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Any O'ist writings on philosophy of language?

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Hal

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I was wondering if anyone could tell me whether there are any Objectivist writings that address issues within the philosophy of language. It's one area of philosophy that particularly interests me but I there wasnt much about it in OPAR, and Ayn Rand didn't list it under her subdivisions of philosophy, hence I'm assuming she didnt write anything on this topic?, If I'm correct, have any other Objectivist writers done so? (I couldnt find anything at the aynrandbookstore),

Im particularly interested in the Objectivist theory of names if there is such a thing, eg what do proper names (and names for universals) refer to. I think I remember Peikoff saying that concepts 'mean' the concrete they subsume, so are there any writings that develop this idea further, and address the standard problems associated with reference theories of meaning?

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Philosophy, as a universal science, is concerned with concepts and not language per se. Languages can differ from man to man but the conceptual faculty behind all languages is the same. Linguistics is the specialized science that studies languages and as such it is not a part of Objectivism.

The fundamental work in Objectivism in this regards is Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology.

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I wasnt talking about linguistics, I was talking about philosophy of language. Philosophy of language isnt linguistics in the same sense that philosophy of science isnt science, and philosophy of law isnt law; it's more to do with the study of 'meaning' than any particular language - for instance how do words 'mean' things, and so on.

I own Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, and that doesnt address what I was looking for; it's primarilly a work of epistemology.

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I own Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, and that doesnt address what I was looking for; it's primarilly a work of epistemology.

ItOE appropriately delimits the field of epistemology and epistemology covers everything that needs to be said by a philosophy with respect to languages. If you are looking for something more than what is covered in there then may I suggest Wittgenstein?

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ItOE appropriately delimits the field of epistemology and epistemology covers everything that needs to be said by a philosophy with respect to languages. If you are looking for something more than what is covered in there then may I suggest Wittgenstein?
I was more interested in an Objectivist perspective, I'm broadly familiar with the standard answers within academic philosophy and none particularly satisfy me. Some issues concerned with meaning appear to be bound up in Ayn Rand's theory of concepts, and there are quite a few unaddressed questions which I'd like to read a more extended answer to. For instance, Peikoff's claim that concepts mean the objects they refer to is something that would need to be developed further, and that would most likely involve an analysis of language to some degree (eg how can we understand a concept like 'pegasus' if it supposedly has no meaning?).
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Im particularly interested in the Objectivist theory of names if there is such a thing, eg what do proper names (and names for universals) refer to. I think I remember Peikoff saying that concepts 'mean' the concrete they subsume, so are there any writings that develop this idea further, and address the standard problems associated with reference theories of meaning?

AFAIK the answer is no, there are no Objectivist writings beyond what you see in ITOE and OPAR that deal with philosophy of language (that said, thank you for just posting a possible counterexample). As for your questions, proper names refer to the specific individual. The label which represents a concept or individual is of no intrinsic significance, but is strictly conventional, so "Sam Jones" refers to that specific individual simply because that is the convention. It may well be that there are two or more individuals with the name "Sam Jones", but that's a fact about the conventions, and not language itself, just as it's not significant that homophonous "led" and "lead" can refer to an action in the past or a soft metal.

The problem of universals on the other hand is mostly outside the realm of philosophy and is a scientific question. Rand has a bit to say about the issue, in addressing the nature of the concept, where she points out that "green or electric" is not a valid CCD. There are a number of points in her writing where she makes statements about man's cognitive nature -- this is one, and in Romantic Manifesto she has comments on music and Helmhotz's theorizing about the nature of human perception. The point is that the properly understood, the "problem of universals" has relatively little pure philosophical content and lots of scientific content, regarding cognition.

Regarding the question which you didn't ask about of the meaning of "unicorn", the term refers to an idea (just as "justice" or "capitalism" refer to ideas). We can sometimes point to concrete actions as cases of "justice", and while it remains an unknown ideal, we could also point to "capitalism" were we to encounter it. Then "unicorn" differs only from "capitalism" in a fairly minor way, that such an entity can't exist; and then "Pegasus" would be a specific imaginary individual (albeit not a unicorn). We understand "Pegasus" because the name represents a mental unit, not a mass-bearing unit. Thus Pegasus does exist, though not as a flying horse, anymore than John Galt exists as a breathing human.

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A brief follow-up on something I said earlier, about Ray's dissertation. After starting to read it, not very many lines into it, I found the following assertion: "After all, the sentence, 'Persons can change bodies' is not self-contradictory." An Objectivist wouldn't make such a claim, since it either means nothing, or is false. So while it might constitute yet another piece of philosophy of language, I would be stunned if the case could be hade that the author is practicing Objectivism. It sort of struck me as being like a Derridist deconstruction of Objectivism, though that might be simply because I found it pointlessly incomprehensible. And perhaps it picks up later,so I don't want to totally prejudice the curious.

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I own Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, and that doesnt address what I was looking for; it's primarilly a work of epistemology.

Then you have not read that work very carefully. You say "Im particularly interested in the Objectivist theory of names if there is such a thing, eg what do proper names (and names for universals) refer to." Did you miss Miss Rand's entire discussion on concept formation?

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I've found a dissertation which was apparently written by an Objectivist as a PhD dissertation,

The author is not an Objectivist, at least as far as actual Objectivists are concerned. But, perhaps you will find more in line with your philosophical interests and perspectives, especially considering your views on consciousness and physical reality, through the group that she is associated with. I think you will find the TOC to be much more tolerant of your views.

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  • 2 weeks later...
AFAIK the answer is no, there are no Objectivist writings beyond what you see in ITOE and OPAR that deal with philosophy of language (that said, thank you for just posting a possible counterexample). As for your questions, proper names refer to the specific individual. The label which represents a concept or individual is of no intrinsic significance, but is strictly conventional, so "Sam Jones" refers to that specific individual simply because that is the convention.
How about in the cases where the named object doesnt exist, or isnt known to exist? To take an example, when I say 'Homer wrote the Iliad', it would be problematic to say that the name 'Homer' here refers to a person, since (as far as I know) it's debateable question whether such a person even existed. If referring is taken to be a direct relation between a word and an object, then difficulties arise when no such object exists.

The problem of universals on the other hand is mostly outside the realm of philosophy and is a scientific question.

The point is that the properly understood, the "problem of universals" has relatively little pure philosophical content and lots of scientific content, regarding cognition.

I'm not sure what you mean, could you clarify? The issue of universals doesn't seem to have anything to do with human cognition - the question is one of metaphysics rather than epistemology or science... Perhaps a theory of cognition would explain how humans gain knowledge of universal concepts (along the lines of IOE), but this is an entirely different issue.

Regarding the question which you didn't ask about of the meaning of "unicorn", the term refers to an idea (just as "justice" or "capitalism" refer to ideas). We can sometimes point to concrete actions as cases of "justice", and while it remains an unknown ideal, we could also point to "capitalism" were we to encounter it. Then "unicorn" differs only from "capitalism" in a fairly minor way, that such an entity can't exist; and then "Pegasus" would be a specific imaginary individual (albeit not a unicorn). We understand "Pegasus" because the name represents a mental unit, not a mass-bearing unit. Thus Pegasus does exist, though not as a flying horse, anymore than John Galt exists as a breathing human.

Would 'horse' also refer to an idea (well, concept)? The word 'horse' refers to the concept of horse, which in turn refers to all the horses that will ever exist?
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Hal,

I know that you said that you have read Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology but it is apparent that you have not grasped the material.

I'm sure that David can competently answer your questions but you keep asking things that would be dissolved by a complete study of ITOE. Relatively stated, ITOE is a short work. Do not let this deceive you, for there is more content in that book than there is in entire volumes written by other philosophers.

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How about in the cases where the named object doesnt exist, or isnt known to exist? To take an example, when I say 'Homer wrote the Iliad', it would be problematic to say that the name 'Homer' here refers to a person, since (as far as I know) it's debateable question whether such a person even existed. If referring is taken to be a direct relation between a word and an object, then difficulties arise when no such object exists.

Somebody did write the Illiad, so the name Homer does refer to a person. The fact that proper name of the person who actually originated the story may not be Homer does not change the fact that Homer was a person.

Would 'horse' also refer to an idea (well, concept)? The word 'horse' refers to the concept of horse, which in turn refers to all the horses that will ever exist?

Yes, horse also refers to an idea when used in the context of all the horses that exist in the past/present/future. As well as an idea, this concept can also be directly attributed to a concrete entity.

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For instance, Peikoff's claim that concepts mean the objects they refer to is something that would need to be developed further, and that would most likely involve an analysis of language to some degree (eg how can we understand a concept like 'pegasus' if it supposedly has no meaning?).

Is that the only sentence that you read? The meaning of a concept is that to which it refers. I wouldn't know what else you'd need to understand that point. A "computer monitor" as a concept means the thing that you are looking at right now. That is what that sentence means, and it is not the theory, that is a summary.

"Pegasus" is not a concept, it is a mythological horse, and it is a constellation, it is a proper name. Are you sure you understand the difference between a concept and a proper name? Your question surely suggests that you do not.

I'm not sure what you mean, could you clarify? The issue of universals doesn't seem to have anything to do with human cognition - the question is one of metaphysics rather than epistemology or science... Perhaps a theory of cognition would explain how humans gain knowledge of universal concepts (along the lines of IOE), but this is an entirely different issue.
Now you are demostrating that you do not understand the concepts of metaphysics and epistemology. The problem of universals is epistemology; it is the core, the crucial, number one issue of the science. It has been so since Plato and Aristotle on through to this very day.

So, I'll have to say that not only have you not read ITOE (or completely did not grasp it), you do not know any modern theories on the subject because you do not even know what the particular sciences objects of study are.

The issue of universals doesn't seem to have anything to do with human cognition

Wow! That is a mind blower dude. You get my Most Ignorant Statement of the Year award. Holy cripes! I just busted a brain artery.

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Is that the only sentence that you read? The meaning of a concept is that to which it refers. I wouldn't know what else you'd need to understand that point.

A "computer monitor" as a concept means the thing that you are looking at right now. That is what that sentence means, and it is not the theory, that is a summary

Peikoff said something along the lines of "a word means a concept and nothing else. A concept means that which it refers to, and nothing else" (IOE - The Analytic/Synthetic dichotomy). Elsewhere in IOE, Rand states that a concept with no referents is invalid. This seems to conflict with the fact that I am perfectly able to understand sentences containing concepts which have no referents, such as 'unicorn' and 'characters in Atlas Shrugged'.

"Pegasus" is not a concept, it is a mythological horse, and it is a constellation, it is a proper name. Are you sure you understand the difference between a concept and a proper name? Your question surely suggests that you do not.
My fault, bad example. I was using the word pegasus as a concept, not a proper name ('winged horses' in general, rather than 'the particular winged horse in greek mythology' ). I realise this is misleading - I should have used unicorn instead, I wasnt thinking properly.

Now you are demostrating that you do not understand the concepts of metaphysics and epistemology. The problem of universals is epistemology; it is the core, the crucial, number one issue of the science. It has been so since Plato and Aristotle on through to this very day.

So, I'll have to say that not only have you not read ITOE (or completely did not grasp it), you do not know any modern theories on the subject because you do not even know what the particular sciences objects

I would be interested what 'modern theories' you think treat the problem of universals as one of epistemology. The standard problem of universals, namely "Do they exist?", is quite clearly a metaphysical question since it pertains to what exists in reality, rather than to any question of our knowledge. Once this question has been answered, there is a second question, namely "How do we derive knowledge of universals?" which is epistemologica in nature. Realists answer 'yes' to the former question while nominalists answer 'no', and then both schools try to account for our universal concepts (eg 18th century nominalists believed our knowledge of universals constituted singular pictures, which somehow managed to 'stand for' every object of their type). From my reading of IOE, Rand gives no answer to the first question (the correct approach in my opinion, since it's poorly formed), and puts forward a theory that explains how we derive our notion of universal concepts.

Plato's idea that universal forms exist in a supra-sensible reality for instance is quite clearly a metaphysical statement, as is Aristotle's belief than essences dwell 'inside' particulars (I realise this is a simplification). On the other hand, Plato's idea that we acquire knowledge of these universals through some kind of supernatural philosophical disclosure would be an epistemological claim.

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Somebody did write the Illiad, so the name Homer does refer to a person.  The fact that proper name of the person who actually originated the story may not be Homer does not change the fact that Homer was a person.
It seems strange, to say the least, that I can quite sensibly use a name and understand other people using the name, without actually knowing who it refers to. In fact, it's entirely possible that Homer wasn't a person, in the sense that Homer has historically been thought to be the person who wrote both the Iliad and the Odysses, whereas modern scholarship suggests that it is likely that these works were written by different people.
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I would be interested what 'modern theories' you think treat the problem of universals as one of epistemology.

That's exactly the point. One of the most distinctive aspects of Objectivism is its answer to the "problem of universals." That answer is given in ITOE, remember, that book that you read so carefully?

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I've found a dissertation which was apparently written by an Objectivist as a PhD dissertation, and it seems quite interesting. That's the kind of thing I was looking for anyway.

Small world. I took classes from the profs listed on this dissertation. Karen Hanson was modern philosophy overview, I think (i.e. Hume through... Sartre?) and I think Paul Spade was my logic prof. I'd hate to think of defending an Objectivist thesis in that department...

The short answer to your question is that you probably will not find such a thing as an Objectivist philosophy of language. Objectivism does not ascribe the same power to language per se (as opposed to conceptual thought) that contemporary philosophy does. It holds that language does not have any epistemological relevance, i.e. language does not determine how or what we know; it is a set of symbols for conveying conceptual information, after those concepts have been formed.

I don't own a copy of ITOE right now, so I can't give you the exact page, but it does refer to Wittgenstein, and I believe the Objectivist opinion of philosophy of language since Wittgenstein would be exactly the same. Not favorable. I'm sure that eventually there will be more discussion of language from an Objectivist standpoint, once more academics become acquainted with Objectivism, but I think it will always take a back seat to epistemology.

Since Objectivism regards concepts as universals, you will find its answer to this problem in the parts of the book devoted to concept-formation.

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Elsewhere in IOE, Rand states that a concept with no referents is invalid. This seems to conflict with the fact that I am perfectly able to understand sentences containing concepts which have no referents, such as 'unicorn' and 'characters in Atlas Shrugged'.

There's no conflict (even with "unicorns" as you mention later), because they do have referents. They refer to imaginary things. Mental things exist, and can be referents, just like physical objects.

The standard problem of universals, namely "Do they exist?", is quite clearly a metaphysical question since it pertains to what exists in reality

It's not clearly a metaphysical question. Objectivism's solution is that universals are actually concepts. They do pertain to what exists, however, because concepts are a grasp of what exists. It's only because most epistemologies are so contrary to realism that this seems so improbable.

Once this question has been answered, there is a second question, namely "How do we derive knowledge of universals?"  [some text removed]  From my reading of IOE, Rand gives no answer to the first question (the correct approach in my opinion, since it's poorly formed), and puts forward a theory that explains how we derive our notion of universal concepts.

Rand does give answers, but this confirms the prevailing opinion in this thread that you haven't fully grapsed the content presented in ITOE. I recommend re-reading the part on concept-formation in particular, because your questions are in fact answered there. Leonard Peikoff's discussion of this in "Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand" is good too.

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I would be interested what 'modern theories' you think treat the problem of universals as one of epistemology. The standard problem of universals, namely "Do they exist?", is quite clearly a metaphysical question since it pertains to what exists in reality, rather than to any question of our knowledge.

Bowzer already answered your first question.

Your designation of the problem of universals as a metaphysical question here assumes in that very statement a Platonic notion of universals as such.

Also, the standard problem of universals is not, "Do they exist?". But, rather, what is their relationship to that which exists? To what do they refer? Do they refer to something "out there" or are they merely constructs within our own mind? It is simple not metaphysics.

Do you have ITOE? This issue is cleared up in the second paragraph of the Foward.

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Hal, a character in a book does not exist within the fiction?

I'm not sure what you mean by 'exist within the fiction', can you clarify? A fictional book might present a description of a character, which may cause the readers to form an idea of said character. But the character itself does not exist. An idea of a thing is not the thing.
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There's no conflict (even with "unicorns" as you mention later), because they do have referents. They refer to imaginary things. Mental things exist, and can be referents, just like physical objects.
Again, mental representations of things are not the things themselves. The idea of unicorns does not have horns, nor does the idea of Santa Claus bring presents to children on Christmas day. When I say "all horses have 4 legs" I am not talking about the idea of horses, I am talking about horses themselves. When I say 'unicorns have horns', this sentence is identical in form to the preceding one, and deserves to be treated in the same way.

Consider the statement "unicorns do not exist". What does the phrase 'unicorns' in this sentence refer to? If it refers to the idea of unicorns then the statement is false - the idea of unicorns certainly does exist (I have it in my mind). If it refers to unicorns themselves then you will need to explain how a term can refer to something that does not exist.

It's not clearly a metaphysical question. Objectivism's solution is that universals are actually concepts.
Universals are universals. Concepts of universals are concepts of universals - again, you're confusing the idea of a thing with the thing itself. In order to form the concept of 'red', I must first encounter red things. The concept that I form is a concept of a universal. The red things themselves are universals. Rand's theory explains how we form these concepts - it does not explain what the things itself actually are or whether they exist.

A tree exists whether or not I experience it. If all humans died tomorrow, trees would still exist. If all humans died tomorrow, would 'redness' still exist? By redness I do not mean the lightwaves which are assumed to produce the experience of 'red' in the human subject - I mean redness itself. This, essentially, is the problem of universals. Where, specifically in IOE, (and I would like a page cite, rather than being told I "have not read the work"), does Rand answer this question and give arguments for her answer.

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