A challenge to Yaron Brook

[Citizen Publius]

This comment is completely unjustified and totally unwarranted. Jack Wakeland's remarks do not constitute "lies" just because you disagree with what he says. Calling someone a liar is a serious moral charge, and unless you can substantiate such a claim you should apologize to him immediately.

I was wrong. I did not know what I was talking about. I offer my apologies.

You are right. I was wrong. I should have read Jack Wakeland's complete quote before I posted. Based on what I have been able to read that Jack Wakeland wrote, I am in agreement with him. Other than what I have learned about them in this thread, I have no idea who Yaron Brooks or Jack Wakeland are. 

Actually, when I made that post, I was just looking for something to debate. I now realize that I made a mistake.  I will just sit this one out and watch from the sidelines. 

'Twas the night before Christmas and I stuck my foot in my mouth big time. There goes all my credibility.

[Oakes]

Al Kufr,

You said: "John Boyd described strategy as connecting yourself to as many centers of power as possible, while isolating one's enemy from as many centers of power as possible."

1. Does a center of power have to reflect our ideals, or was it okay to work with the Soviets in WWII, and with the Afghani jihadists in the 70's? Is the UN a source of good because it connects us to centers of power?

2. If it must reflect our ideals, would you agree that in 4GW conflicts, we should only work with civilians who are unequivocally for the U.S.?

3. Would a truly pro-U.S. civilian become enraged at the way we kill the civilians in his country?

My point, then, is that a center of power that requires a sacrifice in order for us to connect to it is not a center of power at all. The civilians are not really pro-American if we must resort to small-unit tactics, grow beards, build schools, participate in their rituals, and call off operations during Ramadan in order to gain their support. They either support our goals or they don't.

[Jack Wakeland]

On the issue of what the President Bush is getting wrong in his half-hearted ‘war on terrorism,’ I agree with Yaron Brook. Year by year, Mr. Bush’s war policy has become weaker and more confused. This is primarily the product of pragmatism – the principle that one must not use principles – not moral cowardice.

But I agree with Dr. Brook that moral cowardice has been a major ingredient of Mr. Bush’s war policy since the beginning. In his address to the nation on September 12, 2001, Mr. Bush pointedly refused to identify the enemy. He refuses to this day.

We are not in a war with ‘terrorism of global reach.’ We are in a war with Islamism – the political/military/criminal arm of Islam.

I agree with Yaron Brook on all moral-political essentials.

As far as the ideas of the war go, I consider ALL regular mosque-going, five-times-a-day forehead-to-the-ground-praying Muslims to be hostile to the war effort…until PROVEN otherwise. This is because Islam is an unreformed religion.

Unlike the two other Western monotheistic belief systems - Christianity and Judaism – Islam has not been forcibly disarmed of all corporeal powers. It has not been disarmed of ANY of the corporeal powers that were historically wielded by Medieval region. It actively functions – across all national boundaries – with judicial, police, and war making powers. It is an amorphously organized super-national council of moral governors that overseas, constrains, and often directs the actions of the governments of the Muslim people under it.

For these reasons ALL observant Muslims – perhaps 40 or 60% of the world’s Muslims – are ‘fundamentalist’ Muslims. ALL observant Muslims are potential criminal/military enemies.

David Pipes has given me a general sense of the fraction of potential to actual hostiles we face among the world’s Muslim population. As many as 10% of the world’s 1.2 billion Muslims may have provided some kind of material support to Islamic terrorist groups – either directly by hiding and harboring them, or indirectly by funding madrasas or Muslim ‘aid’ groups that they know support terrorism.

What do the other 90% or 95% think? We don’t know for sure. Even in Western countries like Germany, Holland, and the United States, outsiders are morally barred from the mosque.

Based on the observations of David Pipes, the majority of regular mosque goers are hostile to the United States and want to see us lose the ‘war on terrorism.’ (Commenting on the political opinions of Muslims, a non-observant Muslim woman to a talk radio show host, “If they go to mosque, you needn’t aaask.”)

Again, based on Dr. Pipe’s observations, I suspect the minority of regular mosque goers who don’t hate America are confused by a divided loyalty. The few among this minority who are truly loyal to Western Civilization are living a contradiction.

With one foot in each world, they dare not openly oppose the Islamist fanatics who often dominate discourse inside the mosque for fear of social ostracism – the loss of contact with family and friends. Inside the Moslim World, this minority also fears physical reprisal, even death, if they speak out. There is evidence that physical threats and acts of reprisal may have come out of some especially rotten mosques even in the West – in Europe.

Any Moslem who criticizes Islam within earshot of a non-Muslim is widely considered to be a moral traitor, in league with infidels.

In the past it was fair to assume that a man who worships a church dominated by members of Ku Klux Klan has given his moral sanction to the lynching of ‘negras’ – even if he wasn’t a member of that ‘political’ organization.

So it is fair to assume that anyone who regularly attends Mosque has given his moral sanction to the killing of infidels.

Protests and excuses from non-Muslims that the vast majority of Muslims are peaceful decent people who oppose every form of Islamic terrorism don’t count. Protests from MUSLIMS against every form of Islamic warfare and oppression is the only thing that counts in judging the loyalty of a Muslim.

Are all observant Muslims our ideological enemies? Just about all. But this does not make all of them our physical enemies.

If the police power of the mosque is fought; if the moral authority of the mosque is challenged; if the sanity of Islamic fundamentalism is questioned – many mosque goers will stray from their evil non-reformed religion. They will stray just as the victims – and the perpetrators – of Soviet Communism strayed from the belief that socialism is the moral system.

It is for those who have actually taken up arms; those who materially support the killers – that we should reserve our well-aimed bullets and bombs.

In the 1940s, 1980s, and 1990s, Islam organized against America in a way that is parallel to Socialism’s organization against America in the 1880s, 1920s, and 1940s.

The worldly power of socialism peaked with the fall of France in 1940. Under the banners of Hitler and Stalin, socialism had taken over Europe and was on the march. Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, and France were under their boot. In awe of Germany’s power, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain and Turkey cooperated with the new order. Any who stood up to Hitler seemed doomed to fall.

A bloody half-decade of total war with National Socialism and four bloody decades of limited war with International Socialism followed. But after June of 1940, socialism progressively aroused opposition and was met on the military, political, economic, and intellectual battlefields…and it is the mauled, whimpering beast we live with today.

Based on the events of the past 39 months, September 11, 2001 was the high water mark of the Muslim advance.

With an antiquated pre-philosophical ideology of religion, Islam cannot effectively penetrate the culture of Western Civilization (our semi-nihilistic culture may be sick, but it isn’t dead yet). The only way in is through the back door of our existing post-socialist ideology – and, as the fierce opposition from most Dutch leftists proves, they can’t even get far through that door.

Islam can’t stop our penetration of their culture by the mere inarticulate example of our happy way of life. Just watching us going about our daily lives has got many of the people of the Muslim world to wonder about what kind of world-view is behind our civilization. Questions are all it takes to break up the brittle anti-intellectual dogma of unreformed religion.

With a loosely aligned front of pre-industrial nations, Islam cannot stop the military forces of Western Civilization in the field. They aren’t doing well with a guerilla campaign against our small occupation force in Iraq, either. They’ve been doing badly even though we haven’t used our occupation forces conclusively.

And not once since 9/11 have they penetrated our meager border, port, and airline security systems to attack us here in the United States. Intelligence operations and police sweeps have snuffed out the majority of their plots overseas. One has to wonder if America's military offensive inside the heart of the Moslim world has DETERRED al Qaeda from attacking on American soil.

The only reason the Muslims got as far as they did on September 11, 2001 is that we completely ignored them. Now we are paying attention. Now they face an uphill battle in which they are almost continuously on the defensive. For them it is total war. For us, it is an effort that requires a limited – but relentless – attention.

It is from this context that I object to Yaron Brook’s evaluation about what means are necessary for the United States to prevail in our war with Islamism.

This is the sole content of my objection.

This is ultimately not a philosophical objection. At the level of applying moral and political principles to the war, Yaron Brook and I are in complete agreement. What I disagree with is Dr. Brook's assessement of the overall situation.

I totally reject the notion implied in Dr. Brook’s evaluations of the war that the United States is in a desperate situation. I reject his implication that as a result of the ideological vices of our culture, the United States stands at the brink of disaster. I reject the implication that we face defeat.

I agree with Dr. Brook that President Bush’s half- and quarter-measures in the war have pushed quick victory out of our grasp. I disagree with Dr. Brook’s suggestions that Mr. Bush’s ideological vices and weaknesses are pushing victory beyond our grasp.

It is from the perspective that victory is slipping away that Dr. Brook’s urges the U.S. military to be less discriminate in our killing so that we can kill faster before the enemy is able to score another major victory against us. This advice would be more appropriate to a free country the size of Massachusetts, facing state-sponsored Islamist fanatics on all boarders and hostile nations ten times its size in the neighboring area.

But the United States is not Israel. We do not share Israel’s predicament in any way except morally - and even there the Israelis are at a disadvantage. The Israeli left has a stranglehold on national security policy that can only be compared with what happened in the United States during the fall of Saigon (the bitter end of what Ayn Rand correctly observed was a grizzly act of mass self-sacrifice for America). Even at our lowest moment, there has been a deeper well of support for national defense here in America than in Israel today.

Contrary to the implication in Yaron Brook’s most recent press release (below), victory or defeat in Iraq does not turn on the rules of engagement for American ground forces.

Thu, 23 Dec 2004 16:24:04 -0600

Press Release from the Ayn Rand Institute <[email protected]>

Moral Cowardice Prevents Winning the War

IRVINE, CA--The blame for the murder of 19 Americans in Mosul yesterday lies not only with the insurgents who initiated the attack, but also with the Bush Administration's suicidal policies, said Dr. Yaron Brook, president of the Ayn Rand Institute. "The insurgency would have been crushed long ago, and yesterday's attack averted, were it not for America's altruistic policy of placing the lives of Iraqi civilians above its own self-defense.

"America must destroy the insurgency if we are to implement a non-threatening government in Iraq," said Dr. Brook. "This can be done, but to do so we must make the insurgency's complicit civilian population--those who harbor and support the insurgents--pay for the violence that they abet. We must enforce their complete surrender to our presence. Thanks to such a policy, during the occupation of Japan zero soldiers were killed by insurgents and the threat posed by the country was ended.

"Shamefully, the Bush Administration has been unwilling to make hostile Iraqi civilians pay for their crimes," said Dr. Brook. "Time and again, it has treated Iraqi lives as sacrosanct and American security and soldiers as dispensable. It is in the name of sparing civilians that our soldiers have been ordered to follow crippling rules of engagement that have cost hundreds of their lives. It was in the name of sparing civilians that we withdrew from Fallujah in April, and in November allowed thousands of insurgents to flee to places like Mosul. Such capitulations have preserved and emboldened the insurgents, while giving hope to Islamic terrorists worldwide.

"To win this war," concluded Dr. Brook, "we need a fundamental shift in our moral priorities. We need to see the military place the lives of Americans--including American soldiers--above the lives of Iraqi civilians. To those who insist that we continue to sacrifice for the sake of Iraqi civilians, I say that the death of 19 Americans yesterday, and the many more to come, are on your heads."

American troops aren't dying by the dozen because we're too easy on the civilian population. While we should place a much higher priority on arresting disloyal opposition leaders and assassinating some top clerics, reprisals against the civilian population aren't productive. What is to be gained by bulldozing houses?

On the narrower issue of whether or not American soldiers lives and limbs are being sacrificed to altruist rules of engagement, there is a little justice in Dr. Brook’s argument. It is a shameful truth that every large ground unit has a lawyer they consult on questions of the rules of war.

But there is only a little justice in his point.

The American armed forces have been so effective at engaging enemy militiamen, the cost of all the lawyers’ constraints haven’t been material. Nearly all of the tactical constraints placed on military destruction in Iraq have been rational (and MORAL constraints).

Why not destroy all bridges and dams and power plants? Because ground forces used them to invade and the occupation authority used them to begin the American effort to liberalize post-Saddam Iraq.

Why not kill enemy militiamen while they're hiding behind civilians? Because they’re hostages. (Did I have to explain that?)

Why not use ‘carpet bombing?’ Because carpet bombing is not nearly as effective at destroying the enemy’s capacity to fight as precision aimed munitions. Have you ever been to the rifle range? Which will hit the target first, quickly shooting 90 rounds from three magazines from the hip…or taking one or maybe two carefully aimed shots? (Again, did I have to explain that?)

When meeting resistance on the ground, why not just back up and blow up the whole area? When the pace of battle is under the control of American forces (and headquarters doesn’t think we’re taking casualties), the forces spend a few minutes identifying the location of enemy resistance and targeting them for precision guided munitions (See my comments about not carpet bombing, above.)

When meeting heavy resistance on the ground that is strong enough to break up an American advance and cause casualties, general bombardments were used to produce the effect that general bombardments do: to temporarily suppress enemy fire and scatter their assault forces.

On March 23, 2002, a reinforced mechanized battalion of Marines was stopped cold by a massive Fedayeen counter attack at the eastern edge of Nasiriyah. Marine Corps artillery held their fire for only one reason – headquarters lost radio contact with the battalion and, not knowing where they were, did not want to rain several hundred 90-lb shells on them. Four hours into the battle, communications to the rifle company pinned down in the city was restored and the entire eastern end of the city was subjected to a general bombardment.

Only about 4,000 civilians were killed during the invasion of Iraq. Probably fewer than 1,000 have been killed by American forces since then. This is something to be PROUD of.

One VALID tactical question Yaron Brook brings up is: Why not blow up all the mosques?

Good question. I’d add, to that question: Why don’t we have a ‘Team 121’ to identify every mullah that has ever issued a fatal fatwa? Why don’t we kidnap or assassinate each of them? Why don’t was have a “Phoenix” program for Islamists?

The moral cowardice Yaron Brook cites is what stops us.

This is an area on which Dr. Brook and I (and all Objectivists) agree. But, sadly, in making George Bush the best presidential candidate available, it is one of the half-measures the majority of the American electorate has constrained us to follow. But, with an enemy so weak, I do not believe that restraint in attacking Islam and its mullahs will prevent victory.

Happily the policy of not targeting mosques has been essentially corrected. During the battle of Falluja this fall, American forces ravaged nearly all the mosques of the city. Time and time again they cut off enemy strong points and destroyed them before they could disperse. Many of them were mosques. Every mosque that was found to contain armed men or ammunition and supplies was bombed, shelled, rocketed and raided by infantry. Likewise, the first target destroyed in the battle for the Islamist-held city was the hospital. American forces will check to see if there are innocent civilians in the way of battle, but any special treatment for mosques is nothing more than lip service – circles marked on military maps). Today there is no hesitation beyond the rational consideration for innocent life.

Dr. Brook needs to update his opposition to the craven protections given to the mosques of Iraq.

What is material to American victory at a minimum of American casualties are the POLICY decisions made – or not made:

1. by Paul Bremmer’s frozen policy of non-occupation occupation in which no effective attempts to restore government to Iraq were made for over a year,

2. by the decision at the Marine Corps regimental combat team headquarters – and higher ups – to discontinue the battle for Falluja in April,

3. by the Bush Administration’s and Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s deals with al Sadr, and

4. by George Bush’s personal insistence that a proportionally elected Parliament will deliver the liberty to the people of Iraq – a miracle that will be delivered to them because God endows every man at birth with the desire for liberty, even Shi’ites who beat themselves bloody in public to prove their insane devotion to Allah.

Dr. Brook and I agree that these are policies that threaten American victory in Iraq. We agree that these are policies that are getting too many American servicemen killed and maimed.

I hope that, at some point, Dr. Brook and I will agree on what strategic and tactical issues are relevant to American victory. And I hope that, at some point, we will agree on the chances for America's ultimate victory.

At some point it will become obvious all of us that the United States is slowly – too slowly – winning this war.

My disagreement with Yaron Brook is with how he evaluates some of the concrete issues of the war. The application of philosophical principles to the specific issues of military power and war policy requires a consideration of all relevant facts. The specific lessons of history and the differences between the conditions of the past and today need to be considered. Collecting and appraising these facts and evaluating some of the specifics of history are not philosophical skills. Having a superior grasp of philosophy gives one less of an advantage in these specific issues than one might think.

Neither Yaron Brook nor I have a substantial track record of projecting the future trajectory of world events on the scale of months and years. So there is no clear evidence I can offer to you to claim that I will make fewer mistakes in my projections than he does. Meanwhile I'll sit here with an amused smile, waiting patiently to be proved right.

If I am totally mistaken that we will be victorious, Dr. Brook will be targeted for attack long, long before I am. That is why I have been reluctant to criticize him by name. In defeat, his peril would be an honor I could not claim to share.

[Oakes]

Mr. Wakeland,

My two short questions certainly won't do justice to the obviously large effort you put into your post, but they pretty much sum up my reaction to it. The first deals with the philosophy of war, and the second deals with the science of war:

1. Do you believe that the government is obligated to treat non-citizens the same as citizens? In other words, should it spare no expense or risk to treat non-citizens as individuals, each with civil liberties and the right to a trial? Your answer will determine whether you believe we can kill civilians and kill "militiamen while they're hiding behind civilians." I believe that our government needs not treat enemy civilians as individuals, and needs not treat human shields as hostages. The responsibility to do these things lies with their government, whose aggression made it responsible for any civilian deaths resulting from our war of retaliation.

2. Do you recognize any fundamental difference between wars with ideologically-motivated, non-state forces and conventional militaries? Between 4th Generation Warfare and 3rd Generation Warfare? Your answer will determine how much you're willing to underestimate guerilla warfare, underestimate "a loosely aligned front of pre-industrial nations," and underestimate the effect that the "ideological vices of our culture" can have on our chances of victory. I believe that our technological superiority has very little relevance in fighting 4GW, that history shows few cases where guerilla forces couldn't defeat advanced militaries (think Mao's campaign in China, think our ordeals in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia, think Russia's ordeals in Afghanistan and Chechnya), and that 4GW wins primarily because of the problems within our culture that curb our resolve.

[argive99]

Jack,

There is something else that you and Dr. Brook disagree on and that is the possibility of bringing freedom and democracy to the Middle East (and lets just define democracy here as a constitiutional republic). I asked Dr. Brook point blank if he agreed with the "colonial solution" as presented by you and Rober T. and he answered in one word, "no". He predicted that in five years from now Iraq will either be embroiled in civil war or it will be a de facto Islamic state, possibly even a client state of Iran.

Also, Dr. Brook doesn't give a rat's ass (to use an expression) about civilian casualties, "innocents" or collateral damage. He basically said as much. His only concern is with America's defense and the lives of American soldiers. And I don't understand how urban combat can be said to be more effective than an arial assault that destroys the whole area. To quote Burgess Laughlin from his post earlier in this thread, "... what point is there in engaging in small-unit tactics in urban warfare if one's morality calls for the devastation of whole neighborhoods that support, harbor, or even merely tolerate enemies of the Allies in this war?"

You have amazing insights and I enjoy your writing on the subject, but in my opinion, you are way too lenient. I agree with Dr. Brook when he said about your (and Robert T's) statement that Bush's "forward strategy of freedom" is essentially a watered down version of the right strategy that (quoting from memory) "it is a disaster from start to finish and probably worse than doing nothing at all."

[BurgessLau]

During the battle of Falluja this fall, American forces ravaged nearly all the mosques of the city. [...] Likewise, the first target destroyed in the battle for the Islamist-held city was the hospital.

The methods of philosophy are available to everyone: look around and think. The methods of history, as a discipline, are specialized. One small but crucial example is using documentation to back up claims historians make. The purpose of documentation is two-fold. First, it gives readers avenues to follow, avenues that will help them verify or falsify or learn more about claims made by an historian. The second, but causally most important, purpose of documentation in historical writing is self-discipline for the historian. If the historian cannot back up his claim that A did X, then he shouldn't make the claim.

All writers encounter pitfalls. A philosophical writer can make a full, honest effort to evaluate his own argumentation. He can expose it to a small, critical audience and consider their criticisms. But when he finally publishes, his argumentation becomes a target in ways he might never have expected. Historians often proceed in similar ways and encounter the same pitfalls.

The kind of writing that is most fraught with errors in purported evidence and in argumentation is mixed writing: mixing philosophical argumentation and historical argumentation -- two sets of evidence and two sets of argumentation.

Jack Wakeland has courageously immersed himself in that middle area where philosophy and history (even if only a few weeks gone by) are integrated by interpretation of events. He has published his conclusions in numerous and lengthy articles in print and online.

Through the last year, I have come to the point where I don't trust any published source that makes historical claims -- that is, statements about events in the past, even the recent past -- without documentation of some sort. When a writer tells me about events that supposedly happened thousands of miles away, my first reaction is: Oh, how do you know this?

There is a sliding scale of appropriate answers. But if a claim is to be publicly objective (that is, the ideas proposed are based on facts available to the listener as well as to the speaker), then the writer must offer a lead to his sources, so that those sources can be cross-examined and evaluated.

When a writer offers no traceable lead -- for example either no source at all or merely "an informed source says" ... I stop listening and reject all conclusions based on those alleged facts.

The quote above offers an example. The author offers no source. That approach is acceptable in an online discussion group where readers can immediately ask questions ("How do you know?"). It would be unacceptable in a published piece.

My memory of reading news articles at the time -- a shakey source at best -- contradicts the claim made about "the" Fallujah hospital. (Presumably the writer is referring to the main hospital of the city.) See Richard Oppel Jr., "The Conflict in Iraq: Attack by Joint Force; Early Target of Offensive is a Hospital" New York Times, November 8, 2004. (The article, which I read in full last month, seems to be available now only in archive -- for pay -- form, except for the abstract.)

The Oppel article claims that rather than having destroyed it, U. S. forces seized and held it, thus diverting combat forces that could have been used elsewhere in the street fighting. If I recall correctly, the article writer, directly or indirectly, claims to have interviewed U. S. forces involved. That, if true, is a lead allowing further investigation to determine whether the claims are objective. A leadless claim in a published article would offer nothing worth considering.

(Please note: A leadless claim is not an arbitrary claim. The claim becomes arbitrary only when the claim is challenged and then the claimant clams up or evades the question or "answers" with uncheckable "sources" such as a guru who died 5000 years ago and is now channeling through the speaker.)

Does this mean that all of us must be ready in every writing to footnote everything we say? Yes, we should be ready to do so. (I have embarrassed myself numerous times by failing to do so.) Further, writers whose writings appear in published, on-paper journals should always indicate their sources unless the claimed facts are obvious and beyond dispute (for example, the Japanese government attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941).

This requirement makes journalism more difficult to produce and slower to respond to events. So what? Nearly all of the "news" we hear and read is reporting about events individual readers have no control over. Waiting a few more months will have no effect, except to improve our understanding of the facts and the principles underlying them.

My conclusion from this evaluation is that over the years I have largely been wasting my time immersing myself in news and in opinion pieces based on undocumented reports. For that reason, I probably will not renew my subscriptions to print and online news services, even Objectivist ones.

If you have found better ways of evaluating news-related articles, including philosophical interpretations of current events, please let me know. Of course, questioning sources is not the only way. But, while it is not sufficient, it is necessary.

[argive99]

My conclusion from this evaluation is that over the years I have largely been wasting my time immersing myself in news and in opinion pieces based on undocumented reports.

While I agree that it is important to have factually valid informtion, I don't think the problem here is with the facts at our disposal. The recurring issue with these war threads is one of applied morality. The main areas of contention seem to be how to properly define an "innocent" and what level of force should be used against the enemy. Many Objectivists believe (as I do) in total war and are not concerned with enemy casualties. Others have focussed far more on the "appropriate" levels of violence used in retaliation and what are and are not valid targets.

Yaron Brook has taken the Objectivist Ethics and reached the conclusion that a moral culture when defending itself can use whatever level of force it is capable of when it is attacked by an enemy culture that is threatening its destruction. Jack Wakeland has argued for a much more delimited retaliation. Also Yaron Brook has reached the ethical conclusion that an enemy does not deserve to be rebuilt after it has been destroyed (especially at our own expense). Jack Wakeland sees the rebuilding process as neccessary to ensure victory.

I agree that they both hold the same broad philosophical principles. But IMO, Mr. Wakeland looses the forest for the trees. He can describe in the greatest of detail the tactics and weaponry of warfare and yet he is sloppier in his thinking when it comes to applying broad abstract principles to the current scene. For that, I trust Dr. Brook's conclusions far more as his focus is always on morality primarily and on tactics only secondarily. Dr. Brook would never advocate endangering the lives of American soldiers in senseless door to door urban combat while Jack Wakeland countless times has seemingly glorified such a strategy.

To be candid, my assessment of the overall value of The Intellectual Activist (daily and monthly) has diminished as a result. I'm debating on whether or not it is even worth renewing my subscriptions. IMO, there are just too many concessions to the foreign policy premises of the Neo-Cons for my taste.

[Yes]

What I find utterly confounding about Jack Wakeland's thesis is that nowhere does he come out and say that this is a war whose purpose it is to vanquish a known and dangerous enemy- or otherwise fight them to the point where they unconditionally surrender.

Having read his attempt at clarification, I still agree with Dr. Brook and disagree with Wakeland.

[Yes]

One other thing:

I do not consider Jack Wakeland's philosophy to be consistent with that of Objectivism.

[BurgessLau]

I do not consider Jack Wakeland's philosophy to be consistent with that of Objectivism.

In what way do you consider his philosophy to be inconsistent with Objectivism, and what is your evidence?

[Al Kufr]

1. Does a center of power have to reflect our ideals, or was it okay to work with the Soviets in WWII, and with the Afghani jihadists in the 70's? Is the UN a source of good because it connects us to centers of power?

Of course it has to refelct with our ideals and with reality. Like Andrew Bernstein says in his essay about the nature of evil; evil has no real power. Is the UN evil? The only reason it has any "power" is becuase we give it power,so It is my conclusion that the UN is not a center of power.

2. If it must reflect our ideals, would you agree that in 4GW conflicts, we should only work with civilians who are unequivocally for the U.S.?

Of course, we should treat them like allies and protect them like allies and we should also try to get as many as possible.

3. Would a truly pro-U.S. civilian become enraged at the way we kill the civilians in his country?

Not if we kill bad ones, but we should also treat our allies well and be careful not to kill allies and POTENTIAL allies.

My point, then, is that a center of power that requires a sacrifice in order for us to connect to it is not a center of power at all. The civilians are not really pro-American if we must resort to small-unit tactics, grow beards, build schools, participate in their rituals, and call off operations during Ramadan in order to gain their support. They either support our goals or they don't.

Who said im for growing beards or for participating in their rituals? What im for is attacking our enemys, and when i say enemys i mean ALL OF THEM, civilians included. But im also for not killing potential allies and actual people who DO or CAN support us!!!

When we drop a bomb to kill a bunch of terrorists we can also hit civilians who DONT support the terrorists and who dont want to kill americans.

[MisterSwig]

What I find utterly confounding about Jack Wakeland's thesis is that nowhere does he come out and say that this is a war whose purpose it is to vanquish a known and dangerous enemy- or otherwise fight them to the point where they unconditionally surrender.

I don't find it confounding. After all, Jack Wakeland is the man who wrote this:

Islamism is a very shallow guide for action. Fanatic allegiance to its religious dogma is – BY FAR – our enemy’s greatest weakness.

It is the single reason why I am convinced that the United States cannot lose this war. We’d probably win if we did NOTHING but just went about our daily lives.

http://forum.ObjectivismOnline.com/index.p...indpost&p=51259

Why should Jack Wakeland consider the enemy to be "dangerous," when he begins with such a premise? And if the enemy isn't dangerous, why should he care about making them surrender?

[Al Kufr]

With a loosely aligned front of pre-industrial nations, Islam cannot stop the military forces of Western Civilization in the field. They aren’t doing well with a guerilla campaign against our small occupation force in Iraq, either. They’ve been doing badly even though we haven’t used our occupation forces conclusively.

What facts give you the idea that the terrorists are "doing badly" against us?

You have to remember that this is a guerrilla war, THERE ARE NO DECISIVE BATTLES. The guerrilla forces can lose every single fight and still win.

Instead of trying to give all of iraq freedom, we should have dealt with what was the fundamental cultural nature of Iraq as a whole. Or what is the fundamental nature of groups of iraqis(like the Kurds) and made the choice of liberating those groups instead of the entire country. But we chose instead to liberate the good and bad Iraqis alike and now we have to deal with them.

Why not use ‘carpet bombing?’ Because carpet bombing is not nearly as effective at destroying the enemy’s capacity to fight as precision aimed munitions. Have you ever been to the rifle range? Which will hit the target first, quickly shooting 90 rounds from three magazines from the hip…or taking one or maybe two carefully aimed shots? (Again, did I have to explain that?)

Instead of ANY bombing what we need to do is improve our soldiers small unit tactics, just read this excerpt from Col.David Hackworths latest column :

"somewhere between Vietnam and the present insurgency war in Iraq, the golden guerrilla-fighting lessons we learned the hard way in Southeast Asia have disappeared. "

http://wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=42137

Those lessons learned in Vietnam disapeard because our modern military thinks that we can win this war becuase of our technology.

I seriously hope that Jack Wakeland looks at this powerpoint presentation that is circulating in the military right now

http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/ppt/4gw_ooda_iraq.ppt

[Al Kufr]

I don't find it confounding. After all, Jack Wakeland is the man who wrote this:

Why should Jack Wakeland consider the enemy to be "dangerous," when he begins with such a premise? And if the enemy isn't dangerous, why should we care about making them surrender?

I agree with Jacks statement with one correction,

"We’d probably win if we did NOTHING but just went about our daily lives MORALLY"

And by morally I mean that we would also have a proper foreign policy which would mean that we wouldn't have any relations with the middle eastern countries that support terrorists.

The only reason those countries have any power is because we GIVE them power by buying their oil.

[Oakes]

But im also for not killing potential allies and actual people who DO or CAN support us!!!

So you support engaging in small-unit tactics -- putting our troops in far greater danger than if we ignored civilians -- to avoid killing (potentially) pro-American civilians? Again, I state: A center of power that requires a sacrifice in order for us to connect to it is not a center of power at all.

[Al Kufr]

So you support engaging in small-unit tactics -- putting our troops in far greater danger than if we ignored civilians -- to avoid killing (potentially) pro-American civilians? Again, I state: A center of power that requires a sacrifice in order for us to connect to it is not a center of power at all.

Maneuver tactics are not known for causing lots of casualties, if anything the tactics they are using now are more dangerous. Believe it or not our soldiers are still being trained in post-machinegun tactics. With small unit tactics we will be able to attack the enmy more effectively with less American and civilian casualties.

Like I said before, we chose to liberate the good and bad Iraqis alike and now we have to deal with both of them if we want to win.

I would have been all for annihilating population centers like Lind said, IF we chose not to do any nation building.

[Oakes]

Maneuver tactics are not known for causing lots of casualties, if anything the tactics they are using now are more dangerous.

Putting boots on the ground will always be more dangerous than flying jets overhead.

[Al Kufr]

Putting boots on the ground will always be more dangerous than flying jets overhead.

Name a war that was won with pure airpower? Why have any soldiers infact?

Nothing beats boots on the ground and we choose to fix iraq and now we have to be in Iraq for a long time and we have to plan long term.

So Instead of having massive uses of force in short bursts like in fallujah, we will instead have small battles backed up with good HUMINT spread out though time.

No big fights, no massive raids, we should fight like guerrillas. Its the same idea Jack has except with soldiers not with so-called precision strikes.

[Oakes]

Name a war that was won with pure airpower? Why have any soldiers infact?

Name a post in which I advocated that. My only argument is that there may be times when we must kill pro-American civilians to kill an enemy. In that case, it would be wrong to send troops in -- risking their lives -- to avoid killing the civilians.

[Al Kufr]

Name a post in which I advocated that. My only argument is that there may be times when we must kill pro-American civilians to kill an enemy. In that case, it would be wrong to send troops in -- risking their lives -- to avoid killing the civilians.

I say use the right tools for the right job and if any special situation like that comes up then i agree. But I still think that we should send in troops, there is no other better option in the long run.

Our goal should be to eliminate threats to iraqis not to become a threat, that is the only wat we can win if our goal is to establish a free government in iraq.

Im not saying its the right goal but its the Preseidents goal and if we are going to do it we should do it right.

[Sparrow]

Name a war that was won with pure airpower?  Why have any soldiers infact?

The Pacific front of World War II was won by dropping two nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Which is why it is better to have Bush as President rather than Kerry, considering Kerry's anti-nuke policy, advocating global nuclear disarmament, as well as providing Iran with nuclear fuel "for peaceful purpses".

See http://www.johnkerry.com/pdf/pr_2004_0601b.pdf

[Jack Wakeland]

The reason for my strategic optimism in the ‘war on terrorism’ does not come from George Bush’s choice of Iraq as the primary battleground (rather than Saudi Arabia and Iran).

The occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq are ways to fight a proxy war against Islamism in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. There is a great deal of wisdom in fighting Islamism in Pakistan indirectly (Pakistan is a nation of 135 million with substantial armed forces developed to fight its neighbor, India). But it is a sacrifice of all our advantages to not attack the other major centers of Islamism directly. Think of how much more on the defense our enemies would be if American Army was conducting raids in Riyadh to arrest members of the Royal family or the Navy was blowing up evil mullahs with guided missiles in Tehran.

The only Islamist entity we attacked directly was in the brilliant campaign against the Taliban and al Qeada. The takeover of Afghanistan was very effectively leveraged to defang Pakistan’s ISI of the worst of its expansionist Islamist agenda. Also the Bush Administration was very effective at pressing the potentate of Pakistan, General Musharaff, into our service. He has halted the Islamification of his country, helped American intelligence locate several major al Qaeda leaders, and fought his own people in the autonomous tribal territories – a little publicized campaign from March to September of this year. The Pakistani Army netted 600 dead al Qeada – at an equal cost in Pakistani servicemen’s lives – about a third of the number harvested by the takeover of Afghanistan.

This same level of success could have been repeated on a far larger scale if the U.S. had leveraged the extraordinarily successful invasion of Iraq. But rather than immediately using Iraq as a physical and moral spring board to militarily and politically attack the terror masters of Riyadh, Tehran, and Damascus, George Bush demurred from making threats and immediately demonstrated his ‘humanity’ by sending a few battalions of Marines to help out in Liberia and making a big fuss about it.

The Invasion of Iraq could have been leveraged to crush – once and for all – the Islamist terror campaign against Israel. But instead of putting the full resources of the United States of America against all of the region’s supporters of Fatah, Hamas, Hezbullah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Bush Administration demanded that Israel show more ‘restraint.’

And for Iraq Mr. Bush gave us the non-occupation occupation, non-reconstruction reconstruction policy under Paul Bremmer (according to the New York Times less than 2 billion in development funds were spent in 2003). And now we have the ‘Iraqification’ of the war under our man in Baghdad, Ayad Allawi. And the consequence, here at home, is an ugly Vietnam flashback that has blurred our nation’s focus on achieving victory.

These – not petty issues like hesitancy to target mosques in Iraq – are our strategic blunders. Payment for these blunders has not yet come due, but when it does, it will be paid for in American blood.

So why am I still optimistic? Do I see the world through rose-colored glasses?

No. The reason for my strategic optimism comes from the fundamental nature of America and the nature of our enemy. Missing opportunities for major victories in the past two years does not alter the dramatic strategic advantage the America and Western Civilization hold over the Muslim World.

America is spreading out and winning across the globe (see http://tiadaily.blogspot.com/2004/11/empir...-happiness.html ). “Globalism” is Americanism. In strategic terms, the Islamic enemy is fighting a purely defensive battle. Except in a handful of hostile nations closed to the west (e.g., Syria and Iran), for the Islamists this conflict is a rearguard action against an enemy who already ‘occupies’ their culture. The limited offensive warfare mindset in George Bush’s policies has been sufficient to put our Islamist foes on their heals. They are spending almost all their efforts on Iraq (or Israel). They haven’t been able to attack infidels on American soil. This is the surest sign that the demonstration of the power of the American military machine (in November 2001 and March 2003), and the effectiveness of American-led international policing dragnet have established a substantial deterrent to Islamic terrorism. The terrorists and their supporters no longer consider American civilians on American soil to be a ‘soft’ target. Bored, purposeless Arab princes looking for a way to feel important now wonder if it is a good idea to give money for ‘madrasas’ and ‘Muslim relief.’ What if they’re found out? Will there be a knock at the door? Will the look upon hearing a noise and see a Predator Drone?

As far as the situation in Iraq goes, the political situation within that Arab country will now be the greatest determinant of success. Unfortunately, the January elections look like they may launch a whole new series of challenges to the American attempt to liberate Iraq. These problems start with the structure and purpose of the new government.

A parliamentary system – that joins the power of the legislative and executive – is a terrible system. The U.N.-sponsored proportional voting system for political parties is the simplest to administer, but will assure representation to every evil splinter party in a backward nation full of evil factions. This U.N.-designed system is particularly bad because Iraq needs a bicameral legislature and a separately elected president to set-up a political balance of power between its factions. They need it to partially satisfy AND LIMIT Shi’ite expectations for power while making power available to the badly outnumbered pro-liberty minorities found in the Kurdish territories and among Baghdad’s middle class. Worst of all, the new legislature will have the power to enact the basic law – the constitution – of Iraq. Pretending that this is a ‘one-time’ power will not work. Once a political body is explicitly given the power to define its own structure, the limits of its own power, and the source of its authority…it can do anything.

The more fundamental question in all this is, what ideas rule Iraq? How important is Islam to the Shiites? How important is it to the Sunnis? Is there a class distinction that will reduce the influence of Islam? Can the Kurds and semi-secular Iraqi middle class come out on top?

I do not have an answer to this question except to caution against absolute pessimism. The numbers are all on the side of Islam, but liberty is a powerful idea and all the other prizes of Western Civilization are a powerful lure.

I’ve been doing some reading lately on the military and cultural situation in Iraq. The following books give one a picture of the situation at the time they were written and within the limitations of the alternatively liberal and conservative writers who wrote them:

The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the First Marine Division

by Ray L. Smith and Bing West

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-h...6078109-6507968

The Fall of Baghdad

by John Lee Anderson

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-h...6078109-6507968

Baghdad without a Map

and other Misadventures in Arabia

by Tony Horwitz

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-h...6078109-6507968

I’d also refer people to three articles I wrote at the end of September on the situation in Iraq:

__________________________________________

TIA Daily September 27

Ayad Allawi’s War

by Jack Wakeland

Iyad Allawi's War What is Mr. Allawi's strategy to win the war? by Jack Wakeland America has invested most of its efforts in the war against Islamism in Iraq. On June 28, the American-controlled Coalition Provisional Authority turned over the government of Iraq to Iyad Allawi and his provisional cabinet. This was not a symbolic act. For the past two months, the Prime Minister of that troubled country has been in charge of the battle.

Mr. Allawi has become the third man on the Republican Party's presidential ticket. Last week Mr. Allawi addressed a joint session of Congress. As the leader of a nation in danger of slipping into full-scale civil war must, he put a brave face on his government's and the Bush Administration's accomplishments. In a gesture of genuine personal friendship, Mr. Allawi began and ended his appearance by kissing pro-war Democratic Senator Joe Lieberman, a Jew, on the cheek.

The effectiveness of the appearance can be measured in the depth of the opposition to it from the Democratic Party's leadership. A half-hour after the applause in the House Chambers subsided John Kerry broadcast a rebuttal. Former Clinton White House spokesman Joe Lockhart went further - and lower -- calling Mr. Allawi a puppet, "you can almost see the hand underneath the shirt today moving the lips." (http://tinyurl.com/59z93)

Mr. Allawi may have injured the Kerry campaign, but has he been effective in Iraq?

Islamists have taken over Falluja, Ramadi, and many of the towns and cities of Anbar Province, turning much of the Sunni Triangle into a 'no-go' zone for police patrols, truck traffic, construction contractors, Iraqi election officials, and international aid groups. Even parts of Baghdad's Sadr City slum are now closed to the outside world. The consequences of only partially answering the April uprisings are beginning to tell (http://tinyurl.com/6mwwg).

Prior to April 2003, the number of attacks on American troops was at a low level that reflected more on the anarchy of a post-war country than it did on the actions of enemy Islamists. The April-May uprisings were measured in a three or four fold increase in the number of attacks on American troops. And during the summer, the number of attacks on American troops did not abate. Only the press coverage of them did.

In August, Sadr's second uprising nearly doubled the level of attacks. And the second uprising is not over in Baghdad's giant Shi'ite slum. Increasingly, injuries to American soldiers are being caused by small arms fire from bands of militiamen who openly hold territory, rather than by explosive devices planted by tiny groups of rebels who are in hiding.

On the upside, the U.S. armed forces have learned a great deal about how to fight in the streets of Iraq's towns and cities. During this summer's clash in Najaf, American soldiers dismounted their armored fighting vehicles and methodically took ground from the enemy while killing him at rates similar to the 70:1 ratio seen during the invasion [CORRECTION: counting successful enemy ambushes and bomb attacks our kill ratio has been closer to 7:1 against the insurgents]. Every time Muslim militiamen have met the skill, technology, and focused determination of American troops, their will has been broken. The vast majority quit the field to melt back into the population.

However, the enemy militia has learned a little bit more about fighting, too. The small number of American fatalities is due as much to life saving measures as it is to superior experience, tactics, skill, and equipment. Evidence of this shift is the fact that while the number of American dead continues to tick upwards very slowly, the number of wounded has ballooned with over 1000 wounded in August alone. American body armor, the speed of medevac, and the quality of American field hospitals saved at least 300 American lives in August. These measures are particularly effective at dealing with rifle bullets - the bulk of the resistance the militias have to offer.

Wars are not won by tactics alone.

What is Mr. Allawi's strategy to win the war? He is still learning.

In answering Moqtada al-Sadr's challenge to the government, the Prime Minister made exactly the same mistakes as his American predecessors in the previous battle around Najaf. Rather than placing his bets on an innovative assault to preserve the Immam Ali Shrine, he attempted to negotiate with Sadr. After promising to disarm his militia, al-Sadr and hundreds of his militiamen used a cease-fire to escape to Sadr City, the Shi'ite slum of Baghdad.

It took the Prime Minister a couple of days to realize that he had been duped. But when he did, he immediately cut off negotiations for the disarmament of Sadr's militia inside Baghdad. Over the opposition of some members of the 275-man provisional parliament and some of his own cabinet ministers, the Prime Minister decided to return to a military solution for what is, after all, a military problem with Islamist militias.

Based on American military advice, Mr. Allawi's plan is cautious. As newly trained Iraqi occupation soldiers become available to hold it, American forces will progressively attack and re-take rebel-held ground. The United States has trained 50,000 Iraqi men as military and paramilitary troops, plans to train 90,000 more by January, and 100,000 more by the end of next year.

In his address to Congress, the Prime Minister touted the most recent successes of this strategy (http://tinyurl.com/4jn4q):

"In Samarra, the Iraqi government has tackled the insurgents who once controlled the city… Following weeks of discussions between government officials and representatives, coalition forces and local community leaders, regular access to the city has been restored. A new provincial council and governor have been selected, and a new chief of police has been appointed. Hundreds of insurgents have been pushed out of the city by local citizens, eager to get with their lives. Today in Samarra, Iraqi forces are patrolling the city, in close coordination with their coalition counterparts. In Talafa [ph], a city northwest of Baghdad, the Iraqi government has reversed an effort by insurgents to arrest; control [inaudible] the proper authorities. Iraqi forces put down the challenge and allowed local citizens to choose a new mayor and police chief. Thousands of civilians have returned to the city. The Iraqi government now commands almost 50,000 armed and combat-ready Iraqis. Our intelligence is getting better every day. You have seen that the successful resolution of the Najaf crisis, and then the targeted attacks against insurgents in Fallujah."

The greatest weakness in the Iraqi government's plan is in the number of regular army, or "National Guard," forces. Approximately 12,000 soldiers are slated to complete basic training by the end of October, but right now there are only 6000 in the field. Three of the six battalions of the force are deployed in Najaf. (http://tinyurl.com/4cdey)

Aside from weak training and woefully inadequate numbers, the biggest problem with the Iraqi paramilitary forces organized under U.S. occupation administrator Paul Bremer was a failure to properly vet their personnel. Many former Ba'athists and adherents to the Islamist cause were deployed among those loyal to American aims.

This error is not being repeated, but the problem continues on a small scale, nibbling away at the willingness of Iraqi soldiers to fight for their new government (http://tinyurl.com/49oy6).

It will take at least four months for the American training program to produce enough Iraqi National Guardsmen to support American combat operations in Sadr City, Ramadi, and Falluja. It may take even longer for the training program to produce enough soldiers and paramilitary police to occupy and hold the hostile cities like Ramadi and Falluja...and to recover from the defeats these forces are bound to suffer.* To make matters worse, parliamentary elections, scheduled to take place before January 31, will give factions sympathetic to the rebel cause more power in the new Iraqi government.

[*In November the insurgents suffered their biggest defeat to date in Falluja where over 600 were killed. But in December, escapees from the battle of Falluja have helped man a major counteroffensive that has slaughtered new policemen being trained for Ayad Allawi’s government by the busload and made travel hazardous down Baghdad’s airport road. American counter attacks in battalion strength were required to prevent them from completely taking over Mosul, Iraq’s third largest city.]

But in January, there will be [150,000] American military personnel and over [100,000] Iraq military and paramilitary personnel available to oppose insurgents that have grown in number from perhaps 5,000 active militiamen at the beginning of the year to 20,000 today.

The U.S. Army's textbook on guerilla warfare requires anti-insurgency force to have a 10:1 numerical superiority. But Iraq's Islamist militias often don't use guerilla tactics to multiply their effectiveness. When confronted, many of them stand and fight in conventional infantry combat for the purpose of being martyred while killing infidels. This suicidal practice hasn't stopped even though the American armed forces have been very effective at killing Islamists while robbing them of their objective. [This practice cost the insurgents dearly in Samarra in October and Falluja in November…but they have been avoiding that suicidal error in Mosul, Baghdad, and other parts of the country since.]

By resolutely following the textbook on anti-insurgency warfare Prime Minister Allawi can defeat the insurgents [even] without attacking their support networks in Iran and Syria. The question is, will Mr. Allawi and his soldiers be true to their purpose? Iraq's new occupation force has not yet been tested, so there is no answer. [The force has been tested and the answer is that they will fight if they are backed up by American forces…but NOT if they aren’t.]

Even though it is essential to our national security, we the American people will not be voting directly on the conduct of a war this November. Instead, we will be voting on whether or our nation will continue its strong support of Iraq's embryonic republic and its new army and police. We cannot vote for a more aggressive Iraqi strategy that doesn't depend entirely on its weakest link. What is up for a vote is whether or not, in Mr. Allawi's words, we will allow his enemies "to say to Iraqis, to Arabs, to Muslims, that we have only two models of governments, brutal dictatorship and religious extremism."

__________________________________________

TIA Daily September 28

Iyad Allawi's Civil Society

A weak, almost childish political culture that will die without American support

by Jack Wakeland

Iraq's Prime Minister, Iyad Allawi told a joint session of the U.S. Congress that the vast majority of the Iraqi people want "a democratic, prosperous, and stable nation, where differences are respected, human rights protected, and which lives in peace with itself and its neighbors." Is this true?

Polling data removes this question from the realm of speculation.

Since this winter, Iraqis have changed their opinion about the American occupation. In February only 17% of the population wanted us out immediately. Now it is 34%. The numbers from one polling group suggest that this shift may have occurred because the people, who wanted the U.S. armed forces to stay until a new government is established, now feel that it has been. However, in June, when Iraqis were asked why their opinion of the American military had fallen, 41% said it was because of the abuse of prisoners. Photos of Pvt. England humiliating naked prisoners were enough to sour their view of the entire American force.

The people are divided in their political priorities between wanting 'strong' leadership and wanting representative government, but support for the establishment of a republic is rising and stood at about 50% in June. This does not measure what I would expect would be the positive effects of the strong moral leadership of Iyad Allawi. The Republican Institute poll in June indicated that 2/3rds of the population thought that Mr. Allawi was 'effective.'

Religious candidates garner, in general, far more support than secular candidates, by a margin of 68% to 24%. But this does not indicate that 2/3rds of the Iraqi people want Iranian-style Islamic rule. The Republican Institute survey showed that Iraqis think that nearly all of their neighbors have had a malevolent influence on their country and the country that heads their list of bad neighbors is Iran.

The best indicator of all the polls is the open ended question of which country Iraq should model itself after. The winner, by a margin of over three-to-one, for the best model for Iraq was... the United Arab Emirates.

The U.A.E. is a kind of lazy-man's Singapore of the Persian Gulf. It is run by an oligarchy of entrenched playboy-princes (and their families). A 96% Muslim nation that is anti-Israel (like Iraq) and fund the murder of Jews throughout the world...but allows drinking and night life and celebrates high-stakes horse racing.... and it did not opposed U.S. military intervention in Iraq, in 1991 and 2003.

It is a nation of the idle wealthy, with a large welfare-maintenance 'middle class' who are educated and purposeless...but a nation that has opened its doors to foreign investment (including land ownership) that is becoming a tourist mecca on the shores of the Persian Gulf. Oil accounts for only half of its exports...but a society of people who don't work and live off of government disbursements of the nation's oil revenues, while a legion of ambitious South Asian guest workers struggle and labor at making everything in the society work.

Iraqis’ sense that they should be given a comfortable life from their nation's oil wealth is consistent with the strong sense of welfare entitlement they expressed in the survey answers. Three quarters of Iraqis think that the government, not the individual, is primarily responsible for economic welfare. Half want the new government to employ them in a gigantic public works program. And 3/4rs of them want reliable electricity.

These answers should be understood in the context of a population in which only 1/3 have high school diplomas, 8-9% have a college degree, and all but the top 5% are wretchedly and permanently poor.

The Iraqi people are an ambivalent and impressionable group. Theirs is a very weak, almost childish political culture typical of the Third World. In good hands, such a people can have good government and their culture can grow and mature. Their political institutions can become more stable.

No political structure can long protect the liberty of an ignorant people vested with an oil-emirate entitlement mentality. A future of stability and growth depends entirely on the quality of their political leadership. A good leader can convince the people of Iraq that their nation is worth fighting for - and thousands of them, wearing the uniform of a solider or a policeman, still have to die to establish a better government. Good economic contacts with the outside world - especially Iraq's now very close relationship with the United States - assures a strong economic future...if Iraq can become and remain a republic.

Prime Minister Iyad Allawi has a big job ahead of him. He has to be Iraq's Washington and Lincoln. His chances are good so long as he has the nearly invincible power the United States of America behind him

__________________________________________

TIA Daily September 28

Iraq Public Opinion Polls

Opinion surveys paint a portrait of the Iraqi people by Jack Wakeland Oxford Research International, Ltd. has performed four surveys of public opinion in Iraq over the past year (http://tinyurl.com/6exox). The International Republican Institute has performed one (http://tinyurl.com/4wkyj (a PowerPoint presentation)).

The data from both groups' polls are based on an economically and geographically representative sample of 2400 - 3000 people who responded (cooperation from Iraqis was very high, the refusal rates were only about 20%). The results of two Oxford Research International polls are as follows:

In the long term, Iraq needs to be governed by?

A strong leader: 36% (Feb. '04) 36% (June '04)

A democracy: 42% (Feb. '04) 50% (June '04)

Religious leaders: 10% (Feb. '04) 8% (June '04)

Which political leader do you support (the appointment of Iyad Allawi and his cabinet will have changed these responses):

Ibrahim Jaaferi: 19% (Feb. '04) 20% (June '04)

Massoud Barazani: 15% (Feb. '04) 15% (June '04)

Jalal Talabani: 14% (Feb. '04) 9% (June '04)

Saed Sistani: 11% (Feb. '04) 16% (June '04)

Adnan Pachachi: 9% (Feb. '04) 10% (June '04)

Sadam Hussein: 8% (Feb. '04) 1.5% (June '04)

Muqtada al Sadr: 1.5% (Feb. '04) 11% (June '04)

The BBC provides a thumbnail sketch of Iraq's politicians at http://tinyurl.com/4n8kl Mr. Jaaferi is head of the al-Dawa Party, the world's oldest Islamist Shi'ite political group (established in 1950) and one of Iyad Allawi's cabinet ministers. In August, Jaaferi defied his Prime Minister and demanded the immediate withdrawal of American forces from the battle with al-Sadr's militia in Najaf.

Mr. Barazani is leader of the long-standing Kurdistan Democratic Party and Mr. Talabani is head of the newer Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (established in 1975). Both were leaders of the Kurdish rebellion against Saddam Hussein and both have sought to join. Last spring, the two joined forces to advocate a federal system of government for Iraq for the stated reason that it would better protect the freedom of their people. During that campaign, a significant group of the leadership of both Kurdish political parties was killed in an Islamist bomb attack.

Mr. Sistani is the top spiritual leader (Grand Ayatollah) of Iraq's Shi'ite Muslims. He was born in Iran. Ali Sistani He welcomed the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, but his stand on the American presence in Iraq has been ambivalent since then.

Mr. Pachachi is a secular liberal, the former foreign minister of Iraq before his government was deposed by the Ba'ath Party in 1968.

This spring, Muqtada al-Sadr replaced Saddam Hussein as the face of the armed rebellion against the establishment of a constitutional republic.

Was it right for the US-led coalition to invade Iraq?

Right: 48% (Feb. '04) 41% (June '04)

Wrong: 39% (Feb '04) 59% (June '04)

U.S. Forces should: Leave

Now: 17% (Feb. '04) 34% (June '04)

Leave in < 6 or 12 months: 16% (Feb. '04) 14% (June '04)

Leave when Iraq is secure: 21% (Feb. '04) 12% (June '04)

Leave when a government is established: 40% (Feb. '04) 28% (June '04)

Not leave: 2% (Feb. '04) 2% (June '04)

Which country could serve as a model for Iraq?

United Arab Emirates: 21%

United States of America: 6.5%

Kuwait: 6.1%

Japan: 4.8%

Saudi Arabia: 3.6%

Iran: 2.6%

United Kingdom: 2.3%

France: 2.2%

Germany: 1.8%

Switzerland: 1.7%

Syria: 1.3%

The results of the Republican Institute poll, taken in June '04, are as follows:

Which kind of political candidate are you more likely to support?

Religious: 68%

Secular: 24%

Are you more or less likely to support a political party that has a militia?

Less likely: 45%

Don't Care: 30%

More likely: 7%

Who is responsible for economic welfare?

The government: 74%

The individual: 22%

Both polls indicate that about half the population thinks that the government should launch a gigantic public works program to create employment. The Republican Institute poll shows that 3/4rs of the people think that the number one thing the country needs for a better 'infrastructure' is reliable electric power.

Both polling groups found that 1/3 of the population had at least a high school education, 8-9% a college degree. The Oxford polls taken in Iraq show that 2/3rds of the population lives in households of 5 - 10 people.

In February 2003, median household income for 2/3rds of the population was between $0 - $150 per month. In June 2004, median household income for 2/3rds of the population was between $100 - $300 per month. The two numbers are incommensurate. The first is after Socialism and the second after the American introduction of free-market economics established real prices for labor, housing, food, etc.

The vast majority of Iraqis are wretchedly poor, both before and after the American invasion. The American occupation has brought renewed contact with the economy of the outside world. The biggest improvement is that it has, for most Iraqis, brought more control over life for the individual. But life in traditional, semi-pre-industrial society is tough. It is something that a civilized man _should_ have trouble relating to. The following webblog post from an Iraqi physician, "Ali," explains what the economic transition looked like on the ground:

"Last Friday my oldest uncle, along with his 16-year-old son, visited us, as he used to do this once every month. My uncle is a high school manager and a history teacher at the same time in the same school. I saw that he was wearing a nice suit that I haven't seen him wearing before. I said "Nice suit uncle. Is it new?" He said "Yes, I bought it about a month ago". "It must be expensive." I asked and he replied, "Yes it is, but your uncle now can afford it".

"Some of the readers may remember me saying something about my uncle. Before the war he was in the same job and he was paid about 15 thousands Iraqi Dinars that was equal to about 7 US$ a month. His wife, who is also a teacher, was paid a little less than that. He has 5 children; one in primary school, three in high school and a girl in college. Of course that salary couldn't help him support his family, yet he didn't quit. He always hoped that things would change for the better. In order to meet life requirements and offer his kids a proper education, he had to work after school. He worked in every kind of business; a taxi driver, a grocer and opened a small shop for a while, but things didn't go quite well.

"He had to sell his car first, then his 'extra' refrigerator then the only refrigerator then the TV and then and then. The last time we visited him, I had to hold my tears when I entered his house. There was virtually no furniture there, no chairs, no TV no tables, as they sold them all, but what shocked me more is that there were no inside doors. He had to sell those too. I mean his house was literally bare. His kids were ashamed of showing (themselves) because they had nothing proper to wear. It was amazing how he kept honest and didn't accept bribery from his rich students' families...

"Back to where I started, I asked my uncle: "How much do they pay you now? I've heard you get a raise" He answered "Yes I did, I get paid 550 thousands Dinars now" (that's about 400$ a month). "And what about aunt?" I asked, meaning his wife "She gets 450 thousands, as she has less years of service". I said "Good for you! What does it look like now, your life?" He said, "Uncle, (the word serves both sides) it's unbelievable. I've refurnished my house fully and I'm looking for a car, but I'm not in haste as I can't drive now and I want it for Ibrahim (his son) as soon as he can get a driving license". His sons and daughters were always very polite and never asked for anything, they were very understanding to their father's financial difficulties (the right word here should be EXTREEM poverty) they were smart and well educated and never asked for something their father couldn't afford.

"Back to the average income issue: Some readers may remember that I said my salary was about 17 US$ before the war. Shortly after the war it was raised to 120 US$. Three months after that, they made it 150 US$. Two months later it became 200$(although the truth should be said that they promised that it was going to be 250$) and when I went with one of my colleagues (who gets an exact payment) to receive his salary this month (I still haven't got paid for 6 months due to some bureaucratic problems that has just been solved), the accountant said to my friend "congratulations! You are getting a new raise starting from the next month and your salary will be around 300 US$!

"Now I know this is still a very low figure compared to what doctors get in other countries, but look at the pace of the raises; 120, 150, 200, 300 US$ all in one year! I mean it's spooky. What will it be the next year, 500 US$? And what about 3 or 4 years from now? A thousand or can I dare and say few thousand dollars? Will we get more than what the Syrian, Egyptian Iranian and even Saudi doctors!? What a disaster will it be to the mullahs of Iran, Bashar Al-Assad and the king of Saudi Arabia?

"Please, all those who care about the poor Iraqis and want to save them from the brutality of the American invaders and who want to prevent the Americans from stealing our fortune; meaning Bin laden, Zagrawi and their followers, Arab and Muslim tyrants, our good friend monsieur Dominique de Villepin, all the pacifist of the world, the major media, and in short, all those who hate America and obviously love Iraq: Get your s**t together and DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT or else one or two years from now Iraq will be a prosperous country, and then we will never forgive you for letting us down when we needed you!"

[MisterSwig]

The reason for my strategic optimism comes from the fundamental nature of America and the nature of our enemy.  Missing opportunities for major victories in the past two years does not alter the dramatic strategic advantage the America and Western Civilization hold over the Muslim World.

America is spreading out and winning across the globe ... In strategic terms, the Islamic enemy is fighting a purely defensive battle.  Except in a handful of hostile nations closed to the west (e.g., Syria and Iran), for the Islamists this conflict is a rearguard action against an enemy who already ‘occupies’ their culture.  The limited offensive warfare mindset in George Bush’s policies has been sufficient to put our Islamist foes on their heals ...

Jack Wakeland has written some very long posts in defense of his war view. However, I am still having trouble finding a clear, direct response to the important moral point that our soldiers' lives are more valuable than the lives of Iraqi civilians, and that our altruistic tactics in Iraq result in needless American casualties and work to embolden and strengthen the will of the enemy.

If I understand his position, Wakeland argues that the enemy has no chance of defeating us, and therefore we do not have sufficient cause to waste their cities with bombs in order to save some American soldiers' lives.

This evades the very moral principle at hand: that the lives of American soldiers are worth more than Iraqi civilians. One who accepts this principle should understand that even though the enemy is presently incapable of defeating us, they are still the enemy. They are still dangerously significant--significant enough to kill and wound tens of thousands of Americans and threaten many more. One should also understand that it is immoral to sacrifice our lives in order to spare civilians surrounding the enemy.

This is war. We face a hostile culture, which produces tens of thousands of lethal fanatics bent on our destruction. And these warriors are supported and shielded by tens of thousands more within the enemy population centers. This war is an emergency situation. Lives are in peril. And in war you do what needs to be done in order to achieve safety for yourself. You do not throw your life away for the comfort of people on the other side of the dividing line.

Another point: it simply does not matter that the enemy is weaker than we are. Their weakness should not be an excuse for us to hold back our muscle. They are in fact lethal. They have struck our homeland a mighty blow. They have killed and wounded thousands of our soldiers. They are strong enough to make us die and suffer and quake with fear. And they will continue their evil scheme until we stop being weak and force them to die or surrender.

Unlike Wakeland, I am not content with merely putting the enemy on their heels, especially when it means the lives of American soldiers. We must put them on their knees, or on their backs, six feet under.

[Yes]

In what way do you consider his philosophy to be inconsistent with Objectivism, and what is your evidence?

His response to Dr. Yaron Brook is all the evidence I need to support my opinion.

Also, please feel free to read Mr. Wakeland's most recent post No. 72, regarding his view of the current Iraq War/War on Terror.

Jack Wakeland wrote:

" The reason for my strategic optimism comes from the fundamental nature of America and the nature of our enemy. Missing opportunities for major victories in the past two years does not alter the dramatic strategic advantage the America and Western Civilization hold over the Muslim World."

He seems to be trivializing goals. Objectivists do not trivialize goals. Read any number of Ayn Rand's non-fiction works for a further explanation.

Jack Wakeland wrote:

"America is spreading out and winning across the globe (see http://tiadaily.blogspot.com/2004/11/empir...-happiness.html ). “Globalism” is Americanism"

This is a blatant tribute to collectivism. Objectivists do not advocate collectivism in any way.

Jack Wakeland wrote:

"Prime Minister Iyad Allawi has a big job ahead of him. He has to be Iraq's Washington and Lincoln. His chances are good so long as he has the nearly invincible power the United States of America behind him."

Here he advocates America as altruist. Objectivists do not advocate altruism.

In my opinion Mr. Wakeland has no profound claim to Objectivism. So the initital premise of this thread that one Objectivist is criticizing another is flawed at best, insulting to Objectivists at worst.

From my point of view, Mr. Wakeland is merely criticizing Dr. Brook's stand regarding the War on Terror from the point of view of an intelligent, informed individual- not an Objectivist.

[Yes]

Note also that I have responded to Mr. Wakeland's post at TIA, whichyou can read here.

It includes a challenge.

He has yet to respond to such challenge.