Am I valuing need?

[Myrtok]

Since being awakened to Oism, I'm finding myself watching for lessons in every aspect of my life. I enjoy an online game called Starsonata. I enjoy it a lot. I pay a subscription to pay the game, but I value the game more than the actual subscription price. Still, I don't consider sending extra money to the owner of the game. We have an agreement on the price of playing, after all.

However, if I were to learn that the game was in financial trouble and in danger of shutting down, I would consider sending a donation to help keep it alive since I actually place more value on the game than what I am paying anyway. If I actuallly believed that a donation would keep the game alive, rather than simply extend its death, I would donate that money.

In most ways, this story seems consistant with what I've learned about Objectivism, except that I have this nagging feeling that since I wouldn't send extra money in normal circumstances, but that I would send extra money if the owner NEEDED it to continue operation, I am placing a value on the game's need, rather than on the game itself.

BTW, Starsonata is an awesome game if you are into a space MMO, and it is not in any financial trouble at all.

[softwareNerd]

....I wouldn't send extra money in normal circumstances, but that I would send extra money if the owner NEEDED it to continue operation, I am placing a value on the game's need, rather than on the game itself.

Aren't you really placing value on your "need" for the game?

[Dante]

if I were to learn that the game was in financial trouble and in danger of shutting down, I would consider sending a donation to help keep it alive since I actually place more value on the game than what I am paying anyway. If I actuallly believed that a donation would keep the game alive, rather than simply extend its death, I would donate that money.

In most ways, this story seems consistant with what I've learned about Objectivism, except that I have this nagging feeling that since I wouldn't send extra money in normal circumstances, but that I would send extra money if the owner NEEDED it to continue operation, I am placing a value on the game's need, rather than on the game itself.

It doesn't sound to me like you're responding to "bare need" in the same fashion that Rand criticized at all. You value the game regardless of how it's doing financially. In the situation you describe, you would discover that this value is in danger of being lost to you, and you feel a desire to contribute to it to keep it going. There is nothing inappropriate about this. The "need" of the game is the immediate cause of your donation, but it is not the ultimate reason that you value the game. You don't go around looking for failing video games that need money to keep going. This is a particular instance where something you value is in danger, and you respond to that by attempting to preserve your values.

If I suddenly discovered that one of my closest friends was very sick and couldn't afford his hospital bills, I would most certainly help him financially. This is not me responding to bare need, but rather me acting to preserve someone who is extremely important to me on their own terms (independently of their need).

Rand's criticism of altruist morality was that it advocates responding to "bare need," or need alone. According to this viewpoint (the object of her criticism), if I discovered that my friend was pretty sick and needed my help pretty badly, but some other random person I didn't even know needed my help even more, I should respond to the greater need, regardless of what is personally important to me. That idea is at the root of every moral proclamation that one should sacrifice personal interests and values for some greater good, and that deserves all the scorn Rand heaped on it.

[Myrtok]

If I suddenly discovered that one of my closest friends was very sick and couldn't afford his hospital bills, I would most certainly help him financially. This is not me responding to bare need, but rather me acting to preserve someone who is extremely important to me on their own terms (independently of their need).

Rand's criticism of altruist morality was that it advocates responding to "bare need," or need alone. According to this viewpoint (the object of her criticism), if I discovered that my friend was pretty sick and needed my help pretty badly, but some other random person I didn't even know needed my help even more, I should respond to the greater need, regardless of what is personally important to me. That idea is at the root of every moral proclamation that one should sacrifice personal interests and values for some greater good, and that deserves all the scorn Rand heaped on it.

THIS. I like this. Thank you.