choose to react to new information and changing context.

- ico

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I think that, as per Locke, most of the disagreements here are a matter of semantics among rational beings with shaded attachment of meaning to words (as usual with time lags, uncertainty, and their consequences).

If semantics is

1: the study of meanings:

a : the historical and psychological study and the classification of changes in the signification of words or forms viewed as factors in linguistic development

as Merriam Webster gives us as a definitional starting point, the source of the disagreements boil down to a concept's implication/inference (shaded attachment of meaning) based on the writer/reader's contextual and hierarchal understanding (time lags, uncertainty and their consequences?) within any particular proposition.

The Given is that which is consistent with sensual awareness (evolutionary acquisition of patterns of sensations, leading to perceptions): each frame of sensual awareness consists of all the available sensations at that moment, plus summary references back to all prior sensations.

The Given, I have to take as existence/reality.

I cannot fathom my sensual awareness being inconsistent with the Given, as the senses are automatic and non-volitional in their apprehension of data; they just sense what is there.

The acquisition of patterns of sensations, are (per Rand) automatically grouped by the brain into perceptions as (implicit) entities. These 'entities' when 'summarily referenced back to prior sensations' move to an (implicit) identity when the mind recognises a perception (an isolated group of sensations) as 'I have seen this before'.

The Man-made is predicated on sensual awareness of the substrate, because Existence exists, and Consciousness is awareness of that fact via direct, self-evident experience of Existence via integration into the sensual pattern memory bank as an evolving perceptual framework, via the methods of logic, which express the function identified by "A is A".

But Man is not tantamount to the predicate on which he subsists. This is self-evident to any rational observer, because Man can change the substrate intentionally, in the direction of his desires.

The 'Man-made' is volitional. It is not necessitated, but it is contingent. The methods of logic is man-made. The expression "A is A" is man-made. Grasping it is a matter of correlating the 'concept' with the 'perceptual' via 'word' which is deliniated from every other word/concept via definition. Or in the case of reshaping matter in accordance with his understanding of how that matter may be reshaped into automobiles, houses, clothing, etc.

So there is more to Man than sensual awareness, more than a bunch of jiggling chemicals. This shows up in concepts above the level of perception (translation of sensual data into percepts, the fundamental "boot-strapping" process by which we obtain our first, implicit concepts at the perceptual basis level). These concepts relate groups of special-case experiences by their differences and similarities, just like higher order concepts. But, concepts are to percepts like object class types are to object instances, so once formed, are not bound to temporal evolution, can be abstracted and reused in the future. This is how principles evolve in one's mind.

I, personally, do not find this a clarifying restatement of the chapter in Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology on Abstractions from Abstractions.

Man needs two holistically integrated functions: connection to reality (sensual awareness exercised), and the ability to relate sensual experiences into concepts, recursively. That is, action and thought, body and mind, working cooperatively, one harvesting sensual feedback, the other choosing subsequent action based on cognition of the relationships among this and prior sensual experiences.

I, personally do not find this a clarifying restatement of the chapter in ITOE on Concept Formation.

It is an inseparable whole. A Tao, if you like ... you can't separate mind from body without losing meaning.

You cannot separate mind from body without losing life, much less meaning, as it is we, as human beings (an integration of mind and body, an inseperable whole) that create (man-made) the meaning.

The Man-made is not inevitable in any case, it did not have to be produced; the producer could have chosen not to produce it.

A somewhat clearer articulation of 'The Man-made is volitional'.

Once produced, however, it does move it into the realm of the 'Given'.

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Regardless of the word used (Deterministic, Fatalistic, Inevitable, etc..), I don't think that the POINT of what is being discussed is as unclear as some are making it out to be.

The dispute between Dante & I has been basically over whether or not volition and reason are possible in a purely Naturalistic (purely physical) reality. I say no- and since volition and reason are both "given" and "absolute", therefore more than physical nature exists. Dante (and I'm sure Objectivists in general) would like to say that volition and reason are possible within a purely Naturalistic world, and therefore there is no need to consider any super-nature.

The talk of "determinism" came up as a result of this discussion. I am trying to show that if only physical nature exists, then all events (including the one's in our heads) are "deterministic" /"fatalistic"/ "Inevitable"....lacking any meaning or significance in regards to freedom and correspondence to reality. This is because volition and reason require some sort of independence from the influence of other physical phenomena- which is only possible if they are "above"/"beyond" physically natural events.

BTW, that is what "super-nature" means. Not whims and irrational deities and magic and fairies,etc... It just means "above and beyond physical nature". It's almost a re-wording of the term "Meta-Physics" ("meta" meaning above and beyond, "physics" meaning the physical universe). Don't let the mystical connotations scare you away from something that is obviously and necessarily true.

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This is a general statement, and would apply to God. If God exists, God has a body that is contained within Existence;

This "general statement" you used above to describe "Man" by observing the ways in which Man functions...and then you by sleight of hand replace "Man" with "God" (whose functioning you have not observed) and declare that he must function in the same way.

How does this follow?

Yes, we require physical bodies to link us to reality outside of our minds. It does not follow that God would require a physical body for the same. After all, if there is a God, He would be the source of everything else in reality and therefore to speak of His needing some sort of "link" to reality would be absurd.

but God created Existence; so God created itself? That violates any rational scheduling algorithm. Game over.

I don't know of ANY thinking Theist who would say that "God created all of Existence including Himself". This is a rather annoying straw man. If there is a God, He created everything that exists besides Himself and He, Himself would be uncreated and eternal.

Seriously, these types of arguments against Theism are pretty lame.

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