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What Is Logic?

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More comments on the rest of the Categories to follow.

They are welcome if they are relevant to the two topics of this thread:

Specific topic: What is logic?

General, background topic: How should we form definitions?

Otherwise, you might want to start a new thread.

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Ayn Rand tells us in ITOE (quoted from ARL, pages 262-263 in my edition) that logic is not only a fundamental concept of method, but it is *the* fundamental concept of method:

"The Fundamental concept of method, the one on which all the others depend, is *logic*. the distinguishing characteristic of logic (the art of non-contradictory identification) indicates the nature of the actions (actions of consciousness required to achieve a correct identification) and their goal (knowledge)--while omitting the length, complexity or specific steps of the process of logical inference, as well as the nature of the particular cognitive problem invovled in any given instance of using logic."

The genus of logic is therefore "concept of method".

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"The Fundamental concept of method, the one on which all the others depend is *logic*."

Ayn Rand here tells us that the genus of logic is *concept of method.*

"The distinguishing characteristic of logic (the art of non-contradictory identification) indicates the nature of the actions (actions of consciousness required to achieve a correct identification) . . . ."

Ayn Rand here tells us that the differentia (distinguishing characteristic) of logic are actions required to achieve a "correct" (non-contradictory) identification. But a non-contradictory identification of what?

"Logic is man's method of reaching conclusions *objectively* by deriving them without contradcition from the facts of reality--ultimately, from the evidence provided by man's senses." (_Leonard Peikoff_"Nazism and Subjectivism"_quoted in ARL_p. 263)

Given the above, one working definition of logic *might* be:

Logic is man's method of making non-contradictory identifications from the facts of reality.

The problem with this (my) definition is that it was made deductively (it is rationalistic).

Quite frankly, I think to gain deeper insight into the nature of logic, one would have to undertake a slow reading of Aristotle's Organon, a slow listening of Dr. Peikoff's tapes on inductive reasoning, a slow reading of Ayn Rand's ITOE and of Dr. Peikoff's tapes on logic, all with while focusing on formulating a definition of logic.

In addition, Dr. Binswanger has also commented on this subject (as one poster on this thread has pointed out) and his commentary on the nature of logic would also deserve a slow reading.

One would have to also investigate the principles of formulating definitions.

After all this, one would then have to look at reality and then give many examples of increasing complexity, going up the heirarchy of concepts to formulate and validate one's definition of logic.

All this is a task that could easily consume a lifetime.

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RichardParker, I think you have your priorities mixed up. In order to gain a deeper insight into the nature of logic, you must first and foremost look to reality. You may let Aristotle, Rand, Peikoff, Binswanger, and whomever else you wish be your guides - but they are only guides, and are neither a replacement for nor primary to reality.

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. . .  .  In order to gain a deeper insight into the nature of logic, you must first and foremost look to reality. You may let Aristotle, Rand, Peikoff, Binswanger, and whomever else you wish be your guides - but they are only guides, and are neither a replacement for nor primary to reality.

Looking at what some of the best rational thinkers have said or written about logic in the past (remote or near) is looking at reality.

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They are welcome if they are relevant to the two topics of this thread:

Specific topic: What is logic?

General, background topic: How should we form definitions?

Otherwise, you might want to start a new thread.

I have some questions which pertain to both of these topics.

Isn't everything and anything that Aristotle says in the Organon, including what he says in the Categories relevent to the specific topic "What is logic"?

Since the general topic of "how we should form definitions" is impossible to anwswer without first understanding and answering the first (What is logic?), shouldn't we attempt to answer the first topic first?

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Isn't everything and anything that Aristotle says in the Organon, including what he says in the Categories relevent to the specific topic "What is logic"?

Since the general topic of "how we should form definitions" is impossible to anwswer without first understanding and answering the first (What is logic?), shouldn't we attempt to answer the first topic first?

I. In answer to your two particular questions ...

I would say that only a sentence by sentence reading of Aristotle's Categories could answer the first question. That involves more time than I am interested in devoting to it. Authors often make statements that are not directly related to a particular topic. For example, I would not be surprised that Aristotle made comments about other subjects -- such as metaphysics (ontology) -- when he discusses predication (what we say about things). (The title Categories, or kategoriae in Greek, if I recall correctly, means "predications.")

Here is a related and relevant question: Did Aristotle have a concept for logic in the Objectivist meaning of that term (concept)? If so, what word did Aristotle, the father of logic, use to name that idea? Offhand, I don't know. My Greek dictionary, Liddell and Scott Intermediate, says Aristotle did use the term logikos (an adjective) to mean "logical." However logic as an art was a phrase apparently invented by Cicero, nearly 200 years later.

In answer to the second question, I would say that if we are forming a new concept -- such as logic would be if no one had already formed it -- we should and must proceed inductively. That is, we would need to know the elements of logic first, and then -- using the elements as referents -- form the concept from them. If we are trying to understand a concept already formulated by someone else in our division of labor society, then we could start with her definition (actually, the full concept) and then proceed to examine particular things (such as the nature of syllogisms) as referents and see if they fit the idea we started with.

II. In answer to the question which I believe underlies your two particular questions -- Where does one start? -- I would say you are aiming at the very question that motivated me to initiate this thread: Cognitively, where should one start, particularly in formulating a definition of a concept, but generally too?

The more I think about this, the more I conclude that this is the answer: It doesn't matter where one starts as long as one keeps looking for facts, keeps integrating conclusions with other knowledge, and, in all this, keeps alert for contradictions. In thinking, as in baseball, we have to touch all the "bases," but unlike baseball, thinking does not always require that we run in a particular sequence (first base, then second base ...).

The question of where one should start in a particular problem is a psychological problem, not a philosophical problem. By psychological problem, I mean it involves a procedure appropriate for a particular person (with a particular body of knowledge), thinking at a particular time, and with a particular purpose in mind. Another individual may reach the same conclusion, but in a different sequence of mental events.

The issue of which idea is more fundamental in a hierarchy of knowledge would be a philosophical problem, because everyone can address it in the same way. Philosophy deals with the universal; psychology deals with the individual.

Now I have a question for you: Do you disagree with the sequence of steps I outline in the first post of this thread? If so, what procedure would you recommend?

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My Greek dictionary, Liddell and Scott Intermediate, says Aristotle did use the term logikos (an adjective) to mean "logical." However logic as an art was a phrase apparently invented by Cicero, nearly 200 years later.

Burgess, I'm sure you already know this, but since you didn't mention this (surprisingly), I will. The Greek word for reason is logos, and logikos is porbably a modified adjective of that. So I wouldn't attribute the invention of this to Cicero. Cicero was the translator of Aristotle into Latin, and he was probably the first one to create/apply the Latin word 'logic' for this process.

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What is the relationship between logic and reason? (I think this would help in the understanding of logic)

I have heard the terms used interchangeably among many non-Objectivists--and I assume this is not appropriate. The definition of reason:

From Galt's speech:

Man cannot survive except by gaining knowledge, and reason is his only means to gain it. Reason is the faculty that perceives, identifies and integrates the material provided by his senses. The task of his senses is to give him the evidence of existence, but the task of identifying it belongs to his reason, his senses tell him only that something is, but what it is must be learned by his mind.

All thinking is a process of identification and integration. Man perceives a blob of color; by integrating the evidence of his sight and his touch, he learns to identify it as a solid object; he learns to identify the object as a table; he learns that the table is made of wood; he learns that the wood consists of cells, that the cells consist of molecules, that the molecules consist of atoms. All through this process, the work of his mind consists of answers to a single question: What is it? His means to establish the truth of his answers is logic, and logic rests on the axiom that existence exists. Logic is the art of non-contradictory identification.

The closest definition I can find, for the word faculty, to how I think it is used here:

Any of the powers or capacities possessed by the human mind. See Synonyms at ability.  (The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition, from www.dictionary.com)

So is my understanding correct when I say that logic is the exercise of reason? If reason is an ability, and logic is a process--are they that closely related?

Or, is logic purely identification and reason has an extra aspect, integration, meaning it is a wider and more abstract concept? I think of integration as the identification of a relationship between two ideas, and that would fit inside the definition of logic.

I was under the impression that reason was a much more fundamental concept than logic--is there something I'm missing here?

Also, I must say I do not fully understand what is meant by perceiving the material provided by mans senses (part of reason). So--senses give rise to sensations, and reason automatically integrates them to the perceptual level? Is this right? But if reason is a faculty, and logic is a process, how come that isn't reversed?

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Now I have a question for you: Do you disagree with the sequence of steps I outline in the first post of this thread? If so, what procedure would you recommend?

No, I don't have any general disagreement with the sequence of steps you outline in the first post of this thread, but I'm unsure about the specifics as to how you intend to conduct this thread.

What I mean by this, for example, is that you seem to agree that a close reading of the Categories would be *mostly* relevant, but at the same time you do not wish to devote the amount of time that this would require (which is certainly understandable).

Let me elaborate further. Ayn Rand has implicitly and explicitly made several comments in regards to the first topic of this thread, i.e., "what is logic?" So we could focus on her particular corpus of writings (fiction and non-fiction), her statements on audio and video material available, etc. while at the same time drawing on examples from metaphysical reality (I’m drawing a distinction here between man-made reality [historical facts] such as what Miss Rand wrote and said about logic vs. our own observations drawn directly from our own-life-experiences).

But what if this approach is insufficient to fill in some gaps that might arise? Miss Rand on several occasions points to the "debt" she owed Aristotle, which I take to include the concept of Aristotelian logic.

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The more I think of this topic the more I'm beginning to realize several issues that I'm not fully clear on.

First, what is the distinction between logic and concept formation? Could it be that the concept 'reason' subsumes both logic and concept formation?

Second, while reason (in Objectivism) proceeds from sensations to percepts to concepts (induction), reason also subsumes deduction. What exactly is logic's role in this whole deductive and inductive process?

Another reason why I bring up concept formation is because it is related to Burgess’ second topic, i.e., the principles of forming definitions.

Burgess, I would like to elaborate further in regards to your question to me on whether I have any disagreement in regards to your outline in your first post on this thread. I agree that I would start with Ayn Rand, but more specifically, I would start with ITOE. I don’t see how anyone could possibly answer your background question on how to form definitions without going through ITOE, line by line.

In going through ITOE, I would not skip material as it pertains to concept formation, since what we are talking about here is trying to come up with a better understanding of one of the broadest abstractions (concepts) in existence (logic) and to come up with a more general idea of forming definitions, in an Objectivist context.

After going through ITOE, line by line, I would then probably take on Aristotle’s Organon.

I read ITOE nearly a decade ago, but I think I'm now ready to read it again. I'll post my thoughts on Burgess' two questions ("what is logic" and "how should we form definitions") as I go through ITOE and as they pertain to the topics of this thread.

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The Greek word for reason is logos, and logikos is porbably a modified adjective of that. So I wouldn't attribute the invention of this to Cicero. Cicero was the translator of Aristotle into Latin, and he was probably the first one to create/apply the Latin word 'logic' for this process.

This thread has long been dormant, but has now flared into life. Bear with me. I can barely keep up. I will try to respond to one point at a time. (The process is educational and enjoyable, but difficult for me. Perhaps some back-and-forth will clarify some of the issues arising from the original topic.)

First, Free Capitalist, you say that the "Greek word for reason is logos ...." My knowledge of Greek is primitive, but I see several ways to approach this issue. First, let's go from Greek to English. Yes, for some contexts, modern English translators translate the Greek word logos as "reason." However, keep in mind that logos is highly ambiguous. You can see in your Greek dictionary the wide range of referents: everything from "word" as used inside the mind (the basic meaning) to the inward thought itself to a proverb to a whole narration to reason (as intellectual activity, the most extended meaning listed).

Based on a general inference from a smattering of reading of parts of various Greek philosophers' texts, I would say that the Greeks in general did not mean the same thing by "reason" that Ayn Rand means. Plato is the best example. He and many other Greek philosophers were rationalistic. To them "reason" meant orderly mental activity -- independent of sense-perception. That is radically different from Ayn Rand's meaning which ties the activity of reason to sense-perception.

Here is another example of how important it is to not assume that the Greeks meant the same thing by logos that we mean by "reason." In the Categories, 16b26, Aristotle uses the term logos to mean "sentence."

We cannot, therefore, always assume that logos means "reason." And even when the word "reason" might initially seem to be the best equivalent, the reader must wonder, "Did Aristotle or any other Greek writer mean the same thing by 'reason' that Ayn Rand meant?" From the little of Aristotle's writings I have studied, I cannot say with complete confidence that he had the same concept. I have no doubt that implicitly he was talking about the same thing -- that is, the same elements are referred to, but did Aristotle actually have a single concept (a certain kind of idea with a name labeling it) that is the same as Ayn Rand's? Or to take a more striking contrast, did Aristotle mean the same thing by "reason" (perhaps logos) that Kant meant by "reason" Vernunft?

The modern reader of translated ancient texts must constantly be on guard against the pitfall of reading his own modern meanings back into the ancient texts.

Free Capitalist, you say too that logikos is probably a modified adjective of logos. The suffix -ikos indicates that the word is a form of adjective, does it not? Or have I forgotten my basic Greek over the years? (According to my dictionary, the word logos itself is a verbal noun derived from the verb lego, "I say, tell.")

Further, you say Cicero was the translator of Aristotle into Latin. That is news to me. What is your evidence? Which works of Aristotle did Cicero translate into Latin?

Still further, you say Cicero was the first to create/apply the Latin word for "logic" (either logica or dialectica?) to this process. What process are you talking about? Do you mean logic (as we define it)? If so, what is your evidence for saying that Aristotle saw logic (as we define it) as a process? And what is your evidence for saying Cicero was the first to make that translation?

The last question I would raise is the basic one for any discussion of Aristotle's view of logic: What Greek word -- if any -- did Aristotle use that names the idea of "the art of noncontradictory identification"? I would suggest tentatively that he had no such word because he had no such idea. Instead, the terms he used (perhaps sullogismos and analusis as examples?) name elements of logic, rather than logic as a whole.

A Dr. Mayhew or Dr. Gotthelf could answer such questions with the snap of a finger. That is what comes from having expertise.

I have no expertise in any of these topics. Fire away!

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You can see in your Greek dictionary the wide range of referents: everything from "word" as used inside the mind (the basic meaning) to the inward thought itself to a proverb to a whole narration to reason (as intellectual activity, the most extended meaning listed).

This is interesting in light of my present confusion in regards to the distinction between concept formation and logic. If the basic meaning of logos is "word as used inside the mind", then this (my) confusion may in part be due to the ambiguous usages of the concept going back over two thousand years.

Here is another example of how important it is to not assume that the Greeks meant the same thing by logos that we mean by "reason." In the Categories, 16b26, Aristotle uses the term logos to mean "sentence."

So the referents of logos can extend from "word" to "sentence" to "reason."

Or to take a more striking contrast, did Aristotle mean the same thing by "reason" (perhaps logos) that Kant meant by "reason" Vernunft?

I presently have zero expertise in reading Greek, but I do have some expertise in reading German. I've only read selected bits and pieces of Kant's works in German over the years, so I can't presently offer any comments as to what Kant might have meant by vernunft. I can, however, offer the entymological root of vernunft in my German dictionary (pub. 1979) which is ratio. My German-English dictionary (pub. 1973) translates vernunft to "reason" and "judgement."

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What is the relationship between logic and reason? [...]

I have heard the terms used interchangeably among many non-Objectivists--and I assume this is not appropriate.  [...]

So is my understanding correct when I say that logic is the exercise of reason?  If reason is an ability, and logic is a process--are they that closely related?

Or, is logic purely identification and reason has an extra aspect, integration, meaning it is a wider and more abstract concept?  I think of integration as the identification of a relationship between two ideas, and that would fit inside the definition of logic. [...]

Also, I must say I do not fully understand what is meant by perceiving the material provided by mans senses (part of reason).  So--senses give rise to sensations, and reason automatically integrates them to the perceptual level?  Is this right? [...]

I believe your questions are entirely appropriate and pertinent. Here are my short-form answers as far as I have understood these problems.

Correct: reason and logic are not synonyms. Reason is the process by which we come to have knowledge of the world. Logic is the set of techniques (the "art," the method) that keeps us on track, that is, makes sure that reason's identifications are noncontradictory. Reason includes integration but also differentiation, deduction, induction, reduction, and other activities that help us know the world. See IOE for all the details as applied to concept formation (which is only one path of forming knowledge).

The senses provide sensations, which are inchoate. Perception turns the blobs of sensations into objects (entities). We don't see a field of light and dark data points; we see objects (if they are there to be seen). From that stage onward, reason can begin to integrate and differentiate in forming concepts and other ideas: "Oh, I see this object (a dog) is like (integration) this object (a cat), but is also unlike it (different sounds they make, size, bone structure, teeth, and so forth).

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The more I think of this topic the more I'm beginning to realize several issues that I'm not fully clear on.

Welcome to the club. That is why I started this thread.

First, what is the distinction between logic and concept formation?
Logic is an art, a method, a collection of techniques which we can apply to reason to keep reason on track in doing its job, which is to identify the nature of things in reality. Logic helps us make sure the identifications are correct, that is, they do not contradict each other (because nothing in reality contradicts anything else in reality). In other words logic is the particular set of knowledge that helps us make sure our ideas mirror the outside world.

Could it be that the concept 'reason' subsumes both logic and concept formation?

No, just as "heart" does not subsume "stethoscope." The latter is a tool for checking the former, and making sure that the former works right. Reason is the heart, so to speak, of knowledge; logic is a stethoscope that examines the heart's function. More precisely, logic is a toolkit of instruments, including a stethoscope.

(Concept formation is not a synonym of reason; concept formation is only one of many functions of reason.)

Second, while reason (in Objectivism) proceeds from sensations to percepts to concepts (induction), reason also subsumes deduction.  What exactly is logic's role in this whole deductive and inductive process?

Logic is the art, the method, the set of tools that we need to apply to reason (as a process), just as railway inspectors examine the ties and spikes and switches in a railyard -- to make sure the train follows the track (to an objective, that is, noncontradictory identification) and doesn't derail into the ditch (an illogical conclusion).

One way to make sure the idea of "logic" is objective and not floating, I have come to realize, is to repeatedly ask myself: What are the referents of the concept "logic"? My answer is that they are rules such as: (1) Make sure the conclusion of an argument (syllogism) contains terms found in the premises; and (2) Always check crucial ideas -- formed either through induction or deduction -- by reduction back to reality.

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If the basic meaning of logos is "word as used inside the mind", then this (my) confusion may in part be due to the ambiguous usages of the concept going back over two thousand years.

Concepts aren't ambiguous. Words are ambiguous. Somewhere in the Organon, Aristotle points out that ambiguity is inevitable. Why? Because there are more things in the world than we have words for, so some words must do double-duty. In other words (so to speak), a single word -- for example, "free" -- names various ideas which refer to various facts of reality (if the ideas are objective): Under no legal constraint and at no charge and available for a date on Saturday night.

For further clarification (I hope), I can point out that historians make the following distinctions in their fields of study:

- History of philosophy.

- Intellectual history.

- History of ideas.

- History of terms.

The history of terms, as a field of study, traces words themselves through time, even though a given word may name various ideas as times passes. "Reformation" is an example.

The history of ideas, as a field of study, traces ideas through time regardless of the words used to label them. Thus, perhaps, a historian of ideas might trace Aristotle's logos (as reason perhaps) into Roman culture where the term was ratio but the idea was the same maybe -- and then again, maybe it wasn't, because the Latins might have confused it with intellectus ("understanding").

Intellectual history, as a field of study, traces either (1) what intellectuals believed and did, or (2) what intellectuals believed as systems of thought, particularly as ideologies.

History of philosophy, as a field of study, identifies the nature of particular philosophies and perhaps their influence on their successors.

Etymology, not entomology, as I understand the idea, is the study (-logy) of the origin and therefore ancestry of words.

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No, just as "heart" does not subsume "stethoscope." The latter is a tool for checking the former, and making sure that the former works right. Reason is the heart, so to speak, of knowledge; logic is a stethoscope that examines the heart's function. More precisely, logic is a toolkit of instruments, including a stethoscope.

I think this is incorrect.

Logic is the essence of reason, just as the heart is the essence of the circulatory system. Logic is the engine of reason, just as a motor is the engine of a train. Logic is what drives reason.

Just as man's circulatory system serves the purpose of keeping man alive (or is a biological tool nature has evolved for his survival), so too logic serves as a tool within man's reason. Logic is in reason, just as the heart is in man.

A better anatomical analogy to properly understand this would be to say that the brain is in man, just as logic is in reason. Like man's brain which nature has evolved as a tool for man's survival, so too logic is the tool that drives reason. Just like man's brain is the biological-anatomical cause of man's consciousness, so too logic is the methodological cause of reason. Just as the brain is man's biological-anatomical essence, so too logic is the methodological essence of reason.

Reason subsumes logic and logic subsumes induction and deduction. Logic's method depends on the axiom of Identity (A is A) and the two corollaries of Identity: either or and no contradiction.

In other words, the conceptual common denominator (CCD) of deduction and induction is: A is A, either or and no contradiction. This entire package (induction and deduction with the CCD of A is A, either or and no contradiction) forms the concept "logic."

But the concept "reason" subsumes more than just logic. It also subsumes concept formation. It is within concept formation that the process of integration as well as differentiation are so crucial. All of this reason subsumes.

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The history of terms, as a field of study, traces words themselves through time, even though a given word may name various ideas as times passes. "Reformation" is an example.

In Categories 1a10 Aristotle says:

"When things have the name in common and the definition of being which corresponds to the name is the same, they are called synonymous. Thus, for example, both a man and an ox are animals. Each of these is called, by a common name, an animal, and the definition of being is also the same; for if one is to give the definition of each--what being an animal is for each of them--one will give he same definition." (_Barnes_The Complete Works of Aristotle_vol. 1_p. 3)

I have two questions that pertain to Burgess' informal definition of the history of terms and Aristotle's usage of the word synonymous:

I interpret Aristotle to mean that synonymous is not a synonym, as we understand the term today, but to mean that synonymous refers to what we today would call a genus. Is this another example of what Burgess means by "a given word may name various ideas as time passes?"

Did Aristotle speak in Attic Greek? In other words, if one were to take classes and/or make an attempt at self-study of ancient Greek in order to read original sources of Aristotle in non-translation, would Attic Greek be what one would study?

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[...] the brain is in man, just as logic is in reason.

I would like to step away from this discussion of analogies for a moment, and ask another set of questions -- for anyone to answer:

1. Is reason innate in man's mind?

2. Is logic innate in man's mind?

3. If each is not innate, then where does it come from?

The key to answering these questions, I believe, is making sure one knows what the referents of each concept -- reason, logic -- are.

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I would like to step away from this discussion of analogies for a moment, and ask another set of questions -- for anyone to answer:

1. Is reason innate in man's mind?

2. Is logic innate in man's mind?

3. If each is not innate, then where does it come from?

The key to answering these questions, I believe, is making sure one knows what the referents of each concept -- reason, logic -- are.

Concepts of method, such as logic, have no direct referents on the perceptual level of awareness (from ITOE, p. 35 and 36 in my version):

“The concepts of method are the link to the vast and complex category of concepts that represent integrations of existential concepts with concepts of consciousness, a category that includes most of the concepts pertaining to man’s actions. Concepts of this category have no direct referents on the perceptual level of awareness (though they include perceptual components) and can neither be formed nor grasped without a long antecedent chain of concepts.”

Concepts of method pertain (or refer) to systematic courses of action:

“A special sub-category of concepts pertaining to the products of consciousness is reserved for concepts of method. Concepts of method designate systematic courses of action devised by men for the purpose of achieving certain goals. The course of action may be purely psychological (such as a method of using one’s consciousness) or it may involve a combination of psychological and physical actions (such as a method of drilling for oil), according to the goal to be achieved.

Concepts of method are formed by retaining the distinguishing characteristics of the purposive course of action and of its goal, while omitting the particular measurements of both (_Ibid_).”

So what does all this mean, in the current context?

First and foremost, it means that any analogy that refers to specific perceptual concretes without specifying a particular course of action (such as “brain”, or “heart”) when referring to reason and logic is going to be insufficient.

But this was not the purpose of my analogies. The purpose of my analogies was to suggest that reason subsumes logic, an issue that is currently in dispute.

Since concepts of consciousness refer to specific courses of action (psychological or physical), it also means that reason or logic is not innate in man (if I understand the sense in which Burgess is asking his question). Any action (psychological or physical) requires volition, which requires non-deterministic action—free will.

But man is the rational animal, so what does this mean, in the current context?

It means that man has the capacity for rational[logical] action. If man chooses, then he can act rationally.

Burgess asks where does man’s capacity for rationality come from? This is actually not a question for philosophy, but for the science of biology. Since Burgess asked, however, I’ll answer—man’s rationality evolved over the course of several million years from a species of lower primate.

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1. Is reason innate in man's mind?

2. Is logic innate in man's mind?

3. If each is not innate, then where does it come from?

Reason is a faculty (for integrating the material provided by the senses). As such, it is innate in each man's mind, as a result (as Richard noted) of long evolution. That is what defines man -- the rational animal. "Rational" does not mean a particular individual uses reason, only that he has the faculty (capability, power) of doing so. Having a faculty is not a matter of choice. The faculty is innate. Using the faculty is a matter of choice.

On the other hand, logic is not a faculty. It is a body of knowledge about things such as syllogisms, knowledge used to develop ways (methods) of thinking. Logic is not innate. It must be learned. Systematic courses of action are not innate; they must be learned.

I see no way that the concept of an innate faculty can subsume a concept that refers to a kind of acquired knowledge.

I have confirmation through introspection. I "see" myself thinking. But then I also see myself stopping the thought process on a particular problem to ask myself, "Am I proceeding logically here? Have I just committed a fallacy?" In other words, I introspectively see myself reaching into a toolkit of knowledge about how to think objectively. That toolkit is logic. Reason does not subsume logic; it accesses (uses) it as a carpenter uses a tool.

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I think the question whether reason subsumes logic qua “innateness” confuses epistemology with metaphysics.

To say that reason is “innate” in man is a metaphysical statement of fact (in the sense that I now see how Burgess is using the term “innate”). It is simply a restatement of “man is the rational animal.”

To say that reason “subsumes” logic is an epistemological statement--it involves concept formation.

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I'd like to shift our focus somewhat.

"All thinking[REASONING] is a process of IDENTIFCATION and integration." (_GS, FNI, 153; pb 125_as quoted in ARL_p. 262_words in brackets and caps mine_)

". . . LOGIC (the art of non-contradictory IDENTIFICATION)." (_ITOE, 46._as quoted in ARL_p. 263_caps mine_)

If one allows the idea that "thinking" and "reasoning" are synonyms, then there is clearly a conceptual common denominator (CCD) between the two concepts "reasoning" and "logic."

I’m consequently beginning to think that my previous position that reason “subsumes” logic may be mistaken.

I think it might be that logic and reason together are subsumed by a broader abstraction.

In other words, I think that it might be the case that reason and logic together form another genus with the CCD of this genus being the process of identification.

My first thought was to say that this genus is consciousness, but consciousness is an axiomatic concept, so I’m presently not sure if this is correct.

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Did Aristotle speak in Attic Greek?  In other words, if one were to take classes and/or make an attempt at self-study of ancient Greek in order to read original sources of Aristotle in non-translation, would Attic Greek be what one would study?

I am not sure what dialect of Greek Aristotle spoke where he grew up in Macedonia. But yes, to study Aristotle you would study Attic Greek, that is, the Greek originally centered around the Attic peninsula, which includes the port of Athens.

Some Greeks wrote in other dialects -- Ionic or Doric, for example. Archimedes wrote in Doric. He lived in Sicily. The differences are not great.

Biblical writers later wrote koine ("common") Greek. However, Greek reading and writing scholars continued studying Attic Greek through the Roman Empire and into the Byzantine Empire (roughly 500 CE to 1400 CE).

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In other words, I think that it might be the case that reason and logic together form another genus with the CCD of this genus being the process of identification.

I would say that neither reason nor logic is a process of identification.

Wait! Before you fire back, consider this argument: Reason is a faculty (power, ability, potential) of identification, but it is not the identification process itself. Reasoning is the actual identification as a process (not as a faculty).

Likewise, logic is not identification. It is the way (art, method) of identification, but not the identification process itself.

My first thought was to say that this genus is consciousness, but consciousness is an axiomatic concept, so I’m presently not sure if this is correct.

This question gets us back to the question of how to find the genus of a thing. I don't know a formal procedure, but I strongly suspect that one point is that in looking for the genus of X and Y, we should look for the "closest" commonality that is at the same tme "far" enough away to give our differentia meaning.

For example, in looking for the genus of man -- in a philosophical context, not a biological one -- we would not say either of the following:

1. Man is a rational entity.

2. Man is a rational mammal.

Instead, we need to pick a genus -- animality -- that is in between because that allows us to make a contrast to the differentia (guiding force) while emphasizing commonality (motion, for example).

So to apply this, I would say that "consciousness" is too wide. "Cognition" would be better because it is "closer" to reason and logic. I do not know a better way of saying this. Perhaps the issue is a kind of commensurability or proportionality. That is, the "width" of the genus chosen should be proportional in some way to the differentia. I do not know how to specify that.

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