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A being a necessary condition for B means that B cannot occur without A. For instance, the television being turned on is a necessary condition for you watching the basketball game. When Kant talks about the "necessary conditions" for experience, he means those things that have to be true in order for us to actually have the experiences we have.

His use of the term (in English translation) is clearer. However, I see nothing to be gained by saying "necessary condition" rather than "condition." If A is a condition for B, then that alone means B won't happen unless A is there.

The main point of value to me personally is the one you made earlier: The reminder that Kant spoke of different kinds of logic in his usual manner, which is to classify and thereby delimit. Man ends up with a consciousness akin to a cattle stockyard: lots of movement throughout but only within an archipelago of confines.

What this means, I suspect, is disintegration. That is, the various "holding pens" for logic, for example, prevent seamless integration -- of fact and value, for example.

If that inference is correct, then this confirms my tentative conclusion that Kant was in fact primarily a skeptic -- though supposedly of the "moderate" kind. But I need to do more reading (dreadfully) of CPR first.

Fortunately for me, my primary interest in Kant is what he did to disseminate his ideas, not the ideas themselves. The former story is much clearer.

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I would recommend Henry Allison's "Kant's Transcendental Idealism" if you were interested in reading Kant (I'd probably recommend it instead of reading the actual Critique to be honest; Kant's prose is appalling). It's not an outline of the Critique but rather an interpretation, and one which I found a lot more defensible than most traditional works of Kant "scholarship".

I am not sure I understand the method you are suggesting. Do you mean read Allison's work in addition to reading CPR, either before or after or both? Or instead of CPR? If I did the latter, how would I ever be able to speak with confidence about Kant's CPR? I could only speak of Allison's interpretation of Kant, which wouldn't fit my purpose. (I am looking at one document per selected debater in the long reason/faith debate.)

I know how horribly some modern writers have mangled Ayn Rand's philosophy. I would need strong evidence for trusting any scholar's interpretation of Kant precisely because I suspect that Kant did not intend for everything in CPR to be understood. On the other hand, perhaps Allison's interpretation will be useful as a guide through the swamp. For that I will be grateful for the recommendation.

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His use of the term (in English translation) is clearer. However, I see nothing to be gained by saying "necessary condition" rather than "condition." If A is a condition for B, then that alone means B won't happen unless A is there.
Necessary and sufficient conditions is terminology from Leibniz which was very popular in Kant's day (and still today). I suppose you could just say 'condition' but adding 'necessary' removes potential ambiguity (is 'the rain' a condition for me getting wet? It certainly isnt a necessary condition, since I could become wet by jumping into the sea)

The main point of value to me personally is the one you made earlier: The reminder that Kant spoke of different kinds of logic in his usual manner, which is to classify and thereby delimit. Man ends up with a consciousness akin to a cattle stockyard: lots of movement throughout but only within an archipelago of confines.
I suppose you could see it like that, or you could just see it as trying to give a full analysis of logic as a whole, by means of its different parts. I disagree with the way in which he broke things down, but I dont see any problem with doing it in principle. The formal logic of the predicate calculus (for instance) is significantly different from the logic of critical thinking by which political arguments are assessed, and I think both would deserve a different (but related) treatment. In any case, I dont think these divisions of logic were Kant's innovation - I believe they were just the standard of the day. Aristotle broke his logic down into several different categories for instance (analytic v dialectic etc), and these generally survived.

If that inference is correct, then this confirms my tentative conclusion that Kant was in fact primarily a skeptic -- though supposedly of the "moderate" kind. But I need to do more reading (dreadfully) of CPR first.
I would say that claiming Kant is a sceptic involves either a misinterpretation, or a _very_ loose standard by which one is judged sceptical. In IOE Ayn Rand makes a claim along the lines of "all knowledge is human knowledge - it must be from the human point of view alone", and Kant isn't really being any more sceptical than this. Peikoff claimed in OPAR that Kant implied the fact we only have 'human knowledge' means that we can't ever obtain "real" knowledge, but I can find nothing whatsoever in Kant that supports this interpretation. Indeed, Kant is generally thought to have been doing the exact opposite to this. The primary philosophical views of the day, as promoted by people like Locke and Leibniz, was that the knowledge of finite beings such as humans was grossly inadequate when compared to some kind of "God's eye" view which apprehended objects either directly without the i (Leibniz's view), or by being able to fully grasp objects in their particular without having to deal with concepts and generalisations (Locke's view). One of Kant's main points was that this is a completely fallacious standard by which to judge human knowledge. He categorised all views along these lines as 'transcendental realism', which he then stated as being completely opposed to his own philosophy.
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I don't have a copy of the Critique handy, but I'll do the best I can off the top of my head. [...]

Kant subdivided logic into several categories. [...]

In summary:

GENERAL LOGIC
 Pure logic - abstracts away all conditions of objects
 Applied logic - deals with the cognitive function of humans; "how should we reason"

PARTICULAR LOGIC
 The logic of a particular science. Will vary depending on the objects investigated y that science

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC
 Abstracts away all empirical qualities of objects, but leaves behind those contributed by the understanding (their transcendental qualities)[/code]

He also went on to make several more subdivisions [...]

[right][post=63082][/post][/right]

This overview is very helpful for me, as I prepare to (shudder) reread [i]CPR[/i]. The question this classification system invites, though, is what is [i]logic[/i] -- not this type of logic or that type of logic, but [i]logic[/i]?

Working from your descriptions and from the somewhat confusing descriptions in the "logic" article in Caygill, [i]A Kant Dictionary[/i], I would say -- tentatively -- that [i]Logik [/i]for Kant meant, not the [i]art [/i]of noncontradictory identification, of course, but the [i]architecture [/i]of the mind in producing judgements. That matches what I remember from my first, confusing reading of CPR: It was about what this faculty X did by issuing such-and-such and working from so-and-so, in relation to those other faculties Y and Z. It reads as if it were a verbalized flow diagram of an oil refinery designed by Byzantine communists.

In effect, this study of mental architecture is epistemology, though that term apparently would have been anachronistic in Kant's time. (According to F. C. Beiser, [i]The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte[/i], p. 8 et al, the distinction between epistemology and metaphysics [as ontology] arose in the generation after Kant [1724-1804].)

P. S. -- Back to the issue of the skepticism of Kant in [i]CPR[/i]: One secondary reason I tenatively hold that position is Kant's style. After struggling through it for awhile, I finally concluded that the style which Kant [i]chose [/i]for that book was integrally connected with the theme: What you can know is very limited, and I just reinforced my theme by writing something no honest person can understand.

P. S. 2 -- A second bit of evidence leading me to tentatively lean toward essentializing [i]CPR [/i]as skeptical is one of the few clear statements in the book -- where he said he was limiting reason to make room for [i]Glaube[/i], that is, faith/belief. In effect, Kant [i]tells [/i]us he is supporting ("moderate") skepticism and why. (By the way, that statement is one of Kant's philosophical punch lines in [i]CPR[/i].)

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Does that seem bizarre? Sure does. But it fits perfectly with Immanuel Kant. In his earlier academic years he was noted for the erudition and entertainment of his lectures on traveling to far-away places -- to none of which he had ever gone. (He barely left Konigsberg during the 80 years of his life.) Commensurate with that, he -- according to Kuehn -- did believe that there are intelligent beings on other planets in the universe. He offered no evidence for their existence, except -- if I recall correctly -- as a "possibility." Now, that is rationalism.

Treating the arbitrary as a "possibility" is rationalism at its worst.

Treating the arbitrary as a possibility undercuts the very meaning of "non-contradictory identification" of reality.

Treating the arbitrary as a possibility undercuts the very meaning of logic. Logic becomes a type of "tool kit", floating somewhere, out there, without any moral context.

1. Reason is man's means of survival.

2. Reason subsumes logic.

Conclusion: logic is man's means of survival.

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This overview is very helpful for me, as I prepare to (shudder) reread CPR. The question this classification system invites, though, is what is logic -- not this type of logic or that type of logic, but logic?
I've no idea how Kant would have answered this, but speaking for myself, I'm not sure that it's possible to define logic in the way you want to, without either making it incredibly vague, or excluding large parts of what has traditionally been called logic. For instance, very little of what has been said in this thread seems to apply directly to specialised branches of mathematical logic, such as proof theory. Sure, you _could_ describe it as the 'art of non-contradictory identification', but this doesn't seem to capture the essentials of the discipline (non-contradictory identification is certainly involved, but then its involved in physics too), and I doubt it's what many logicians would use to describe their work. And if your definition of logic isnt one which would be accepted by most logicians then I think I'd be sceptical of it - it would be like defining 'science' in a way which excludes the activities carried out by the majority of biologists.

I think most of the definitions of logic in this thread have centered around the day-to-day use of logic, rather than taking into account the more formal aspects (Aristotle's syllogisms and modern symbollic logic for example). If you're looking for one short definition which nicely captures EVERYTHING which gets called logic, then I dont think youre going to find one. I'd prefer to define our day-to-day application of logic as "the art/craft/techne of non-contradictory identification", then define symbollic logic as "the formal study of reasoning", mathematical logic as "the study of formal systems" and so on. Yeah, some of them are sort of similar, but I dont think that they all have something in common which you could use to formulate one nice definition. The word 'logic' is just too broad - it's like trying to give a definition of 'beauty' which captures what one of Mozart's symphonies, Helen of Troy, and the night's sky when seen from the countryside, all have in common. Socrates couldn't do it and I doubt I could either.

P. S. -- Back to the issue of the skepticism of Kant in CPR: One secondary reason I tenatively hold that position is Kant's style. After struggling through it for awhile, I finally concluded that the style which Kant chose for that book was integrally connected with the theme: What you can know is very limited, and I just reinforced my theme by writing something no honest person can understand.

Yeah, Kant was a pretty horrible writer. I doubt he meant it though - he completely rewrote one of the major parts of the Crtique because he felt people had misunderstood him, so I don't think he was deliberately trying to be obscure. It seems to be a feature of German philosophers that they either produce some of the difficult obscurantism imaginable, or beautiful prose which belongs alongside the work of poets.

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The word 'logic' is just too broad - it's like trying to give a definition of 'beauty' which captures what one of Mozart's symphonies, Helen of Troy, and the night's sky when seen from the countryside, all have in common.

The "thing" they all have in common is:

A is A

Either or

No contradiction

The ones that don't have these in common should be "tossed out."

What I'm saying here is that the ones that don't have A is A, Either or, No contradiction as their essence should be studied, like a pathologist studies a dead body in order to understand what caused a person's death.

Put more eloquently, they should be refuted and this is the only context in which studying Kant makes any sense. Why? Because Kant doesn't make any sense. He never really intended for his gibberish to make any sense.

Burgess, if you think Kant doesn't make any sense in English translation, I've got news for you--he makes even less sense in German.

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The word 'logic' is just too broad - it's like trying to give a definition of 'beauty' which captures what one of Mozart's symphonies, Helen of Troy, and the night's sky when seen from the countryside, all have in common.

If you are really interested in understanding the underlying logic in art, I highly recommend The Romantic Manifesto, by Ayn Rand.

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And if your definition of logic isnt one which would be accepted by most logicians then I think I'd be sceptical of it

And I would almost be willing to accept a definition of logic rejected by most of todays logicians as prima facie evidence of its validity. The epistemological status of most logicians is as divorced from reality as is the philosophy from whence their epistemology comes.

it would be like defining 'science' in a way which excludes the activities carried out by the majority of biologists.

No. Biologists deal with reality on an everyday basis, and reality is something that most philosophers have little to no contact with at all.

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1.  Reason is man's means of survival.

2.  Reason subsumes logic.

Conclusion: logic is man's means of survival.

I have comments, but first I need clarification:

In the second item, what do you mean by "subsume"? (Is it an epistemological concept or an ontological concept?)

Also in the second item, do you mean that, in every man, the faculty itself subsumes the art? Or do you mean the concept of the faculty subsumes the concept of the art (and thereby the art itself)?

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In the second item, what do you mean by "subsume"? (Is it an epistemological concept or an ontological concept?)
Epistemological

Also in the second item, do you mean that, in every man, the faculty itself subsumes the art?

What do you mean by "the faculty itself subsumes the art"?

Or do you mean the concept of the faculty subsumes the concept of the art (and thereby the art itself)?

"Reason is" = A;

"means of survival"= B;

"logic" = C;

Reason is man's means of survival; [A is B]

Reason subsumes logic; [All C is B]

conclusion: logic is man's means of survival [all C is A].

The CCD (or the essence, or the essential characteristic) of both reason and logic is:

A is A (axiom of identity) and two of identity's corollaries: either or and no contradiction.

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Epistemological

I still don't understand what you are trying to say about the relationship between reason (as a faculty) and logic (as an art). I will try this approach.

"subsume ... 1. to consider or include (an idea, term, proposition, etc.) as part of a more comprehensive one." (Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd edition, unabridged.

That is generally what I mean by the idea "subsume." Subsummation is, as you said, an epistemological concept -- that is, as the examples show, it refers to cognitive contents of the mind not to characteristics or parts (such as faculties) of the mind.

To the dictionary description quoted above, I would add the element, for a hierarchical epistemology like Objectivism's, of hierarchical reference. For example, the concept of "man" refers to -- subsumes -- Aristotle, Charlemagne, Aquinas, Napoleon, and Ayn Rand, as well as others. This meaning of subsummation as reference is an epistemological meaning. Ideas refer to physical entities (or other ideas).

Now, reason (as a faculty of the mind) is not an idea. I can have a concept of reason, but reason itself is a characteristic power of a mind. In that sense, reason does not subsume anything. It might include things as "parts," but it does not subsume them.

That is why I am bewildered by a statement such as reason subsumes logic -- unless you are saying that the concept of reason, in some way, subsumes the concept of logic.

I can understand saying reason uses (or should use) logic (just as it uses language), but not that it subsumes it. Am I missing something here?

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I still don't understand what you are trying to say about the relationship between reason (as a faculty) and logic (as an art). I will try this approach.

"subsume ... 1. to consider or include (an idea, term, proposition, etc.) as part of a more comprehensive one." (Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd edition, unabridged.

That is generally what I mean by the idea "subsume." Subsummation is, as you said, an epistemological concept -- that is, as the examples show, it refers to cognitive contents of the mind not to characteristics or parts (such as faculties) of the mind.

To the dictionary description quoted above, I would add the element, for a hierarchical epistemology like Objectivism's, of hierarchical reference. For example, the concept of "man" refers to -- subsumes -- Aristotle, Charlemagne, Aquinas, Napoleon, and Ayn Rand, as well as others. This meaning of subsummation as reference is an epistemological meaning. Ideas refer to physical entities (or other ideas).

Now, reason (as a faculty of the mind) is not an idea. I can have a concept of reason, but reason itself is a characteristic power of a mind. In that sense, reason does not subsume anything. It might include things as "parts," but it does not subsume them.

That is why I am bewildered by a statement such as reason subsumes logic -- unless you are saying that the concept of reason, in some way, subsumes the concept of logic.

I can understand saying reason uses (or should use) logic (just as it uses language), but not that it subsumes it. Am I missing something here?

I'm sorry, but I no longer understand your questions--all I can do is refer you to IOE.

I no longer have as much time as I'd like to devote to this topic. My interest remains, however, and for now I'm content with simply being a passive observer of this thread.

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Concepts of method (such as logic) are concepts of consciousness and have as their content not only mental concretes, but also particular types of psychological actions.

The types of psychological actions the concept logic refers to pertain to a process of identification. This process of identification can have as its object of focus either mental or physical entities. The purpose of this identification, is to achieve knowledge, either introspectively or extrospectively.

What do I mean when I say "man is the rational animal"? I am saying "reason" is in man, just as assuredly as I'm saying "man's brain resides in man." But what does it mean to say that "man is rational"? It means that I am refering to particular actions, and these actions can pertain to physical action (such as a brain surgeon removing a brain tumor, or a scientist spliting the atom, or an industrialist creating metal) or to mental (psychological) action (such as a philosopher or a poet introspecting).

The nature of these actions can be either non-contracitory or contradictory. When these are contradictory, they demonstrate that man is fallible. When they are non-contradictory, they are a demonstration of man's power over nature, including his own nature.

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Logic is premised reasoning, that is to say reason with axioms. One could reason deductively, given that Socrates is a man and All mean are mortal, we deduce Socrates is therefore mortal. Deductively speaking, how de we know all men are mortal? Or that Socrates is a man? Deduction has only one premise: keep asking questions. Eventual it becomes irrational.

Logic, on the other hand, has "rules" to it...independent of what these rules are. Aristotlean logic has the axioms outlined by him. Hegelian dialectics(as mystical as they are) are a form of logic.

Just my thoughts :nerd:

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Logic is premised reasoning, that is to say reason with axioms. One could reason deductively, given that Socrates is a man and All mean are mortal, we deduce Socrates is therefore mortal. Deductively speaking, how de we know all men are mortal? Or that Socrates is a man? Deduction has only one premise: keep asking questions. Eventual it becomes irrational.

Logic, on the other hand, has "rules" to it...independent of what these rules are. Aristotlean logic has the axioms outlined by him. Hegelian dialectics(as mystical as they are) are a form of logic.

Just my thoughts :nerd:

In Objectivism the major axioms of logic are existence, conciousness, and identity. Hardly irrational, considering that not only are they the BASIS for logic and rationality but also that Objectivism has much more essential requirements for axoims. Specifically, using "irrational" to describe and reject logic(and its base) is a fallacy known as concept stealing.

Logic is not just deduction but induction as well.

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In Objectivism the major axioms of logic are existence, conciousness, and identity.  Hardly irrational, considering that not only are they the BASIS for logic and rationality but also that Objectivism has much more essential requirements for axoims.  Specifically, using "irrational" to describe and reject logic(and its base) is a fallacy known as concept stealing.

Logic is not just deduction but induction as well.

I don't understand. Are you saying that logic (as the art of noncontradictory identification) has three axioms? Aren't those the axioms of the whole philosophy?

Further, what do you mean, "Objectivism has much more essential requirements for axoims"? Do you mean "more" as in greater number? Or do you mean "more-essential" -- that is, deeper down in a hierarchy of abstractions?

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Hardly irrational, considering that not only are they the BASIS for logic and rationality but also that Objectivism has much more essential requirements for axoims. Specifically, using "irrational" to describe and reject logic(and its base) is a fallacy known as concept stealing.
No, no, no. I am saying that using deduction to keep asking questions can get irrational, not that logic is irrational.

What are some examples of axioms that Aristotle outlined for logic?

One good example is Aristotle's "A is A"

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No, no, no. I am saying that using deduction to keep asking questions can get irrational, not that logic is irrational.

One good example is Aristotle's "A is A"

The process of reduction (of reducing a concept to its mental and ontological concretes) is not irrational. It is one of several techniques used in establishing a definition.

Burgess asks if I'm suggesting that the concept "reason" subsumes the concept "logic?" Yes, this is what I'm suggesting.

I'd like to now restate something I stated earlier:

"The CCD (or the essence, or the essential characteristic) of both reason and logic is:

A is A (axiom of identity) and two of identity's corollaries: either or and no contradiction."

The genus of the concept "logic" is "reason." Their (logic and reason's) CCD is the process of "identification" (A is A, either or, no contradiction), for the CCD of the genus is the CCD of concept it subsumes.

However, the concept "reason", subsumes more than just the concept logic. I'm suggesting that it also subsumes concept formation.

Both reason and logic are subsumed by a higher level concept, namely, they are concepts of "method."

Concepts of "method" are unique in that they can subsume both ontological concepts (such as a faculty) and psychological processes (such as when one uses logic when introspecting).

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That's not an axiom for logic.

Free Capitalist is right on target. A is A is not an axiom "for logic," as "Plato" says it is.

Before reacting further, however, I would like to ask Plato for clarification. When you speak of an axiom "for logic," do you mean:

(1) A=A is an axiom only for (or of) that body of knowledge (syllogisms, fallacies, etc.) we call logic?

or

(2) A=A is an axiom for (or of) all knowledge, an axiom that a logical thinker reaches out to, so to speak, and applies when he is testing the validity of his thoughts?

P. S. -- "Plato," why do you choose to use as a screen name the name of a man -- important though he was as the first great philosopher -- who was the antithesis of Ayn Rand, the founder of Objectivism, the object of study in this website?

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The process of reduction (of reducing a concept to its mental and ontological concretes) is not irrational. It is one of several techniques used in establishing a definition.
It can get irrational. It is not innately irrational. I am refering to the Philosopher's Deduction Fallacy.

Free Capitalist is right on target. A is A is not an axiom "for logic," as "Plato" says it is.
Well, I guess "you" are "correct".
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