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How would you define potentiality?

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AshRyan

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In my Ancient Greek Philosophy class this week, we have been discussing Aristotle's distinction between potentiality and actuality. An acorn is not an actual oak tree, but it has the potential to become an oak tree--but it does not have the potential to become an apple tree. A human child has the potential to become many different things--a doctor, a painter, a factory worker, etc., etc.--but not all of these things, and he does not have the potential to become, say, a toaster or a cow.

My question is this: is it fair to say that potentiality is essentially a negative concept, which just means something along the lines of, "that which does not contradict the nature of the entity in question"? That is, does saying that an acorn has the potential to become on oak tree but not an apple tree simply mean that it would not contradict the nature of an acorn to become an oak tree, but it would contradict the nature of an acorn to become an apple tree? Or can potentiality be defined positively? How would you define potentiality?

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Perhaps potentiality is a combination of identity and causality - things are what they are and behave according to their nature - A is A & A acts like A - a combination of the present principle and the future one.

The potentiality of an acorn to become an oak tree is, it is an acorn and it is an acorn's nature to become an oak tree. The potential of a human child is not to become a toaster or a cow because such is the child's nature to become an adult human.

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The Greek dunamis has been variously translated as potentiality, capacity, faculty, and potency. It can also mean power, might, strength, and ability. I believe Aristotle thinks of it as a positive, not as a negative. Writes Joe Sachs, a tutor at my college, "A potency in its proper sense will always emerge into activity, when the proper conditions are present and nothing prevents it," and, "The word has a secondary sense of mere logical possiblity, applying to whatever admits of being true, but this is never the way Aristotle uses it."

Aristotle defines potency in the Metaphysics 1020a6: "Therefore the authoritative definition of the primary kind of potency would be a source of change in something else, or as something else." He calls it a source, an arche. Thus, he considers it something that is there, not just something that is logically possible.

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Yes, I'm aware of the Greek word and the other possibilities for its translation. I agree with you that when translated as "power" or "potency," it definitely has a positive meaning (and I agree with you that this is probably what Aristotle meant).

What I'm curious about is the proper way to conceptualize the more common use today of the word "potentiality" specifically. I thought along the lines that y_feldblum did, but I don't think that really works because there's no guarantee of what will actually become of the entity in the future. That's why I started thinking along the lines of its being a negative concept.

Although the more I think about the explanation you offered using "potency" as a translation, the more sense that seems to make for "potentiality" as well. (And the reason that there are so many possibilities potentially open to human beings is because of our creative power that results from our faculty of reason.) Do you think that there is a difference between these terms in this context? (Obviously "potency" can mean other things in different contexts, but I'm unsure now of whether there's any distinction between the two terms used in this context.)

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What I'm curious about is the proper way to conceptualize the more common use today of the word "potentiality" specifically.
Using potentiality as a negative concept seems to be the same as using the concept of "metaphysical possibility". And I do think possible/impossible are the more commonly used words for such a thing. I think Aristotle's positive concept of potency is a wonderful concept.

Although the more I think about the explanation you offered using "potency" as a translation, the more sense that seems to make for "potentiality" as well.  (And the reason that there are so many possibilities potentially open to human beings is because of our creative power that results from our faculty of reason.)  Do you think that there is a difference between these terms in this context?

Potentiality can carry the same meaning as potency, I think, but fails to convey that the dunamis is something in the material, rather than just something the material will do. Potency emphasizes the reason that something is potential, which is the identity of the object.

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Thanks for your comments, Daniel. Greg Salmieri also addressed this post via email, and he offered the following formulation which I found helpful (and which he said I could post here): "I would say, in our present context, it identifies causal powers but from a certain perspective, viz. as differentiated from the results of their exercise."

He also recommended Dr. Gotthelf's article "Aristotle's Conception of Final Causality" in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology for a brief explanation of how Aristotle's distinction between two different types of potentials (active and passive) figure into his view of causation.

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Thanks. I'll check "Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology" out from the library tomorrow.

I'm currently doing a lot of work with Aristotle's On the Soul, by the way. He seems to me much closer to Objectivism than he is generally said to be (everyone loves to focus on his deathless active intellect, so many other important points are forgotten); I'll let you know what I come up with.

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I'm currently doing a lot of work with Aristotle's On the Soul, by the way. He seems to me much closer to Objectivism than he is generally said to be (everyone loves to focus on his deathless active intellect, so many other important points are forgotten); I'll let you know what I come up with.

I'm reading through the Metaphysics right now. I'm planning on doing On the Soul next, so I would definitely be interested in hearing what you come up with. My general impression has also been that he is closer to Objectivism than is often acknowledged.

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I'm reading On the Soul too, and I have the opposite impression, so I would be interested in hearing both of your takes.

Hmm. I'll post tons of stuff when I have it, but for now I thought I'd direct you to one part of On the Soul in particular: about 425b25 through 426a25. This seemed to capture the essence of the objectivity of perception. I found the following quote especially interesting:

"[The earlier thinkers] supposed that there is neither white nor black without seeing, nor flavor without tasting. In one way what they said was right, but in another way it was not right, since the sense and the thing perceived are meant in two ways, either as in potency or as at work, and in the latter meaning what they said applies, but in the former meaning it does not apply."

In other words, the color actually exists only in the relationship between perceiver and perceived. But the potential for color is there even apart from consciousness. This seems both in line with Objectivism and a clever application of dunamis/entelecheia.

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Actually, I agree with that entirely. I find it striking how physically and metaphysically accurate Aristotle's account of perception in book 2 is. Touch is a bit dubious, but all in all I think he's got it right, especially the part about the mediums of perception.

But in book 3 he starts talking about the "common sense"--what we could call the perceptual level--which is the more important account of perception... and, from what I can tell, it all starts to fall apart. Suddenly perception seems to rely on phantasia, which isn't perception at all but cognition. It seems like the account of the senses given in book 2 is pushed to the wayside.

It's all very confusing.

(I'm not at all confident in my understanding of this book, and would love to be talked out of this.)

EDIT: Also, I'd be eager to know of any worthwhile secondary sources on De Anima. All I've looked at so far is Aquinas's commentary.

EDIT: Now that I'm actually looking at the passage that you pointed me to, I realize that it's in book 3, not book 2. I still think it better goes with the discussion in book 2, since he's talking about sensations again. But I'll have to look more carefully at why that passage shows up there.

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But in book 3 he starts talking about the "common sense"--what we could call the perceptual level--which is the more important account of perception... and, from what I can tell, it all starts to fall apart. Suddenly perception seems to rely on phantasia, which isn't perception at all but cognition. It seems like the account of the senses given in book 2 is pushed to the wayside.
I think you might be misunderstanding Aristotle, but I'm not sure. I'll share the paper I'm working on when I'm done, as well as the results of an oral exam/discussion I'll be having soon. I will probably do one of them on perception and one on the intellect.

EDIT: Also, I'd be eager to know of any worthwhile secondary sources on De Anima. All I've looked at so far is Aquinas's commentary.

I was just browsing through the library here the other day and found a few books that look interesting:

Two Greek Aristotelian Commentators on the Intellect (Schroeder and Todd)

Aristotle on Perception (Everson)

The Psychology of Aristotle (Brentano, this one is good)

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A warning in advance though: be pretty skeptical of some of the interpretations in there. I could be wrong about this, but as I recall, there was a commentary section in there which had some good background info that might help you discern the good parts from bad.

There's also a collection of essays, edited (I think) by Martha Nussbaum, on De Anima. I haven't looked through this in much detail, but I've heard some good things about it. If you're looking for overall commentary, though, the stuff that's already been mentioned is probably best; this book probably focuses on problems in understanding very particular aspects of the text.

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By the way, I don't think it's correct to equate the common sense (?) with the perceptual level. What Aristotle means by common sensibles is those characteristics which are perceivable by means of more than one sense. So, for example, shape is a common sensible because we can perceive it by means of both sight and touch; color is not, because we can only perceive color with our eyes.

I don't think Aristotle really had a significant theory of sensations as against perceptions. Feel free to correct me though... it's been a while since I read De Anima, and I was focusing mostly on other parts of it.

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to respond to your question about potentiality, you could understand it in a trivial sense like that, because you are assuming that potentiality is part of the definition of an acorn. In fact, this is why you chose the acorn as an example, because its definition is an underdeveloped form of oak tree- its a temporal distinction. I have a good thought. Can you define an object that does not have this property? or, that has no potential? The object couldn't exist in time, or else I could just say that it has the potential to be itself at a later point in time. I could say that the object has the property that when it ages it automatically disappears, but then it would have the potential to disappear. So, potentiality is merely existence-in-time. If you use the concept to mean potentiality-for, as in potentiality to become an oak tree, or potential to fall, then you mean that for an object is that in time a value, caused by the object, can exist. In this sense its positive because it essentially adds a temporal dimension to an object. Its only negative if you assume the concept in your definition of an object.

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Coming into the discussion a little late here but I had to dive in at some point anyway. I used the argument of Aristotle's potentiality to argue the case for abortion, in that a foetus is not a human being but has the only potential to become one. A foetus is in itself essentially then only a foetus, at the point of birth it becomes a human being and therefore aborting a foetus cannot be judged on the same grounds as murder of a human being.

But was I right in this judgement, I wonder.

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I used the argument of Aristotle's potentiality to argue the case for abortion, in that a foetus is not a human being but has the only potential to become one.  A foetus is in itself essentially then only a foetus, at the point of birth it becomes a human being and therefore aborting a foetus cannot be judged on the same grounds as murder of a human being.

But was I right in this judgement, I wonder.

Forum members, since it's almost Thanksgiving I'd like to express my thanks for the stimulation this site gives me to think. Second I'd like to express my thanks for bearing with a newbie, and one without formal philosophy training at that.

sanchopanza,

My personal opinion is that any other statement would be incorrect. I attribute this thought to the distinction between a policeman's "murder" of a criminal caught in the act of a heinous crime with that of say the World Trade Center terrorist attack. However, I am not sufficiently advanced in my thinking to try to make an absolute judgment about when it becomes morally correct to commit a "murder".

Back on topic: Along the lines of me being a newb, it seems to me that potentiality is always positive - although the individual result might be horrendous, i.e., potential to become a mass murderer. That an acorn cannot become an apple tree seems to be a simple statement as to the nature of an entity even though the sentence contains a negative term. Can someone enlighten me?

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I would argue that potentiality is always neutral or amoral. Potentiality in itself is nothing, it is something that is not one thing or the other, the actuality is positive or negative. This idea of potentiality vs. actuality goes along the same lines as concept vs. reality. The concept is amoral, only the reality is moral or immoral, positive or negative.

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