Induction through deduction?

[Grames]

Are you trying to drop the claim that ostensive defintion applies to first level concepts then?

No. The would destroy any possibility of founding concepts in reality and destroy all of Objectivism. I, for one, do not have that ambition.

Once a child has a word that he applies to a type, he has an actual concept and has left the implicit concept stage. He needs a definition, but he does not need any particular definition and an ostensive definition will suffice at first. There is no such thing as a "Final Authority in Ethics" because there is no such thing as a final authority in epistemology.

[Plasmatic]

No. The would destroy any possibility of founding concepts in reality and destroy all of Objectivism. I, for one, do not have that ambition.

Once a child has a word that he applies to a type, he has an actual concept and has left the implicit concept stage. He needs a definition, but he does not need any particular definition and an ostensive definition will suffice at first.

One cannot have a "type" without achieving a unit. Once one has a unit and reaches the conceptual level ostensive definition does not apply.

Anyway :

Ostensive definitions are usually regarded as applicable only to conceptualized sensations. But they are applicable to axioms as well. Since axiomatic concepts are identifications of irreducible primaries, the only way to define one is by means of an ostensive definition e.g., to define "existence," one would have to sweep one's arm around and say: "I mean this." (We shall discuss axioms later.)

The rules of correct definition are derived from the process of concept-formation. The units of a concept were differentiated—by means of a distinguishing characteristic(s)—from other existents possessing a commensurable characteristic, a "Conceptual Common Denominator." A definition follows the same principle: it specifies the distinguishing characteristic(s) of the units, and indicates the category of existents from which they were differentia

And as to your "pre language" comment:

There can be no such thing as a concept without the objects to which it refers. And conversely, a sound, if it is to be a word, cannot denote objects directly, without representing a concept. (A word which did that would be a proper name.) But a concept is only a mental unit, a symbol, for a number of concretes of a certain kind. Therefore, when I say words denote visual objects, I do not have to repeat: "Don't forget that the visual objects have been conceptualized, and the word is the result of that process and names all those visual objects."

There is no such thing as a "Final Authority in Ethics" because there is no such thing as a final authority in epistemology.

Edited September 24, 2010 by Plasmatic

[Grames]

One cannot have a "type" without achieving a unit. Once one has a unit and reaches the conceptual level ostensive definition does not apply.

Does it really not occur to you that the quotes you use refute your own position?

Ostensive definitions are usually regarded as applicable only to conceptualized sensations. But they are applicable to axioms as well.

For conceptualized sensations and axioms there are units (this, that, and the other thing are shades of red; this, that, and the other thing are existents) and yet the ostensive definition is not just the first definition but also the last definition and the only definition.

The rules of correct definition are derived from the process of concept-formation.

Which means it is quite impossible to require a formal verbal definition before forming any concepts. If the rules of definition are derived from concept-formation, but we cannot have any concepts without definitions then you have created a vicious circle that prevents anyone from ever having the first thought.

"Don't forget that the visual objects have been conceptualized, and the word is the result of that process and names all those visual objects."

Yes, a word that applies to a type is a concept, not a proper noun. When a child learns that 'doggy' does not just apply to the dog that lives in his own house but also the neighbor's dog and the dogs on TV and dogs in his picture book and all things of that type then the light has gone on. That is the "Helen Keller moment".

That Helen Keller even had her special moment of grasping the sign language symbol for water is evidence and proof that your theory is wrong.

The "final authority" comment goes to your insistence that a concept must have a verbal definition. Well then, which definition? To even attempt to answer that question once and for all for everybody is authoritarian. You are setting up yourself or somebody else to be the final authority in epistemology by deciding what the correct definitions are for concepts. You will deny that anyone is even capable of thinking conceptually without a verbal definition. That attacks objectivity at the root.

[Plasmatic]

Does it really not occur to you that the quotes you use refute your own position?

Ostensive definitions are usually regarded as applicable only to conceptualized sensations. But they are applicable to axioms as well.

For conceptualized sensations and axioms there are units (this, that, and the other thing are shades of red; this, that, and the other thing are existents) and yet the ostensive definition is not just the first definition but also the last definition and the only definition.

It occurs to me that exactly what I was concerned about with making a quick post has happened. I forgot to qualify my comment.[ as I mentioned in the other thread.] I did think though from the prior context it was clear that we are excludung axioms and conceptualized sensations. It also occurs to me I have focused on the wrong response to your comment:

The names assigned to types of things at the first level are words, so your pre-language argument is not going to work.

The above is a concession that first-level concepts do "ascribe a characteristic to every member of an unlimited class" and are NOT the pre-conceptual perceptual groups of the implicit concept where man holds his concepts visually. Once you give it a name/word ("a sensuous concrete" ) you have completed the process and risen to the conceptual level.

When I said:

And therefore acheives generality attributing an essential charachteristic to all of a given class within a range.

You said:

First level concepts are first defined ostensively. An ostensive definition attempts no attribution of an essential characteristic

The above is what I was thinking of when I said :

Are you trying to drop the claim that ostensive defintion applies to first level concepts then?

It is not the definition that I should have made the point. But that the definition follows from the process of forming the concept itself! A definition identifies an essential characteristic because it is following the conceptualization process itself which "ascribes a characteristic to every member of an unlimited class" .

The whole point is that you where claiming that first level concepts are not units but perceptual and "'not the product of inference or computation by consciousness" ! The only stage that would be related to your [Kelly's] "directness" is "pre-conceptual", that is, perceptual stage.

The "final authority" comment goes to your insistence that a concept must have a verbal definition. Well then, which definition? To even attempt to answer that question once and for all for everybody is authoritarian. You are setting up yourself or somebody else to be the final authority in epistemology by deciding what the correct definitions are for concepts. You will deny that anyone is even capable of thinking conceptually without a verbal definition. That attacks objectivity at the root.

Ive clarified what I was trying to comment on in relation to definitions.However your interpretation of that article is exactly the wrong one. Exactly the type of interpretation I suspect the society linked to at the bottom of the page is founded on.

My posting that quote :

The rules of correct definition are derived from the process of concept-formation

affirms that both are a result of :

The requirements of cognition (and the principle of unit-economy)

Which affirms the fact that , in answer to the question "who decides" the only answer is "Reality" or "The requirements of cognition determine the objective criteria of conceptualization" as well as definition.

Edited September 27, 2010 by Plasmatic

[Grames]

It occurs to me that exactly what I was concerned about with making a quick post has happened. I forgot to qualify my comment.[ as I mentioned in the other thread.] I did think though from the prior context it was clear that we are excludung axioms and conceptualized sensations. It also occurs to me I have focused on the wrong response to your comment:

We cannot exclude them. We each are trying to say something is true of all concepts, so there can be no setting aside of troublesome cases and deadly counterexamples.

The above is a concession that first-level concepts do "ascribe a characteristic to every member of an unlimited class" and are NOT the pre-conceptual perceptual groups of the implicit concept where man holds his concepts visually. Once you give it a name/word ("a sensuous concrete" ) you have completed the process and risen to the conceptual level.

It is not the definition that I should have made the point. But that the definition follows from the process of forming the concept itself! A definition identifies an essential characteristic because it is following the conceptualization process itself which "ascribes a characteristic to every member of an unlimited class" .

The whole point is that you where claiming that first level concepts are not units but perceptual and "'not the product of inference or computation by consciousness" ! The only stage that would be related to your [Kelly's] "directness" is "pre-conceptual", that is, perceptual stage.

As I understand you, you are claiming that if we have a concept then we must have a definition in the form of a proposition that ascribes an essential characteristic to every member of an unlimited class. I think you claim this because definitions are made before the concept-formation process is complete.

But that is not necessarily true.

Above the level of conceptualized sensations and metaphysical axioms, every concept requires a verbal definition. Paradoxically enough, it is the simplest concepts that most people find it hardest to define—the concepts of the perceptual concretes with which they deal daily, such as "table," "house," "man," "walking," "tall," "number," etc. There is <ioe2_50> a good reason for it: such concepts are, chronologically, the first concepts man forms or grasps, and can be defined verbally only by means of later concepts—as, for instance, one grasps the concept "table" long before one can grasp such concepts as "flat," "level," "surface," "supports." Most people, therefore, regard formal definitions as unnecessary and treat simple concepts as if they were pure sense data, to be identified by means of ostensive definitions, i.e., simply by pointing.

<snip 2 paragraphs>

In fact and in practice, so long as men are able to identify with full certainty the perceptual referents of simple concepts, it is not necessary for them to devise or memorize the verbal definitions of such concepts.

Edited September 27, 2010 by Grames

[Plasmatic]

We cannot exclude them. We each are trying to say something is true of all concepts, so there can be no setting aside of troublesome cases and deadly counterexamples.

What? I have no clue what you would be saying is true of "all" concepts. Particularly since you have explicitly stated that you wish to:

restrict the scope of my "... in any way" to first level concepts, if that was not already clear to anyone reading this. If you exempt first level concepts from your idea that concept formation involves induction this dispute would be resolved.

Besides axioms and conceptualized sensations are grasped explicitly far later than the first-level no matter what definition they have.

As I understand you, you are claiming that if we have a concept then we must have a definition in the form of a proposition that ascribes an essential characteristic to every member of an unlimited class. I think you claim this because definitions are made before the concept-formation process is complete.

I clarified, "It is not the definition that I should have made the point. But that the definition follows from the process of forming the concept itself! A definition identifies an essential characteristic because it is following the conceptualization process itself which "ascribes a characteristic to every member of an unlimited class" .

The debate we are having is whether or not first-level concepts are inductive.

But that is not necessarily true.

ITOE pg 50 said:

Above the level of conceptualized sensations and metaphysical axioms, every concept requires a verbal definition. Paradoxically enough, it is the simplest concepts that most people find it hardest to define—the concepts of the perceptual concretes with which they deal daily, such as "table," "house," "man," "walking," "tall," "number," etc. There is <ioe2_50> a good reason for it: such concepts are, chronologically, the first concepts man forms or grasps, and can be defined verbally only by means of later concepts—as, for instance, one grasps the concept "table" long before one can grasp such concepts as "flat," "level," "surface," "supports." Most people, therefore, regard formal definitions as unnecessary and treat simple concepts as if they were pure sense data, to be identified by means of ostensive definitions, i.e., simply by pointing.

<snip 2 paragraphs>

In fact and in practice, so long as men are able to identify with full certainty the perceptual referents of simple concepts, it is not necessary for them to devise or memorize the verbal definitions of such concepts.

Yes indeed! You have found one of the instances where Rand discusses the "pre-conceptual" stage of "holding concepts visually"! The important thing to note is that if "table" is not a unit it is preconceptual.

[Plasmatic]

For the sake of clarity and Integrity ,this comment of mine:

The only time that "table, cat, dog" and "horse" can be said to be "defined ostensively" is in the preconceptual stage! In order to have an explicit concept one MUST perform measurement omission and create a unit.

Now as I have said, one cannot do this [form a complete unit and "rise to the conceptual level" ] without "ascribing a characteristic to every member of an unlimited class".

Really should have been this:

The only time that "table, cat, dog" and "horse" can be said to be "defined ostensively" perceptual / visual is in the preconceptual stage! In order to have an explicit concept one MUST perform measurement omission and create a unit.

Now as I have said, one cannot do this [form a complete unit and "rise to the conceptual level" ] without "ascribing a characteristic to every member of an unlimited class".

This should help to highlight what truly is at issue.

[Grames]

What? I have no clue what you would be saying is true of "all" concepts. Particularly since you have explicitly stated that you wish to:

I encompass all concepts in my claim that they are ultimately not inductive either directly because they are first level or by hierarchical dependence they are founded upon another concept which was not given inductively. Only first level concepts are literally not inductive. It is not true that all knowledge is inductive and there are no free-floating fragments of knowledge that are the products of only induction.

Besides axioms and conceptualized sensations are grasped explicitly far later than the first-level no matter what definition they have.

The colors, smells, tastes and sounds are among the first things any child learns to name and are perfect examples of exactly what a first level concept is. Even axioms are first level in that nothing is hierarchically prior, meaning no earlier concept is required before grasping the axioms.

I find that you don't even understand what it means for a concept to be first level. That is the root of our disagreement.

I clarified, "It is not the definition that I should have made the point. But that the definition follows from the process of forming the concept itself! A definition identifies an essential characteristic because it is following the conceptualization process itself which "ascribes a characteristic to every member of an unlimited class".

I don't know what you mean by "follows". You either mean "logically caused by or conforms to" or "comes after in time; chronologically later". The latter meaning would contradict "first-level concepts are inductive", so I took you to mean the former and that definition is prior to the completion of concept formation. Do you agree or disagree with this?

Yes indeed! You have found one of the instances where Rand discusses the "pre-conceptual" stage of "holding concepts visually"! The important thing to note is that if "table" is not a unit it is preconceptual.

It is inexplicable how you cling to the notion that "table" and "blue" are not really concepts when they are and Rand names them and treats them as examples of concepts. They are full blown mature concepts, not larval pre-concepts or implicit concepts. You might want to try explicitly distinguishing between those stages and citing Rand in support, because they don't mean what you think they mean if you come to the conclusion the "blue" is not really a concept until one learns that it corresponds to so many nanometers of wavelength of light, or that a "table" is not a concept until one defines it as a type of furniture with flat level surface and supports. When a particular color is perceived and is identified as blue then that is also identifying it as a unit of the concept "blue" (equivalently, simultaneously, and immediately), and a definition is not a kind of qualifier or prerequisite that could prevent that from being true.

[Plasmatic]

I encompass all concepts in my claim that they are ultimately not inductive either directly because they are first level or by hierarchical dependence they are founded upon another concept which was not given inductively. Only first level concepts are literally not inductive.

This seems like word salad to me. All means all.

The colors, smells, tastes and sounds are among the first things any child learns to name and are perfect examples of exactly what a first level concept is. Even axioms are first level in that nothing is hierarchically prior, meaning no earlier concept is required before grasping the axioms.

Your doing it again. You keep equating first-level with axioms and conceptualized sensations. Nobody conceptualizes sensations or grasps axioms on the first level!

AR: To reach axiomatic concepts consciously, you have to have a certain amount of knowledge about epistemology. You do not need knowledge of a full, philosophical theory of epistemology, but you have to have the self-consciousness to identify explicitly certain elements in your knowledge which have been implicit up to then. It requires a sufficient amount of knowledge and a very significant degree of introspection. The ability to introspect is necessary to begin to identify the implicit explicitly. And for that there has to be the material of introspection. So you have to have a sufficient knowledge both of the outside world and of the process of your own consciousness before you can begin to identify the widest abstractions.

A percept is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism. It is in the form of percepts that man grasps the evidence of his senses and apprehends reality. When we speak of "direct perception" or "direct awareness," we mean the perceptual level. Percepts, not sensations, are the given, the self-evident. The knowledge of sensations as components of percepts is not direct, it is acquired by man much later: it is a scientific, conceptual discovery.

I find that you don't even understand what it means for a concept to be first level. That is the root of our disagreement.

Our disagreement is indeed on what exactly is a first level concept. Im beginning to suspect that the "root" of it will not be solved by quoting ITOE...

I don't know what you mean by "follows". You either mean "logically caused by or conforms to" or "comes after in time; chronologically later". The latter meaning would contradict "first-level concepts are inductive", so I took you to mean the former and that definition is prior to the completion of concept formation. Do you agree or disagree with this?

No , I dont agree. But I cant blame you for being confused until I clarified.

It is inexplicable how you cling to the notion that "table" and "blue" are not really concepts when they are and Rand names them and treats them as examples of concepts. They are full blown mature concepts, not larval pre-concepts or implicit concepts. You might want to try explicitly distinguishing between those stages and citing Rand in support, because they don't mean what you think they mean if you come to the conclusion the "blue" is not really a concept until one learns that it corresponds to so many nanometers of wavelength of light, or that a "table" is not a concept until one defines it as a type of furniture with flat level surface and supports. When a particular color is perceived and is identified as blue then that is also identifying it as a unit of the concept "blue" (equivalently, simultaneously, and immediately), and a definition is not a kind of qualifier or prerequisite that could prevent that from being true

Hopefully the above along with this quote will clear this up for you.

Im gonna have to post quite a bit of quotes from ITOE:

Prof. D: There's still some puzzlement concerning the difference between "unit" and "concept." Take the stage of concept-formation where a child regards certain entities as resembling each other. A child is observing these three notepads, and they are just entities so long as he does not show that he is treating them as distinct from other objects.

AR: Okay.

Prof. D: But now he notices similarities and differences, and treats these as related together and distinguished from some other things. So these three objects are at this point units. But has he thereby arrived at the point of conceptualizing them? As far as I can see there is one more step involved in this unification, according to the definition given of "concept" on page 10: "A concept is a mental integration of two or more units which are isolated according to specific characteristics and united by a specific definition."

AR: Aren't you confusing two aspects here? The definition on page 10 refers to what a concept is—it refers to the product of the process. But now you are describing the process. Well now, as a process yes, you first have to separate them as you described. And in the process of deciding that these three have something in common and are different from others, you are treating them as a unit. You are now looking at them not only as three blue objects, but three units of one group that have something in common as against everything else.

Prof. D: I've described the process, but I have arrived also at a product which is: these regarded as units. Now at that point do I have the concept of "pad," or do I still have something further to do, a further integration to make, before the product would be a concept?

AR: Yes. You have to give it a name. <ioe2_168>

Prof. D: Oh, give it a name—not "united by a specific definition"?

AR: A definition would be involved in more complex subjects, but on the first level, you don't have to have a definition. None of us would use a definition of "table," but in fact a definition is possible. In regard to a higher complexity of concepts, however, you couldn't possibly hold it in mind beyond a moment, without giving it a definition.

But here, as you described the process of forming a concept of three perceptual entities, when you've reached the point you described—that is, you now regard them as units of one group—that knowledge as such is not going to be a concept in your mind, for the following reason. In order to hold the group, you still have to mentally project, visualize, or deal with three entities. Therefore you are not yet mentally out of the stage of perceptual awareness.

Prof. D: In other words, at this stage there would be just this perceptual group.

AR: That's exactly what you would have: a perceptual group.

Prof. D: Now suppose I hadn't given them a name yet, and I go to another room. And there are some more of these notepads on a table. Would it mean that I wouldn't identify these, just automatically, as related?—that I would have to go through this integration over again, and then that integration would again be just at the perceptual level?

AR: No, it depends on how bright a child you are. I suspect—strictly by empirical observation—that a child does precisely this before he's ready to learn to speak. That is, to grasp that a word identifies a certain group of objects, he would probably be doing exactly what you describe. He would observe something in common in these pads, and then he goes into another room and he sees two more. He might connect them in his mind, so that if he could state his mental process, it would amount to: "Oh, these are something like the three I saw in the other room." Only he wouldn't have any of these words nor the concept "three." But it would be precisely by observing certain objects more <ioe2_169> than once and not necessarily only in one room—it's precisely by learning to differentiate, which I believe takes quite a period of time—that a child becomes ready to form the concept fully, which happens when he finds a word for it.

Prof. D: Now suppose this child tasted these, but he still doesn't have any words. And he tastes them and he likes them. But later when there aren't any in the room, he starts squalling. And his mother runs around wondering how to quiet him. She tries bringing him different objects, but nothing quiets him. And then she brings him one of these pads, and that quiets him, and he starts eating it. And so she says, "Why, he was crying for the pad all along." But he still doesn't have a name for these things. Isn't this behavior indicative of his approaching these now open-endedly? There wasn't even one in the room, and he was crying for it. And so one would have to say that even without a name these are being treated in an open-ended way rather than a purely perceptual way?

AR: Only to this extent: what you are describing is exactly the preconceptual stage.That is the mind in process. At the end of that process, he will be ready to grasp that a word names these objects.

Otherwise, observe the following. Infants in the first weeks of life are not able to learn words. Before they begin to speak, you observe that they are beginning to make sounds, inarticulate sounds, as if they were trying to communicate something. Therefore some enormous amount of information is already in their mind—perceptual information on its way to becoming conceptualized or brought into conceptual order. But in order for it to become a concept, the infant has to acquire some method of identifying the total of these objects conceptually. That's the purpose that a word serves. Because if he doesn't have a word, he will be tied to his perceptual material.

So assuming for a moment that he could learn to speak but without concepts, he would have to say to his mother the equivalent of: "I want another one of those blue objects which I saw day before yesterday." But he can't say any of that, nor can he hold it in his mind that way for very long. <ioe2_170>

Therefore, if your question is: at what point does this preliminary mental activity become a full-fledged concept? I say it becomes that when the child learns that a perceptual symbol—remember that a sound or the visual shape of a word is a percept—when he learns that that percept stands for all those concretes that he's trying to integrate.

Prof. D: The word takes him beyond the perceptual level because now he's not limited to the five pads he saw. But even without the word, though, in the case of the child I was referring to, isn't he already beyond the five pads he saw? He might have eaten the five.

AR: He wouldn't be there to ask for the sixth if he did.

Prof. D: But suppose he does the next day, though. He knows they are gone, and he's howling, and when he's brought a new one he's satisfied. And he smiles when he sees it being brought. Let's suppose that the presence of a word is necessary for the existence of a concept. Is it because the word open-ends the unification going on?

AR: It ends the process.

Prof. D: Didn't he already have it open-ended without the word? He went on to new ones.

AR: He has an open-ended identification from memory. He might remember that there were blue pads, and he would like more blue pads. But he couldn't hold more than, well, let's say five identifications of that kind. Maybe he'll remember the five pads and two ashtrays and three pens. But if each time he has to hold it by a visual type of memory, or by taste if he's eaten it, without any other form of identification, it would be impossible for him to progress beyond that stage.

Prof. D: You say that the word, then, permits him to let go, as it were, of visual memory.

The word, though, is a sound that is denoting the concept, i.e., this group of things in an open-ended way.

AR: Right.

Prof. D: But now the meaning of the sound, then, is what it denotes.

AR: Right. <ioe2_171>

Prof. D: But what it denotes will have to be present to his mind.

AR: Well, certainly. But not every instance of it.

Prof. D: No, but what will be present to his mind again would be perceptual memories, wouldn't it?

AR: At first just the memory of one blue pad; as his conceptual development goes higher: the essential characteristics of the concretes which form the units of a given concept. It isn't that he lets go of concretes in the sense that he no longer has to know what his concept refers to. But he doesn't have to carry in mind the specific memory of all the different concretes of that kind which he has observed.

The key is "visual memory" versus a unit designated by a word.

Again :

There can be no such thing as a concept without the objects to which it refers. And conversely, a sound, if it is to be a word, cannot denote objects directly, without representing a concept. (A word which did that would be a proper name.) But a concept is only a mental unit, a symbol, for a number of concretes of a certain kind. Therefore, when I say words denote visual objects, I do not have to repeat: "Don't forget that the visual objects have been conceptualized, and the word is the result of that process and names all those visual objects."

Prof. G: The question I have deals with the concept "implicit." I want first to get at the general notion of "implicit" and then its meaning in the notions of "implicit concept," "implicit measurement," etc.

AR: Well, I would like to state my general definition, and then let's examine it.

The "implicit" is that which is available to your consciousness but which you have not conceptualized. For instance, if you state a certain proposition, implicit in it are certain conclusions, but you may not necessarily be aware of them, because a special, separate act of consciousness is required to draw these consequences and grasp conceptually what is implied in your original statement. The implicit is that which is available to you but which you have not conceptualized..............................................

.AR: You are wrong on the second but, as near as I understand you, you are right on the first: "implicit" is a knowledge which is available to you but which you have not yet grasped consciously. And by "grasped consciously" I mean: brought into conceptual terms. You have not identified it conceptually. So that, if I say that "existence" is implicit in the first awareness, I mean the material from which the concept "existence" will come is present, but the child just learning concepts would not be able to form the <ioe2_161> concept "existence" until he has formed a sufficient number of concepts of particular existents.

Prof. G: What I would like to do is to get a better understanding of the nature of that awareness. Let's consider the notion of "implicit concept." You state, on page 6, that when one has an implicit concept, one grasps the constituents of what may later be integrated into a concept.

AR: Yes.

Prof. G: Now, I take it that, in this sense of "implicit," there is a form of awareness here which is below the level of the explicit. There is no formulation on the part of the person involved.

AR: It simply means just what I said. It is not yet conceptualized, but it is available. Therefore, if you substitute the definition "conceptualized or not" for "explicit and implicit," it will be perfectly clear.

By the way what we are debating reflects heavily on Dr. Peikoffs theory of induction.........

[Grames]

Your doing it again. You keep equating first-level with axioms and conceptualized sensations. Nobody conceptualizes sensations or grasps axioms on the first level!

On the contrary, everybody conceptualizes sensations and grasps axioms on the first level because that is the only way possible.

Nobody would ever think of an axiomatic concept without a reason to. Ayn Rand describes what is required before there is a motivation to take up the issue in the chapter on axiomatic concepts. The axiomatic concepts themselves remain first level because the referents are given directly in perception.

After the first discriminated sensation (or percept), man's subsequent knowledge adds nothing to the basic facts designated by the terms "existence," "identity," "consciousness"—these facts are contained in any single state of awareness; but what is added by subsequent knowledge is the epistemological need to identify them consciously and self-consciously.

Do you claim that from this sentence"The knowledge of sensations as components of percepts is not direct, it is acquired by man much later: it is a scientific, conceptual discovery." it follows that "blue" is not first level? The analysis of cognitive thought into the three stages of sensations, perceptions and conceptions is later, but everybody starts at the level of percepts as the epistemological given. Blue is first found at the perceptual level and then named and conceptualized before there is any self-awareness of the process of concept formation or of perceiving, let alone sensing.

Our disagreement is indeed on what exactly is a first level concept.

Then put in your own words what a first level concept is. Quoting Rand is insufficient because you don't read her the way I do (the correct way )

Im gonna have to post quite a bit of quotes from ITOE:

The key is "visual memory" versus a unit designated by a word.

Again :

All of these quotes, what does any of this have to do with first level concepts? When I invoke a child in a discussion of first level concepts, I do not mean to refer to a gurgling infant (as Professor D does) but a speaking child learning words and concepts. A child grasps the concept blue when he has the word "blue" and uses it to group together the shades of blue and refer to them distinctly apart from other colors. He has a complete understanding of what "blue" refers to that will be true forever and he did not need to know anything else a priori to the experience of seeing blue colored things: he understands "blue" at the first level. If there are no words there are no concepts. All of these quotes about wordless visual memory are just off topic.

The distinction between "explicit and implicit" concepts is "conceptualized or not", and if you will kindly notice that makes no distinction or claim whatsoever about what level of concept is discussed. First level concepts can be implicit.

[Plasmatic]

This new draft by Prof. McCaskey nudged me to return to this thread:

http://www.johnmccaskey.com/joomla/images/for-download/PittVolume.pdf

"Third, maybe induction is a vexing problem to us because we took a wrong turn somewhere. Maybe there is something good in the old view. Consider: Our professor continues the lecture by putting up his photo of a black Australian swan. ―Even if all the swans you‘ve ever seen are white, what happens when you then go to Australia and see this, a black swan? With induction, you can never be certain.‖ A student replies, ―But that black thing is not a swan.‖ ―Of course it‘s a swan.‖ ―No, it‘s not.‖ ―Yes, it is.‖ ―No, it‘s not.‖ There is simply no way to know whether all swans are white without criteria for knowing what is and is not a swan. There is something right in the old idea that, at bottom, induction is about forming good, well-defined concepts; that if your concepts are ill-delimited, no universal proposition using them will be possible; and that if you get the concepts right the universal statements will follow straightaway....."Aristotle‘s most frequent use of the noun ―induction‖ (epagōgē) or the adjective ―inductive‖ (epaktikos, as in epaktikos logos, ―inductive reasoning‖) is in the Topics. Early in the first book, in a short chapter introducing induction, Aristotle gives this definition: ―Induction . . . is a proceeding from particulars to a universal.‖3 The definition has been conventional ever since, but there is an ambiguity here. Did Aristotle mean proceeding from the observation of particular things to formation of a universal concept? Or did he mean proceeding from particular propositions to the statement of a universal proposition? That is, is induction primarily a process for forming universal concepts or for forming universal propositions? Is it a process of conceptual abstraction, the result of which can then ground universal statements, or is it at bottom a process of propositional inference? Using modern terminology: In human cognition does ampliation take place fundamentally at the conceptual level or at the propositional level?"

Now, I will add to the previous discussion of what a first level concept is to me. I follow Ms. Rand in affirming :

"the fact that functions can be observed perceptually is not the essential issue" and when determining first level concepts, "All the things which you can perceive directly [and conceptualize] without pressupposing in that concept some other conceptual material,those are first-level concepts." ITOE

Edit:

I also want to add, in order to correct my attribution to Kelly what was claimed by someone else, this quote:

"

Between the percept and inferential knowledge lies the perceptual judgment,

the conceptual identification of what is directly perceived-e.g., "This is a

table."the acquisition of the concept involved ("table") depends on the awareness of

patterns of similarity among objects. Hence the perceptual judgment is not a form of direct awareness; the entire conceptual level is indirect."

Edited October 21, 2012 by Plasmatic